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Abstract
This doctoral thesis studies three phenomena in the labour market which occurred during the period
known as the ‘Peruvian Growth Miracle’. From 2005 and until the economic crisis induced by the Covid
pandemic, it was characterized by exceptional macroeconomic growth and increased employment and real
wages, well above the Latin American average. The first paper decomposes wage differences between
Peruvian men and women into parts attributable to differences in labour market attributes and differences
in wage structures that women experience in the labour market. Specifically, it studies the evolution across
the entire pay distribution of the component associated with gender discrimination experienced by female
workers. The effect of those in the informal sector, who are the most affected by this treatment effect, is
a central part of the research. The main finding is the presence and the prevalence of ‘sticky floors’, i.e.
the confinement of women in low paid jobs, in the informal sector during this period. As important as this,
these gaps are primarily explained by the lower reward for their observed characteristics that women obtain
in the Peruvian labour market across the wages distribution.
The second and third papers study the labour market impacts of the Venezuelan Exodus, a massive im-
migration inflow which, according to UNHCR, constituted a forced migratory movement of similar relative
magnitude to the Syrian case. The first of these papers studies the impact of this exogenous shock on differ-
ent labour market outcomes for the natives for both the formal and the informal sector. We use a set of novel
econometric techniques that pay attention to aspects of the consistency and inference of the treatment effect
estimators, whose discussion remained neglected in most of the literature. Since most of the competition
with the natives occurs in low-skilled jobs, a particular emphasis is placed on the effect at the bottom of the
skills distribution in the host labour market. On average, the Exodus did not have a statistically significant
effect on the outcomes studied. Nevertheless, there is a non-negligible adverse effect for those low-skilled
native workers in the urban area more exposed to Venezuelan immigration.
The final chapter focuses on the Venezuelan migrant population. In particular, it investigates how dis-
crimination experienced by these migrants at the hands of Peruvian employees impacts their wages, and
the effect that wage inequities have on their perception of workplace discrimination. The study reveals the
existence of migrant pay gaps across the wages distribution, and these are more pronounced when we take
a more objective measure of discrimination. Most of these gaps are explained by a treatment effect that
affects Venezuelan workers based on their nationality, as these have a higher education level than Peruvians
and a comparable work experience. The magnitude of this wage-structure effect affects their perception
of workplace discrimination. Nonetheless, variables that reflect migrants’ expectations for equality (e.g.,
education and experience) have a more sizeable effect.
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General introduction
Since the turn of the new millennium, the South-American economy of Peru has performed extraordinarily
well in terms of macroeconomic growth. In particular, the period between 2001 and 2019 has been the only
time since the beginning of the 20th century that the country experienced uninterrupted GDP per capita
growth for more than one decade (see Maddison 2007; World Bank 2021a). Moreover, Peru was one of the
few countries that successfully endured the global economic crisis of 2008-09 – the Great Recession. Even
though the same period has also been favourable for other Latin American countries, their comparative
macroeconomic performance is poor compared to that of Peru (Mendoza 2013). Peru’s per capita GDP
growth, averaging 4% per year, was more than twice that of the other economies in the region (which
averaged 1.4% per year). Over the same time, Peru’s annual inflation rate (less than 3%) was consistently
the lowest in the region (which averaged 6.8%) per year. Some (e.g. Ross and Peschiera 2015) labelled this
exceptional development as the ’Peruvian Growth Miracle’.
This episode started after a decade of recession, hyperinflation and significant deficits in the balance of
payments during the 1980s. An essential characteristic of the structural reforms put in place to revert this
crisis was a unilaterally substantial trade openness based on primary commodity exports (see Dancourt 1999
for further discussion). The positive terms-of-trade shocks during the 1990s and the favourable external
financing conditions played an important role in stabilizing the economy in the subsequent years (Santos and
Werner 2015). Nonetheless, the lack of policies for productive diversification aimed at shifting the export
basket towards alternative sectors with high value-added, made Peru’s growth strategy strongly dependent
on the exports of raw minerals and fuels (IMF 2014; United Nations 2019). Throughout the last two
decades, the mineral sector has accounted for around 60% of Peru’s exports and little more than 10% of
the country’s tax revenues. Such an economic structure, with undiversified exports and imports mainly
comprised of capital goods, is highly vulnerable to fluctuations in terms of trade (Mendoza 2013). More
importantly, the weak backward economic linkages inherent in Peru’s mining activity, and its low labour
intensity relative to countries with similar income levels (Hausmann and Klinger 2008), concentrated its
growth benefits within relatively few segments of the population (Gonzales de Olarte 2015; Seminario
2015).
A direct consequence of this growth strategy is the consolidation of a duality in Peru’s labour market,
with a modern formal sector co-existing with a large low-productive informal sector. This latter sector plays
a crucial role in this thesis given its large size compared other economies at similar stages of economic de-
velopment. More specifically, Peru’s informality rate, at 70%, is one of the highest in South America (ILO
2018b). In fact, while the above-mentioned structural reforms focused on improving macroeconomic indic-
ators, they led to a reduction in the proportion of informal workers within the overall economy (Hausmann
and Klinger 2008). Nevertheless, the timid attempts of Peru’s government to promote formalization in the
last years have not been entirely successful (ILO 2014). In addition to the implication that the informal
sector represents a loss in tax revenues (Vtyurina 2015), jobs in this sector are precarious, lack access to
social benefits and result in pay rates often well below the minimum legal wage. This aspect makes its pre-
valence troublesome from a policy perspective, as workers in this sector are more vulnerable to poverty and
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occupational risks (OECD and ILO 2019). Notably, the role of women in its labour market deserves special
attention. Compared to countries in Latin America Peru has the highest proportion of women participating
in the labour market, which is consistently over 65% (ILO 2018a). Furthermore, along with Mexico, Peru
exhibits the widest difference in the proportion of women engaged in the informal sector relative to males
(eight percentage points, see ILO 2018b).
The informal labour market has not been the main employment sector for only the Peruvian female
workers. It has also been the sector where the vast majority of the approximately 800,000 Venezuelans
who suddenly arrived in Peru in 2016 found a job. This exogenous inflow of foreign workers occurred as a
consequence of the Venezuelan Exodus, the biggest migration in Latin America’s recent history, second only
to the Syrian immigration (UNHCR 2019a), and culminated in the progressive collapse of the economic and
social conditions in that neighbouring country (Restuccia 2019; Reinhart and Santos 2015). The relevance
of this labour supply shock cannot be understated. Previous to this Exodus, Peru had one of the lowest
stocks of immigrant workers, comprising less than 0.3% of its population (World Bank 2021b). Hence, an
influx equivalent to 2.5% of its population (UNHCR 2020) constitutes an unprecedented event whose effects
have had repercussions across different sectors of the economy, such as the housing market, and on internal
demand. Nonetheless, importantly for this thesis, is the effect of this Exodus on labour market outcomes
of the natives. This Exodus is also unique given the close cultural ties between migrants and natives.
However, most Peruvians have been reluctant to welcome new Venezuelans. Indeed, their attitude has been
characterized by distrust toward the migrants (Blouin et al. 2019; PUCP 2020), which is comparable to what
occurs in countries with a sizeable cultural distance between migrants and natives (Dancygier and Laitin
2014). Most of the literature examining the impact of discrimination on migrant wages has been centred
around the migration of culturally distant individuals to countries with high levels of average incomes (e.g.,
Germany, the United Kingdom). In contrast, it is much rarer to study immigration between countries within
the same region where language and culture are shared.
This thesis investigates different aspects of these developments over the last two decades in Peru ex-
ploiting a novel set of methodological econometric approaches. Surprisingly, these procedures have been
under-analysed in the literature. The first paper examines what part of the gender wage gap is attributed to
the differential treatment that females obtain in the labour market. Admittedly, this is not the only paper
that provides evidence on gender wage differentials for Peru. However, this chapter advances the previous
evidence by decomposing these differentials across the wage distribution to provide deeper policy insights.
For instance, the method applied allows to assess the male wage advantages at the bottom of the payment
distribution in the informal labour market, and what part of this differential is explained by a wage-structure
effect. A large part of this literature has associated this wage-structure component of the gap with labour
market discrimination. By studying the yearly changes of this quantile treatment effect, it evaluates if the
growth induced by the ’Peruvian Miracle’ translated into similar wage increases between men and women,
and if it induced more competitive market structures eventuating in a reduction in the degree of female
discrimination.
The second chapter exploits a quasi-experimental design represented by the Venezuelan Exodus in Peru
to investigate if this sizeable and exogenous shock of foreign workers had a causal effect on the labour mar-
ket outcomes of the native workers. Namely, it investigates the effect of the Venezuelan influx on hourly
wages in the formal and the informal sectors separately. Such an emphasis is justified since changes in
these equilibria have more immediate social and political repercussions in the host country. However, im-
migration also induces adjustments in other labour market outcomes such as informality levels and wage
inequality. This study’s contribution is also methodological, as it applies an alternative method that cir-
cumvents the problems associated with the standard DiD method to estimate the impact of immigration,
paying specific attention to the consistency of the estimates obtained and the improved power and sizes of
the Wald test used to test the research propositions of key interest. An array of different estimators for the
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treatment effect of this shock are used. These range from panel data to Synthetic Control Methods (SCM),
and allow the robustness of the key results to be determined. Given the demographic and occupational char-
acteristics of the immigrants, the chapter also analyses their effect across different subsamples of natives.
Additionally, the study investigates the occupational downgrade that Venezuelan migrants experience in the
Peruvian labour market, both in terms of the type of job and the complexity of the tasks that jobs in Peru
involve compared to Venezuela. The key finding is that the impact of the Venezuelan influx on the Peruvian
labour market is not widespread and is confined to an impact on wages in the informal sector in Lima with
a downward adjustment consequent on the increased supply entirely consistent with the predictions of a
competitive labour market.
The third and final empirical chapter focuses instead on the wage effects associated with the discrim-
ination that informal Venezuelan workers in Peru are perceived to experience. Our data allow us to study
the effect of both subjective and objective discrimination across the wages distribution. On the one hand,
it ascribes how self-perceived discrimination is associated with lower migrant wages. On the other hand, it
also estimates the magnitude of the gap between Peruvians and Venezuelans. Importantly, a novel decom-
position allows unveiling that part of these wage differences which cannot be ascribed to observed charac-
teristics of those who report perceiving discrimination. The chapter also examines how studies the migrants’
perception of discrimination is affected by wage inequalities and disparities experienced by Venezuelans.
The approach used allow us to quantify Venezuelan awareness of their differential treatment in the labour
market on their perception of discrimination, and assess if the variables related to their expectation of equal
treatment in the labour market are more important drivers than the objective discrimination. The key finding
of this chapter is that unequal wage treatment, as objectively measured by the wage structure effect between
Peruvians and Venezuelans, exhibits a statistically significant effect, although modest, on the perception of
discrimination. However, non-wage factors like educational level, Venezuelan labour force experience, and
the time spent in Peru exert stronger effects that are larger in magnitude on the Venezuelan perception of
discrimination.
The thesis also contains a concluding section that brings together the common issues explored in the
thesis and discusses the agenda for future research emerging from this research. Each empirical chapter
in this thesis is self-contained in nature. As such, it comprises the research questions and explains in
detail the relevant context. Also, it provides a detailed description of the methodology applied as well as
the data sources used for the empirical work. This latter is crucial, as the high-quality data availability
in Peru compares very favourably with that currently available for most other Latin American countries.
The availability of such data has made it possible to study topics in this thesis that have important policy
relevance, part of which is discussed in more detail in the concluding chapter of this thesis.
Chapter 1
The distribution of the Gender Pay Gap
during the ‘Peruvian Growth Miracle’:
an unconditional quantile approach
1.1 Introduction
This study analyzes the gender wage gaps in Peru between 2005 and 2017. This is a period coined by some
(Ross and Peschiera 2015) as the ’Peruvian Growth Miracle’ given the high (real) growth rates in both per
capita GDP (4.5%, more than twice the average for Latin American countries, 1.8%) and hourly-wages in
the formal and informal sectors (1.7% and 3.8%, respectively) that Peru experienced during that period.1
There is a debate in the literature about the behaviour of gender pay gaps during similar growth episodes.
Some (Pampel and Tanaka 1986; Boserup 1970) state that these usually experience an inverted U pattern
as the economy grows. Thus, the burgeoning industrial sector increases labour demand in male-dominated
activities at the initial stages, increasing the wage gap. In later stages, labour demand in the service sector
expands, and consequently, job opportunities for women increase, inducing a reduction in the gap. Other
empirical studies suggest a more deterministic relationship. On the one hand, Seguino (1997) finds that
gender wage gaps in South Korea did not decrease during the 1970-1990 period, characterized by a signi-
ficant exports boom and a heavy industrialization process. On the other hand, Mitra et al. (2015) ) using a
panel of 101 countries between 1990 and 2000, find that growth and gender wage gaps have been negatively
associated. In recognition of this discussion and the female vulnerability that gender wage gaps imply2, this
study analyzes if the growth of wages during the ’Peruvian Growth Miracle’ has been accompanied by a
change in gender pay disparities across the wage distribution. We are ultimately interested in that part of
this differential attributed to the unequal treatment that working women face. In other words, we are con-
cerned with that portion of these gender differences that are attributable to the fact that the labour market
systematically pays more to males than females with similar characteristics. Importantly, we conduct the
analysis separating the formal and informal sectors, given their inherent labour market differences and the
pervasiveness of the latter sector in the Peruvian economy.
Studies that have analyzed gender wage gaps for Peru (and Latin America) share a number of specific
characteristics. First, some studies measure differences in mean wages between males and females on
the basis of a male dummy estimated by OLS within a Mincerian earnings equation (e.g. Garavito 2011;
1An improvement was also found in the education and health sectors (Beteta and Del Pozo 2016), infrastructure (Webb 2013),
sanitation services (World Bank 2010) as well as other areas (for a brief survey, see PCM 2013 and INEI 2014b).
2As a consequence of this, gender gaps was one of the most referenced aspects by both the Peruvian government (in terms of legal
standards, MTPE 2010) and international agencies (CEPAL et al. 2013; OIT and PNUD 2009) during the last decade.
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Coppola and Calvo-Gonzalez 2011). These studies portray a partial and imprecise picture of the wage gaps
because they ignore disparities at other parts of the wages distribution other than the mean. Second, some
other studies also decompose this mean gap using separate gender-specific sub-samples and identify that
part attributable to unequal treatment against women (see Castillo 2011; Montes 2007; Yamada et al. 2013
for analysis for Peru and Atal et al. 2009 for Latin American countries). Their policy recommendations are
limited because they only focus on a specific statistic of the wages distribution without providing insights on
other distribution statistics. Third, to the best of our knowledge, no single study considers the heterogeneity
between formal and informal labour markets. Hence, none has explicitly addressed the potential differences
in gender pay gaps across these two distinct labour markets.
In order to advance the empirical literature on this topic, this paper applies Recentered Influence Func-
tions (RIF) regressions (Firpo et al. 2007). This estimation method provides the effect of a given covariate
at every percentile of the unconditional distribution of the outcome variable for years 2005, 2011 and 2017.
This framework permits the analysis of different aspects of the gender wage gap, defined here as the differ-
ence between males and females in log hourly wages after controlling for relevant characteristics. Initially,
we estimate the magnitude of the gender wage gap not only at the mean but, departing from previous stud-
ies, also at different percentiles of its marginal distribution. We are specifically interested in ‘sticky floors’,
the male’s advantage occurring at the lower end (typically at the 10th percentile) of the wages distribution,
which reflects the tendency of women to be confined and stuck in poorly paid jobs. Equally important are
the ‘glass ceilings’ effects, which are disparities present at the upper end (typically at the 90th percent-
ile) reflecting the limit on women’s progression towards high-pay jobs. Secondly, the RIF method enables
us to extend the Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposition (Oaxaca 1973 and Blinder 1973) of mean differ-
ence to every percentile of the unconditional distribution of log hourly wages. Hence, we decompose the
gender wage gaps in the endowment effect (that part due to males having better levels of characteristics
than females) and the wage-structure effect (that part due to unequal treatment against women). This latter
component is crucial for policy purposes because it has been typically associated with discrimination in the
labour economics literature. Finally, we investigate to what extent these results differ between the formal
and informal sectors over the 2005-2017 period. The comparison of these results over the relevant years
provides insights on what happens with gender pay disparities during the Peruvian Growth episodes.
There are four key findings. First, in both sectors, gender pay gaps are statistically significant across the
unconditional distribution and favour male workers, even when controlling for the observed characteristics
that determine the (log) hourly wages. Second, the gaps are found to be considerably wider in the informal
compared to the formal sector. In the latter, for 2017, these estimated effects are around 50% in the 10th
percentile and around 15% in the 90th percentile. Third, once we decompose these differences, we find
that most of the gender pay gaps are attributable to unequal treatment against women in both formal and
informal sectors. So, even though we find inequalities across the wages distribution, these are more striking
at the bottom end, reflecting the role of ‘sticky floors’. In 2017, the pro-male bias in the informal sector at
the bottom and the top deciles were 71% and 21%, respectively. Fourth, women at the bottom of the log
hourly-wages distribution in the informal sector face a sizeable sticky floor, one which is sizeable and has
not decreased over time. Consequently, this persistence of the treatment effect casts doubt on the overall
efficiency of policies put in place by the Peruvian government to alleviate this problem during the ’Peruvian
Growth Miracle’.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a concise description of the Peruvian labour
market during the 2005-2017 period in terms of inequality, participation and sectoral employment, and out-
lines government policies implemented to offset gender wage disparities. Section 3 describes the empirical
methodology applied, which is the RIF regression, and describes the dataset for this research. Section 4 re-
ports the estimates for the gender wage gaps at different percentiles of the (log.) hourly wages distribution,
decomposes these gaps into treatment and endowments effects and presents robustness checks to assess the
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sensitivity of our results. Section 5discusses the results in terms of their policy implications and outlines
potential areas for future research.
1.2 Peru’s labour market during the ’Peruvian Growth Miracle’
During the 2005-2017 period, the Peruvian labour market experienced a generalized rightward shift of the
log hourly-wage distributions for males and females (Figure 1.1). In the formal sector, females had in 2005
higher wages than males across the distribution. By 2017, this relationship reverted and males earned higher
wages at almost every percentile of the wages distribution, although their advantage is modest and reaches
a peak of 7% (see Table 1.A1 in the Appendix). In contrast, male to female differences in hourly wages
increased in the informal sector around the mean of the distributions and at some of the key order statistics
shown, particularly at the lower percentiles.
Figure 1.1 – Wage distributions for males and females by sector, 2005 and 2017
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Consequently, the overall inequality in hourly wages during these 12 years, as measured by the Gini
coefficient, has decreased in the formal sector and remained broadly constant in the informal sector (left
panel of Figure 1.2). Specifically, the Gini fell from 0.46 to 0.40 in the former sector and remained around
0.47 in the latter. The evolution of the ratio of mean hourly wages (male to female, right panel of the
Figure) reflect that, as men in the informal sector have earned wages around 1.1 and 1.2 time higher than
their female counterparts throughout the period. Note that the behaviour of the mean gender gap after
pooling formal and informal workers (darkest line) resembles that of the informal sector, and its value is
similar to what other studies have found for Peru in the last years (MTPE 2014; OIT and PNUD 2009;
CEPAL et al. 2013; INEI 2014a).
At the same time, employment rates have remained above 90% throughout and by 2017 represent,
respectively, 96% and 94% for males and females of working age (Figure 1.3). The fact that most of the
employment in Peru is located in the informal sector can explain these remarkably high rates, given no
barriers to entry and the lack of law enforcement for these activities (Aliaga 2010; Freije 2002; Saavedra
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1999). The proportion of informal employees, defined as those not affiliated to a pension system, has
been decreasing in a monotonic fashion. Nonetheless, it still represented 72% of the total employment in
2017 (bottom left panel), consistent with ILO (2014) reports. The probability of females engaging in these
activities was higher than males over those 13 years (bottom right panel). In fact, women are more likely to
work as self-employed and are also more likely to be found in small and medium-sized firms.
This latter reveals a more widespread vulnerability problem for female employment, as a higher relat-
ive proportion of these is employed in the informal sector. Lower productivity characterizes jobs in this
sector, as well as the absence of institutions such as the minimum wage, social benefits, labour and safety
regulations (IADB 2010). In addition, the self-employment occupational category where women are more
likely to be engaged is characterized by its low productivity and volatility of incomes (INEI 2014b), while
a small firm size in Peru is associated with long hours of work, lack of physical and legal protection, and a
higher degree of occupational risks (MTPE 2012). This results in a further over-representation of women
in low-paying jobs, which increases inequality, as shown in Figure 1.2.
Data from Peru’s National Household Survey for 2015-2017 suggest two key reasons for workers in the
informal sector to remain in that sector. Slightly less than half of them are aware of the benefits of being
a formal worker but do not consider these sufficiently attractive. A smaller proportion of informal workers
(around 35%) would like to be formal but their low earnings do not allow them to afford the bureaucratic
and administrative fees to transition to that sector. Nevertheless, there are differences in the importance that
males and females ascribe to these two. Disregarding the formal status is more prevalent for men (around
60% in their case), while the low earnings argument is more prevalent for females (around 40%).
The Peruvian government has promoted a set of actions to improve labour market conditions for fe-
males during those years. First, the National Employment Policies (2012) comprised specific actions of
government agencies to promote females’ employment, employability, and entrepreneurship. Second, two
National Plans of Equality of Opportunities (2000-2005 and 2006-2010) aimed to assure decent female
work through specific instruments. These include equitable labour market legislation and programs to
strengthen female’s productive capacities. In the end, these two policies resulted in the 2007 Law of Equal-
ity of Opportunities between Females and Males (Law N° 28983), which fostered access to employment,
training, promotion and safe working conditions for women (MTPE 2015). According to CEPAL et al.
(2013), this represented an important advance in legislative design. Two other legal norms stand out. The
8
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Elaborated by the author based on INEI − National Household Survey (2005−2017)
2007 Supreme Decree Nº 027-2007-PCM defines mandatory guidelines in all government institutions re-
lated to non-discrimination and the formulation of gender-equality-related public policies. Also, the 2009
Law 294098 provides the right of paid leave for both parents after childbirth. This was done in an attempt
to encourage and strengthen a more equitable distribution of housework tasks (MTPE 2010).
The characterizations above suggests the need to move beyond mean log hourly-wages differences to
estimate the magnitude of ‘glass ceilings’ and ‘sticky floors’. A significant wage-structure effect could
prove that these policies were ineffective in fostering lower discrimination against women. The following
section presents the analytical framework applied in order to get address these concerns.
1.3 Methodological framework
This section initially presents the Recentered Influence Function (RIF) regression method and demonstrates
how it can extend the OB decomposition to every percentile of the unconditional distribution of the outcome
variable. We also briefly discusses here the potential effect that sample selection may exert on the estimates
obtained. The dataset used in this study is then described including key changes in the labour market gender
composition during the economic growth period of 2005-17.
1.3.1 RIF regressions and OB decomposition
Firpo et al. (2007, 2009); Fortin et al. (2010) outline an OLS-based regression, unconditional quantile
regression method, that permits the estimation of the impact of changes in an explanatory factor on the un-
conditional quantile of the outcome variable. The point of departure for this is the understanding that many
common descriptive statistics can be expressed as statistical functionals (i.e. any function of the outcome
variable’s distribution function). For quantiles, the function T (F) = F−1 (τ), with F−1 (.) continuously dif-
ferentiable at all quantiles τ , gives the value of the outcome variable after inverting the distribution function
9
at a particular quantile τ . The Influence Function (IF), IF (y;qτ) where y is the observed outcome variable
and qτ is the distributional statistic of interest (the τ-th quantile), corresponds to the first-order directional
derivative of T (F) and assesses the influence of either adding or deleting an individual observation on
the quantile of interest without the need to re-calculate the statistic. Adding back the distributional stat-
istic of interest to the IF (since it is centred around zero) yields the Recentered Influence Function (RIF),
RIF (y;ν) = ν (Fy)+ IF (y;v).
The expression of the RIF for the τ-th quantile of the unconditional distribution of y is defined as
RIF (y,qτ) = qτ + IF (y,qτ)≡ qτ +
τ − I {yi ≤ qτ}
fy (qτ)
(1.1)
where I (.) is an indicator function, qτ is the τth quantile of the unconditional distribution of y, and fy (qτ)
is the probability density function of the marginal distribution of the outcome variable evaluated at qτ . The
RIF regression model is then defined as:
E [RIF (y,qτ) |x] = x
′
γ (1.2)
where the RIF is assumed to be a linear function of the covariates contained in x. An important property of
the RIF is that the mean of the recentered function corresponds to the quantile of interest,and by the law of
iterated expectations we have that qτ = E [RIF (y;qτ)] = E [E [RIF (y,qτ) |x]] = x
′
γ. This expression can be
estimated by OLS. Firpo et al. (2009) show that such a regression, with the RIF function for the quantiles
of y (wages in this case) replacing y itself as the dependent variable, is in fact an unconditional quantile
regression as it estimates the effect of the covariates on the marginal τ-th quantile of y.
For our purposes, the RIF regression allows estimating the unconditional gap at every quantile of the
wages. This provides a way to investigate the presence of ‘sticky floors’ or ‘glass ceiling’ in the pay distri-
bution. This latter suggests a crucial conceptual difference relative to the conditional regression approach
(Koenker and Bassett 1978, 1982; Koenker and Hallock 2001). In the conditional case, the specification of
the covariates determines the quantile (given it is conditional on the covariates contained in the specifica-
tion), but in the unconditional case the quantile is independent of the covariates used.3 This, in turn, affects
the scope of policy recommendations that conditional quantile regression provides. Whereas conditional
quantile models do not yield generalizable results to a population or broader policy context (since these
regression models do not average up to their unconditional population counterparts), unconditional quantile
models provide consistent estimates of the impact of explanatory variables on the unconditional distribution
of the outcome variable.
The computation of the components described in Equation 3.1 is required before OLS estimation of
Equation 1.2. In order to do so, we can use the analogy principle: compute the sample q̂τ and then estimate
the density value at point f̂ (q̂τ ) using non-parametric kernel density methods. An estimate of the RIF
for each observation is then obtained by plugging the density estimates into Equation 3.1. The sampling
variances for the RIF regression estimates can be computed using bootstrapping techniques. However, each
RIF variable must be recomputed based on each new sample generated as part of the bootstrapping exercise.
For the current application, we use 250 replications for the bootstrapping routine (see below).
If we assume a linear model for wages ws = xsβs+εs fors=M,F , where w are the observed wages, x is a
vector of covariates, β a vector of parameters, εs are unobservable characteristics and s= {Males,Females},
we are able to apply the typical Oaxaca (OB) decompositions (Oaxaca 1973) which, under plausible regu-
3To the extent that quantile regression implies a nonlinear operator, the law of iterated expectations (LIE) does not hold and hence
coefficients estimated under this framework are conditional to that particular model. On the other hand, to the extent that RIF regression
amounts to OLS with a transformed dependent variable, properties of linear regression, namely LIE, hold. This then enables the use
of linear decompositions.
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larity conditions4, allows for an additive separation into treatment and endowment effects of gender differ-
ences in mean wages. However, the application of OLS-based RIF procedures allow extending this standard




















This extension is possible since a critical assumption of the OB method, namely that the conditional ex-
pectation function of wages is linear (in parameters), holds under RIF. The first term, the endowment
effect, captures that part of the gap attributed to the more favourable distribution of male relative to fe-
male characteristics. The second term, the wage-structure (treatment) effect, reflects the higher returns that
males systematically secure in the labour market relative to comparable females. This component has also
been defined as discrimination against women.5 Compared to alternative decomposition methods, mainly
Machado and Mata (2005), RIF decomposition is exact and exploits the existence of a residual obtained
through numerical integration of the conditional to the marginal distribution. However, it is obvious that
Equation 1.3 is subject to the standard ‘index problem’ and, as specified above, assumes that the male wage
structure provides the wage distribution prevailing in the absence of any differential.
Studies for Peru have almost exclusively relied on the classical OB mean approach to decompose gender
wage gaps. For instance, Montes (2007) analyzed the urban areas during the 1997-2000 period and found
that the small negative treatment effect (i.e. favouring women) in 1997 disappeared by 2000. Castillo (2011)
studied wage gaps on a national level for the 2003-2009 period and reported that out of the total gaps, which
ranged between 15% and 22%, the treatment effect (favouring males) represents about a half of them. This
is a lower estimate than MTPE (2014) reports for 2012: out of the 33% gender gap, 29% is found to be due
to a treatment effect. Also, Atal et al. (2009) decompose gaps for 18 Latin American countries and find
that the treatment effect accounts for 20% of the gap, whereas the endowment effect represents a vanishing
small -2%. This indicates that, on average, females had better characteristics than their male counterparts.
In fact, these also report that the magnitude of treatment effect in Peru is the fifth-largest among the set of
countries analyzed. At the same time, few studies in Latin America have applied the RIF OB approach to
study gender wage gaps. On the one hand, Salardi (2012) analyzes pay disparities for Brazil between 1986
and 2006. She finds that gender pay gaps favoured males at the bottom at the top and of the distribution
in the former year. By 2006 this U shaped pattern disappeared, although the gaps remained across the
distribution. The decomposition results reported suggest that in both years the gaps were attributable to
the presence of treatment effects, mainly at the extremes, and this component has declined in time. On
the other hand, Pacheco (2013) studied urban Nicaragua in 2005 and 2009 and reports that in 2005 the
treatment effect attributed to being female yielded different magnitudes at different percentiles. By 2009,
the treatment component shrank at the lower and upper parts of the wages distribution.
An important assumption of unconditional RIF regressions is that variables included in the estimation
are exogenous. However, wages are likely to be characterized by a selection process that can lead to
inconsistent estimates. In this particular application, this sample selection is twofold. In the first place, the
selection into employment is induced by the job search, which affects participation in the labour market
(Gronau 1973; Heckman 1979). In the second place, given the high informality rates, there is also selection
4According to Fortin et al. (2010), these are: mutually exclusive groups, outcomes defined according to a defined structural
form, feasibility of a simple counterfactual treatment, existence of overlapping support and invariance of conditional distributions
(construction of the counterfactual for workers in B that would have prevailed if they were paid like those in A assumes that the
conditional wage distribution can be extrapolated).
5Note that this decomposition implies the creation of a counterfactual wage, which in this case corresponds to x′F β̂M,τ and is
interpreted as the predicted wage for the females if their characterstics were paid according to the labour market returns for males at
the τth percentile of the unconditional distribution.
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into the formal and informal sector since we are estimating equations separately for both sectors.6 For
semi-parametric estimators, including polynomials of the Heckman-type selection correction terms into the
outcome equations has been suggested (Buchinsky 1998b; Newey 1988). This strategy is also a possibility
for RIF regressions, but there are challenges to its implementation. On the one hand, there is the need for
variables that impact the probability that the individual is working but does not affect the level of wages. On
the other hand, even if a suitable instrument were available, there is a need for an identification strategy for
the constant term in the log wage equation because it is conflated with the constant of the higher polynomial
selections terms. A way to circumvent this is to specify a RIF regression model with a rich set of covariates.
It is plausible that these included observed characteristics are correlated with those unobservables that
affect participation, resulting in a sample selection on observables. This can only be assumed but not tested.
Similar to Salardi (2012) and Pacheco (2013), the results presented here do not include an explicit correction
for selection bias and hence do not claim to reflect causal effects. It should be noted that the literature on
selection correction within a RIF framework remains unsettled with no definitive view on the appropriate
methodology either within the context of a single or multiple selection correction contexts (as would be
the case here). However, the approach adopted here provides a detailed and thorough description of the
distribution of gender pay gaps and their evolution over time. Furthermore, it is implausible to conceive
that the results reported here are driven exclusively by selection effects. Such selection effects, if present,
are likely to be small in magnitude and unlikely to distort the broad concluding narrative outlined here.
1.3.2 Data
The dataset used in this study is derived from three repeated cross-sections from Peru’s National Household
Survey (ENAHO, according to its initials in Spanish), collected by the National Statistical Office (Institute
of Statistics and Informatics) for the years 2005, 2011 and 2017. Three reasons underlie the choice of this
dataset. First, this constitutes Peru’s government primary source of information for obtaining employment
indicators given its representativeness of both formal and informal sectors (see Figure 1.A1 in the Appendix
for the number of observations in each sector). Second, it allows conceptually comparable estimates to be
obtained through the years since its sampling design has been unaltered since 2005. Third, it includes
detailed information on hourly wages (which avoids measurement error problems in the key dependent
variable for this study) and individual-level demographic and labour market characteristics.
The availability of this information allows us to estimate three models which successively provide re-
fined estimates of the gender gaps. The first includes a set of demographic variables typically included
in Mincerian equations; the second model adds a vector of dummies for the industry where the individual
is employed. The third (full) model completes the specification by including a vector of dummies for the
individual’s occupation.7 So we have
ωi = β0 +δ1sexi +β1agei +β2educi +δ2urbani +Φ1Industi +Φ2Occupi +υ (1.4)




corresponds to the logarithm of the individual’s hourly-wage (for their principal and
secondary activity, including monetary wages and in-kind payments), sex is a dummy which equals 1 if
the individual is male and 0 otherwise, age corresponds to a second order polynomial of individual’s age
(in years), educ corresponds to a second order polynomial of individual’s schooling (in years), urban is
a dummy which equals 1 if the individual is located in an urban area and 0 otherwise, Indust is a vector
6Whether the decisions of entering into the labour market and working in the formal or informal sectors are taken simultaneously
or as a two-stage process only adds complexity to the estimation but does not change the fact that sample selection remains a plausible
process here.
7ENAHO also includes the employment size of the firm where the individual works, which according to some studies (e.g. World
Bank 2015 and Távara et al. 2014) has a positive relationship with a firm’s productivity levels in Peru. However, we do not use this
variable in the regressions since this is only for available for individuals who work in the private sector.
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of eight industry dummies and Occup is a vector of eight occupation dummies. These latter two follow
international classifications in order to facilitate comparability with other studies. On the one hand, the
vector of industry dummies is a reduced version of the International Standard Industrial Classification of All
Economic Activities (ISIC), Revision 3.8 On the other hand, the vector of occupation dummies is a reduced
version of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) from the International Labour
Organization. 9
In the same vein as Aktas and Uysal (2012); Albrecht et al. (2003, 2009); Buchinsky (1998a), we
restrict the sample to those individuals aged between 18 and 65 years old who are employed. Related to
the age interval, the lower bound corresponds to the minimum legal age in Peru10and the upper to the legal
retirement age. In regard to the employment variable, INEI considers as employed those who had a job,
worked more than 15 hours per week and declared a positive wage.11
Informality is approximated by the absence of affiliation to a pension system. Admittedly there is not
a unique definition of informal status. Nevertheless, according to Freije (2002), p. 2: "Informal workers
lack almost every form of social protection [...] No access to the pensions system protection make informal
workers unable to retire and force them to work longer perhaps under decreasing productivity of their
human capital". Since this description characterizes an important part of informal workers in Peru rather
than alternative definitions (e.g. working on a firm without accounting books, not receiving an invoice for
their professional services, working less than 40 hours per week, etc.), we choose this as our indicator of
informality. Also, we make a distinction in the occupational categories included in both of these sectors. On
the one hand, we consider as formal only those white and blue-collar workers, both in the public and private
sector, who are in a pensionable job. On the other hand, we consider informal employers, independent or
white and blue-collar workers without a pensionable job. We exclude from the analysis family workers and
unpaid family workers. Later, we undertake robustness checks to assess whether our results change when
considering alternative occupational categories for the formal and informal workers (see section 1.4).
Information in ENAHO was recorded after a probabilistic, stratified and multi-stage sampling to provide
representative estimates of the population. Consequently, it is necessary to take this survey design into
account by, on the one hand, applying the sampling weights (which reflects the inverse of the probability
that the observation is included in the sample)12 and, on the other hand, adjusting the standard errors for
stratification and clustering of the sample. Failure to do the former would result in biased estimates of
population parameters, while failure to do the latter would result in artificially lower standard errors and,
in turn, in misleadingly high test statistics (Chen and Shen 2015; Kreuter and Valliant 2007; Kolenikov
2010). To the extent that we are primarily estimating RIF regressions and the terms of the Oaxaca Blinder
decomposition, and because to our best knowledge, the Taylor-linearization formulas to estimate analytical
VCE under survey design are not available for these, we calculate the standard errors and the (percentile-
method) confidence intervals of the estimates by bootstrapping which, unlike Jacknife or Balance Repeated
Replication techniques, provides consistent VCE estimates in the case of non-smooth statistics such as
8The original classification (available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=2) considers 17 major groups but we
add them into 8: Agriculture, forestry, and fishing; Mining and quarrying; Manufacturing and Public Utilities; Construction; Wholesale
and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants; Transport, Storage, and Communication; Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; Community,
Social and Personal Services.
9The original classification (available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco08/index.htm) considers ten major
groups but, provided that the number of females as managers and armed forces who are non-missing was null for both years, we
merge these major groups with that of Professionals. In the end, we have eight major groups: Managers, Professionals and Armed
forces, Technicians and associates, Clerks, Service and sales workers, Skilled agricultural and fishery workers, Craft and related trades
workers, Plant and machine operators and assemblers and Elementary occupations.
10The minimum working age (without the need of explicit parental authorization) is 14 years old but this varies between different
industries. For example., this minimum age is 15 in agriculture; 16 in mining and 17 in fishing. Therefore, we take the minimum
common age.
11INEI’s definition of unemployment corresponds to those who did not have a job but was looking for it. It also includes those who
were not looking for a job but were engaged in productive activities which might not involve a monetary payment.
12These sampling weights, included within the dataset, have already been adjusted by INEI to correct for non-representativeness
and non-response. There is no need to apply further calibration or poststratification to this variable (Chen and Shen, 2015).
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quantiles. We use the Stata routine devised by Kolenikov (2010), which rescales the bootstrap replicates to
ensure that the bootstrapping scheme resembles the original sampling in every iteration. In contrast to the
more naive paired-bootstrapping, this will provide the correct VCE estimates for survey data.
Before turning to the econometric estimation, it is useful to review how the labour force composition
changed between 2005 and 2017 in terms of some key variables (Table 1.1). In the case of formal workers,
there is a statistically significant increase in the proportion of workers aged between 18 and 25 years and
those aged between 56 and 65 years at the expense of the intermediate age groups. Specifically, the propor-
tion of males in the youngest age bracket increased from 9% in 2005 to 13% in 2017 and from 9% to 15% in
the case of the females. Turning to the employment across industries, female participation increased mainly
in the wholesale and retail industry (by 7 percentage points), while male participation mainly increased
in construction (4 percentage points) industry. Female workers increased by five percentage points their
participation in Services and sales and Elementary jobs (both of which are characterized by lower wages) at
the expense of their participation in Managerial and professional occupations. A different pattern emerges
when we focus on the informal sector. The largest increase in the age composition in this sector occurred
for the oldest age bracket for both male and female workers (around 4 percentage points in both cases).
Wholesale and retail is the industry where more than half of female workers are allocated while one-third
of male workers are employed in agriculture, forestry and fishing industry. Informal female workers in-
creased their participation mainly in the Community, social and personal services industry (4 percentage
points) and males increased their participation mainly in two industries: Transport, storage and communic-
ation (4 percentage points) and Construction (5 percentage points). More women reallocated in the Service
and sales occupations (8 percentage points) in the informal sector, and in comparison males increased their
participation mainly in the Machine operators occupations(4 percentage points) over the period.
Table 1.1 – Participation rates by sex and sector, 2005 and 2017
2005 2017 Diff.
Females Males Females Males Females Males
Formal
Age Group (Years)
18 25 9.390 (1.030) 9.113 (0.730) 15.668 (0.782) 13.612 (0.530) 6.279*** (1.293) 4.500*** (0.903)
26 35 38.229 (2.033) 31.854 (1.203) 31.238 (0.882) 29.908 (0.709) -6.991*** (2.216) -1.946 (1.396)
36 45 32.267 (1.776) 32.476 (1.238) 28.504 (0.871) 27.254 (0.684) -3.763* (1.980) -5.223*** (1.414)
46 55 15.722 (1.273) 18.684 (0.957) 16.771 (0.651) 18.115 (0.531) 1.049 (1.429) -0.569 (1.095)
56 65 4.393 (0.811) 7.873 (0.684) 7.819 (0.480) 11.111 (0.411) 3.426*** (0.942) 3.238*** (0.798)
Ethnicity (D)
Not indigenous 95.825 (0.620) 88.521 (0.781) 95.362 (0.452) 90.156 (0.505) -0.463 (0.772) 1.635* (0.937)
Indigenous 4.175 (0.620) 11.479 (0.781) 4.638 (0.452) 9.844 (0.505) 0.463 (0.772) -1.635* (0.937)
Industry
Agric., forest. and fish 2.705 (0.811) 6.053 (0.707) 3.269 (0.305) 7.074 (0.400) 0.564 (0.871) 1.021 (0.832)
Mining and Quarrying 0.897 (0.550) 4.982 (0.774) 0.562 (0.151) 4.158 (0.303) -0.335 (0.570) -0.825 (0.834)
Manufacturing 12.776 (1.353) 14.870 (0.963) 10.439 (0.666) 14.825 (0.620) -2.337 (1.509) -0.045 (1.153)
Construction 1.607 (0.428) 7.910 (0.657) 3.064 (0.334) 11.998 (0.478) 1.457*** (0.543) 4.088*** (0.813)
Wholesale and Retail 9.094 (1.163) 11.487 (0.883) 16.962 (0.770) 11.432 (0.530) 7.867*** (1.395) -0.055 (1.039)
Transport, Storage, and Comm. 3.052 (1.318) 4.589 (0.594) 4.742 (0.495) 6.401 (0.370) 1.690 (1.409) 1.812*** (0.701)
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 9.887 (1.401) 10.987 (1.176) 12.300 (0.689) 12.843 (0.515) 2.414 (1.567) 1.856 (1.285)
Community, Social and Personal Svs 59.983 (2.375) 39.122 (1.309) 48.662 (1.035) 31.269 (0.720) -11.321*** (2.604) -7.853*** (1.505)
Occupation
Managers, Profess. and Armed forces 44.584 (2.175) 26.712 (1.337) 32.402 (0.982) 19.681 (0.618) -12.182*** (2.394) -7.031*** (1.474)
Technicians and related 14.378 (1.521) 12.160 (0.970) 14.051 (0.726) 14.498 (0.544) -0.328 (1.688) 2.338** (1.116)
Sales clerks 21.213 (1.887) 11.652 (0.742) 25.080 (0.906) 15.390 (0.576) 3.867* (2.097) 3.738*** (0.939)
Service and sales workers 5.480 (0.869) 6.577 (0.606) 10.655 (0.649) 8.580 (0.422) 5.175*** (1.085) 2.004*** (0.740)
Skilled agric. and fish. workers 0.000 (0.000) 0.361 (0.160) 0.083 (0.040) 0.479 (0.133) 0.083** (0.040) 0.118 (0.208)
Continued on next page
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Table 1.1 – Participation rates by sex and sector, 2005 and 2017 (continued from previous page)
2005 2011 Diff.
Females Males Females Males Females Males
Craft and related trades workers 4.348 (0.793) 12.504 (0.909) 2.731 (0.356) 10.527 (0.492) -1.617* (0.869) -1.977* (1.033)
Machine operators 0.648 (0.295) 7.951 (0.634) 0.586 (0.171) 9.364 (0.466) -0.062 (0.341) 1.412* (0.787)
Elem. occupations 9.349 (1.423) 22.083 (1.061) 14.412 (0.726) 21.480 (0.637) 5.063*** (1.602) -0.603 (1.247)
Informal
Age Group (Years)
18 25 18.681 (0.613) 22.504 (0.567) 18.225 (0.507) 19.605 (0.425) -0.457 (0.800) -2.899*** (0.714)
26 35 28.938 (0.753) 29.422 (0.613) 23.305 (0.532) 24.673 (0.472) -5.633*** (0.922) -4.749*** (0.774)
36 45 28.203 (0.742) 24.402 (0.516) 26.383 (0.550) 26.585 (0.485) -1.820** (0.925) 2.184*** (0.711)
46 55 15.715 (0.512) 14.706 (0.395) 19.363 (0.428) 16.433 (0.354) 3.648*** (0.668) 1.727*** (0.530)
56 65 8.463 (0.370) 8.966 (0.298) 12.724 (0.371) 12.703 (0.315) 4.262*** (0.525) 3.737*** (0.437)
Ethnicity (D)
Not indigenous 79.672 (0.739) 77.582 (0.762) 76.540 (0.681) 75.107 (0.674) -3.132*** (1.039) -2.475** (1.071)
Indigenous 20.328 (0.739) 22.418 (0.762) 23.460 (0.681) 24.893 (0.674) 3.132*** (1.039) 2.475** (1.071)
Industry
Agric., forest. and fish 14.668 (0.574) 38.186 (0.749) 14.984 (0.425) 35.217 (0.626) 0.315 (0.815) -2.969** (1.294)
Mining and Quarrying 0.074 (0.029) 0.815 (0.149) 0.123 (0.043) 1.486 (0.171) 0.049 (0.052) 0.671*** (0.228)
Manufacturing 12.264 (0.576) 11.634 (0.485) 10.410 (0.431) 8.966 (0.373) -1.854** (0.720) -2.668*** (0.638)
Construction 0.735 (0.161) 9.847 (0.404) 0.778 (0.098) 15.451 (0.453) 0.042 (0.188) 5.604*** (0.622)
Wholesale and Retail 50.418 (0.823) 14.962 (0.511) 54.097 (0.654) 12.943 (0.403) 3.679*** (1.072) -2.018*** (0.684)
Transport, Storage, and Comm. 1.803 (0.220) 12.172 (0.429) 1.715 (0.177) 16.195 (0.449) -0.088 (0.284) 4.023*** (0.648)
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 3.256 (0.325) 3.743 (0.302) 4.045 (0.274) 3.459 (0.236) 0.790* (0.431) -0.285 (0.391)
Community, Social and Personal Svs 16.781 (0.636) 8.642 (0.378) 13.849 (0.464) 6.283 (0.293) -2.933*** (0.798) -2.359*** (0.487)
Occupation
Managers, Profess. and Armed forces 6.125 (0.450) 3.034 (0.259) 3.633 (0.263) 2.209 (0.165) -2.492*** (0.526) -0.824*** (0.311)
Technicians and related 4.972 (0.391) 5.620 (0.448) 3.955 (0.269) 5.650 (0.276) -1.017** (0.478) 0.030 (0.536)
Sales clerks 4.590 (0.393) 1.746 (0.178) 3.996 (0.264) 1.587 (0.140) -0.594 (0.476) -0.159 (0.228)
Service and sales workers 31.896 (0.773) 7.329 (0.335) 40.179 (0.629) 7.990 (0.321) 8.283*** (1.002) 0.661 (0.476)
Skilled agric. and fish. workers 9.995 (0.423) 28.379 (0.657) 10.320 (0.349) 26.591 (0.537) 0.324 (0.617) -1.788 (1.100)
Craft and related trades workers 9.188 (0.506) 14.930 (0.494) 8.741 (0.389) 14.948 (0.465) -0.448 (0.638) 0.018 (0.714)
Machine operators 1.541 (0.219) 10.349 (0.423) 1.380 (0.171) 14.837 (0.446) -0.161 (0.278) 4.488*** (0.634)
Elem. occupations 31.692 (0.763) 28.614 (0.648) 27.796 (0.593) 26.189 (0.511) -3.896*** (0.970) -2.425*** (0.830)
Note: (Ln.) Sample includes individuals between 18 and 65 years. Estimates calculated applying sampling weights and VCE corrected according to
survey’s complex sample design. SE in parenthesis.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI - National Household Survey (2005-2017)
1.4 Results
This section applies RIF regression to estimate the magnitude of percentile-specific log hourly-wage gender
gaps and to decompose these unconditional gaps in order to identify that part that can be attributed to
unequal treatment of women. Finally, we undertake robustness checks to analyze the sensitivity of the
results reported here.
1.4.1 Gender Wage Gap Estimates
The observed male to female differences in (log-hourly) wages vary between the formal and informal sector
(Figure 1.4 and Table 1.A2 in the Appendix). On the one hand, the main characteristic of the formal labour
market in 2005 was that females earned higher wages than their male counterparts, not only on average but
also for every percentile of the distribution. Nonetheless, this female advantage appears to have vanished by
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2017 since the confidence intervals of the estimates are no longer below the zero line but, instead, around
that line. On the other hand, there is preliminary evidence of both ‘sticky floors’ and ‘glass ceilings’ in the
informal sector, since across the wages distribution, males earn, statistically, higher wages than females.
Importantly, ‘sticky floors’ are deeper than ‘glass ceilings’ since the gaps decrease as we move up across
the distribution: for 2017, the male to female difference is 62% at the 5th, 51% at the 10th and 42% at
the 15th percentile (bottom end) and amounts to 16% at the 75th and 12% at the 90th percentile (top end).
Also, note that there is no evidence of change in these gaps in this sector between the beginning and the end
of the period. Gaps in 2011 seem statistically larger than those in 2005.
Figure 1.4 – Raw gaps by sector, 2005, 2011 and 2017
2005: βOLS=−0.118, CIOLS=[−0.192, −0.044], N=4,706
2011: βOLS=0.025, CIOLS=[−0.015, 0.064], N=9,050
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Note: Gender dummy equals 1 if individual is male and 0 otherwise. Sample includes individuals between 18 and 65 years. Observations weighted by the survey’s probability weights and VCE estimated according to survey’s complex
sampling design. Vertical lines correspond to the 95% confidence intervals.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI − National Household Survey (2005−2017)
2005 2011 2017
RIF regression allows us to control for individual differences in observed characteristics, which provides
more compelling evidence about gender wage gaps. In order to do this, we pool both males and females
observations and estimate the gender dummies at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of the
unconditional wages distribution using RIF regression and at the mean of the unconditional wages dis-
tribution using OLS (Figure 1.5). For simplicity and to conserve space, we omit results from the model
which only includes demographic variables and the set of industry dummies (nevertheless, they are shown
in Table 1.A3 in the Appendix). As before, results differ between sectors but, notably, do not differ across
the different models. In the formal sector, gaps in 2011 and 2017 increase once we control for different
individual characteristics, and they remain relatively constant, around 15%, across the percentiles of the un-
conditional distribution. Interestingly, the observed gaps favouring women in 2005 (shown in the previous
graph) disappear once we control for observed characteristics.
However, we find statistical evidence of both ‘sticky floors’ and ‘glass ceilings’ in the informal sector.
The former is more acute than the latter, given the negative gradient of those cross-percentiles estimates.
From the full model for 2017, ‘sticky floors’ manifest themselves as a 66% and 47% gap at the 10th and
25th percentiles, whereas ‘glass ceilings’ manifest themselves as a 21% and 19% gap at the 75th and
90th percentile. Also, the results indicate that gender differences have not contracted relative to 2005. In
particular, gaps from the full model in 2005 are respectively 12 and 5 percentage points lower at the 10th
and 25th percentile than in 2017. In comparison to 2011, the estimated gaps are 23 and 2 percentage points
lower at those same percentiles (although their confidence intervals overlap). The essential message so
far is clear: gaps in the informal sector suggest a sticky floor effect and a glass ceiling, being the former
more pronounced. Neither has decreased materially between the beginning and the end of the period under
analysis.
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Note: Sample includes individuals between 18 and 65 years. Gender dummy equals 1 if individual is male and 0 otherwise. Demographics only model includes education (2nd degree polinomial), age (2nd degree polinomial) as well as ethnicity and
urban area dummies; the full model adds a set of industry dummies and occupation dummies. Observations weighted by the survey’s probability weights and bootstrapped−VCE estimated according to survey’s complex sampling design. Vertical lines
correspond to the percentile−based bootstrap 95% confidence intervals.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI − National Household Survey (2005−2017)
OLS 10th perc. 25th perc. 50th perc. 75th perc. 90th perc.
These results using the pooled dataset imply that labour market returns to observed characteristics
between males and females are comparable. Since our ultimate interest lies in estimating the treatment
effect component of the gender wage gap, which depends on the between-gender differences in these re-
turns, we now calculate the value of the (adjusted) Wald (cross-model) statistic13 for the hypothesis that
there are no differences between coefficients from the male-only sample and those from the female-only
sample. We calculate this statistic for each set of results arising from RIF regressions at 10th, 25th, 50th,
75th and 90th percentiles and from OLS. The set of estimates is shown in the Appendix A for formal sec-
tors (Table 1.A4 - Table 1.A6) and informal (Table 1.A7 - Table 1.A9). For brevity, we omit results for
the model including only demographic variables plus the set of industry dummies. The key results suggest
that in the formal sector the estimates for the males and females samples differ at every percentile of the
unconditional wage distribution for both years (Table 1.2). More specifically, when we consider the demo-
graphics only model, we find statistical differences in returns to education between males and females at the
percentiles shown. When we consider the model including all the variables, there are significant differences
in estimated industry dummies for 2005 and occupation dummies for 2011 and 2017. In this last year, the
industry dummy estimates are greater for males at the percentiles below or equal to the median. Occupation
dummies are larger for males at percentiles greater than or equal to the median (Table 1.A6). Focusing
on the informal sector, the results also show statistical differences (below 5%) between male and female
coefficients for both years. In the demographics only model, the vector of schooling and the urban dummy
differ consistently between males and females. When considering the full model, the males’ and females’
dummies for urban areas and occupations are statistically different for the three years shown across the dif-
ferent percentiles. In particular, urban area coefficients are greater for females across the 2005 distribution.
In addition, occupation dummies estimates are larger for males at percentiles greater than or equal to the
median in both years (Table 1.A8 and Table 1.A9).
13The (adjusted) Wald test statistic amounts to an F test (with degrees of freedom equal to (k,dff− k+1), with dff the design
degrees of freedom) in the case of survey data (Aneshensel 2013).
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Table 1.2 – (Adjusted) Wald tests for coefficient differences between males and females by sector, 2005, 2011 and 2017
Formal Informal
OLS P. 10 P. 25 P. 50 P. 75 P. 90 OLS P. 10 P. 25 P. 50 P. 75 P. 90
2005
Demograph. only
Regression 2.067* 1.006 6.124*** 1.992* 6.963*** 5.172*** 2.634** 7.793*** 2.814*** 1.627 1.070 1.439
Shooling (years) (v) 5.185*** 0.523 15.487*** 4.131** 14.222*** 6.008*** 0.111 0.225 3.730** 3.751** 1.556 1.150
Age (years) (v) 0.643 0.078 0.286 0.763 1.842 1.054 0.343 3.322** 2.808* 0.604 0.287 2.371*
If indigenous (d) 0.172 5.214** 1.803 0.002 3.899** 9.211*** 0.057 0.411 0.200 0.209 0.669 0.466
If hh in urban area (d) 0.284 0.009 0.365 0.703 1.917 1.493 10.377*** 31.797*** 2.590 0.002 0.792 0.170
Full model
Regression 2.099*** 2.773*** 5.349*** 3.950*** 3.372*** 3.928*** 7.447*** 8.278*** 8.649*** 5.708*** 2.663*** 4.185***
Shooling (years) (v) 3.264** 0.267 0.368 0.757 8.083*** 3.150** 1.706 2.312* 1.011 1.898 2.617* 0.034
Age (years) (v) 0.321 0.287 0.326 0.262 0.210 0.022 0.870 5.572*** 4.886*** 0.751 0.949 2.296
If indigenous (d) 0.110 5.262** 1.833 0.001 3.184* 7.069*** 0.031 0.000 1.000 0.187 0.246 0.578
If hh in urban area (d) 0.197 0.147 0.206 1.521 1.121 0.164 34.381*** 64.188*** 29.111*** 5.776** 0.003 0.016
Industry (v) 2.356** 4.744*** 1.958* 1.933* 1.492 5.619*** 1.676 2.979*** 0.898 2.263** 2.295** 4.514***
Occupation (v) 0.980 0.887 3.736*** 3.249*** 0.822 1.614 7.980*** 8.301*** 5.640*** 3.233*** 3.588*** 3.988***
2011
Demograph. only
Regression 1.001 2.544** 5.809*** 10.399*** 2.429** 3.090*** 3.514*** 5.524*** 11.752*** 3.539*** 0.318 2.490**
Shooling (years) (v) 1.298 4.087** 13.386*** 18.838*** 5.184*** 4.081** 0.664 2.795* 7.396*** 3.182** 0.553 5.231***
Age (years) (v) 1.090 0.119 3.550** 7.716*** 0.828 0.029 0.053 0.142 0.027 0.238 0.399 0.910
If indigenous (d) 0.063 6.224** 0.000 0.003 2.141 0.266 0.004 0.161 0.053 2.153 0.452 0.296
If hh in urban area (d) 1.310 1.906 0.072 0.017 0.824 4.838** 12.740*** 20.099*** 21.542*** 2.275 0.071 0.472
Full model
Regression 2.488*** 2.321*** 3.551*** 7.827*** 2.954*** 2.044*** 9.683*** 9.906*** 17.497*** 8.158*** 2.323*** 1.666**
Shooling (years) (v) 0.010 1.307 1.192 3.195** 2.314* 1.087 1.542 0.516 2.757* 1.096 0.134 1.668
Age (years) (v) 1.066 0.514 2.175 5.813*** 1.048 0.183 0.115 0.394 0.282 0.198 1.315 1.377
If indigenous (d) 0.856 9.110*** 0.788 0.245 2.085 0.091 0.029 0.828 0.323 1.276 1.518 0.113
If hh in urban area (d) 3.074* 4.860** 0.486 0.626 1.266 2.710* 45.015*** 56.029*** 70.613*** 15.820*** 0.054 1.577
Industry (v) 1.526 1.989* 1.171 1.933* 0.593 1.765* 0.314 0.201 0.662 2.149** 0.799 1.201
Occupation (v) 3.456*** 1.876* 3.504*** 7.107*** 3.936*** 1.568 12.462*** 11.264*** 12.476*** 6.343*** 4.523*** 1.606
2017
Demograph. only
Regression 2.088* 1.405 6.309*** 17.562*** 1.708 4.358*** 10.941*** 7.868*** 13.380*** 5.505*** 2.268** 2.317**
Shooling (years) (v) 5.537*** 2.250 18.125*** 39.691*** 1.357 11.343*** 3.168** 2.577* 1.881 1.589 0.410 3.613**
Age (years) (v) 0.344 0.879 2.473* 0.877 1.021 0.414 1.721 1.667 2.340* 1.304 4.426** 4.082**
If indigenous (d) 1.322 1.019 0.282 1.762 7.666*** 1.527 3.964** 5.550** 3.640* 0.010 0.095 0.027
If hh in urban area (d) 0.498 2.350 2.380 0.280 0.004 0.049 44.332*** 32.802*** 45.131*** 11.723*** 2.506 0.282
Full model
Regression 2.225*** 2.724*** 2.992*** 6.703*** 2.687*** 2.173*** 12.881*** 14.376*** 18.675*** 7.166*** 7.351*** 3.162***
Shooling (years) (v) 3.379** 1.386 3.418** 11.187*** 0.708 2.794* 10.136*** 6.892*** 3.922** 3.357** 1.980 2.575*
Age (years) (v) 0.136 0.340 1.294 0.421 1.205 0.354 1.903 3.712** 7.761*** 3.045** 4.254** 3.380**
If indigenous (d) 0.246 2.857* 1.942 1.046 6.495** 1.333 2.558 2.266 2.637 0.068 0.276 0.004
If hh in urban area (d) 0.020 0.030 0.062 0.459 0.016 0.147 132.881*** 127.437*** 122.771*** 45.274*** 14.666*** 0.149
Industry (v) 1.290 2.747*** 2.325** 1.219 0.887 0.913 2.273** 5.431*** 3.505*** 1.050 10.722*** 3.349***
Occupation (v) 4.244*** 2.602** 4.174*** 6.087*** 3.438*** 1.886* 6.522*** 8.400*** 5.887*** 1.833* 2.161** 4.349***
it:Note: F statistics of joint-hypotheses tests shown. Sample includes individuals between 18 and 65 years. Demographics only model includes education (2nd degree
polinomial), age (2nd degree polinomial) as well as ethnicity and urban area dummies. Observations weighted by the survey’s probability weights and VCE estimated
according to survey’s complex sampling design. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level
Elaborated by the author based on INEI - National Household Survey (2005-2017)
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Thus, the results presented provide a detailed portrayal of the magnitudes of the unconditional wage
gaps in Peru. However, they do not provide us with a critical insight for policy: Are the leading cause be-
hind the observed (raw) differences attributed to unequal treatment against women or an endowment effect
favouring males? To address this issue, in the following subsection, we will use RIF regressions to decom-
pose the observed unconditional gaps at every percentile of the wage distribution, based on Equation 1.3.
1.4.2 Decomposition of the gender wage gaps
Results for the unconditional decompositions of differences between males and females in log-hourly wages
are invariant across the three different models estimated, provided their confidence intervals overlap all
over the distribution (see Figure 1.6 and Table 1.A10 in the Appendix). Consequently, results that follow
for formal and informal sectors are robust to alternative specifications. As anticipated, regularities differ
between these sectors. Focusing on the formal sector, the endowment effects provide evidence that in both
2011 and 2017, women had better level endowments of characteristics than the male workers. Nevertheless,
since the treatment effect mirrors the latter but with opposite signs (i.e., the differences in labour market
returns favour males relative to females), the gap is statistically insignificant.
















































































































Note: Sample includes individuals between 18 and 65 years. Demographics only model includes education (2nd degree polinomial), age (2nd degree polinomial)
as well as ethnicity and urban area dummies. Observations weighted by the survey’s probability weights and VCE estimated according to survey’s complex
sampling design. Vertical lines correspond to the percentile−based bootstrap 95% confidence intervals.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI − National Household Survey (2005−2017)
Demograph. (M1) M1 + Indust. (M2) Full (M2 + Occupat.)
Three key results for policy-making are found in the informal sector. In the first place, in every single
year, the treatment effect is positive at every point of the log hourly-wages distribution. In contrast, the
endowments effect is close to zero, implying that the gender wage gap can be explained mainly by the
treatment effect alone. Put differently, the disadvantage women face in the informal sector is due to an
unequal treatment exercised against them. In the second place, ‘sticky floors’ and ‘glass ceilings’ exist, but
19
the estimated effects are more sizeable at the bottom of the distribution. Based on the full model, this effect
amounts to a gender difference of 56% in 2005, 97% in 2011 and 71% in 2017 at the 10th percentile. At the
90th percentile, it amounts to 16% in 2005 and 2011 and 21% for 2017. In other words, women in the lower
parts of the distribution earn the lowest wages rewards and thus are those who suffer the greatest effect of
labour market discrimination. Finally, the unequal treatment that women face in the informal sector, mainly
at the bottom end of the distribution, has not changed between the beginning and the end of the ’Peruvian
Growth Miracle’ since confidence intervals of these estimates overlap for 2005 and 2017 (Figure 1.7).
Figure 1.7 – Treatment effect in the informal sector, 2005, 2011 and 2017
2005: P.10=0.561, P.15=0.526, P.20=0.438, P.25=0.408
2011: P.10=0.967, P.15=0.859, P.20=0.752, P.25=0.656































Note: Sample includes individuals between 18 and 65 years. Demographics only model includes education (2nd degree polinomial),
age (2nd degree polinomial) as well as ethnicity and urban area dummies. Observations weighted by the survey’s probability weights
and VCE estimated according to survey’s complex sampling design. Vertical lines correspond to the percentile−based bootstrap
95% confidence intervals.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI − National Household Survey (2005−2017)
1.4.3 Robustness Checks
These main decomposition results hinge on different assumptions related to the definition of employment in
the formal and informal sector and the use of sampling weights. In order to test the sensitivity of our results
to these assumptions, we undertake a series of robustness checks. These measure the difference between the
estimates of the decomposition terms shown above and those found under alternative definitions of employ-
ment and sample design. First, we analyze the differences in the decomposition terms when we consider
only those informal workers who are employers and white and blue-collar workers, both private and public.
Therefore, we see what happens to the results when we exclude from the sample independent workers. Res-
ults (Figure 1.8 and Table 1.A11 in the Appendix) across the distribution suggest that decomposition terms
do not vary in 2005 under this alternative definition. However, there are statistical differences in the years
2011 and 2017. In the case of the endowment effect, results suggest that the alternative definition provides
estimates that are 10 and 15 percentage points higher in 2005 and 2017, respectively. The difference in the
treatment term reveals a more definitive pattern. It is positive at the bottom end of the distribution and turns
negative as we move to higher percentiles. In both years, estimates under the alternative informal definition
are 30 and 25 percentage points lower at the 10th and 25th percentile, respectively. In contrast, our main
estimates are more conservative at the top end, about 10 percentage points lower at the 90th percentile.
We now analyze the differences in the decomposition terms when we leave out from the analysis the
public sector workers either in the formal or informal sectors (Figure 1.9 and Table 1.A12 in the Appendix).
The number of such workers in the informal sector is relatively small as the majority are concentrated in
the formal sector. After excluding these workers, the treatment effects differ mainly from the median of the
distribution until approximately the 80th percentile. In turn, the difference in endowment effects emerges
in the bottom half of the distribution. In fact, the largest differences were found in 2005. Nevertheless,
20
































































Note: Difference calculated as SRS minus SVY estimates. Difference calculated as the original SVY minus alternate
SVY estimates. Demographics only model includes education (2nd degree polinomial), age (2nd degree polinomial) as
well as ethnicity and urban area dummies. Observations weighted by the survey’s probability weights and bootstraped−
VCE estimated according to the survey’s complex sampling design. Vertical lines corresponds to the percentile−based
bootstrap 95% confidence intervals.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI − National Household Survey (2005−2017)
Demograph. (M1) M1 + Indust. (M2) Full (M2 + Occupat.)
the differences are negative, suggesting that our main results are more conservative than those under this
alternative definition. This is unsurprising given that public sector workers tend to be relatively well paid
in Peru. Finally, we compare our results with those arising after estimating the decompositions without
individual sampling weights. In other words, we treat the data as originating from simple random sampling
(Figure 1.10 and Table 1.A13 in the Appendix). The results suggest that differences are small in magnitude
and not statistically significant.
Consequently, we can assert that results presented here are robust across models estimated and, import-
antly, when comparing to the results that cater for the sample design. Overall, the core estimates reported
in the main text are more conservative than those that consider only the private workers in both formal and
informal sectors. The sensitivity when excluding independent workers from the informal sample needs to
be further assessed. Notwithstanding, it is crucial to consider that our main key policy results still hold
even if we assume this latter alternative definition. Specifically, in the informal sector, sticky floor and
‘glass ceilings’ are present and persisted across the years, with the former phenomenon considerable more
pronounced than the latter.
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Note: Difference calculated as SRS minus SVY estimates. Difference calculated as the original SVY minus alternate SVY estimates. Demographics only model
includes education (2nd degree polinomial), age (2nd degree polinomial) as well as ethnicity and urban area dummies. Observations weighted by the survey’s
probability weights and bootstraped−VCE estimated according to the survey’s complex sampling design. Vertical lines corresponds to the percentile−based
bootstrap 95% confidence intervals.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI − National Household Survey (2005−2017)
Demograph. (M1) M1 + Indust. (M2) Full (M2 + Occupat.)
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Note: Sample includes individuals between 18 and 65 years. Difference calculated as SRS minus SVY estimates. Demographics only model includes education
(2nd degree polinomial), age (2nd degree polinomial) as well as ethnicity and urban area dummies. Vertical lines corresponds to the percentile−based bootstrap
95% confidence intervals.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI − National Household Survey (2005−2017)
Demograph. (M1) M1 + Indust. (M2) Full (M2 + Occupat.)
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1.5 Conclusions and policy recommendations
This study used RIF regressions (Firpo et al. 2007, 2009) as the primary tool to extend the Oaxaca-Blinder
gender-wage gap decomposition (Oaxaca 1973 and Blinder 1973) to every percentile of the unconditional
(log) hourly-wage distribution. For the 2005-2017 period, characterized by the high growth of hourly
wages in both the formal and informal sector, this extension allowed us to decompose the unconditional
difference between men and women into a part attributable to unequal treatment against women (typically
framed as discrimination against women in the labour economics literature) and that part attributable to
differences in levels of characteristics (endowments). Hence, this study advances the existing literature for
the Latin American region and mainly Peru since previous analyzes have only focused on the mean of the
wages distribution and have not considered intrinsic differences in formal and informal labour markets. In
addition, it focuses on the pay gap over a period of sharp and rapid economic growth in Peru.
Results suggest that, across different models, gaps are statistically significant across the distribution
of wages in the formal and informal labour markets, revealing the existence of ‘sticky floors’ and ‘glass
ceilings’ in both sectors. These two phenomena have persisted over time. In addition, the magnitudes of
these gaps are more striking in the informal sector and are remarkably high at the bottom of the distribution
(ranging from 40% to 50% in 2005) and have increased in 2017 (around 50% to 65%), whereas gaps at the
top end remain fairly constant (around 20%). This indicates that informal working women at the bottom
of the wages distribution face a more significant disadvantage when compared to men. Pay gaps oscillate
around 13% in 2011 and 2017 across the wages distribution in the formal sector. The results based on the
decomposition of these gaps differ between both sectors. In the formal sector, the treatment effect does not
exhibit a clear pattern in 2005, but by 2017 the endowment effects favour females and the treatment effects
favour males. A more remarkable result is found in the informal sector, where the gaps at every percentile
can be explained almost exclusively by the unequal treatment effect against women. In particular, there is
evidence that the magnitude of the sticky floor has persisted over time in this sector.
The decomposition estimates appear robust across different models at every percentile. Importantly, the
results presented here are not materially different depending on how the sample design is treated. However,
they are more conservative than those under an alternative definition of employment, excluding public
sector workers from the sample. Nevertheless, it is important to note that excluding self-employed informal
workers does have statistical effects on the results presented here. These differences are greater at the bottom
of the distribution. However, even under this robustness check, the main results are that the treatment effect
exhibits deeper ‘sticky floors’ than ‘glass ceilings’, which is a finding that remains unchanged.
Consequently, from a policy-maker’s perspective, the most important take-away is that informal working
women at the bottom end of the distribution are those that remain the most vulnerable given their low hourly
wages and the fact that they suffer a higher burden of discrimination. The ’Peruvian Growth Miracle’ is not
one that reduces the gender pay gaps over this period. This result casts doubt on the overall effectiveness of
policies put in place by the Peruvian government to alleviate and mitigate this problem. A tentative solution
would require a more coordinated effort in terms of increasing the transition of workers from the informal
to the formal sector since an essential part in reducing wage inequality in Latin America in the last decades
can be attributed to this shift (Messina and Silva 2018).
The empirical analysis reported here is largely descriptive in nature. Nevertheless, this does not diminish
the contribution of the empirical exercise to the debate on gender inequality in Peru. In particular, the
vulnerable nature of women at the bottom end of the pay distribution in the informal sector is a consistent
theme that emerges and one that should animate policy concern. Nevertheless, two key elements need to
be incorporated into future research on the gender wage gap in Peru. The first and most important is to
explicitly model selection into employment and formal/informal choice and establish if the results stated
here are robust to selection correction. The literature on the appropriate way to correct such selection bias
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within the RIF framework is not a settled issue. No strong consensus has yet emerged on the appropriate
empirical strategies to adopt. However, we believe the magnitude and persistence of the gender treatment
effects reported at the bottom end of the pay distribution are likely to be invariant to the selection correction
procedures, though this awaits further research. The second element is to further analyze to what extent
the findings presented here remain invariant to the use of alternative definitions of informal workers. The
robustness checks undertaken here have provided some insights on this issue. However, this key definitional
concept is not uniquely defined as it varies across both context and countries. Although the use of the
non-pensionable nature of the job as the basis for classification of informal and formal sectors offers a
meaningful characterization of informality in Peru, other definitions must be considered as a means of
investigating the robustness of this definition to alternative definitions and classifications. This remains a
central part of an agenda for future research here.
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Appendix
Table 1.A1 – Descriptive statistics of hourly-wages for males and females by sector, 2005, 2011 and 2017
2005 2011 2017
Females Males Females Males Females Males
Formal
Mean 7.283 (0.460) 7.132 (0.501) 8.690 (0.227) 9.287 (0.259) 11.774 (0.393) 11.890 (0.224)
P10 2.206 (0.098) 2.077 (0.054) 3.065 (0.060) 3.237 (0.046) 4.310 (0.053) 4.385 (0.060)
P25 3.293 (0.116) 2.906 (0.069) 4.219 (0.098) 4.375 (0.069) 5.536 (0.086) 5.919 (0.069)
P50 5.370 (0.183) 4.540 (0.116) 6.621 (0.165) 6.591 (0.105) 8.593 (0.170) 8.735 (0.125)
P75 8.730 (0.327) 7.187 (0.257) 10.509 (0.194) 10.206 (0.164) 13.812 (0.245) 13.635 (0.209)
P90 12.527 (1.955) 11.984 (1.218) 15.655 (0.681) 16.078 (0.470) 20.708 (0.505) 20.770 (0.499)
Gini 0.412 (0.021) 0.477 (0.025) 0.384 (0.010) 0.415 (0.012) 0.396 (0.017) 0.388 (0.008)
Informal
Mean 2.416 (0.080) 2.601 (0.068) 3.684 (0.098) 4.715 (0.087) 5.035 (0.152) 5.813 (0.075)
P10 0.381 (0.013) 0.557 (0.014) 0.604 (0.015) 1.121 (0.021) 0.898 (0.024) 1.499 (0.025)
P25 0.828 (0.016) 1.075 (0.020) 1.317 (0.030) 2.017 (0.024) 1.858 (0.033) 2.615 (0.042)
P50 1.595 (0.026) 1.866 (0.024) 2.461 (0.032) 3.287 (0.035) 3.456 (0.047) 4.314 (0.042)
P75 2.687 (0.059) 2.903 (0.049) 4.065 (0.072) 5.130 (0.064) 5.659 (0.081) 6.623 (0.069)
P90 4.660 (0.139) 4.807 (0.086) 7.009 (0.151) 8.470 (0.190) 9.289 (0.203) 10.429 (0.198)
Gini 0.517 (0.012) 0.464 (0.012) 0.508 (0.011) 0.464 (0.008) 0.495 (0.014) 0.435 (0.006)
Note: (Ln.) Sample includes individuals between 18 and 65 years. Estimates calculated applying sampling weights and VCE
corrected according to survey’s complex sample design. SE in parenthesis.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI - National Household Survey (2005-2017)
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Female
Male
Note: Dashed and solid lines refer to informal and formal sectors, respectively. Sample includes working individuals
between 18 and 65 years.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI − National Household Survey (2004−2017)
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Table 1.A2 – Raw wage gaps by sector, 2005, 2011 and 2017
OLS P. 10 P. 25 P. 50 P. 75 P. 90
β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE
Formal
2005 -0.118*** (0.038) -0.058 (0.052) -0.128*** (0.046) -0.169*** (0.044) -0.199*** (0.041) -0.045 (0.094)
2011 0.025 (0.020) 0.054** (0.023) 0.036 (0.024) -0.006 (0.029) -0.028 (0.023) 0.026 (0.043)
2017 0.022 (0.015) 0.017 (0.018) 0.067*** (0.017) 0.018 (0.022) -0.013 (0.021) 0.001 (0.030)
Informal
2005 0.193*** (0.020) 0.376*** (0.043) 0.260*** (0.027) 0.159*** (0.018) 0.080*** (0.022) 0.030 (0.029)
2011 0.359*** (0.016) 0.621*** (0.037) 0.428*** (0.025) 0.291*** (0.015) 0.233*** (0.019) 0.191*** (0.028)
2017 0.274*** (0.015) 0.512*** (0.033) 0.340*** (0.023) 0.223*** (0.014) 0.158*** (0.016) 0.117*** (0.026)
Note: Sample includes working individuals between 18 and 65 years. Gender dummy equals 1 if individual is male and 0 otherwise. Observations
weighted by the survey’s probability weights and VCE corrected according to survey’s complex sample design. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant
at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level
Elaborated by the author based on INEI - National Household Survey (2005-2017)
Table 1.A3 – Modelled wage gaps by sector, 2005, 2011 and 2017
OLS P. 10 P. 25 P. 50 P. 75 P. 90
β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE β SE
Formal
2005 (Obs=4,706)
Observed -0.118*** (0.038) -0.072* (0.043) -0.102*** (0.039) -0.189*** (0.040) -0.246*** (0.051) -0.024 (0.074)
Model 1 (Demograph. only) 0.051 (0.037) 0.031 (0.043) 0.031 (0.036) -0.026 (0.036) -0.070 (0.049) 0.178** (0.073)
Model 2 (M1 + Industry) 0.024 (0.033) 0.054 (0.043) 0.058 (0.036) -0.018 (0.036) -0.110** (0.048) 0.036 (0.070)
Model 3 (M2 + Occupation) 0.067** (0.030) 0.088** (0.041) 0.107*** (0.033) 0.021 (0.035) -0.076 (0.046) 0.087 (0.069)
2011 (Obs=9,050)
Observed 0.025 (0.020) 0.050** (0.024) 0.025 (0.024) -0.001 (0.026) -0.031 (0.026) 0.032 (0.046)
Model 1 (Demograph. only) 0.169*** (0.017) 0.126*** (0.025) 0.136*** (0.022) 0.153*** (0.024) 0.125*** (0.024) 0.229*** (0.045)
Model 2 (M1 + Industry) 0.139*** (0.018) 0.115*** (0.026) 0.117*** (0.022) 0.134*** (0.024) 0.091*** (0.024) 0.150*** (0.047)
Model 3 (M2 + Occupation) 0.166*** (0.018) 0.141*** (0.026) 0.145*** (0.021) 0.157*** (0.024) 0.116*** (0.025) 0.195*** (0.048)
2017 (Obs=13,746)
Observed 0.022 (0.015) 0.027 (0.018) 0.074*** (0.018) 0.020 (0.020) -0.015 (0.021) 0.001 (0.027)
Model 1 (Demograph. only) 0.155*** (0.013) 0.090*** (0.018) 0.177*** (0.017) 0.166*** (0.018) 0.131*** (0.019) 0.162*** (0.026)
Model 2 (M1 + Industry) 0.134*** (0.013) 0.083*** (0.019) 0.162*** (0.018) 0.153*** (0.018) 0.110*** (0.019) 0.124*** (0.027)
Model 3 (M2 + Occupation) 0.138*** (0.013) 0.083*** (0.019) 0.158*** (0.017) 0.154*** (0.018) 0.117*** (0.020) 0.133*** (0.028)
Informal
2005 (Obs=21,134)
Observed 0.193*** (0.020) 0.388*** (0.039) 0.273*** (0.027) 0.166*** (0.019) 0.072*** (0.023) 0.031 (0.032)
Model 1 (Demograph. only) 0.276*** (0.018) 0.470*** (0.038) 0.360*** (0.025) 0.244*** (0.018) 0.155*** (0.022) 0.126*** (0.032)
Model 2 (M1 + Industry) 0.317*** (0.019) 0.501*** (0.041) 0.386*** (0.027) 0.274*** (0.019) 0.195*** (0.024) 0.195*** (0.037)
Model 3 (M2 + Occupation) 0.322*** (0.019) 0.516*** (0.042) 0.394*** (0.027) 0.278*** (0.019) 0.198*** (0.024) 0.199*** (0.037)
2011 (Obs=24,446)
Observed 0.359*** (0.016) 0.657*** (0.037) 0.419*** (0.021) 0.289*** (0.016) 0.235*** (0.019) 0.183*** (0.027)
Model 1 (Demograph. only) 0.412*** (0.016) 0.731*** (0.037) 0.473*** (0.020) 0.333*** (0.016) 0.279*** (0.019) 0.234*** (0.028)
Model 2 (M1 + Industry) 0.434*** (0.018) 0.728*** (0.040) 0.485*** (0.023) 0.341*** (0.018) 0.290*** (0.022) 0.312*** (0.034)
Model 3 (M2 + Occupation) 0.421*** (0.018) 0.745*** (0.041) 0.492*** (0.023) 0.331*** (0.018) 0.262*** (0.022) 0.269*** (0.034)
2017 (Obs=30,269)
Observed 0.274*** (0.015) 0.512*** (0.032) 0.331*** (0.021) 0.222*** (0.015) 0.169*** (0.016) 0.111*** (0.024)
Model 1 (Demograph. only) 0.341*** (0.014) 0.607*** (0.032) 0.408*** (0.020) 0.274*** (0.015) 0.218*** (0.016) 0.169*** (0.024)
Model 2 (M1 + Industry) 0.373*** (0.016) 0.638*** (0.036) 0.447*** (0.022) 0.286*** (0.017) 0.238*** (0.020) 0.237*** (0.031)
Model 3 (M2 + Occupation) 0.369*** (0.016) 0.664*** (0.037) 0.468*** (0.022) 0.290*** (0.017) 0.217*** (0.020) 0.196*** (0.031)
it:Note: Sample includes individuals between 18 and 65 years. Gender dummy equals 1 if individual is male and 0 otherwise. Demographics only model includes education
(2nd degree polinomial), age (2nd degree polinomial) as well as ethnicity and urban area dummies; the full model includes adds a set of industry dummies and occupation
dummies. Observations weighted by the survey’s probability weights and bootstrapped-VCE estimated according to survey’s complex sampling design. * Significant at 10%
level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI - National Household Survey (2005-2017)
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Table 1.A4 – Regression models by gender (demographics only model) in the formal sector, 2005 and 2017
Females Males
OLS RIF OLS RIF
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
2005
Schooling (years) -0.103*** 0.000 -0.002 -0.058*** -0.138*** -0.261*** 0.018 0.055 0.143** -0.018 -0.070*** -0.080
(0.026) (0.034) (0.022) (0.015) (0.025) (0.070) (0.038) (0.078) (0.069) (0.039) (0.022) (0.063)
Schooling (years)2 0.009*** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.004** 0.001 -0.000 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Age (years) 0.021 0.030** 0.047*** 0.060*** 0.005 -0.036 0.028* 0.042 0.042 0.046** 0.006 -0.035
(0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.040) (0.016) (0.034) (0.032) (0.021) (0.019) (0.054)
Age (years)2 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000*** 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
If indigenous (d) -0.070 -0.145* -0.035 -0.050 -0.008 -0.033 -0.101* 0.137 0.155 -0.056 -0.203*** -0.406***
(0.049) (0.080) (0.057) (0.050) (0.067) (0.109) (0.060) (0.085) (0.101) (0.127) (0.074) (0.072)
If hh in urban area (d) 0.053 0.060 0.046 -0.055 -0.063 0.222* 0.096** 0.074 0.118** -0.148* 0.065 0.386***
(0.060) (0.076) (0.066) (0.060) (0.067) (0.124) (0.047) (0.121) (0.056) (0.077) (0.068) (0.075)
Constant 0.587* -0.461 -0.620* -0.402 1.435*** 2.962*** -0.148 -1.154 -1.975** -0.363 1.542*** 2.462**
(0.336) (0.332) (0.352) (0.256) (0.334) (0.772) (0.407) (0.868) (0.856) (0.451) (0.356) (1.124)
Observations 3245 3245 3245 3245 3245 3245 1461 1461 1461 1461 1461 1461
R2 0.276 0.049 0.125 0.239 0.206 0.113 0.212 0.061 0.193 0.187 0.110 0.035
Model test 321.789 137.005 194.636 966.730 380.360 64.037 236.795 34.116 161.561 276.861 214.121 56.067
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Educ. test 158.050 107.037 139.193 584.111 295.695 35.189 222.073 27.509 92.033 187.872 105.996 19.738
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
2017
Schooling (years) -0.064*** 0.044** 0.023 -0.042*** -0.127*** -0.240*** -0.050*** 0.060*** 0.021 -0.077*** -0.143*** -0.156***
(0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.024) (0.012) (0.023) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019)
Schooling (years)2 0.007*** 0.000 0.002** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.007*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age (years) 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.032*** 0.023** 0.029*** 0.018** 0.022*** 0.044*** 0.035*** 0.031***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Age (years)2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
If indigenous (d) -0.091*** -0.001 -0.061 -0.051 -0.007 -0.191*** -0.155*** 0.067 -0.025 -0.178** -0.236*** -0.279***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.058) (0.061) (0.081) (0.058) (0.048)
If hh in urban area (d) 0.131*** 0.144*** 0.132*** 0.113*** 0.130*** 0.156*** 0.103** 0.049 0.049 0.083* 0.127** 0.169***
(0.019) (0.042) (0.035) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.043) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048) (0.050) (0.038)
Constant 0.941*** 0.061 0.015 0.540*** 1.629*** 2.735*** 0.743*** 0.169 0.154 0.212* 1.531*** 2.304***
(0.131) (0.152) (0.182) (0.161) (0.164) (0.217) (0.141) (0.218) (0.160) (0.125) (0.177) (0.195)
Observations 8473 8473 8473 8473 8473 8473 5273 5273 5273 5273 5273 5273
R2 0.258 0.050 0.125 0.190 0.190 0.128 0.322 0.087 0.207 0.300 0.198 0.085
Model test 2671.019 916.302 2568.158 2279.100 1689.871 488.419 2288.968 297.263 2109.318 3354.224 1285.522 340.555
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Educ. test 1381.002 719.692 1102.488 1573.107 1233.623 409.354 1829.973 239.707 879.476 2601.900 1188.097 320.159
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Note: Sample include individuals between 18 and 65 years. Observations weighted by the survey’s probability weights, bootstrapped-VCE estimated according to the complex sampling design
in parenthesis and p-values of the joint-hypotheses tests in brackets. (d)=Dummy variable. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 1.A5 – Regression models by gender (full specification) in the formal sector, 2005
Females Males
OLS RIF OLS RIF
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Schooling (years) -0.074*** 0.001 0.012 -0.028* -0.102*** -0.226*** -0.013 0.037 0.062 -0.045 -0.070*** -0.140**
(0.021) (0.035) (0.023) (0.015) (0.023) (0.059) (0.038) (0.084) (0.072) (0.042) (0.023) (0.066)
Schooling (years)2 0.006*** 0.001 0.000 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.005*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Age (years) 0.018 0.020* 0.032** 0.040*** 0.003 -0.009 0.030* 0.040 0.031 0.036 0.012 0.002
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.030) (0.016) (0.038) (0.034) (0.025) (0.018) (0.047)
Age (years)2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
If indigenous (d) -0.085** -0.142* -0.048 -0.081* -0.031 -0.036 -0.107** 0.125 0.128 -0.077 -0.201*** -0.378***
(0.039) (0.073) (0.049) (0.046) (0.062) (0.107) (0.049) (0.096) (0.082) (0.114) (0.072) (0.075)
If hh in urban area (d) 0.035 0.050 0.056 -0.034 -0.069 0.152 0.067 0.103 0.098* -0.150** 0.031 0.211***
(0.056) (0.064) (0.056) (0.047) (0.068) (0.119) (0.046) (0.110) (0.060) (0.072) (0.063) (0.069)
Industry
-Mining and Quarrying 1.031*** 0.507*** 0.520*** 0.706*** 1.008*** 2.056*** 1.205*** 0.265 0.651*** 0.790*** 0.972*** 3.735***
(0.100) (0.136) (0.119) (0.129) (0.123) (0.262) (0.303) (0.346) (0.250) (0.199) (0.183) (0.524)
-Manufacturing 0.231*** 0.183 0.068 0.136* 0.180*** 0.259*** 0.077 -0.052 0.311 0.129 0.089 0.192
(0.057) (0.152) (0.103) (0.081) (0.066) (0.083) (0.171) (0.415) (0.215) (0.132) (0.093) (0.255)
-Construction 0.133** -0.005 0.021 0.120** 0.112 0.083 0.447 0.419 0.483 0.649 0.590* 0.593
(0.060) (0.193) (0.126) (0.060) (0.081) (0.110) (0.339) (0.367) (0.418) (0.453) (0.346) (0.702)
-Wholesale and Retail 0.161** 0.264* 0.018 0.025 0.035 0.217* -0.017 -0.114 0.023 0.003 0.006 -0.315
(0.063) (0.140) (0.103) (0.070) (0.069) (0.118) (0.209) (0.481) (0.288) (0.206) (0.110) (0.236)
-Transport, Storage, and Comm. -0.088 -0.149 -0.277 -0.216*** -0.066 0.170 0.731* 0.426 0.470 0.533 0.598 1.984*
(0.123) (0.195) (0.174) (0.081) (0.111) (0.239) (0.424) (0.383) (0.471) (0.420) (0.385) (1.104)
-Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 0.420*** 0.258** 0.090 0.109* 0.295*** 0.921*** 0.294* 0.366 0.440 0.275 0.161 0.452
(0.130) (0.124) (0.105) (0.061) (0.101) (0.336) (0.165) (0.343) (0.281) (0.174) (0.122) (0.301)
-Community, Social and Personal Svs -0.014 0.241* 0.128* 0.139** -0.135* -0.454*** -0.056 0.150 0.456* 0.057 -0.217 -0.623**
(0.065) (0.129) (0.077) (0.063) (0.071) (0.121) (0.197) (0.355) (0.252) (0.171) (0.152) (0.307)
Occupation
-Managers, Profess. and Armed forces 0.658*** 0.556*** 0.672*** 0.781*** 0.570*** 0.357** 0.873*** 0.599** 1.366*** 1.138*** 0.504*** 0.513*
(0.092) (0.089) (0.074) (0.082) (0.091) (0.182) (0.164) (0.250) (0.208) (0.132) (0.154) (0.308)
-Technicians and associates 0.348*** 0.474*** 0.575*** 0.532*** 0.195** 0.206 0.521*** 0.421* 1.054*** 0.660*** 0.155 0.490*
(0.074) (0.103) (0.079) (0.086) (0.076) (0.131) (0.133) (0.252) (0.249) (0.110) (0.114) (0.275)
-Clerks 0.401*** 0.447*** 0.464*** 0.416*** 0.308*** 0.200* 0.569*** 0.472** 1.092*** 0.659*** 0.205** 0.349**
Continued on next page
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Table 1.A5 – Regression models by gender (full specification) in the formal sector, 2005 (continued from previous page)
Females Males
OLS RIF OLS RIF
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
(0.059) (0.088) (0.077) (0.076) (0.086) (0.105) (0.082) (0.213) (0.201) (0.114) (0.087) (0.174)
-Service and sales worker -0.091 0.031 0.180* 0.010 -0.160*** -0.424*** 0.004 -0.428 0.275 0.055 0.013 0.358
(0.074) (0.124) (0.103) (0.080) (0.060) (0.124) (0.174) (0.451) (0.331) (0.125) (0.085) (0.267)
-Skilled agric. and fish. workers 0.479 0.882*** 0.174 0.699 0.550 0.794
(0.393) (0.127) (0.494) (0.491) (0.429) (0.759)
-Craft and related trades workers 0.125** 0.356*** 0.327*** 0.312*** 0.063 -0.235** 0.019 -0.099 0.145 -0.062 -0.060 -0.139
(0.055) (0.089) (0.088) (0.075) (0.068) (0.104) (0.143) (0.407) (0.219) (0.108) (0.078) (0.217)
-Plant and machine operators 0.133** 0.349*** 0.346*** 0.251*** 0.009 -0.322*** 0.081 -0.129 -0.122 0.316 -0.148 -0.266
(0.066) (0.081) (0.094) (0.073) (0.099) (0.125) (0.278) (0.837) (0.732) (0.552) (0.098) (0.232)
Constant 0.401* -0.425 -0.453 -0.216 1.258*** 2.115*** -0.034 -0.913 -1.459* -0.008 1.417*** 1.855**
(0.243) (0.329) (0.347) (0.244) (0.297) (0.538) (0.386) (0.868) (0.770) (0.478) (0.302) (0.885)
Observations 3245 3245 3245 3245 3245 3245 1461 1461 1461 1461 1461 1461
R2 0.414 0.104 0.224 0.354 0.282 0.229 0.367 0.158 0.361 0.295 0.192 0.221
Model test 12086.98 3769.29 14685.49 6.5e+05 10253.88 2.4e+05 20705.70 1.8e+05 14730.23 15613.87 57237.55 4043.31
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Educ. test 62.45 5.15 9.38 52.78 105.45 43.25 9.36 0.23 1.16 6.24 21.84 14.19
[0.00] [0.08] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.89] [0.56] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00]
Industry test 145.41 54.62 90.82 108.91 235.53 102.44 23.60 17.58 42.56 100.57 94.57 102.97
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Occup. test 102.42 92.60 126.27 184.92 74.26 32.74 72.85 55.39 165.13 89.63 30.61 7.07
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.31]
Note: Sample include individuals between 18 and 65 years. Observations weighted by the survey’s probability weights, bootstrapped-VCE estimated according to the
complex sampling design in parenthesis and p-values of the joint-hypotheses tests in brackets. (d)=Dummy variable. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5%
level; *** Significant at 1% level.
30
Table 1.A6 – Regression models by gender (full specification) in the formal sector, 2017
Females Males
OLS RIF OLS RIF
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Schooling (years) -0.056*** 0.037* 0.026 -0.021 -0.107*** -0.239*** -0.041*** 0.073*** 0.026 -0.049*** -0.130*** -0.163***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.014) (0.027) (0.014) (0.022) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022)
Schooling (years)2 0.005*** -0.001 0.000 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.005*** -0.002* 0.001 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age (years) 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.028*** 0.021** 0.029*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.031***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
Age (years)2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
If indigenous (d) -0.089*** -0.008 -0.064 -0.058 -0.005 -0.174*** -0.118*** 0.105* 0.028 -0.154** -0.216*** -0.258***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.042) (0.041) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.062) (0.060) (0.074) (0.058) (0.050)
If hh in urban area (d) 0.112*** 0.106** 0.105*** 0.098*** 0.135*** 0.150*** 0.117*** 0.095** 0.092** 0.136*** 0.128** 0.128***
(0.021) (0.043) (0.036) (0.032) (0.034) (0.025) (0.037) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.052) (0.039)
Industry
-Mining and Quarrying 0.464*** 0.335*** 0.305*** 0.447*** 0.494*** 0.461*** 0.437** -0.048 -0.010 0.258* 0.479* 1.247**
(0.046) (0.053) (0.033) (0.049) (0.062) (0.079) (0.176) (0.083) (0.090) (0.139) (0.274) (0.577)
-Manufacturing 0.113*** 0.126** 0.049 0.074** 0.049 0.114** 0.028 -0.197** -0.170 0.032 0.139** 0.098
(0.034) (0.059) (0.036) (0.034) (0.042) (0.051) (0.059) (0.079) (0.107) (0.096) (0.064) (0.090)
-Construction 0.180*** 0.170** 0.179*** 0.232*** 0.148*** 0.121** 0.000 -0.152 -0.191 -0.025 0.099 0.276**
(0.044) (0.076) (0.046) (0.057) (0.043) (0.047) (0.045) (0.102) (0.121) (0.076) (0.073) (0.132)
-Wholesale and Retail 0.046 0.118* 0.009 -0.002 0.033 0.014 -0.115** -0.240*** -0.274*** -0.127 0.004 0.126
(0.037) (0.062) (0.048) (0.045) (0.031) (0.041) (0.058) (0.078) (0.091) (0.094) (0.055) (0.079)
-Transport, Storage, and Comm. 0.114*** 0.124* 0.051 0.103*** 0.075** 0.127 -0.002 -0.109 -0.155 -0.028 0.037 0.141
(0.040) (0.072) (0.056) (0.037) (0.034) (0.083) (0.051) (0.104) (0.107) (0.084) (0.065) (0.103)
-Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 0.055* 0.150** -0.011 0.017 -0.017 0.073 -0.009 -0.193** -0.299*** -0.002 0.093 0.110**
(0.029) (0.063) (0.044) (0.047) (0.032) (0.055) (0.058) (0.076) (0.084) (0.080) (0.063) (0.055)
-Community, Social and Personal Svs 0.016 0.116** 0.028 0.081* -0.023 -0.141*** -0.051 -0.161** -0.151* 0.067 0.017 -0.019
(0.034) (0.059) (0.040) (0.048) (0.038) (0.051) (0.042) (0.072) (0.084) (0.059) (0.036) (0.053)
Occupation
-Managers, Profess. and Armed forces 0.557*** 0.399*** 0.576*** 0.792*** 0.541*** 0.272*** 0.396*** 0.306*** 0.565*** 0.610*** 0.265*** -0.007
(0.024) (0.050) (0.045) (0.029) (0.038) (0.063) (0.045) (0.053) (0.042) (0.045) (0.096) (0.114)
-Technicians and associates 0.400*** 0.313*** 0.464*** 0.579*** 0.381*** 0.222*** 0.331*** 0.323*** 0.609*** 0.390*** 0.132** -0.015
(0.036) (0.043) (0.040) (0.046) (0.053) (0.056) (0.047) (0.066) (0.064) (0.071) (0.053) (0.046)
-Clerks 0.321*** 0.326*** 0.391*** 0.431*** 0.264*** 0.108*** 0.264*** 0.253*** 0.477*** 0.351*** 0.116** -0.024
Continued on next page
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Table 1.A6 – Regression models by gender (full specification) in the formal sector, 2017 (continued from previous page)
Females Males
OLS RIF OLS RIF
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
(0.029) (0.051) (0.037) (0.042) (0.030) (0.039) (0.041) (0.061) (0.054) (0.062) (0.059) (0.063)
-Service and sales worker 0.067* -0.007 0.064 0.078* 0.029 0.035 0.029 0.014 0.173*** 0.059 -0.037 -0.130*
(0.038) (0.084) (0.061) (0.043) (0.035) (0.043) (0.047) (0.090) (0.062) (0.071) (0.052) (0.067)
-Skilled agric. and fish. workers 0.133 -0.051 0.222 0.205 0.254* 0.065 0.090 0.047 0.636** 0.052 0.016 0.028
(0.181) (0.414) (0.230) (0.136) (0.154) (0.095) (0.140) (0.305) (0.249) (0.335) (0.090) (0.087)
-Craft and related trades workers 0.155*** 0.233*** 0.281*** 0.266*** 0.107** -0.064* -0.116 -0.275* 0.043 -0.061 -0.102 0.018
(0.027) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040) (0.043) (0.035) (0.102) (0.145) (0.134) (0.126) (0.087) (0.159)
-Plant and machine operators 0.231*** 0.273*** 0.363*** 0.310*** 0.120*** 0.035 -0.300** -0.095 -0.121 -0.322*** -0.212*** -0.160
(0.028) (0.055) (0.043) (0.049) (0.034) (0.045) (0.131) (0.341) (0.269) (0.082) (0.077) (0.106)
Constant 0.951*** 0.080 0.081 0.580*** 1.610*** 2.716*** 0.792*** 0.250 0.285* 0.308** 1.547*** 2.285***
(0.140) (0.131) (0.183) (0.173) (0.175) (0.237) (0.137) (0.201) (0.158) (0.128) (0.175) (0.210)
Observations 8473 8473 8473 8473 8473 8473 5273 5273 5273 5273 5273 5273
R2 0.326 0.084 0.188 0.275 0.229 0.141 0.362 0.128 0.272 0.344 0.209 0.095
Model test 35253.48 57240.70 3.5e+05 82363.14 45464.42 5052.66 1.9e+05 17505.87 1.4e+05 7537.77 6737.19 1753.29
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Educ. test 436.39 43.44 116.46 117.54 353.50 179.21 292.91 78.36 117.86 254.73 93.86 97.59
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Industry test 147.41 198.39 151.45 182.18 167.82 96.08 25.88 30.10 32.50 15.76 31.74 32.19
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00]
Occup. test 1164.36 134.57 438.42 952.32 401.79 47.47 226.72 120.87 279.38 376.27 31.68 8.27
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.31]
Note: Sample include individuals between 18 and 65 years. Observations weighted by the survey’s probability weights, bootstrapped-VCE estimated according to the complex sampling design in parenthesis
and p-values of the joint-hypotheses tests in brackets. (d)=Dummy variable. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 1.A7 – Regressions models by gender (demographics only model) in the informal sector, 2005 and 2017
Females Males
OLS RIF OLS RIF
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
2005
Schooling (years) 0.047*** 0.162*** 0.120*** 0.050*** -0.014 -0.058*** 0.048*** 0.183*** 0.081*** 0.031*** -0.018 -0.028
(0.008) (0.022) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.016) (0.015) (0.025) (0.021) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018)
Schooling (years)2 0.001 -0.007*** -0.004*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.001 -0.008*** -0.001 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age (years) 0.051*** 0.065*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.015 0.025*** 0.039*** 0.062*** 0.074***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Age (years)2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
If indigenous (d) -0.179*** -0.404*** -0.251*** -0.125*** -0.068*** -0.093*** -0.169*** -0.330*** -0.281*** -0.105*** -0.105** -0.051
(0.018) (0.057) (0.033) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.038) (0.110) (0.056) (0.033) (0.042) (0.040)
If hh in urban area (d) 0.453*** 0.684*** 0.694*** 0.449*** 0.304*** 0.234*** 0.586*** 1.334*** 0.797*** 0.447*** 0.269*** 0.253***
(0.023) (0.057) (0.032) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.040) (0.111) (0.064) (0.035) (0.029) (0.023)
Constant -1.265*** -2.965*** -2.023*** -1.100*** -0.594*** 0.022 -1.531*** -3.153*** -1.894*** -1.147*** -0.912*** -0.561***
(0.053) (0.161) (0.111) (0.080) (0.101) (0.151) (0.152) (0.348) (0.173) (0.148) (0.194) (0.210)
Observations 13296 13296 13296 13296 13296 13296 7838 7838 7838 7838 7838 7838
R2 0.222 0.083 0.157 0.183 0.131 0.087 0.203 0.109 0.139 0.144 0.123 0.060
Model test 2911.232 1272.204 1800.845 2634.208 1678.086 553.799 2276.907 913.014 2509.572 2027.585 1460.989 409.495
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Educ. test 392.349 69.453 214.370 712.064 323.896 278.876 221.039 53.105 76.774 186.233 385.634 89.607
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
2017
Schooling (years) 0.002 0.079*** 0.052*** 0.012 -0.024** -0.096*** 0.017* 0.074*** 0.054*** 0.014** -0.016 -0.044***
(0.008) (0.021) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015)
Schooling (years)2 0.003*** -0.002* -0.001 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.002*** -0.001 -0.000 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Age (years) 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.016 0.010 0.016*** 0.040*** 0.058***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
Age (years)2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
If indigenous (d) -0.056*** -0.056 -0.055** -0.037** -0.076*** -0.122*** 0.010 0.135** 0.043 -0.034 -0.064** -0.113**
(0.016) (0.049) (0.027) (0.017) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027) (0.066) (0.044) (0.026) (0.032) (0.048)
If hh in urban area (d) 0.457*** 0.780*** 0.664*** 0.397*** 0.258*** 0.230*** 0.666*** 1.291*** 0.993*** 0.497*** 0.302*** 0.249***
(0.020) (0.042) (0.028) (0.021) (0.023) (0.032) (0.024) (0.077) (0.034) (0.024) (0.021) (0.026)
Constant 0.259*** -1.171*** -0.410*** 0.436*** 0.827*** 1.448*** -0.304** -2.059*** -0.786*** 0.260** 0.365*** 0.487**
(0.080) (0.184) (0.104) (0.090) (0.102) (0.122) (0.119) (0.258) (0.140) (0.104) (0.127) (0.197)
Observations 16913 16913 16913 16913 16913 16913 13356 13356 13356 13356 13356 13356
R2 0.161 0.065 0.125 0.117 0.091 0.065 0.161 0.070 0.123 0.113 0.077 0.053
Model test 1386.627 1253.004 1674.052 1485.384 900.294 449.847 3602.882 1119.745 2883.952 3445.113 2045.784 601.757
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Educ. test 437.465 104.388 210.278 354.183 780.618 310.944 887.124 129.340 253.944 300.944 254.415 334.989
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Note: Sample include individuals between 18 and 65 years. Observations weighted by the survey’s probability weights, bootstrapped-VCE estimated according to the complex sampling design
in parenthesis and p-values of the joint-hypotheses tests in brackets. (d)=Dummy variable. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 1.A8 – Regression models by gender (full specification) in the informal sector, 2005
Females Males
OLS RIF OLS RIF
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Schooling (years) 0.065*** 0.146*** 0.109*** 0.054*** 0.023** 0.007 0.079*** 0.224*** 0.109*** 0.059*** 0.019 0.006
(0.007) (0.019) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.017) (0.014) (0.022) (0.020) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019)
Schooling (years)2 -0.002*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.001** 0.001 0.002 -0.002** -0.011*** -0.004*** -0.001 0.002 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age (years) 0.058*** 0.083*** 0.067*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.020 0.028*** 0.043*** 0.065*** 0.076***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Age (years)2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
If indigenous (d) -0.168*** -0.374*** -0.231*** -0.119*** -0.071*** -0.092*** -0.176*** -0.375*** -0.297*** -0.101*** -0.093** -0.045
(0.020) (0.057) (0.036) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.034) (0.109) (0.051) (0.032) (0.041) (0.040)
If hh in urban area (d) 0.241*** 0.266*** 0.336*** 0.259*** 0.193*** 0.189*** 0.519*** 1.300*** 0.740*** 0.368*** 0.191*** 0.196***
(0.030) (0.081) (0.047) (0.023) (0.021) (0.031) (0.038) (0.105) (0.057) (0.036) (0.033) (0.023)
Industry
-Mining and Quarrying 0.701*** 0.600*** 0.544*** 0.657*** 0.854*** 0.742** 0.751** 2.307*** 0.642 0.608 0.209 0.061
(0.123) (0.094) (0.123) (0.116) (0.218) (0.377) (0.311) (0.527) (0.835) (0.416) (0.274) (0.242)
-Manufacturing 0.133*** 0.112 0.187*** 0.230*** 0.183*** -0.150* 0.069 -0.157 0.204 0.233** 0.065 0.055
(0.037) (0.080) (0.065) (0.045) (0.065) (0.088) (0.088) (0.167) (0.163) (0.095) (0.137) (0.244)
-Construction 0.223*** 0.137* 0.225*** 0.283*** 0.361*** 0.100 0.311*** 0.119 0.396** 0.795*** 0.174 -0.403***
(0.040) (0.080) (0.076) (0.060) (0.054) (0.066) (0.095) (0.157) (0.171) (0.117) (0.245) (0.130)
-Wholesale and Retail 0.084* -0.064 0.028 0.131*** 0.167*** 0.178*** 0.162*** -0.097 0.179 0.182** 0.216*** 0.185**
(0.049) (0.090) (0.086) (0.048) (0.055) (0.059) (0.056) (0.136) (0.136) (0.081) (0.057) (0.073)
-Transport, Storage, and Comm. -0.021 0.034 -0.010 0.063 -0.064 -0.149 0.295** -0.016 0.297 0.226* 0.249** 0.572**
(0.042) (0.087) (0.075) (0.058) (0.052) (0.105) (0.122) (0.195) (0.189) (0.119) (0.117) (0.291)
-Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 0.140** 0.102 0.141** 0.221*** 0.138 0.181 0.295*** -0.084 0.122 0.406*** 0.502*** 0.517**
(0.064) (0.092) (0.068) (0.065) (0.090) (0.144) (0.088) (0.114) (0.169) (0.119) (0.136) (0.230)
-Community, Social and Personal Svs 0.123** 0.116 0.128** 0.177*** 0.083 0.015 0.168** -0.166 0.253* 0.295*** 0.213*** 0.088
(0.053) (0.081) (0.063) (0.059) (0.062) (0.107) (0.070) (0.140) (0.139) (0.085) (0.061) (0.116)
Occupation
-Managers, Profess. and Armed forces 0.595*** 0.105 0.139** 0.304*** 0.988*** 1.518*** 0.424*** 0.453*** 0.262*** 0.299*** 0.643*** 0.633***
(0.061) (0.082) (0.056) (0.047) (0.089) (0.226) (0.066) (0.124) (0.094) (0.076) (0.087) (0.125)
-Technicians and associates 0.474*** 0.140*** 0.112** 0.219*** 0.694*** 0.951*** 0.344*** 0.099 0.204*** 0.168*** 0.485*** 0.606**
(0.068) (0.046) (0.057) (0.058) (0.080) (0.135) (0.092) (0.133) (0.075) (0.055) (0.088) (0.244)
-Clerks 0.280*** 0.004 0.126 0.245*** 0.413*** 0.560*** 0.230*** 0.239*** 0.175* 0.175** 0.325** 0.248
Continued on next page
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Table 1.A8 – Regression models by gender (full specification) in the informal sector, 2005 (continued from previous page)
Females Males
OLS RIF OLS RIF
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
(0.068) (0.117) (0.081) (0.078) (0.098) (0.200) (0.056) (0.091) (0.096) (0.083) (0.127) (0.152)
-Service and sales worker 0.127*** 0.085 -0.011 0.065** 0.170*** 0.318*** -0.144*** -0.230*** -0.192*** -0.162*** -0.102** -0.075
(0.021) (0.062) (0.038) (0.033) (0.042) (0.105) (0.036) (0.070) (0.046) (0.043) (0.049) (0.064)
-Skilled agric. and fish. workers -0.284*** -0.830*** -0.643*** -0.183*** 0.014 0.067** -0.015 -0.172 0.052 -0.039 -0.028 0.027
(0.046) (0.114) (0.068) (0.045) (0.037) (0.029) (0.072) (0.215) (0.134) (0.076) (0.052) (0.072)
-Craft and related trades workers 0.044** -0.013 0.015 0.017 0.083 0.234*** -0.411*** -1.073*** -0.600*** -0.362*** -0.049 -0.113
(0.021) (0.053) (0.041) (0.035) (0.058) (0.079) (0.079) (0.217) (0.117) (0.105) (0.134) (0.265)
-Plant and machine operators 0.065* -0.011 0.004 0.043 0.096 0.070 -0.436*** -0.960*** -0.665*** -0.234 -0.206* -0.167
(0.039) (0.050) (0.066) (0.072) (0.065) (0.091) (0.119) (0.287) (0.227) (0.185) (0.113) (0.245)
Constant -1.255*** -2.762*** -1.870*** -1.113*** -0.689*** -0.107 -1.637*** -3.004*** -2.000*** -1.323*** -1.109*** -0.711***
(0.051) (0.171) (0.098) (0.074) (0.097) (0.141) (0.142) (0.357) (0.203) (0.141) (0.202) (0.227)
Observations 13296 13296 13296 13296 13296 13296 7838 7838 7838 7838 7838 7838
R2 0.275 0.109 0.198 0.215 0.186 0.134 0.244 0.131 0.160 0.173 0.156 0.080
Model test 1.9e+08 4293.66 65278.61 1.5e+06 1.9e+05 3.6e+06 82363.46 80963.03 2931.21 9157.24 11287.86 26911.05
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Educ. test 220.02 60.23 123.31 241.52 113.76 108.93 108.95 104.74 38.99 89.54 137.01 43.29
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Industry test 85.20 117.87 39.48 61.93 61.40 65.16 34.70 77.57 10.32 76.65 39.37 72.93
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.17] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Occup. test 207.94 129.58 175.50 55.29 235.78 138.71 98.36 85.96 55.30 52.62 98.90 66.30
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Note: Sample include individuals between 18 and 65 years. Observations weighted by the survey’s probability weights, bootstrapped-VCE estimated according to the complex sampling design in parenthesis
and p-values of the joint-hypotheses tests in brackets. (d)=Dummy variable. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 1.A9 – Regression models by gender (full specification) in the informal sector, 2017
Females Males
OLS RIF OLS RIF
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Schooling (years) 0.032*** 0.082*** 0.060*** 0.028*** 0.010 -0.011 0.044*** 0.099*** 0.074*** 0.031*** 0.011 -0.006
(0.008) (0.021) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.023) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014)
Schooling (years)2 -0.000 -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.000 0.001* 0.003*** -0.000 -0.003* -0.002** 0.000 0.001** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age (years) 0.040*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.019 0.014* 0.019*** 0.041*** 0.058***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.016) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Age (years)2 -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
If indigenous (d) -0.033** -0.006 -0.024 -0.027 -0.065*** -0.095*** 0.019 0.112* 0.057 -0.018 -0.044 -0.092**
(0.016) (0.049) (0.026) (0.016) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.060) (0.046) (0.027) (0.034) (0.046)
If hh in urban area (d) 0.213*** 0.240*** 0.291*** 0.198*** 0.125*** 0.192*** 0.628*** 1.380*** 0.889*** 0.414*** 0.242*** 0.209***
(0.022) (0.054) (0.032) (0.021) (0.022) (0.040) (0.028) (0.088) (0.035) (0.026) (0.023) (0.034)
Industry
-Mining and Quarrying 0.416*** 0.328*** 0.370*** 0.407*** 0.496*** 0.454*** 0.328** 0.815** 0.999*** 0.254 -0.441*** -0.331***
(0.067) (0.070) (0.060) (0.066) (0.111) (0.155) (0.135) (0.339) (0.217) (0.298) (0.076) (0.129)
-Manufacturing 0.045 0.081 0.100* 0.146** 0.051 -0.170** -0.256*** -0.764*** -0.149 0.030 -0.138* -0.223*
(0.036) (0.071) (0.056) (0.058) (0.053) (0.081) (0.073) (0.194) (0.117) (0.078) (0.075) (0.130)
-Construction 0.196*** 0.076 0.158*** 0.320*** 0.318*** 0.040 -0.035 -0.427* 0.156 0.109 0.050 -0.139
(0.030) (0.051) (0.048) (0.047) (0.037) (0.063) (0.111) (0.228) (0.141) (0.134) (0.138) (0.130)
-Wholesale and Retail 0.026 -0.055 -0.093 0.032 0.152*** 0.057 -0.094*** -0.501*** -0.173** -0.092* 0.064 0.116*
(0.028) (0.081) (0.062) (0.043) (0.029) (0.067) (0.034) (0.086) (0.084) (0.051) (0.047) (0.064)
-Transport, Storage, and Comm. -0.052 0.003 -0.128** -0.064 0.040 -0.037 -0.157** -0.366 -0.121 -0.112 -0.183** -0.152
(0.045) (0.055) (0.063) (0.057) (0.068) (0.084) (0.075) (0.241) (0.132) (0.141) (0.086) (0.121)
-Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 0.115** 0.117** 0.043 0.125** 0.151** 0.109 0.074 -0.398*** 0.010 0.116 0.261*** 0.249
(0.052) (0.051) (0.058) (0.051) (0.062) (0.113) (0.065) (0.134) (0.108) (0.073) (0.098) (0.154)
-Community, Social and Personal Svs 0.076* -0.012 0.019 0.125** 0.226*** 0.076 -0.042 -0.483*** -0.103 -0.017 0.131** 0.120
(0.041) (0.064) (0.055) (0.049) (0.042) (0.095) (0.035) (0.100) (0.098) (0.038) (0.060) (0.078)
Occupation
-Managers, Profess. and Armed forces 0.601*** 0.192*** 0.253*** 0.337*** 0.748*** 1.608*** 0.395*** 0.211** 0.232*** 0.282*** 0.470*** 0.772***
(0.070) (0.062) (0.053) (0.053) (0.077) (0.184) (0.067) (0.087) (0.064) (0.068) (0.077) (0.178)
-Technicians and associates 0.450*** 0.049 0.156*** 0.264*** 0.569*** 1.089*** 0.418*** 0.093 0.221*** 0.226*** 0.482*** 0.996***
(0.062) (0.043) (0.033) (0.039) (0.074) (0.178) (0.078) (0.153) (0.070) (0.067) (0.075) (0.160)
-Clerks 0.332*** 0.277*** 0.263*** 0.177*** 0.283*** 0.711*** 0.155*** 0.223** 0.282*** 0.238*** 0.139** -0.081
Continued on next page
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Table 1.A9 – Regression models by gender (full specification) in the informal sector, 2017 (continued from previous page)
Females Males
OLS RIF OLS RIF
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
(0.048) (0.047) (0.050) (0.061) (0.087) (0.149) (0.033) (0.090) (0.041) (0.048) (0.060) (0.094)
-Service and sales worker 0.099** 0.055 0.105* 0.029 0.103** 0.289*** -0.066** -0.066 -0.091* -0.016 -0.052* -0.042
(0.039) (0.077) (0.056) (0.052) (0.051) (0.097) (0.031) (0.078) (0.049) (0.031) (0.028) (0.055)
-Skilled agric. and fish. workers -0.403*** -1.128*** -0.777*** -0.290*** -0.009 0.086*** -0.228*** -0.277** -0.571*** -0.366*** -0.112*** 0.030
(0.020) (0.046) (0.034) (0.029) (0.019) (0.027) (0.041) (0.129) (0.113) (0.046) (0.029) (0.044)
-Craft and related trades workers 0.057* -0.077 -0.027 0.007 0.191*** 0.259*** -0.294*** -0.818*** -0.573*** -0.291*** 0.064 0.175
(0.031) (0.058) (0.028) (0.032) (0.039) (0.082) (0.081) (0.234) (0.113) (0.087) (0.067) (0.135)
-Plant and machine operators 0.017 -0.032 0.011 0.035 0.056 0.023 -0.332*** -0.956*** -0.537*** -0.178 -0.050 0.091
(0.039) (0.041) (0.046) (0.045) (0.065) (0.089) (0.128) (0.297) (0.180) (0.117) (0.131) (0.203)
Constant 0.209*** -0.932*** -0.289*** 0.394*** 0.632*** 1.109*** -0.208 -1.669*** -0.556*** 0.344*** 0.315** 0.398**
(0.079) (0.175) (0.098) (0.095) (0.113) (0.146) (0.133) (0.284) (0.156) (0.107) (0.129) (0.187)
Observations 16913 16913 16913 16913 16913 16913 13356 13356 13356 13356 13356 13356
R2 0.233 0.111 0.189 0.173 0.139 0.110 0.198 0.094 0.146 0.135 0.101 0.077
Model test 5.5e+07 5.9e+05 4.2e+05 14377.91 1.2e+06 3359.15 2.9e+07 41286.95 31813.04 48109.46 26827.41 67628.30
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Educ. test 124.47 23.54 80.77 110.69 117.67 56.55 547.04 102.74 149.09 210.33 122.65 188.25
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Industry test 103.79 63.94 144.94 109.33 201.96 32.74 59.20 115.52 100.48 22.58 81.37 36.82
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Occup. test 956.25 868.68 889.22 187.36 168.85 232.04 112.14 39.50 89.12 132.64 143.81 68.48
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Note: Sample include individuals between 18 and 65 years. Observations weighted by the survey’s probability weights, bootstrapped-VCE estimated according to the complex sampling design in parenthesis
and p-values of the joint-hypotheses tests in brackets. (d)=Dummy variable. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level.
37
Table 1.A10 – RIF decompositions by sector, 2005, 2011 and 2017
2005 2011 2017
Endowment Treatment Endowment Treatment Endowment Treatment
Formal
Model 1 (Demograph.)
Mean -0.168† 0.050 -0.150† 0.175† -0.145† 0.166†
P10 -0.096† 0.035 -0.091† 0.146† -0.067† 0.084†
P25 -0.200† 0.070 -0.144† 0.179† -0.122† 0.189†
P50 -0.199† 0.030 -0.189† 0.183† -0.186† 0.204†
P75 -0.132† -0.066 -0.144† 0.116† -0.151† 0.138†
P90 -0.171† 0.127 -0.169† 0.197† -0.133† 0.135†
Model 2 (M1 + Indust)
Mean -0.072† -0.046 -0.093† 0.118† -0.118† 0.140†
P10 -0.069† 0.008 -0.064† 0.119† -0.057† 0.074†
P25 -0.199† 0.069 -0.117† 0.152† -0.115† 0.182†
P50 -0.134† -0.035 -0.172† 0.166† -0.187† 0.204†
P75 -0.022 -0.176† -0.098† 0.069† -0.127† 0.114†
P90 0.155† -0.200† 0.043 -0.015 -0.062† 0.063†
Model 3 (M2 + Occup)
Mean -0.165† 0.047 -0.179† 0.204† -0.176† 0.198†
P10 -0.163† 0.102 -0.193† 0.248† -0.105† 0.123†
P25 -0.393† 0.263† -0.238† 0.274† -0.171† 0.238†
P50 -0.234† 0.065 -0.260† 0.255† -0.252† 0.269†
P75 -0.073† -0.126† -0.126† 0.097† -0.160† 0.147†
P90 0.055 -0.099 -0.017 0.045 -0.068† 0.069†
Informal
Model 1 (Demograph.)
Mean -0.097† 0.289† -0.064† 0.422† -0.082† 0.356†
P10 -0.141† 0.516† -0.127† 0.747† -0.139† 0.650†
P25 -0.109† 0.368† -0.088† 0.516† -0.106† 0.446†
P50 -0.080† 0.239† -0.050† 0.340† -0.059† 0.282†
P75 -0.084† 0.164† -0.043† 0.275† -0.051† 0.208†
P90 -0.088† 0.118† -0.034† 0.225† -0.056† 0.173†
Model 2 (M1 + Indust)
Mean -0.066† 0.259† -0.021 0.380† -0.072† 0.346†
P10 -0.060† 0.435† -0.077 0.697† -0.038 0.550†
P25 -0.073† 0.332† -0.045 0.472† -0.055 0.395†
P50 -0.033 0.192† 0.005 0.286† -0.049 0.272†
P75 -0.100† 0.179† -0.020 0.253† -0.101† 0.259†
P90 -0.098† 0.129† 0.018 0.172† -0.134† 0.250†
Model 3 (M2 + Occup)
Mean -0.124† 0.317† -0.122† 0.481† -0.129† 0.404†
P10 -0.185† 0.561† -0.347† 0.967† -0.202† 0.714†
P25 -0.148† 0.408† -0.228† 0.656† -0.167† 0.507†
P50 -0.065† 0.225† -0.070† 0.361† -0.107† 0.329†
P75 -0.130† 0.210† -0.052 0.285† -0.104† 0.261†
P90 -0.129† 0.160† 0.031 0.160† -0.094 0.210†
Note: Sample includes individuals between 18 and 65 years. Demographics only model includes education (2nd degree polinomial),
age (2nd degree polinomial) as well as ethnicity and urban area dummies. Observations weighted by the survey’s probability weights
and bootstraped-VCE estimated according to the survey’s complex sampling design. † Significant at 95% based on the percentile-based
bootstrap confidence intervals.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI - National Household Survey (2005-2017)
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Table 1.A11 – Difference in RIF decompositions under alternate informal employment definition, 2005,
2011 and 2017
2005 2011 2017
Diff. endowm. Diff. treatm. Diff. endowm. Diff. treatm. Diff. endowm. Diff. treatm.
Model 1 (Demograph.)
Mean 0.023† 0.027 -0.014† 0.053† -0.015† 0.068†
P10 -0.013 0.113 -0.050† 0.240† -0.044† 0.283†
P25 -0.008 0.046 -0.038† 0.167† -0.054† 0.162†
P50 0.031 0.020 -0.010 0.045 -0.014† 0.042
P75 0.077† -0.067 0.002 -0.068† 0.002 -0.045†
P90 0.012 0.042 -0.007 -0.121† 0.034 -0.068†
Model 2 (M1 + Indust)
Mean 0.045† 0.004 0.003 0.036 -0.007 0.061
P10 0.115† -0.015 0.059 0.130 0.026 0.214†
P25 -0.003 0.041 -0.037 0.167† -0.021 0.128†
P50 0.025 0.026 0.014 0.020 -0.021 0.049†
P75 0.031 -0.021 0.002 -0.069 -0.018 -0.025
P90 0.062 -0.008 -0.075† -0.053 0.071† -0.105†
Model 3 (M2 + Occup)
Mean 0.030 0.019 -0.074† 0.113† -0.069 0.123†
P10 0.064 0.036 -0.129 0.319† -0.080 0.319†
P25 -0.049 0.087 -0.153† 0.283† -0.103† 0.211†
P50 0.032 0.019 -0.025 0.060 -0.044 0.072
P75 0.036 -0.026 -0.018 -0.049 -0.037 -0.006
P90 0.083† -0.028 -0.118† -0.010 0.060 -0.094
Note: Sample includes individuals between 18 and 65 years. Difference calculated as the original SVY minus alternate SVY estimates. Demographics only
model includes education (2nd degree polinomial), age (2nd degree polinomial) as well as ethnicity and urban area dummies. Observations weighted by the
survey’s probability weights and bootstraped-VCE estimated according to the survey’s complex sampling design. † Significant based on the percentile-based
bootstrap 95% confidence intervals.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI - National Household Survey (2005-2017)
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Table 1.A12 – Difference in RIF decompositions under alternate employment definitions (only private
workers), 2005, 2011 and 2017
2005 2011 2017
Diff. endowm. Diff. treatm. Diff. endowm. Diff. treatm. Diff. endowm. Diff. treatm.
Formal
Model 1 (Demograph.)
mean -0.018 -0.067 -0.029† -0.058† -0.037† -0.037†
p10 -0.028 -0.055 -0.035† 0.029 -0.022† 0.005
p25 -0.146† -0.036 -0.076† -0.009 -0.056† 0.010
p50 -0.040 -0.137† -0.078† -0.087† -0.079† -0.029†
p75 0.139 -0.205 0.042† -0.173† -0.001 -0.134†
p90 0.106 0.190 0.000 0.050 -0.002 0.008
Model 2 (M1 + Indust)
mean -0.080† -0.004 -0.064† -0.023 -0.055† -0.019†
p10 -0.066† -0.017 -0.039† 0.033 -0.034† 0.017
p25 -0.198† 0.016 -0.090† 0.006 -0.064† 0.018
p50 -0.046 -0.131† -0.133† -0.031 -0.105† -0.003
p75 -0.090 0.023 -0.020 -0.112† -0.035 -0.100†
p90 0.027 0.269 -0.046 0.097 -0.031 0.038
Model 3 (M2 + Occup)
mean -0.070† -0.015 -0.052† -0.035† -0.048† -0.026†
p10 -0.158† 0.076 -0.013 0.007 -0.042† 0.025
p25 -0.314† 0.132† -0.134† 0.050 -0.081† 0.035†
p50 0.024 -0.202† -0.137† -0.027 -0.084† -0.024
p75 0.083 -0.149 0.055 -0.186† -0.016 -0.119†
p90 -0.082 0.377 -0.025 0.076 -0.006 0.013
Informal
Model 1 (Demograph.)
mean -0.003 -0.009† -0.002 -0.007 -0.002 -0.006†
p10 0.002 -0.013 -0.005 -0.004 0.001 -0.021†
p25 0.007 -0.011 -0.001 -0.013† 0.001 -0.013†
p50 -0.002 -0.017† -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.010†
p75 -0.002 -0.015 -0.006† -0.007 -0.004† -0.012†
p90 -0.009 -0.009 -0.003 0.012 -0.006† 0.007
Model 2 (M1 + Indust)
mean -0.011† -0.000 -0.010† 0.001 -0.007† -0.001
p10 -0.014 0.003 -0.025† 0.016 -0.015† -0.006
p25 -0.008 0.004 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008†
p50 -0.016 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.009† 0.000
p75 -0.016† -0.001 -0.009 -0.003 -0.019† 0.002
p90 -0.001 -0.017 -0.006 0.014† -0.007 0.008
Model 3 (M2 + Occup)
mean -0.014† 0.003 -0.015† 0.006† -0.011† 0.003
p10 -0.010 -0.000 -0.026 0.017 -0.020† -0.001
p25 -0.017 0.014 -0.010 -0.004 -0.008† -0.005
p50 -0.028 0.010 0.002 -0.007 -0.009 -0.000
p75 -0.008 -0.008 -0.015† 0.003 -0.010 -0.006
p90 -0.011 -0.007 -0.017 0.025† -0.013 0.014
Note: Sample includes individuals between 18 and 65 years. Difference calculated as the original SVY minus alternate SVY estimates. Demographics only
model includes education (2nd degree polinomial), age (2nd degree polinomial) as well as ethnicity and urban area dummies. Observations weighted by the
survey’s probability weights and bootstraped-VCE estimated according to the survey’s complex sampling design. † Significant based on the percentile-based
bootstrap 95% confidence intervals.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI - National Household Survey (2005-2017)
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Table 1.A13 – Difference in RIF decompositions SRS and SVY by sector, 2005, 2011 and 2017
2005 2011 2017
Diff. endowm. Diff. treatm. Diff. endowm. Diff. treatm. Diff. endowm. Diff. treatm.
Formal
Model 1 (Demograph.)
Mean -0.008 0.025 -0.004 0.001 -0.018 0.019
P10 -0.051 -0.001 -0.020 -0.006 -0.016† 0.013
P25 -0.038 0.020 -0.012 -0.010 -0.019 -0.008
P50 -0.032 0.031 -0.027 -0.008 -0.037† 0.003
P75 0.026 0.070 0.003 0.015 -0.017 0.038†
P90 0.073 0.028 0.050 0.034 0.001 0.059†
Model 2 (M1 + Indust)
Mean -0.038 0.055 -0.003 0.000 -0.017 0.018
P10 -0.055 0.004 -0.025 -0.000 -0.008 0.005
P25 -0.038 0.020 -0.013 -0.010 -0.018 -0.010
P50 -0.044 0.043 -0.026 -0.010 -0.043† 0.008
P75 -0.005 0.100 0.001 0.018 -0.013 0.034
P90 -0.016 0.117 0.027 0.057 -0.000 0.061
Model 3 (M2 + Occup)
Mean -0.036 0.053 -0.002 -0.001 -0.008 0.009
P10 -0.081 0.029 -0.001 -0.024 -0.004 0.001
P25 -0.044 0.025 -0.004 -0.018 -0.003 -0.024
P50 -0.045 0.044 -0.007 -0.029 -0.034 0.000
P75 0.009 0.087 0.006 0.013 -0.003 0.025
P90 0.024 0.078 0.038 0.046 -0.008 0.068
Informal
Model 1 (Demograph.)
Mean 0.006 0.023 -0.000 0.027 0.002 0.025
P10 -0.007 0.023 -0.004 0.057 0.004 0.017
P25 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.061 0.001 0.045
P50 0.002 0.039 0.003 0.016 -0.001 0.025
P75 0.014 0.029 0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.014
P90 0.009 0.028 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.015
Model 2 (M1 + Indust)
Mean -0.008 0.038 0.009 0.018 0.028 -0.001
P10 -0.000 0.016 0.079 -0.026 0.073 -0.051
P25 0.004 0.007 0.025 0.037 -0.001 0.047
P50 -0.036 0.077 -0.014 0.033 -0.002 0.027
P75 -0.002 0.045 -0.014 0.018 0.024 -0.009
P90 -0.002 0.039 -0.034 0.037 0.045 -0.032
Model 3 (M2 + Occup)
Mean -0.013 0.043 0.008 0.019 0.006 0.022
P10 -0.029 0.045 0.071 -0.019 0.006 0.015
P25 -0.007 0.018 0.029 0.033 -0.009 0.055
P50 -0.040 0.082 -0.011 0.030 0.014 0.011
P75 0.009 0.035 -0.003 0.007 0.020 -0.005
P90 0.021 0.017 -0.039 0.042 0.026 -0.013
Note: Sample includes individuals between 18 and 65 years. Difference calculated as SRS minus SVY estimates. Demographics only model includes
education (2nd degree polinomial), age (2nd degree polinomial) as well as ethnicity and urban area dummies. † Significant based on the 95% confidence
intervals.
Elaborated by the author based on INEI - National Household Survey (2005-2017)
Chapter 2
The Effect of the Venezuelan Exodus on
Peruvian Labour Market Outcomes
2.1 Introduction
Few policy debates capture the attention of the general public and academics alike as the effect of im-
migration on labour market outcomes. The empirical evidence that provides insights on this has typically
relied on long-lasting immigration processes (Dustmann et al. 2007; Okkerse 2008). Some of these studies
(see, e.g. Dustmann et al. 2016; Kerr and Kerr 2011) appear to justify the fears of natives in the EU, USA
and Britain who believe that migrants lead to higher natives’ unemployment and lower wages (Grigorieff
et al. 2020; Blinder 2015; Citrin and Sides 2008). As valuable as these contributions are, such sustained
migration inflows, by inducing changes in structural characteristics of the economy (like economic cycles,
technology, or the composition of the native labour force), plausibly complicate the identification of causal
impacts (Dustmann et al. 2008). An alternative strategy that adds credibility to the results consists of in-
stead studying episodes where the arrival of migrants occur suddenly and exogenously (Kerr and Kerr 2011;
Frölich and Sperlich 2019). This is the route that we pursue in this paper.
The Venezuelan Exodus of 2016 provides a unique opportunity to recreate a hypothetical situation of
what would have occurred in the Peruvian labour market had this immigration never took place while
keeping other factors constant. Such a massive episode has its roots in the acute humanitarian crisis and
deterioration of the economic conditions in Venezuela, such as the free fall of its per capita GDP and
inflation levels that reached one million percent (see Reinhart and Santos 2015; Restuccia 2019). The 4.5
million who forcibly left their country made it the “largest [Exodus] in the [Latin American] region’s recent
history” (UNHCR 2019d, p. 10), and second only to the recent Syrian migration crisis. This influx of
working migrants transformed Peru overnight into the second-largest recipient of Venezuelans, culminating
in the fact that by 2019 these represented 2.5% of Peru’s population. This is broadly similar to what Syrian
refugees represented in Turkey in 2015 (2.8%, see UNHCR 2020, 2019d and Tumen 2015).
We provide quasi-experimental evidence of the impact that this unprecedented influx had on the Per-
uvian labour market. We focus on the effect on natives’ wages, separating the formal and informal sectors in
recognition of the fact that immigrants primarily inserted in the latter sector of the labour market. Departing
from most of the literature (see the review in Okkerse 2008), we also study how this event affected wages
inequality and the size of the informal sector. We exploit a two-stage Differences-in-Differences (2S-DiD)
combined with alternative variance estimators customized to suit our research design. We demonstrate that
this strategy improves upon the standard DiD as it removes a usually overlooked source of inconsistency in
the Average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) estimator and substantially improves the size and power
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of the Wald tests. The characteristics of the treatment (at an aggregated level within few units) allow us
to also apply panel data and Synthetic Control Methods (Abadie et al. 2010, 2015), that relax some identi-
fying assumptions and confirm the suitability of our main method. Additionally, we study the Venezuelan
immigrants’ skills and the downgrading they experience in the host labour market.
The results of this paper can be split into two. Venezuelans in Peru experience an occupational down-
grade in terms of their jobs and the abilities on the tasks they perform in their work relative to pre-
emigration. This occurs despite the fact that most hold an upper education level compared to the native
Peruvians. This is similar to what Peri (2016) and Dustmann et al. (2016) finds for gradual immigration
processes experienced by Europe and the USA. Estimates for the treatment effects of the Exodus for the
native working population comport with the findings of Card (2001), Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Peri
and Yasenov (2017), who do not find evidence of significant wage effects in both the formal and informal
sectors. This suggests both that several adjustment margins reduce the wage impact of immigrants and the
existence of complementarities between natives and immigrants. However, as theoretically suggested by
Dustmann et al. (2008), and similar to what Ceritoglu et al. (2015) find in Turkey, there are large negative
effects (around -10%) of the treatment on wages for informal workers in Lima y Callao, the epicentre of the
Peruvian economy. Results for the other outcome variables differ across the methods: the exodus caused
an increase in informal and inequality in the formal sector between 2% and 4% at the end of the period
according to our preferred estimation method, whereas under SCM estimation these changes are not found
to be statistically significant.
The contribution of this study is twofold. Firstly, we provide quasi-experimental evidence on the la-
bour market impact of the Venezuelan Exodus, which to date has not received sufficient attention despite
its relevance. As Peri (2016); Okkerse (2008); Dustmann et al. (2008) suggest, the literature has mainly
focused on developed economies to study the labour market effects of immigration (Card 1990; Hunt 1992;
Carrington and de Lima 1996; Peri et al. 2020; Foged and Peri 2015), even in the absence of an exogen-
ous shock. Therefore, we extend the typical scenario to one where the natives are principally engaged in
the informal sector and have a lower level of education than the immigrants. Unlike the studies on the
Syrian immigration in Turkey (Akgündüz et al. 2015, 2018; Ceritoglu et al. 2015; Del Carpio and Wagner
2015), we separately analyze the impacts for the informal and formal labour market. Secondly, our empir-
ical approach corrects the problems induced by department-year shocks and the small number of clusters
and treated regions, which surprisingly remained mostly ignored in the literature. Based on Brewer et al.
(2018); Frölich and Sperlich (2019); Angrist and Pischke (2009), and the influential study of Bertrand et al.
(2002), these plausibly drive the reported magnitude and statistical significance of previous DiD studies.
Compared to the few studies which have analyzed the Venezuelan Exodus under different estimation pro-
cedures (Asencios and Castellares 2020; Boruchowicz et al. 2021; Morales and Pierola 2020), we analyze
all the areas where these migrants settled and calculate the results for the sub-sample most exposed to dir-
ect competition from immigrants. This provides a more complete picture of the effects of the Venezuelan
Exodus on the Peruvian labour market.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we review some of the previous literature on the
impact of immigration on labour market outcomes. Section 3 describes the data sources for the study’s
key (formal and informal wages) and ancillary variables (informality levels and formal and informal labour
market inequality) in the study. Section 4 describes both the Venezuelan Exodus in Peru and the labour
market that these immigrants join. Section 5 discusses the econometric methods and checks the validity
of the identifying assumptions. Section 6 presents the results of the main analysis, with the results for the
subgroup of low skilled natives presented in Appendix B. Section 7 presents a set of robustness checks in
terms of variables definitions and alternative estimation methods. Finally, section 2.8 discusses the results




The academic concern about the impact of immigrants on wages dates back to at least Card’s (1990) study
of the 1978 Mariel Boatlift, which comprised the unexpected arrival of almost 60,000 Cubans to Miami.
This study profoundly influenced the direction of research in labour economics because of its novel meth-
odological approach and the fact that the reported absence of effects on native employment and wages
challenged standard labour market models (Peri and Yasenov 2017; Angrist and Pischke 2009). Theoret-
ically, the standard framework predicts that, in the short run, immigration will result in a fall of wages for
those in the host country because it leads to an increase in labour supply given a downward-sloping labour
demand curve (Peri 2016).
However, as soon as we incorporate stylized facts about labour markets, such as complementarity and
imperfect substitutability of natives and immigrants or perfect capital mobility1, the effects of an inflow of
unskilled workers are no longer straightforward. Not only this inflow will affect natives’ wages differently,
with the unskilled ones losing out, but also the average effect on natives wages may be zero or even positive
(Dustmann et al. 2008). The way that immigration is defined in these models can also influence our under-
standing of the effects of immigration. As Card and Peri (2016) show, the adverse effects on native labour
market outcomes reported by Borja (2014) are explained by the negative bias mechanically induced by his
definition of immigration. Focusing instead on the immigrant-driven supply shocks leads to moderate and
even zero effects. Additional adjustment mechanisms, such as changes in the skill mix, industry structure,
firms preferences or even task differentiation, induces effects beyond what simpler models predict.
One of the most commonly used empirical method within this debate is the national skill-cell approach.
This compares a nation’s actual supplies of workers in particular skill groups to those it would have had
in the absence of immigration and then uses outside information on the elasticity of substitution among
skill groups to compute the relative wage consequences of the supply shock (see Okkerse 2008; Dustmann
et al. 2016; Peri 2016). For example, within this basic framework, Borjas (2003) reported negative effects
of immigration (around -3%) on the average wage of residents in the USA, with the workers at the bottom
and on the top of the socio-economic distribution being the most affected. However, once we modify some
of its basic assumptions, different results emerge. For instance, Ottaviano and Peri (2012) drop the perfect
substitutability between natives and migrants within skill-defined cells and find that immigration over the
1990-2006 period had small positive effects on the wages of the USA’s natives instead. Manacorda et al.
(2006) follow a similar approach and finds that immigration was associated with positive (but, again, minor)
wage effects for UK natives in the 1975-2005 period. Dustmann et al. (2008) assume that immigrants
compete with natives within the same wage percentiles and find negative effects along the lower part of the
native distribution (where immigrants mostly locate) and positive wage effects further up the distribution.
Peri (2007) finds that immigration is associated with an increase in the average wage of native Californians,
the state with the highest percentage of working immigrants.
These studies certainly provide valuable insights. However, a key issue is that these do not recreate a
hypothetical situation of what would have occurred if immigration had not taken place (Dustmann et al.
2008). Instead, these empirical approaches rely heavily on theoretical models and, consequently, their
results can be understood as a simulation of the impact for given elasticities of substitution (Okkerse 2008).
Hence, implausible assumptions about the underlying production model used to derive the elasticity of
substitution, such as perfect substitution between natives and immigrants, can explain the adverse effects
on wages in some studies following the national skill-cell approach (e.g. Borjas 2003). In turn, unexpected
waves of immigrants (or refugees) with little ability to choose their destination provide a more robust basis
for analysis relative to episodes where the inflow of migrants is not exogenous but rather more gradual in
1Following Dustmann et al. 2008, this is a reasonable assumption for small open economies like Peru. Doing away with this
assumption implies that average wages (not only wages of the unskilled) may decrease as a consequence of immigration. As shown in
Ottaviano and Peri 2012 the faster capital is able to adjust, the smaller will be the effect on average wages in the economy
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nature. Because in this case their arrival is sudden and induced by exogenous political factors rather than a
thriving host economy, the unresponsiveness of technology and physical capital to these events allows for a
better basis to determine their short-run effects. These impacts can thus be claimed as representing causal
effects (Frölich and Sperlich 2019; Peri and Yasenov 2017). The Venezuelan Exodus allows us to explore
this quasi-experimental route in the study here.
Quasi-experimental evidence from earlier episodes besides Card (1990) reveals that, in general, these
large migration inflows are not damaging for native labour market outcomes. Hunt (1992) examines the
repatriation of Algerians to France who arrived in 1962 and by 1968 represented 1.6% of the total French
labour force. The study exploits the regional variation in the number of repatriates using instrumental
variables (IV) estimation. The author finds that the elasticities of wage and employment relative to the
proportion of repatriates are negative although small in magnitude (less than 1%). Carrington and de Lima
(1996) studied the impact of the “retornados”, whose return to Portugal from Angola and Mozambique in
the mid-1970s increased the national labour force by 10% in just three years. Based on their preferred set
of results, the authors conclude that this slightly increased unemployment in the host country. Nonetheless,
they recognize that the Europe-wide unemployment rate increase over the same period highly influences
this effect. Friedberg (2001) studies the impact of the returning Israelis between 1989-1994 by exploiting
the variation in immigration across occupations. Their results from IV estimation suggests that immigrants
do not adversely impact native labour market outcomes; instead, immigrants work in occupations with low
wages, low wage growth and contracting employment. Subsequent applications have improved some of the
identification issues in which these studies incur. As discussed below, these are related to the estimation
of the standard errors and the selection of control groups. For example, the reassessment of the effects by
Peri and Yasenov (2017), using more robust methods to estimate the counterfactual, confirms Card’s (1990)
findings.2
In recent years, much of the quasi-experimental literature on immigration has shifted its focus from
developed countries to those developing countries affected directly by the Syrian refugee crisis, particularly
Turkey. Most of these studies exploit a standard Differences-in-Differences (DiD) method to identify causal
impacts and often provide conflicting conclusions. On the one hand, Ceritoglu et al. (2015) find that this
treatment had a negligible impact on wages and large increases in unemployment, accruing mainly among
the informal workers and those located at the bottom of the wage distribution. On the other hand, Akgündüz
et al. (2015), using regional-level panel data, find that employment rates of natives in various skill groups
are mainly unaffected. Akgündüz et al. (2018), using a combination of DiD and Synthetic Control Methods
(SCM), report that the refugee influx increased the number of foreign firm entries. Additionally, Balkan
and Tumen (2016) use DiD and find that the general level of consumer prices declined by approximately
2.5% due to immigration.
These quasi-experimental studies, however, exhibit several limitations which may threaten the validity
of their conclusions offered. For instance, those studying the Syrian episode rely on no more than three
pre-treatment years and two post-treatment years. This time window is too small to allow them to support
the argument that the identification assumptions of their DiD strategy credibly hold or that it captures
the effects of temporal heterogeneity. Also, elasticity estimations from Akgunduz (2015 and 2018) are
possibly distorted by the non-comparability of data on the number of immigrants used from 2013 onwards.
Beyond data-related issues, methodological problems question the validity of their estimated impacts, as we
elaborate in subsection 2.5.1. First, none of these studies accounts for the confounding role of the evolution
of the department-year shocks in the point estimates of their causal effects reported3, which affects the
2However, Borjas’ (2017) reappraisal of this event instead finds dramatic negative wage effects for natives, as large as 30%. These
are subsequently confirmed in Borjas and Monras (2017). Yet, Clemens and Hunt (2017) claim that there are reasons to believe that
these are actually spurious: in the first case results are explained by unaccounted change in the composition of the sample used, and
in the second by the plausible lack of exogeneity of the instrument used.
3Admittedly Balkan and Tumen (2016) and Ceritoglu et al. (2015) equate this to trade volumes; but we have reasons to believe that
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consistency of the estimators of interest. Second, except for Ceritoglu et al. (2015)4, most studies recognize
the problem of clustering of the idiosyncratic errors. However, their strategy to correct for this lacks the
necessary asymptotic justification, which results in over-rejection of the null hypothesis of zero effect, as
we explain below. Thirdly, the selection of the control groups in Balkan and Tumen (2016) and Ceritoglu
et al. (2015) is made arbitrarily and, in fact, the share of immigrants in some treated areas is not all that
much different from the share in some control areas (see e.g. Figure 2 in the former). The more refined
construction of the units in the control group using SCM by Akgündüz et al. (2018) could be thwarted by
the poor pre-treatment fit of the estimated counterfactual, which suggests a possible bias in the estimation
of their treatment effect.
The few studies that have analyzed the impact of Venezuelan immigration on the Peruvian Labour
market take a different econometric approach than the one adopted in this chapter. Under an area analysis
approach, Morales and Pierola (2020) estimate the effects of the intensity of Venezuelan settlements and
find a 3.2% decrease in monthly earnings for workers with secondary education in the formal services sector.
In order to circumvent the lack of data on migrants by region, they use Bartik instrumentation. Besides the
complications induced by the presence of a negligible amount of immigrants in most Peruvian provinces,
this strategy is potentially subject to the problem related to the construction of these type of instrumental
variables, pointed out by Clemens and Hunt (2017) .5 Asencios and Castellares (2020) and Boruchowicz
et al. (2021) focus on Lima y Callao and find a slight reduction in hourly wages for some groups of workers,
such as young high school dropouts. The former focuses on the changes in employment and income,
using the Heckman (1979) sample selection correction. Nonetheless, their identifying assumptions are
unclear, and the fulfilment of bivariate normality of the errors in the Mincerian and the selection equation
remains untested. Likewise, despite the fact that their estimating equations are derived assuming that the
characteristics of the workers remain unchanged, the possible “time-in-sample bias” (Baltagi 2005) from
their 3-month rotating panel is not addressed. Boruchowicz et al. (2021), in turn, use the original Synthetic
Control Methods (SCM) of Abadie et al. (2010, 2015). In this chapter, we apply a modified version of the
original SCM estimator, which is more robust to their reported deviations from the convex hull assumption,
and we also perform statistical inference under a more powerful test statistic (see below).
Even though wages adjustments have more immediate social and political repercussions for the host
country (Dustmann et al. 2019), these are only one of the channels through which the labour market might
react to the arrival of foreign workers (Dustmann et al. 2008; Akgündüz et al. 2018; Balkan and Tumen
2016). Changes in the income distribution can influence future growth prospects (Banerjee and Duflo
2003), while higher informality levels are associated with lower productivity (La Porta and Shleifer 2014).
Hence, we also study the impact of the immigrant (or refugee) influx on hourly wages inequality in the
formal and informal sectors, as well as on the level of informality.
2.3 Data
This study combines two different data sources. The first micro-dataset is the National Survey of the Res-
ident Venezuelan Population (ENPOVE) in Peru, collected in 2018 by Peru’s National Statistical Office
(INEI). It provides demographic and labour market information of Venezuelan migrants for each of the five
cities where these settled. These cities are comprised of Lima and Callao, Tumbes, Cusco, Arequipa and
La Libertad. This data also records the specific route and time spent by the migrants in every location from
their departure point in Venezuela until they arrived at their current location in Peru. This information al-
these are not the only factors explaining the department-year effects.
4The statistical significance of some of their results can be explained because the White (1980) robust standard errors used can
under-estimate the asymptotic variance matrix, resulting in over-sized Wald tests (Cameron and Miller 2015)
5An instrumental variable strategy was also pursued by Akgündüz et al. (2018) for the Turkish case. However, in this case the
number of observations is too small given their estimation strategy is valid only asymptotically.
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lows assessing some aspects of the identification assumptions for the empirical analysis. Migration patterns
from ENPOVE closely follow the pattern of the whole population (compare Figure 2.A3 and Figure 3.A2).
In addition, it contains information on the last occupation (or job) held by Venezuelans prior to emigration,
which allows an analysis of their occupational downgrading. The second micro-dataset is Peru’s National
Household Survey (ENAHO), also collected by INEI. This is a set of repeated cross-sections from 2005 to
2019 that constitutes the official source in Peru for labour market indicators, as it is statistically represent-
ative of workers in both formal and informal sectors. Its sampling design, unaltered since 2005, provides
comparable information of the outcomes and controls across the years. As this provides information for
natives, this is the dataset used for the econometric analysis in this chapter. We take the treatment as taking
place at the department level, with the treated areas being the five departments (regions) where the five cities
above are located (see Figure 3.A1 above).
By taking the yearly ENAHO samples, the aggregated variables at the department level to perform the
SCM are calculated with a high level of precision (see the survey’s documentation in http://iinei.inei.gob.pe/microdatos/).
This contrasts with Boruchowicz et al. (2021), who aggregate the (quarterly) ENAHO sample data at a lower
administrative level than what the sample design originally allows. By doing so, the collapsed variables used
for their estimation are affected by the “small-area estimation” problem (Tzavidis et al. 2018; Pfeffermann
2002), plausibly inducing a measurement error in their results (see Peri and Yasenov 2017 for discussion
in the SCM context). The data used here also allow for a larger number of years compared to the studies
undertaken for Turkey (reviewed above) and for more pre-treatment periods than the average of those in the
Ferman et al. (2020) review. A sample restriction we impose throughout is to include only those individuals
between 18 and 65 years old who are employed.6
Hourly wages, the ratio of self-reported total wages to self-reported hours of work (including both
primary and secondary jobs), are deflated using the Peruvian Central Bank GDP series, taking 2007 as the
base year. We approximate informal employment through the lack of affiliation to a pension system. This
characteristic is more intimately linked to a crucial aspect of informality, namely the lack of protection by
legal and regulatory frameworks that are associated with poor-quality jobs without social security. This is
preferred to alternative definitions based on the firm (e.g. if it does not have accounting books or does not
provide a legal invoice to hire workers) or in the individual (e.g. working less than 40 hours per week)
(Hussmanns 2001; ILO 2002; Freije 2002).7 Because INEI considers employed those who worked more
than 15 hours per week regardless of the occupational category (INEI 2019b, p. 553), we drop those
classified as “unpaid family workers” from our samples.
The demographic (at individual-level) control variables in the regressions are sex (equals 1 if male and
0 otherwise), age (in years), years of schooling8, area of residence (equals 1 if living in an urban area and 0
otherwise). The industry and occupation control variables follow standard international classifications. The
vector of six industry dummies is a reduced version of the International Standard Industrial Classification
of All Economic Activities (ISIC), Revision 4: 1) Agriculture, forestry and fishing (A and B and C); 2)
Manufacturing and Public Utilities (D and E); 3) Construction (F); 4) Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels
and Restaurants (G and I); 5) Transport, Storage, and Communication (H and J); 6) Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate and Community, Social and Personal Services (K - U). The vector of seven occupation
dummies, originally defined as an adaptation of the International Standard Classification of Occupations
(ISCO-2008) from ILO: 1) Managers, Professionals and Armed forces (MGs 1, 2 and 10); 2) Technicians
6The lower age bound of 18 years old represents the minimum legal age that a person can offer their work and the upper bound
represents the legal retirement age in Peru.
7Note how by focusing on the main occupation to classify the worker as informal, we conform to Hussmanns (2004) suggestion of
taking jobs as the observation units rather than employed persons given the existence of multiple job-holding workers.
8Peru’s education system does not have an upper cap on the number of years a student can remain at a given level (which is relevant
mainly for university or technical institution students). For those who reported concluding the level, we take the minimum amount of
years it took to attain. For those who did not conclude, schooling is the minimum of years from the immediate lower level plus the
years studied.
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and associates (MG 3) and Skilled agricultural and fishery workers (MG 6); 3) Clerks (MG 4); 4) Service
and sales workers (MG 5); 5) Building workers, electricians, artisans and telecommunications (MG 7); 6)
Industrial machinery operators, assemblers and drivers (MG 8); 7) Elementary occupations (MG 9).9 The
size of the firm, directly related to the firm’s productivity (Távara et al. 2014), is not used since it is absent
for those workers in the public sector.
By merging occupation data in the ENAHO and ENPOVE with ONET 25.1 (2019) dataset (from US-
Department of Labour) we calculated for every worker indices of cognitive, communication and manual
intensity as well as a global occupational complexity index following Ottaviano et al. (2013) (see appendix
therein).10 ONET dataset assigns scores that describe the intensity of distinct abilities (“skills”) in every
occupation. Using Hardy et al. (2018) cross-walks, we translate these from O*NET-SOC-10 to SOC-10
and from this to ISCO-2008 codes. We then use table 2 in the annex of INEI (2016) to correlate the former
codes into INEI nomenclature. We take three types of skills from this database: Cognitive Intensity (10
variables classified as “cognitive and analytical”), Communication Intensity (4 variables capturing written
and oral expression and understanding) and Manual Intensity (19 variables capturing dexterity, strength,
and coordination). Each of the values in these variables is re-expressed as its corresponding percentile to
measure the relative importance of a given skill among other workers (e.g. a task with a score of 0.02 for
some skill indicates that only 2 percent of workers were supplying that skill less intensively). We then take
the average of these re-scaled values within each of the three types of skills. The (overall) Complexity
index, Complexity = (Cognitive+Communication)/ManualIntensity, which summarises the intensity of
cognitive-communication skills relative to manual skills of each worker’s occupation.
For the panel data and SCM estimation, micro-level information for wages, informal status and the
controls are averaged within departments (using the sampling weights). The variable for inequality in DiD
analysis is the Recentered Influence Function for the Gini coefficient (Firpo et al. 2009; Rios-Avila 2020),
which provides estimated coefficients reflecting the marginal impact on the index itself. In the panel data
and SCM estimation, inequality is represented by the departmental-level Gini coefficient.
2.4 The Venezuelan Exodus in Peru
2.4.1 The Venezuelan immigration process
The Venezuelan Exodus represents a refugee crisis of comparable magnitude to the 6.6 million Syrian
refugees. Due to the socio-economic instability and political turmoil in which Venezuela was plunged since
2013, approximately 4.5 million left the country as of January 2020. About 85% settled in neighbouring
Latin America and the Caribbean countries (R4V 2020b). This massive volume of refugees and migrants,
and the ensuing humanitarian crisis that this triggered, led some to label it the largest external displacement
crisis in Latin America’s recent history (UNHCR 2019d).
The Venezuelan case is a prime example of economic mismanagement and reveals a link between do-
mestic debt, financial repression, and external vulnerability (Reinhart and Santos 2015). The collapse in
oil prices between 2013 and 2019 explains the 60% collapse of Venezuelan GDP per capita (left panel of
Figure 2.A1), while the boom from the year 2000 correlates with the substantial increase in debt (right
panel of the same figure). The seigniorage system’s failure led to the emergence of hyperinflation in 2013,
which was about one million percent in 2018 (see Restuccia 2019). Consequently, between 2014 and 2018,
the country’s poverty rates doubled, from 48% to 87% (España and Ponce 2018). Food shortages since
9The original ISIC Rev 4 classification includes 10 major groups (MG). The original ISCO-08 classification includes 21 sections.
10Admittedly, US occupation skills will differ from those in Peru and Venezuela. However, it is reasonable to assume that this
difference goes in the same direction for occupations in both countries. There are no reasons to believe that the suddenness of the
influx might have led to composition changes in the host country in the short run. Moreover, because we are not interested in the actual
value of these indices but, instead, in their change, these differences in levels in both countries relative to the USA are not a primary
concern.
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2015 led many to shift their consumption basked to only price-controlled food items, which also became
increasingly scarce. Comparable shortages in medicines caused an increase in their prices and these items
thus became unaffordable for most Venezuelans.11 Community-based support organizations established by
the government did not improve the situation (IACHR 2017). The unprecedented drop in the quality of life
explains why Venezuela consistently topped Bloomberg’s Economic Misery Index between 2014 and 2018.
Political and social turmoil accompanied this economic collapse. There was government repression of
public demonstrators, which resulted in thousands of arbitrary arrests and prosecutions by military courts
(HRW 2018). The detainees were subject to torture, abuses with sexual violence against women, as doc-
umented by the Inter-American Commission for the Human Rights (IACHR 2017). The insecurity caused
by a crime crisis further eroded the social fabric from 2014, as Venezuela turned into the “second most vi-
olent country in the world” according to the Venezuelan Observatory of Violence.12 Homicides became the
primary cause of death among adolescents and young people, particularly the poorest in society (IACHR
2017).
These factors led to an unprecedented emigration of Venezuelans who arrived in Peru in 2016, which
we take as the beginning of the treatment (Figure 2.A3).13 Within a brief period, Peru went from being one
of the Latin American countries least used to foreign workers (Torales et al. 2003) to the second-largest
recipient of Venezuelans worldwide (see Figure 2.A5 based on UNHCR 2020). Since the beginning of
this influx until 2019, approximately 830,000 Venezuelans entered the country representing 2.5% of Peru’s
population. According to the Population Census of 2017, 85% of these settled in five regions. The most
important receptor was the metropolitan area of Lima and Callao, the capital city and the epicentre of
economic activity in Peru. This region comprises 38% of the total employment and 48% of the total GDP.
Tumbes, bordering Ecuador, is their entry post in north of Peru. La Libertad and Arequipa are respectively
the second and third recipients of Venezuelan influx, with the latter being the second largest contributor to
Peru’s GDP. In contrast, Cusco, where the Venezuelans have mostly integrated, is a tourist-centred city and
generates mostly services-oriented jobs.14
The main emigration route for the Venezuelans (depicted as solid lines in Figure 3.A1) begins in moun-
tainous West Venezuela (brown areas in that map), according toUNHCR (2018b) and OIM (2018b; 2018c;
2019).15 Consistent with this, our data also reveal that 93% of immigrants reach Peru through Colombia
or Ecuador, with Tumbes (in the northern end of Peru) a common entry point (Table 2.A2). However,
this migration path is not free of risks for these immigrants, as 40% of the violent and other incidents ex-
perienced occurred during this transit (with the most frequent being robbery, physical assault, and death
threats) (UNHCR 2019b). Because this route almost exclusively involves land, our data also confirms that
most of the trips are made by bus (coinciding with UNHCR 2019b report). This contrasts with the multiple
transportation modes that also characterize the Syrian journeys towards Europe (UNHCR 2018a).
In order to help incorporate this unprecedented inflow of Venezuelans into the formal sector, the Per-
uvian government adopted a series of measures which were developed in three phases (see Table 2.A1 for
a further description). The first one, between January 2017 and January 2018, established the Temporary
Permit of Permanence (PTP). This provided Venezuelans with one year of legal permanence in Peru and
enabled them to work as employees or as self-employed.16 However, long waiting times to obtain this per-
11As of 2016, there was an 82.8% deficiency of calories in the basic food basket, 9 out of 10 homes were food insecure and 70%
had lost more than 8.7 Kg of body weight. As of 2017 the estimated shortage of medicines was around 90% an children mortality
increased 30% between 2015 and 2016 (IACHR 2017).
12According to this source, homicide rates reached 91.8 for every 100,000 inhabitants. According to the Citizen Council for Security
and Criminal Justice, Venezuela’s capital, Caracas, is considered the most violent in the world, along with seven other Venezuelan
cities (IACHR 2017).
13Data publicly released by Peru’s immigration authority prior to 2016 refers only to those immigrants over 18 with a working visa.
14Peru is the largest recipient of Venezuelan asylum seekers, comprising 50% of these requests (R4V 2020a). As of 2019, in Cusco
and Arequipa asylum-seeking applications from the Venezuelan population increased sharply (INEI 2019a).
15The rugged terrain of the jungles in southern Venezuela makes it an impenetrable territory but one that is also linked to illegal
activities, mainly drug trafficking (Van Dun 2016).
16By the end of January 2018 operationalized the steps for Venezuelans to apply for the Special Resident immigration status defined
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mit resulted in only one in four Venezuelans being PTP holders as of 2018 (see Table 2.A2). Specifically,
the applicant had to gather documentation from different government agencies in Peru (including the IN-
TERPOL international exchange token) and wait an additional six months for the immigration Authority to
validate the PTP document (see Blouin 2019)17.
The next two phases then set restrictions for Venezuelans’ assimilation into the Peruvian formal la-
bour market. The second phase began in the last week of August 2018, which abolished the free entry of
Venezuelans. Two norms eliminated the PTP and made the passport mandatory to enter the country from
September 2018 onwards.18 This requirement constitutes an exceptionally prohibitive measure, as passport
processing fees oscillated between 2,000 and 5,000 USD within Venezuela, where the monthly minimum
wage does not exceed 5 USD (Blouin et al. 2019). Indeed, the two most prominent entrance peaks in 2018
are explained by Venezuelans trying to circumvent this requirement (see Figure 2.A3). The third and final
phase began in mid-2019 when, in addition to a valid passport, Venezuelans were also required to pos-
sess a Humanitarian Visa to enter Peru. It could only be obtained at the Peruvian Consulate in Venezuela,
Colombia or Ecuador. Nonetheless, the vast number of Visa requests in these locations made it unfeasible
for the consular services to process them within a reasonably short time window (UNHCR 2019b). On
the 14th of June 2019, the day before this rule came into place, an influx of 8,000 Venezuelans took place
(UNHCR 2019c, see Figure 2.A3). Subsequently, the influx fell to a daily average of approximately 1,300
Venezuelans, way below the average of 3,000 entrants experienced before June (Migraciones 2018).19 It
is likely that these measures also led to an increase in the number of those who irregularly entered Peru,
although there are no official figures.20
2.4.2 The Venezuelan integration into the host economy
A steady per capita GDP growth (see Figure 2.A6) and a high employment rate, as shown in the upper
panel in Figure 2.1, characterises the Peruvian economy during this period. The same graph shows that
a fundamental difference with the labour market of developed economies, where previous studies of the
impact of immigration have focused (e.g. Card 1990; Hunt 1992; Carrington and de Lima 1996), lies in
Peru’s sizeable informal sector. Even though it has progressively reduced, more than 60% of the employ-
ment remains informal. This share is significantly larger than the one that characterizes the Turkish labour
market (ILO 2017, 2019), which experienced a comparable inflow of Syrian immigrants (see section 2.2).
Average hourly wages in this sector have been less than half than the prevailing in the formal sector (lower
right panel of Figure 2.1). This latter reflects differences in labour productivity between sectors and their
ability to absorb sector migrants (mainly the informal, as shown below). Consequently, in our regression
modelling, we analyze the impacts of the Exodus in both sectors separately.
Despite sharing the same (Spanish) language and close historical ties, Peruvians’ reactions to Venezuelans
who arrived at their country during the Exodus have not been entirely favourable. As analysed in more de-
tail in the next chapter, most Peruvians do not welcome the arrival of more Venezuelans into the country
and believe that these immigrants negatively affect their wages and labour market opportunities. Follow
up surveys confirm that Peruvians’ attitudes towards Venezuelans immigrants deteriorated in the following
in DS Nº 007-2017-IN (see Table 2.A1). This provided them with an immigration card that proved regular residence in Peru.
17In May 2018, Peru’s government gave the opportunity to those Venezuelans who were waiting for their PTP to be processed to
obtain the Extraordinary Working Permit. This was two-month working permit, valid until the granting of the PTP.
18The first of these norms was given by a Supreme Decree (DS) on 19th August 2018, which tightened their deadline to enter Peru
and request their PTP from 31th of December 2018 (as declared in the DS of 23th January 2018) to 31th of October. The second DS
was issued five days later.
19At the same time, a new pre-admission process was established which implied that, after June 2019, application for refugee status
(which would obviate the need for the visa) could only be done once Venezuelans reached the border of the country via an interview
(IDEHPUCP et al. 2020).
20According to ENPOVE, 90% of Venezuelans in Tumbes regard Peru as their final destination. Data from OIM (2020) allow us to
assume that the 63% of Venezuelans who were denied entrance via Tumbes would have tried to enter anyway. The growing number
of Venezuelans who subsequently entered Peru did not have a passport (OIM 2018b,c, 2019) provides further support for this.
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Note: Sample restricted to only employed individuals between 18 and 65 years. Vertical dashed lines denote the beginning of the treatment.
Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
years (see PUCP 2020). This occurs despite sharing the same language and their close cultural ties. In fact,
in contrast to other massive immigration episodes studied by Card (1990), Carrington and de Lima (1996)
or Foged and Peri (2015), Venezuelan immigrants are more educated than the natives. Specifically, around
60% of Venezuelan workers in the treated areas have higher education, whereas a Peruvian worker’s most
common educational level is secondary (see Table 2.1). Nevertheless, Peruvians believe that Venezuelans
are uneducated (see table 1 in the next chapter). Also, while the gender composition is similar among nat-
ives and immigrants, there is a sizeable age difference. The Venezuelan population is younger, with almost
70% aged between 18 and 35.
Venezuelans almost exclusively work in the informal labour market (bottom panel in Table 2.1).21 This
coincides with what the descriptive studies of Koechlin et al. (2019), Fuentes (2019), as well as the OIM’s
Displacement Tracking Matrices (OIM 2018a; 2018b; 2018c; 2019) report, and mirrors the experience of
the Syrian immigrants in the Turkish labour market (Akgündüz et al. 2015; Ceritoglu et al. 2015). However,
other factors besides the large size of the informal sector in Peru explain this. One is that the long waiting
times to obtain the PTP (described above) clashed with their need to immediately earn a minimum income
to support themselves and to send remittances.22 Another reason lies in Peru’s tight legislation for hiring
foreigners (Geronimi 2004), which offered little incentives to employers.23 Also, the deficient law enforce-
ment in Peru (Viollaz 2019) allowed natives to hire as informal workers even those Venezuelans with valid
21In Table 2.1 we define as informal those workers with a health insurance status. This is different from what we use in the main
estimations (affiliation to the pension system) because data in ENPOVE only includes the insurance variable. This might slightly
over-estimate the percentage of informal workers, since in ENAHO dataset (which includes both affiliation to pension and to health
insurance) 76% of the workers without health insurance are not affiliated to a pension system.
22ENPOVE data reveals that 70% of Venezuelan workers send remittances and that every transfer represents between 5% and 25%
of their average labour market income.
23The law for the hiring of foreign workers (Legislative Decree No. 689 of 1991 and Supreme Decree No. 014-92-TR of 1992)
declares that they cannot represent more than 20% of the total number of workers and their wages cannot exceed 30% of the total
payroll in the firm. In addition, the Supreme Decree No. 179-2004-EF defines that foreigners without permanent residence in Peru are
subject to a special income tax regime of 30%.
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work permits (Blouin 2019; IDEHPUCP et al. 2020).24 This latter factor also encouraged Venezuelans
engage in self-employment in the lower productivity occupations (OIM 2018d).
Table 2.1 – Demographic characteristics of Peruvians and Venezuelan immigrants in treated areas (%),
2018
Peruvians Venezuelans
Arequipa Cuzco La Libertad Lima y Callao Tumbes Total
Education level
No Level 1.03 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.00 0.08
Primary 11.67 4.61 8.90 14.32 9.33 5.61 9.37
Secondary 44.57 29.01 28.31 24.43 30.41 60.30 30.33
Technical 19.21 16.85 20.44 20.90 20.45 13.83 20.41
College 20.91 48.40 41.74 38.58 39.02 19.69 39.09
Postgraduate 2.60 1.12 0.61 1.59 0.71 0.56 0.73
Gender
Female 44.04 43.44 39.93 41.74 42.67 48.62 42.66
Male 55.96 56.56 60.07 58.26 57.33 51.38 57.34
Age group (years)
18-25 16.20 27.97 34.57 31.01 32.07 34.89 32.02
26-35 26.53 44.96 45.07 42.48 41.30 42.98 41.38
36-45 26.07 19.77 14.15 17.25 18.27 14.74 18.24
46-55 18.41 6.09 5.61 6.61 7.13 5.98 7.10
56-65 12.80 1.21 0.60 2.64 1.24 1.41 1.27
Does not have HI
Percentage 30.20 95.20 93.98 96.06 94.16 96.65 94.21
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Employed in Venezuela
Percentage 85.22 81.11 81.37 80.94 69.62 80.97
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Estimates for Peruvians considering only the treated
areas. HI stands for Health Insurance. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2018 and ENPOVE data.
In order to explore if their informal-worker status affects their ability to use their higher educational
background in the host country, we calculate the occupational distribution and job complexity measures for
Venezuelans before and after they migrate, extending the idea in Dustmann et al. (2013) and Foged and Peri
(2015). Two key results emerge (Table 2.2). Firstly, Venezuelan immigrants are over-represented in low
productivity occupations (e.g., sales and elementary occupations) and have a lower mean complexity index
than the natives. This also holds for the earlier phase of immigrants. Secondly, Venezuelans experience
a striking downgrading after arriving in Peru. On the one hand, 40% of Venezuelans had managerial and
technical jobs in their home country, and only 10% performed this same type of work in Peru. On the other
hand, the share of those who perform elementary occupations increases from 5% pre-emigration to 22%
post-emigration. The lower panel shows that their mean complexity index is less than half for the jobs held
in Venezuela. The shift from occupations intensive in communication and cognitive skills towards more
manual jobs mostly explains this result. These regularities also hold for immigrants with secondary and
higher education while those who are lower educated do not experience such a downgrade (Table 2.3).25
This downgrading occurs even in the absence of the language barrier, which constitutes a hurdle for
Syrian immigrants in their host markets (Akgündüz et al. 2018; Konle-Seidl and Bolits 2016). In turn, it is
similar to what migrants from outside the European Union experience in Germany, United Kingdom and
the United States (Dustmann et al. 2013, 2016), where the immigration process was instead gradual and
lengthy.26
24IDEHPUCP et al. (2020) reports that a large number of PTP holders had this document rejected by potential employers, who
would “only accept foreign personnel if they have the immigration card”, contravening immigration rules.
25The previous evidence of immigrants working in low occupational categories and their downgrading upon arrival also holds within
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Table 2.2 – Occupational distribution and skill level, 2018
Peruvians Venezuelans
Earlier Recent
Pre Post Pre Post
Occupation category (%)
Managers and professional worker 11.29 18.06 3.97 17.07 2.91
Technical workers 17.18 23.04 7.93 21.40 5.36
Clerical services sales workers 29.10 37.90 45.88 39.21 47.80
Craft and trades workers 8.96 8.05 13.20 6.75 14.26
Machine operators 11.78 7.68 7.49 9.38 6.59
Elementary occupations 21.69 5.27 21.53 6.19 23.08
Complexity score
Communication skill 0.30 0.39 0.28 0.38 0.28
Cognoscitive skill 0.28 0.36 0.24 0.35 0.23
Manual skill 0.54 0.47 0.53 0.50 0.53
Complexity index 3.94 5.82 1.96 4.78 1.88
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Pre and post refer to the
job the Venezuelan immigrant had in Venezuela (before migrating) and in Peru, respectively. Score
measures follow Ottaviano et al. (2013). Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2018 data,
ENPOVE data, O*NET 25.1 Database and crosswalks by Hardy et al. (2018).
Table 2.3 – Occupational distribution and skill level by education level, 2018
Primary level Secondary level Higher level
Peruv. Venezuelans Peruv. Venezuelans Peruv. Venezuelans
Earlier Recent Earlier Recent Earlier Recent
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Occupation category (%)
Managers and profess 0.03 5.89 6.43 2.88 0.30 0.83 1.49 1.40 1.49 0.89 24.94 25.40 4.76 27.07 4.43
Technical workers 35.61 14.67 1.75 9.42 1.22 15.72 13.98 2.88 17.13 0.99 22.27 27.23 10.59 25.51 8.40
Clerical svs sales workers 19.60 33.56 47.82 42.10 43.53 26.76 48.47 44.06 44.45 43.49 29.43 34.41 46.42 36.16 50.83
Craft and trades workers 7.05 19.26 17.39 12.33 21.17 10.95 14.38 19.38 11.88 17.86 5.05 4.60 10.28 3.30 11.15
Machine operators 7.24 11.18 12.10 20.14 7.26 16.10 12.86 8.99 13.93 9.65 7.49 5.41 6.42 5.34 4.85
Elementary occupations 30.47 15.45 14.51 13.13 26.52 29.63 8.82 23.29 11.12 27.12 10.82 2.95 21.52 2.62 20.33
Complexity
Communication skill 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.28 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.41 0.45 0.31 0.45 0.30
Cognoscitive skill 0.23 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.36 0.40 0.25 0.41 0.24
Manual skill 0.70 0.61 0.54 0.65 0.58 0.65 0.58 0.59 0.61 0.57 0.43 0.41 0.50 0.42 0.50
Complexity index 0.94 1.69 1.85 1.50 1.32 1.30 2.57 1.16 2.01 1.37 6.61 7.49 2.29 6.75 2.25
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Pre and post refer to the job the Venezuelan immigrant had in Venezuela
(before migrating) and in Peru, respectively. Lower education level includes those with primary and less; intermediate, those with secondary; higher,
those with at least some college, technical education and postgraduates. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2018 data, ENPOVE data, O*NET
25.1 Database and crosswalks by Hardy et al. (2018).
The absorption of the Venezuelans into the informal sector and consequently into low productivity activ-
ities results in a tighter and leftward-shifted hourly wage distribution than that of the natives (Figure 2.2).
Their hourly wages at the mean and at different percentiles are lower, and the wage gap increases as we
move up the income distribution. Venezuelan wages at the 1st decile are the same as that of Peruvians;
in contrast, their hourly wages at the 9th decile (slightly more than 1 GBP in 2018 prices) are less than
half that of the natives. In fact, only 60% of Venezuelan workers earn a monthly wage higher than Peru’s
minimum legal wage as of 2018 (around 170 pounds sterling in 2018 prices). This occurs despite the fact
that most migrants had prior work experience in Venezuela (see bottom of Table 2.1). Almost 90% of these
work in small-sized firms, characterized by low productivity levels in Peru (Távara et al. 2014) and around
82% work more than the maximum legal number of weekly working hours (Koechlin et al. 2019).
the different treated areas (Table 2.A3).
26The evidence of downgrading confirms the suitability of our quasi-experimental approach for analyzing the impacts of the Exodus
compared to those based on the national-skill approach (see section 2.2), as these assume that the location of the immigrant in the
skills distribution corresponds to their education level (Dustmann et al. 2013).
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2.5 Identification strategy
2.5.1 Econometric methods
The analysis of the 2016 Venezuelan Exodus to Peru requires methods based on for quasi-experimental
designs. As reported in the previous section, despite its massive size, the sudden influx did not affect in
the short run Peru’s economic structural characteristics which could also impact the outcomes of interest.
These include regional institutional quality, technological progress or its labour demand composition. Fur-
thermore, the origin of this Exodus lies in Venezuela’s economic and political factors, which are not related
to Peru’s economic growth. Due to the availability of repeated cross-sections (RCS) for ten years before and
fours years after the treatment, we can exploit the department-level variation of this sharp treatment (see
Figure 2.A3 and Figure 3.A2). We are interested in estimating the Average Treatment Effect of the Treated
(ATET). In the case of the wages, it tells us how much the average wages changed in the treated departments
after being exposed to the influx, relative to a counterfactual situation where these never experienced such
shock (see Lee 2016; Frölich and Sperlich 2019). With only one treated department (s = 1) and one control
(s = 0) and one year before (t = 0) and after (t = 1) the impact, the unconditional ATET in terms of the
potential outcomes, where super-indices 1 and 0 denote the potential outcomes with and without treatment,
is given by
AT ET = E
(








Y 0|s = 1, t = 1
)
(2.1)
The unobservability of the counterfactual (second term) requires its estimation under some identifying
assumptions. To provide a more secure basis for informing policy, we apply different methods for its
estimation (Abadie and Cattaneo 2018; Samartsidis et al. 2019; Strumpf et al. 2017). Nonetheless, we take
as our main estimator that which arises from a two-stage DiD method. As we explain below, this is better
suited for analysing the effects of the Venezuelan Exodus.
2.5.1.1 Estimation at individual level
The DiD method estimates the ATET as the difference in average wages between treated and control groups
in t = 1 after netting out differences in t = 0. Conditional on a vector of covariates X which is unaffected
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by the treatment, in the simple case this corresponds in the simple case to
AT ET DiD (X) = [E (Y |s = 1, t = 1,X)−E (Y |s = 1, t = 0,X)]− [E (Y |s = 0, t = 1,X)−E (Y |s = 0, t = 0,X)] (2.2)
where the potential outcomes are now replaced by their observed averages. The counterfactual is identified
by adjusting the observed (conditional) average in the post-treatment of the control department for the
differences in averages in the pre-treatment.
A first concern is that this strategy is valid only if the parallel trend assumption (PTA) holds, i.e. in
the absence of the Exodus, the (conditional) evolution of average outcomes would have been the same
in treated and the control departments. This is essentially untestable and cannot be taken for granted (Lee
2016; Angrist and Pischke 2009; Frölich and Sperlich 2019). Two additional concerns become more evident
if we use the equivalent linear model to reflect our case where different departments are treated
Yst = αs +λt +βDst +X
′
stγ+Vst ;s = 1, ...,S; t = 1, ...,T (2.3)
where s and t indexes the departments and years. The treatment indicator is Dst = 1(treateds = 1)×
1(year ≥ 2016). I.e., this is 1 for the treated departments from 2016 onwards and 0 otherwise, so β̂ provides
an estimate of the ATET. The terms αs and λt represent a full set of unobserved department and time ef-
fects, respectively, which capture any correlation between the policy assignment and time-invariant factors
and secular time trends. The (column) vector Xst includes controls that vary along the department-year
level and Vst is an unobserved random variable with zero mean assumed uncorrelated with Xst .27 Important
efficiency gains can be grasped with a multilevel model (Frölich and Sperlich 2019), which for a random
draw corresponds to (with the variables in lower case to emphasize that data is now at the individual level)




istδst +εist where εist = vst +uist ;s = 1, ...,S; t = 1, ...,T ; i = 1, ...,Mst (2.4)
where zist is a (column) vector of individual-specific covariates, εist is the unobserved individual-specific
error comprised now of two random variables, vst and uist are unobserved department-year and idiosyncratic
components with zero mean and which is uncorrelated with explanatory variables and independent of each
other. We can think of vst as shocks shared by individuals within the same department and year, e.g.
department-level business cycles. Mst indexes the number of observations in every department-year cell.
Direct estimation of Equation 2.4, as is customarily done in the literature, leads to two types of problems.
The first is related to the consistency of β̂ . Since the level at which the sampling of data for DiD estimation
takes place is departmental(region)-year, the asymptotic analysis requires taking Mst → ∞ while keeping
S and T fixed. It turns out that under “large Mst” asymptotics, the presence of vst leads to meaningful
negative consequences: β̂ from Equation 2.4 conflates both the effect of the treatment at department-year
level (which we are after) and the differences in the evolution of the department-year shocks (Angrist and
Pischke 2009; Frölich and Sperlich 2019). Surprisingly, proper handling of the vst component has been
largely ignored in the literature (Bertrand et al. 2002).28 We address this problem by applying a two-stage
DiD estimator (2S-DiD) process described in Hansen (2007) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2014), which
our data renders feasible as the average cell size is between 217,685 and 337,842 observations. In the
first stage, we apply the Pooled OLS estimator with the individual-level data yist = ξst + z
′
istδ+ uist ;s =
1, ...,S, t = 1, ...,T, i = 1, ...,Mst to estimate the department-by-year fixed effects, ξ̂st . In the second stage
27Henceforth we do not specify the dimensions of the matrices and vectors here. However, we assume these are conformable for
the operations involved.
28In order to see this more clearly, ignoring xst and zist in Equation 2.4 and taking only two years and one treated and one control, the
estimator of the ATET is β̂ = β +[(ε11 − ε10)− (ε01 − ε00)]. As we average larger and larger samples within departments-years, a weak
LLN assures that plimβ̂ eliminates the influence of uist since E (uist) = 0 but not of vst , yielding plimβ̂ = β +[(v11 − v10)− (v01 − v00)]
as Mst → ∞.
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we estimate the causal parameter of interest using a fixed effects (FE) estimator on the following model
ξ̂st = αs +λt +βDst +x
′
stγ+ vst ;s = 1, ...,S; t = 1, ...,T (2.5)
Dst and ξst are partialled out from the two-way fixed effects (αs and λt ) and xst by a standard Frisch-
Waugh-Lovell argument.29 We also estimate Equation 2.4 including 4 lags and 4 leads of the treatment to
exploit the notion of Granger predictability (Angrist and Pischke 2009). This means that βDst is replaced
by ∑2014t=τ0 βtDst +∑
2019
t=2016 βtDst , where Dsτ = 1(treateds = 1)× 1(year = τ). Joint significance of the β̂ s
in the first term suggests that PTA is not plausible while the estimated β s from the second term provide
information about effects’ time-heterogeneity relative to the last pre-treatment year (2015).
The second type of econometric problem concerns the estimation of the standard errors (SE). Typically,
studies (e.g., Balkan and Tumen 2016; Akgündüz et al. 2015, 2018; Mora et al. 2019) only control for the
arbitrary within-departments correlation of the idiosyncratic errors uist in Equation 2.4 (i.e., E (uistu jsτ) =
σ2v , i ̸= j). Their estimates of the variance-covariance matrix using the Liang and Zeger (1986) estimator
(cluster-robust variance estimate, henceforth CRVE) ignore the policy autocorrelation problem induced by




̸= 0, i ̸= j, ℓ> 0, see Imbens and Wooldridge 2014; Hansen
2007), leading to a sizeable underestimation of the actual SEs. As Bertrand et al. (2002) demonstrate, this
strategy results in a 44% probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis of no effect using a nominal 5% level
test. Even if we rule out the cross-sectional correlation of vst , the validity of CRVE requires that S → ∞.
Applications reviewed in section 2.2 are instead characterized by a “small-S”, which results in a large over-
rejection of the null hypothesis of no effect (Cameron et al. 2008; Cameron and Miller 2015; Lee 2016;
Wooldridge 2003). This over-rejection further increases as the cluster heterogeneity increases (Carter et al.
2017; Lee and Steigerwald 2018)30 and as the number of treated departments S1 decreases (Mackinnon and
Webb 2016; Bell and McCaffrey 2002). Moreover, Brewer et al. (2018) note that in typical DiD settings, the
real challenge for inference is the power associated with small-S. Their simulations show that this makes it
harder to detect effects of realistic magnitude even with a correctly sized test.
In view of these concerns, we assess the statistical significance of estimates from Equation 2.5 using
different methods. In order to reduce the degree of over-rejection due to the small-S problem, we ap-






N−K (where K is the
number of right-hand side variables), and evaluate the Wald statistic using the critical values from a T distri-
bution with S−1 degrees of freedom (DoF). Additionally, we carry out inference using the Bias-Corrected
CRVEs (CRVE2 and CRVE3) of Bell and McCaffrey (2002). These variance-covariance estimators are
built upon the heteroskedasticity-consistent HC2 and HC3 variance estimators from MacKinnon and White
(1985) and result in Wald statistics with smaller size distortions than those typically applied in the literat-
ure (Cameron et al. 2008; Imbens and Kolesar 2012). We report the effective number of clusters S∗ from
Carter et al. (2017) which adjusts (downward) the observed S to reflect the degree of sample heterogeneity.
A sizeable difference between S and S∗ suggests that inference should be based on the p-values from the
wild cluster bootstrap procedure (Mackinnon and Webb 2016) and also allow us to evaluate the reliability
of Wald statistics based on CRVE.31 For the wild cluster bootstrap, we use both the Rademacher’s and
the Webb’s (2013) distribution. The latter is found to be more appropriate with less than 10 (effective)
29Note how in the first step we have imposed homogeneity of the slopes, δst = δ and in the second step all the uncertainty comes
through vst because our large Mgt ignores the estimation error of ξst . This partialling out is done for the purpose of avoiding the
rank-deficiency problem (see Cameron et al. 2008) and to avoid ending up with intractably large matrices for the calculation of cluster
robust SE estimators.
30Heterogeneity in this case is defined as a measure that captures violation of the following assumptions: identical number of obser-
vations for every region s and identical variance-covariances matrices for the covariates and for the error across s (Carter et al. 2017;
Lee and Steigerwald 2018). Note how the estimating approach based on Equation 2.5 satisfies by construction the first assumption,
unlike the more typical analyzes undertaken which directly estimates Equation 2.4.
31In our application, S∗ systematically suggests substantial cluster heterogeneity which rules out the applicability of the alternative
inference approach by Donald and Lang (2007). Mackinnon and Webb (2016), in a similar setting as ours, suggest that this is a rather
conservative method because it tends to under-reject the null hypothesis.
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clusters (see Cameron et al. 2008 for details). We also calculate the p-values that result from evaluating the
CRVE2-based Wald statistic using the data-determined DoF from Imbens and Kolesar (2012, henceforth,
IK-DoF)32. Simulations therein demonstrate that this combination results in slight under-rejection of the
null hypothesis of no effect.
As a direct way to deal with the plausible serial correlation of vst in Equation 2.5, we use Hansen’s
(2007) Feasible GLS (FGLS) estimator assuming that vst follows a (stationary) AR(1) and AR(2) process. A
substantial improvement compared to alternative FGLS approaches for panel data (e.g. Kiefer 1980) is that
its transformation matrix relies on an iteratively bias-corrected (BC) estimator of the (finite-dimensional)
vector ρ that characterizes the nature of the AR process.33 As we show below, it provides more efficient
inference than the usual FE. Indeed, Brewer et al. (2018) simulations show that this bias-corrected FGLS
(FGLS-BC) estimator and the CRVE improve the power of the test considerably while providing correctly
sized tests. It is also robust to misspecification of the error process, even with small S and with fewer periods
than in our application.34 We follow Brewer et al.’s (2018) concluding recommendation and take this as our
preferred estimator in our study.35
As shown in section 2.6, this approach for the effects of vst leads to different point estimates and standard
errors compared to the quasi-experimental studies reviewed above. It suggests that some of their results
reported in the existing literature might be driven by their omission from the empirical analyzes undertaken
in these studies.
2.5.1.2 Estimation at aggregated level
In order to assess the robustness of our results from our main estimation strategy used in the previous
subsection, we also estimate the ATET using the Synthetic Control Method (SCM, Abadie et al. 2010,
2015; Abadie 2020). Compared to the DiD, SCM estimates the ATET for each of the i = 1, ...,5 treated
departments in the post treatment year t > T0, t = 12, ...,15 (the beginning of the treatment is 2016 and so
T0 = 11) by
AT ET SCMit = Y
I
it −Y Nit = Yit −Y Nit (2.6)
where Y Ijt is the potential outcome for department i after being exposed to the intervention, which is always
observed. Letting Y Njt be the observed outcomes of the 24− 5 ≡ J departments consigned to the control
group known as the donor pool indexed by j = 5+1, ...,5+ J, the counterfactual for each i is identified by










The optimal synthetic control weights, the ω∗j s, minimize a quadratic distance between units in the donor
pool and each i only in terms of pre-treatment observed attributes given by
32This measure of DoF is in turn based on Bell and McCaffrey’s (2002) DoF, which approximates the finite sample distribution of
the CRVE2-based Wald test via a t-distribution with K DoF. This K is a function of the design matrix which equalizes the first two
moments of an expression involving the population variance and the estimated variance to the first two moments of a χ2Kdistribution.
Imbens and Kolesar (2012) extend this approach to exploit the implicit equicorrelated errors structure present in the clustering case.
See their paper for further details.
33This bias in Kiefer’s approach is induced because under FE, ρ is calculated from residuals v̂st ≈ vst − vs which with T fixed do
not behave like the underlying errors. The bias can be substantial with even a moderate T (Hansen 2007).
34Additionally, under the maintained hypothesis of serially correlated errors, FGLS is not affected by the negative relationship
between power of the test and panel length because the first-stage transformation removes the serial correlation from the error terms,
unlike the case of FE estimation.
35Asymptotically, failure of the AR(p) assumption to construct the FGLS estimator does not affect its consistency. In fact, a
weighting matrix based on an incorrect parametrization of the serial correlation process will often still be closer to the optimal GLS
weighting matrix than the identity matrix used by standard OLS (Brewer et al. 2018; Hansen 2007). Even modest efficiency gains can
be beneficial (Cameron and Miller 2015)
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W ≡ (ω5+1, ...,ω5+J) = argmin(Xi −X0W)
′




ω j = 1 (2.8)
where Xi and X0 is a column vector and a J-columns matrix, respectively, of pre-treatment characteristics
for i and for each of the js in the donor pool, V is a diagonal symmetric positive semidefinite matrix
which reflects the contribution of each of those characteristics in the counterfactual and W is the vector of
weights.36 The two restrictions on W ensure that the counterfactual is constructed using only a subset of
untreated departments which best resemble the pre-treatment economic characteristics of the treated areas i
(i.e. is sparse) and that is based on interpolation of these units.37
Compared to the DiD, SCM estimates the causal effect of interest even when Y Njt follows a more general
Latent Factor Model, with a set of factor loadings and common factors replacing the unobserved effects
in Equation 2.5 (see Bai 2009).38 However, for this to be possible, the convex hull condition must hold.
This implies that the ω∗j s allow the weighted average of the outcomes of units in the donor pool to fit
perfectly the outcome of each of the i in all pre-treatment periods (see Appendix B in Abadie et al. 2010).
In practice, this condition is rarely met (Powell 2018) and Ferman and Pinto (2021) show that in this case the
estimated ω∗j are biased. Consequently, we improve upon the existing empirical evidence for the Venezuelan
Exodus by also applying the modified synthetic control estimator introduced by Ferman and Pinto (2021).








h = i,5+ 1, ...,5+ J. The authors show that, with imperfect fit, this method can lead to lower bias of
the ATET estimator even under a non-zero correlation between treatment assignment and time-varying
unobservables.39
Following Peri and Yasenov (2017) and Peri et al. (2020), a way to check the lack of statistically sig-
nificant differences between the synthetic unit and the observed treated unit comes from the estimated
coefficients of the saturated panel model given vt
y = treated +δpre pre+∑
Q







where treated is 1 if the observation is the treated unit and 0 otherwise; pre is 1 if the observation be-
longs to the pre treatment period 2005-2014 (2015 is the base) and 0 otherwise and postp, with q =
2016,2017,2018,2019, is 1 if the observation belongs to every year in the post-treatment and 0 otherwise.
Abadie et al. (2010) propose an exact inferential method based on the distribution of the estimator
from (in-space) placebo interventions. Each of these placebo effects are calculated by iteratively taking
one department as the treated while placing the remaining J units in the donor pool, and estimating the
treatment effects as in Equation 2.6. Under the null hypothesis of no effect, an abnormally large effect for
the treated i compared to the placebos signals its statistical significance. However, some large effects might
not be actually caused by the intervention but by a poor pre-treatment fitting, distorting the comparison
against the placebo runs. Moreover, taking an arbitrary cut-off for the Root Mean Squared Prediction
36In our application, each of the columns in Xi and X0 can be thought as partitioned in 2: a column vector comprised of pre-
treatment averages of each of the Z economic predictors and a column vector comprised of some observed pre-treatment values for
the outcome. This latter controls for an Ashenfelter-type induced selection that can potentially bias the estimator.
37The estimation of the covariates weights matrix, V, is important to achieve bias reduction. Based on Kuosmanen et al. (2021)
results, we avoid using a nested optimization algorithm for the estimation of V. We instead resort to the regression-based approach to
determine the elements of this matrix.
38This is a generalization of Equation 2.4 in which the sum of the two scalars αs +λt is replaced by the product of two vectors,
say αsλt , each representing a set of fixed factors (factor loadings) and a set of year-specific factors (common factors)(Samartsidis
et al. 2019). The DiD cannot identify the ATET in this model because the unobserved group and year effects are no longer linearly
related. Direct estimation requires a larger number of departments and years than those in our application to ensure that asymptotic
unbiasedness applies (see Bai 2009; Xu 2017).
39Ferman and Pinto (2021) show that the method suggested by Doudchenko and Imbens (2016), who measure outcomes in levels






and construct the counterfactual, is equivalent
to theirs.
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Errors (RMSPE) as a criterion for “good” fitting ends up being completely arbitrary (Abadie 2020; Abadie
et al. 2015). Consequently, we resort to p-values from the distribution of ratios of post and pre-treatment
RMSPEs, RMSPE posth
/
RMSPE preh where h = i,5+ 1, ...,5+ J from the permutations, calculated as the
relative rank of the ratio, p = Rank
/
J.40 Compared to the graphical analysis in Boruchowicz et al. (2021),
by relying on p-values we add transparency to the inference as these penalize the estimated effects by a
poor pre-treatment fit. Firpo and Possebom (2018) conclude from their simulations that this p-value is the
uniformly more powerful test compared to other inference procedures conventionally applied with SCM.
Due to the size of J, we consider an effect as significant only if the p-value for i is the smallest obtained.
As alternative robustness checks (in section 2.7), we also estimate the ATET from the aggregated panel
data (Equation 2.3) using the (partialled-out) FE and First Differences (FD) correcting the standard errors
using methods in the previous sub-section. These two estimators consistently identify the ATET even if the
the unobserved effects (αs,λt) are correlated with the explanatory variables. However, a key assumption is
strict exogeneity, E (vst |DsT , ...,Ds1,XsT , ...,Xs1,αs,λt) = 0 (plus a suitable rank assumption) which implies
that the explanatory variables in each t are uncorrelated with vst , ∀s ̸= t.
In order to safeguard against the possibility these estimators are confounded by individual state trends
and a failure of the strict exogeneity assumption, we estimate two additional models. The first is a random-
growth model where an additional source of heterogeneity is given by a trend of the unobserved department-
specific effect in Equation 2.3, gst. Likewise, we do not restrict the correlations between (αs,λt ,gst) and
the explanatory variables but still retain the assumption strict retain the assumption of strict exogeneity. As
shown in Wooldridge (2010), first-differencing the equation with the random-trend leads to
∆Yst = gs +ηt +β∆Dst +∆x
′
itγ+∆uit ;s = 1, ...,S; t = 2, ...,T (2.10)
where ηt ≡ λt − λt−1. The second model is a dynamic AR(1) panel data model which drops the strict
exogeneity and only assumes sequential exogeneity (i.e. allows for a feedback of ust to Ds,t+p, p= 1, ...,T −
t)
Yst = αs +λt +θYs,t−1 +βDst +X
′
stγ+Vst ;s = 1, ...,S; t = 2, ...,T (2.11)
This requires that only one lag of yit is necessary for dynamic completeness once we condition on the un-
observed effects and the observed covariates. The coefficient corresponding to the lagged variable is not of
direct interest here. However, it proxies for time-varying unobserved factors that affect the evolution of the
outcome (Bond 2002) and safeguards the key estimators from the threat of reverse causality (Leszczensky
and Wolbring 2019). We estimate this as a two-step difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991)
incorporating an efficient (cluster-robust) weighting matrix to account for the correlation between differ-
enced errors. We instrument the endogenous term ∆Ys,t−1 by its (internal) lagged levels. A proliferation in
the number of instruments is avoided by restricting the instruments to just two lags and further collapsing
them (by adding horizontally formerly distinct columns of the Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988 instrument matrix).
The failure to do so can result in overfitting of the endogenous variables and a reduction of the power of
the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions (Roodman 2009a,b). We anticipate a good small sample
performance in the light of these restrictions as the loss of relevant information for omitting more distant
lags tends to be modest (Bond 2002).








)2 and RMSPE postj =√ 1T−T0 ∑Tt=T0 (Yjt −∑k w∗kYkt)2 where k =
i,5+1, ...,5+ J excluding the j taken as treated
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2.5.2 Identifying assumptions checks
We first examine the pre-2016 evolution of the average outcomes. A likely result of the (unconditional)
PTA is that the series for treated and untreated departments in the pre-treatment period were also parallel
(Angrist and Pischke 2009; Angrist and Krueger 1999). The averages of (log.) hourly wages in the treated
areas have been consistently higher than the comparable averages for the untreated group and is reduced
after the beginning of the treatment. The monotonic growth in the first ten years is a clear manifestation
of the ’Peruvian Growth Miracle’ (Ross and Peschiera 2015). Their parallel trends signal the validity of
the assumption (Figure 2.3). The graph for the ancillary variables (Figure 2.A7) indicates that immigrants
locate in areas with lower informal employment (though with rates above 55%) and that the gap between
untreated and treated areas has risen from 10 to 15 percentage points. In turn, Gini coefficients for both
formal and informal sectors are not statistically different. However, the (unconditional) PTA holds in both
cases despite the non-linear evolution of the inequality in the informal sector (see Frölich and Sperlich
2019). These results suggest that including all non-treated departments as control groups (instead of just an
ad-hoc selection) is unlikely to lead to counterfactual identification problems.























Note: Sample includes employed native individuals between 18 and 65 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Vertical dashed lines denote the beginning of the treatment.
Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Treated Untreated
Secondly, we examine if treated departments are different in terms of observed characteristics compared
to those untreated units. Because the DiD approach controls for all time-invariant differences between
treatment and control groups, we focus on time-varying differences that affect the outcome variables’ trends
in the pre-treatment.41 The characteristics in both groups have remained steady and are reasonably similar,
suggesting that significant differences in varying unobserved confounders are unlikely. Specifically, the
proportion of males and average workers’ age and education are close (Table 2.A4). Compared to untreated
areas, natives in treated areas have a more extensive representation in Craft and Trades occupations (10%
vs 14%, respectively) and less in the Technical jobs (16% vs 28%, respectively). Also, natives in treated
areas have a higher representation in the Services industry (around 24% vs 18%) and a lower representation
in the Agriculture sector (6% vs 27%). The fact that treated areas are the most significant urban centres in
the country explains these findings. We include control for these variables in our econometric modelling to
account for these differences.
Thirdly, we analyze patterns of migration of Venezuelans within Peru using ENPOVE data. It is done in
recognition that the migration of Venezuelans across Peru in search of better job opportunities can under-
mine the identification of ATET, as it would lead to spillover effects over the departments that we assume
41Because the treatment is at department-level, the exposure of individuals to the treatment is unconfounded (Angrist and Pischke
2009).
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to be untreated (Abadie 2020). The first indication that there is no selective migration is the reduced time
(a little more than ten days) it takes them to reach their current location in Peru once they leave Venezuela.
Such a short time window makes it unlikely for them to integrate into labour markets in the sites along their
migration route. This time window is plausibly explained by the transit difficulties they experience in their
journey. For example, those heading towards the Andean regions (Arequipa and Cuzco) take almost one
month to reach their destination due to the extra time and monetary costs involved and the lower supply
of transportation services to those areas. Nevertheless, the transit time outside Peru mainly explains the
total transit time of Venezuelans. In fact, it thoroughly explains the transit time for Venezuelans settled in
Tumbes.
A second indication that immigrants did not change labour markets within Peru is the low proportion of
long journeys prior to getting to their current location. Only 15% took more than one month and 6% more
than two months to reach their current location. A further indication is that almost all of them remained
in the same department once they arrived in Peru. Indeed, 83% remained in the same district (a smaller
administrative area than department), ranging from 75% to 98% across the treated areas. Additionally, the
fact that over 90% of Venezuelans plan to remain in Peru reassures us that our study does not suffer from
emigration outside the host country either, unlike what Akgündüz et al. (2018) report for the Syrians in
Turkey. This evidence suggests the absence of migration of Venezuelans across regions and outside Peru.
Hence we believe that spillovers are unlikely to be a concern for identification.
Table 2.4 – Venezuelan immigration routes and timing, 2018
Treated areas Total
Arequipa Cuzco La Libertad Lima y Callao Tumbes
Total of trips
Mean 7.63 8.06 7.23 6.49 6.18 6.52
(0.10) (0.16) (0.16) (0.06) (0.25) (0.05)
Trip length outside Venezuela
Total 1.07 0.94 0.73 0.36 0.85 0.38
(0.13) (0.21) (0.12) (0.04) (0.16) (0.04)
Outside Peru 0.68 0.64 0.57 0.34 0.85 0.35
(0.09) (0.14) (0.09) (0.04) (0.16) (0.04)
Inside Peru 0.39 0.30 0.16 0.02 0.03
(0.08) (0.13) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Proportion of journeys
More than 1 month 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.35 0.14
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
More than 2 months 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.06
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
Has stayed in the same department
Proportion 0.95 0.95 0.94 1.00 0.97 1.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Has stayed in the same district
Proportion 0.75 0.68 0.91 0.83 0.97 0.83
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Plans to stay in Peru
Proportion 0.95 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.94
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Trip length in months. Trip length outside
Venezuela refers to length of the trip (in months) from 1st stop outside Venezuela to the current place in Peru. Average
length of intermediate stay measures the average time (in monthds) per place where immigrants transit outside Venezuela
and Peru, for those whose trip length is more or equal than 2 months. SEs in parenthesis. Source: Author’s calculations
using ENPOVE data.
If the Venezuelan Exodus drives down wages for certain skill groups, native Peruvians in that skill group
can also move around different labour markets to gain higher wages (or at least face strong incentives to
do so). This, in turn, will dissipate the impacts of immigration throughout the national economy and hence
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our econometric methods will not be able to identify these effects (Dustmann et al. 2008). For the USA,
Card (2001) finds that mobility flows of natives and older immigrants in the USA are minimal, and hence
this substitution effect is likely negligible in magnitude. We have reasons to believe that the same holds for
Peru. The first reason for this is that the real estate market in Peru is not as developed as those in the USA
and Europe, which makes the internal migration of workers more challenging. The second reason is that in
2013-2018 almost half of the departments in Peru had a positive migration rate. Cuzco and Tumbes, two of
the treated departments, are part of this group, but their inflow rates are negligible (less than 0.5 for every
1000 workers) compared to the other regions (INEI 2019b, Table 9.3). Finally, following Dustmann et al.
(2013), our large regional definitions (regions and not districts) make migratory movements more likely to
be internalized and reflected in the econometric results.
2.6 Results
This section presents the ATETs of the Venezuelan Exodus on the key (viz., a formal and informal wages)
and ancillary (viz. informal employment levels, formal and informal sector inequality) outcomes using the
whole set of employed workers between 18 and 65 years old (as described in section 2.3). For the DiD
estimation, both the typical single-stage and the two-stage, we include as controls a set of individual level
demographic variables typically included in Mincerian equations (a male dummy, years of age and years of
schooling, and an interaction of these two latter, a dummy variable for urban settlement status) in addition
to vectors containing industry and occupation dummies.42
For the SCM estimation, the variables included as controls at department-year level are real GDP per
capita, the percentage of the economically active population in services, the share in manufacturing, along
with the economically active population with secondary schooling. Additionally, we include the average
years of schooling, the proportion of people aged 18 to 25 and 26 to 35, as well as the proportion of workers
in urban areas and a dummy for if the department is on the border frontier with Ecuador and Colombia.
Because the pre-treatment outcomes would also allow us to control for factor loadings in the estimation of
the counterfactual, we include in the model pre-treatment outcomes for only years 2005, 2010 and 2015. In
section 2.7 we apply other estimation methods that relax some of the assumptions assumed here.
Since we anticipate heterogeneous effects on specific subgroups of the native population, we also es-
timate results for an array of sub-groups. Also, based on the demographic characteristics of Venezuelan
workers (from Table 2.1) and the documented downgrade they experience (from Table 2.2), we expect that
the most affected group will be those those with at most secondary education and aged between 18 and 35
years old. These are more prone to directly compete in the labour market with Venezuelans immigrants.
Hence, we separately analyse this particular subsample (see section 2.8, Table 2.B1 to Table 2.B22). The
effects on these “low skilled” workers are mostly indistinguishable from those in the whole sample and so
we only refer tangentially to these in what follows.
2.6.1 Key outcomes
We take as a departure point the single-stage DiD with repeated cross-sections. I.e., initially, we (naively)
ignore the role of vst in Equation 2.4 and rely on the variance estimators conventionally used in this small-S
design. However, the estimated treatment effect (upper panel in Table 2.5) is not statistically significant
under any inference method. The lower panel suggests that the effects exhibit temporal heterogeneity
instead. Inference based on the CRVE suggests that the treatment had significant effects in the formal
sector only at the beginning (in 2016) and in the informal sector only at the end of the period (in 2019).
42Additional estimation results from models including only demographic controls and those adding only a vector of industry dum-
mies where the individual is employed were estimated. The results for these are available upon request.
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Nonetheless, the reliability of these commonly applied methods is in our case, at best, dubious. The first
indication of this is the sizeable difference in the effective number of clusters (around 6) and the observed
number of clusters (24), suggesting that inference should be based instead on p-values from the wild cluster
bootstrap.43 A further indication is provided by the statistical significance of the (cluster-robust) F-test on
the leads (Ds2011, ...,Ds2014) from the regression for the informal sector. This latter suggests that the key
DiD identification assumption is not fulfilled in this sector. Still, results from this single-stage DiD method
suggest that the Exodus caused an increase in native formal hourly wages of 3.2% in 2016 and an increase
in wages in the informal sector. Hourly wages in the formal sector for less-skilled workers were not affected
(see table Table 2.B1).
Table 2.5 – Single stage DiD: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal and informal
wages (full set of controls), 2011-2019
Formal wages Informal wages
β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE P-val. Rade P-val. Webb β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE P-val. Rade P-val. Webb
Aggregated
2016-2019 0.009 (0.008) (0.015) [0.460] [0.530] 0.029 (0.008)*** (0.020) [0.225] [0.295]
S* 6.208 6.451
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 0.032 (0.017)* (0.016)* [0.085] [0.100] 0.028 (0.017) (0.020) [0.365] [0.350]
2017 0.016 (0.017) (0.015) [0.300] [0.335] 0.020 (0.017) (0.018) [0.315] [0.360]
2018 -0.028 (0.017) (0.020) [0.270] [0.285] -0.039 (0.017)** (0.024) [0.320] [0.235]
2019 -0.022 (0.017) (0.020) [0.395] [0.435] -0.066 (0.017)*** (0.025)** [0.125] [0.100]
N 148,419 267,006
S* 6.139 6.519
F stat. OLS 1.625 3.884**
Notes: The sample is restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Individual level covariates are age and schooling
years in levels and interacted and gender, area, industry and occupation dummies. SE CRVE refers to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs; P-val. WB Rade and
Webb, to the p-value of the Wild Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights and Webb weights, respectively, using 199 replications. S* refers to the effective
number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald (2013). F-stat refers to the statistic of the F test for the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment
qualification and the dummy for the years previous to the treatment using the cluster-robust VCE. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant
at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
Once we take into account the effect of the unobserved department-year specific shocks (vst ) by es-
timating the 2S-DiD (Equation 2.5, using in the first stage the complete set of controls) along with more
efficient variance estimators, the effects of the Exodus on wages lose statistical significance (Table 2.6).44
Two results stand out compared to those from the 1-stage DiD. First, p-values from the wild bootstrap pro-
cedure based on the Rademacher distribution (as well as those based on the Webb distribution, not shown
in the table), which provide more reliable inference given S∗, are noticeably larger. This is also true for
p-values that result from the evaluation of the CRVE2-based Wald statistic using the IK-DoF. Secondly, the
lack of significance of Granger F-tests (bottom of the table) provides more credibility to these results as
this suggests the fulfilment of the (conditional) parallel trends assumptions. Note how these conclusions are
invariant to the number of lags we use to characterize the AR process.
43The effective number of clusters and the IK-DoF in the regressions in this study (for both the total and low-skilled only sample)
are small enough to suggest that reliable inference can be achieved by methods other than CRVE.
44This lack of statistical significance remains invariant to a change in the set of controls used in the first stage (Table 2.A5).
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Table 2.6 – 2 stages DiD: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal and informal wages (full set of controls), 2011-2019
Formal wages Informal wages
β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. IK P-val. WB N β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. IK P-val. WB N
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE OLS 0.013 (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) [0.609] [0.675] 216 0.016 (0.018) (0.030) (0.031) [0.623] [0.635] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.008 (0.023) (0.023) 192 0.019 (0.026) (0.023) 192




2016 FE OLS 0.027 (0.033) (0.023) (0.024) [0.298] [0.295] 216 0.029 (0.038) (0.024) (0.025) [0.293] [0.320] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.026 (0.029) (0.026) 192 0.026 (0.027) (0.029) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.027 (0.029) (0.027) 168 0.026 (0.026) (0.029) 168
2017 FE OLS -0.006 (0.033) (0.025) (0.025) [0.827] [0.835] 216 0.024 (0.038) (0.025) (0.025) [0.366] [0.390] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) -0.007 (0.035) (0.027) 192 0.019 (0.036) (0.031) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) -0.006 (0.031) (0.028) 168 0.020 (0.033) (0.028) 168
2018 FE OLS 0.011 (0.033) (0.040) (0.041) [0.793] [0.770] 216 -0.011 (0.038) (0.032) (0.033) [0.746] [0.795] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.010 (0.037) (0.044) 192 -0.017 (0.042) (0.038) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.011 (0.033) (0.046) 168 -0.016 (0.036) (0.034) 168
2019 FE OLS 0.004 (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) [0.914] [0.915] 216 -0.030 (0.038) (0.028) (0.028) [0.322] [0.290] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.003 (0.038) (0.034) 192 -0.037 (0.045) (0.032) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.004 (0.034) (0.036) 168 -0.035 (0.037) (0.029) 168
S* 7.835 7.835
IK-DoF 6.846 6.846
F stat. FE OLS 1.707 1.080
F stat. GLS-BC AR(1) 0.211 0.394
F stat. GLS-BC AR(2) 0.008 0.272
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Using a 2-step estimation procedure presented in Hansen (2007), individual level covariates (age and schooling in levels
and interacted and gender, area, industry and occupation dummies) are partialled out first and then the treatment effects are estimated from a 2-way FEs (regions and years) model. SE Homosk. refers to homoskedasticity-only SEs; SE
CRVE, to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs; SE CRVE2, to Bell and McCaffrey (2002) bias corrected CRVE2; P-val IK, to the p-value taking the effective DoF from Imbens and Kolesar (2012) (IK-DoF) taking CRVE2 SEs
and P-val. WB, to the p-value of the Wild Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights using 199 replications. S* refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald (2013). FE GLS-BC refers to the
FE GLS Bias-corrected estimator of Hansen (2007) using SE CRVE. F-stat refers to the statistic from the F test of the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years previous to the treatment
using the cluster-robust VCE. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
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We now estimate the ATET using the 2S-DiD method restricting the data to different subpopulations
in terms of sex, age and education. However, the lack of significance of the treatment effect on hourly
wages remains (Figure 2.4). Only within the small group of informal workers with technical, college and
postgraduate education, the treatment is found to be statistically significant on the basis of the confidence
intervals (at 5% of significance) across different inference procedures. The effect on this group, which
represents only 11% of the total workers and 16% of the informal employees, is positive and around 5.2%.45
The general lack of significance of the effects is also found when separating the low-skilled sub-sample of
males and females (Figure 2.B1).
Figure 2.4 – 2 stages DiD: ATET Heterogeneity of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal and
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Using a 2-step estimation procedure presented in Hansen
(2007), individual level covariates (age and schooling in levels and interacted and gender, area, industry and occupation dummies) are partialled out first and then the
treatment effects are estimated from a 2-way FEs (regions and years) model. FE OLS CRVE refers to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs; Wild Boots., to the
p-value of the Wild Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights using 199 replications and FE GLS-BC, to the FE GLS Bias-corrected estimator of Hansen (2007)
using SE CRVE. Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
The estimated synthetic control units, which allows estimation of the ATET under the SCM, does a fair
job reproducing the pre-treatment trajectories of treated departments. Three different criteria provide sup-
45The average department-year cell size in this group is 12,797.6 observations
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port for this. The pre-treatment RMSPE values (left panels of Figure 2.5), summarizing the discrepancies in
pre-treatment outcomes among the treated departments and their estimated synthetic control, are reasonably
low. Also, the averages of the control variables for the treated regions and their corresponding synthetic
controls are close to each other (Table 2.A7). The lack of statistical significance of the coefficient from the
interaction of the pre-treatment period dummy and the synthetic unit dummy (column labelled “2005-2014”
in Table 2.A8, from DiD-like regressions (Equation 2.9), provides further reassurance. This also holds for
the analysis on the low-skilled subpopulation (table Figure 2.B2 and Table 2.B6).
Focusing on the estimated ATET (shown in the right side panels in Figure 2.5 following Equation 2.6
), the observed effects of the Exodus on hourly wages are positive. Nonetheless, a visual assessment of
its statistical significance reveals that, except for Cusco and Lima in the formal sector and Arequipa in the
informal sector, these effects are not extreme compared to the distribution of placebo effects (Figure 2.A9).
A more thorough assessment, based on the p-values from the distribution of ratios of RMSPEs (shown in
Table 2.7), confirms the lack of statistical significance of the effects except for hourly wages in the formal
sector in Lima and Callao. In this department, the Exodus increased the wages by 14%, an estimate larger
than the ones reported by previous studies. Nevertheless, the pre-treatment fit for Lima and Callao is far
from perfect as this standard method from Abadie et al. (2010) assumes. A re-assessment of the effects using
the Ferman and Pinto (2021) synthetic control estimator, in order to safeguard from this failure of the convex
hull assumption, shows that the effects in all departments, including Lima and Callao, are statistically
insignificant (Table 2.8). Although the effects in the low skilled population based on the standard SCM
yields non significance in all departments (table Table 2.B7), those obtained using the demeaning procedure
are statistically significant in Lima and Callao’s informal sector (table Table 2.B10). This result will be
further subject to a robustness check in subsection 2.7.2.
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN.
Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Arequipa Cusco La Libertad Lima y Callao Tumbes
The estimation of the counterfactuals using the standard SCM for sub-samples across sex, age and
education yields statistically insignificant treatment effects, as shown in Table 2.9 (see Figure 2.A11 for the
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Table 2.7 – SCM: P-values for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal and informal
wages, 2005-2019
ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value
Formal wages
Arequipa 0.0893 0.0758 1.2216 7/20 0.3500
Cusco 0.0978 0.0700 1.6671 4/20 0.2000
La Libertad 0.0538 0.0508 1.2342 6/20 0.3000
Lima y Callao 0.1434 0.0574 2.5467 1/20 0.0500
Tumbes -0.0060 0.0459 0.4746 20/20 1.0000
Informal wages
Arequipa 0.1360 0.0443 3.2643 2/20 0.1000
Cusco 0.0406 0.0862 0.7343 14/20 0.7000
La Libertad -0.0176 0.0260 1.1832 10/20 0.5000
Lima y Callao 0.0627 0.0696 1.0391 12/20 0.6000
Tumbes 0.0202 0.0516 1.0293 11/20 0.5500
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only those
employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. ATE shows to the average TE
for the post-treatment periods; RMSPE, the root mean square prediction error for the pre-
treatment period (2005-2015); ratio, the ratio of the RMSPE for the pre-treatment relative to
the RMSPE for the post-treatment (2016-2019); rank, the relative position of the ratio among
the J+1 units and p-value, the probability that a random draw from the donor pool takes a
lower than the value for the corresponding treated region. Source: Author’s calculations
using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
evolution of the TEs). The same conclusion is reached when splitting the sample among low-skilled males
and females (see Table 2.B11)
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Table 2.8 – SCM demeaned: P-values for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal
and informal wages, 2005-2019
ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value
Formal wages
Arequipa 0.0168 0.0882 0.3832 18/20 0.9000
Cusco 0.1464 0.0907 1.8068 3/20 0.1500
La Libertad 0.0459 0.0629 0.8288 14/20 0.7000
Lima y Callao -0.0685 0.0456 1.7697 4/20 0.2000
Tumbes -0.0455 0.0472 1.2175 9/20 0.4500
Informal wages
Arequipa 0.0455 0.0487 1.0362 13/20 0.6500
Cusco 0.0170 0.0811 0.6312 16/20 0.8000
La Libertad 0.0023 0.0344 0.9277 13/20 0.6500
Lima y Callao -0.1428 0.0577 2.7023 2/20 0.1000
Tumbes 0.0086 0.0560 0.9869 10/20 0.5000
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only those
employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. ATE shows to the average TE
for the post-treatment periods; RMSPE, the root mean square prediction error for the pre-
treatment period (2005-2015); ratio, the ratio of the RMSPE for the pre-treatment relative to
the RMSPE for the post-treatment (2016-2019); rank, the relative position of the ratio among
the J+1 units and p-value, the probability that a random draw from the donor pool takes a
lower than the value for the corresponding treated region. In all of these, we first demeaned
the data following the routine by Ferman & Pinto (2019). Source: Author’s calculations
using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.9 – SCM: P-values for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal and informal
wages across subsamples, 2005-2019
Formal wage Informal wage
ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value
Sex
Arequipa
Male 0.1705 0.1354 1.2645 4/24 0.1667 0.1336 0.0610 2.2250 1/24 0.0417
Female 0.0922 0.1185 0.9848 9/24 0.3750 0.0837 0.0952 0.9207 6/24 0.2500
Cusco
Male 0.1266 0.0933 1.6329 2/24 0.0833 0.0716 0.0904 0.9141 12/24 0.5000
Female 0.1220 0.1313 1.1349 5/24 0.2083 -0.0067 0.1042 0.7497 12/24 0.5000
La Libertad
Female 0.0623 0.1232 0.9058 10/24 0.4167 0.0406 0.0988 0.6837 10/24 0.4167
Male 0.0812 0.0688 1.1921 4/24 0.1667 -0.0059 0.0472 0.2177 20/24 0.8333
Lima y Callao
Male 0.2212 0.1681 1.3173 2/24 0.0833 0.0497 0.0792 0.7311 14/24 0.5833
Female 0.2066 0.2042 1.0379 9/24 0.3750 0.1460 0.1428 1.0988 5/24 0.2083
Tumbes
Female 0.0423 0.1072 0.7002 11/24 0.4583 -0.0470 0.1632 0.3857 17/24 0.7083
Male 0.0107 0.0794 0.4046 17/24 0.7083 -0.0110 0.0536 1.3747 4/24 0.1667
Age
Arequipa
30-45 years 0.1573 0.1231 1.3506 5/24 0.2083 0.0432 0.0696 0.9565 13/24 0.5417
18-29 years 0.0288 0.1359 0.5320 14/24 0.5833 0.0936 0.1204 1.0004 8/24 0.3333
46-65 years 0.1606 0.1327 1.2182 8/24 0.3333 0.1713 0.1272 1.3968 2/24 0.0833
Cusco
46-65 years 0.1532 0.1471 1.0575 8/24 0.3333 0.0322 0.1135 0.5900 11/24 0.4583
30-45 years 0.1114 0.0888 1.5210 3/24 0.1250 0.0341 0.0887 0.9593 13/24 0.5417
18-29 years 0.0910 0.1177 1.2686 5/24 0.2083 0.0981 0.1638 0.7266 13/24 0.5417
La Libertad
30-45 years 0.0526 0.0592 1.0254 6/24 0.2500 0.0105 0.0411 0.5899 18/24 0.7500
46-65 years 0.1005 0.0914 1.1212 9/24 0.3750 -0.0314 0.0741 0.7418 9/24 0.3750
18-29 years 0.0699 0.1244 0.7982 11/24 0.4583 0.0393 0.0785 0.9050 11/24 0.4583
Lima y Callao
30-45 years 0.2512 0.1792 1.4028 4/24 0.1667 0.0666 0.0865 0.9374 14/24 0.5833
18-29 years 0.1018 0.1779 0.8500 11/24 0.4583 0.0519 0.1748 0.3861 19/24 0.7917
46-65 years 0.2754 0.1760 1.5648 4/24 0.1667 0.1252 0.1613 0.8432 4/24 0.1667
Tumbes
18-29 years 0.0669 0.1449 0.5339 15/24 0.6250 -0.1200 0.1046 1.2860 4/24 0.1667
46-65 years 0.1069 0.1384 0.9917 10/24 0.4167 0.0272 0.1001 1.0086 4/24 0.1667
30-45 years -0.0067 0.0860 0.9386 7/24 0.2917 0.0257 0.0529 1.2819 6/24 0.2500
Education
Arequipa
High level 0.1063 0.1205 0.9534 9/24 0.3750 0.1296 0.1101 1.3220 2/24 0.0833
Low level 0.1895 0.1558 1.2340 6/24 0.2500 0.1268 0.0919 1.3977 4/24 0.1667
Cusco
High level 0.0967 0.0888 1.2863 5/24 0.2083 0.1260 0.1444 1.0536 7/24 0.2917
Low level 0.0870 0.1396 1.4555 3/24 0.1250 0.0624 0.0943 0.9535 5/24 0.2083
La Libertad
Low level 0.0471 0.0674 0.7616 13/24 0.5417 0.0002 0.0408 0.7990 11/24 0.4583
High level 0.0800 0.0668 1.4482 4/24 0.1667 0.0772 0.1104 0.7387 11/24 0.4583
Lima y Callao
High level 0.1498 0.1994 0.7832 13/24 0.5417 0.1749 0.2538 0.7026 12/24 0.5000
Low level 0.2432 0.1755 1.3959 4/24 0.1667 0.0417 0.0672 0.9335 6/24 0.2500
Tumbes
Low level 0.0351 0.1074 0.4957 19/24 0.7917 -0.0197 0.0642 1.0685 5/24 0.2083
High level -0.0270 0.0775 0.5850 16/24 0.6667 -0.0168 0.1770 0.1687 20/24 0.8333
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation.
ATE shows to the average TE for the post-treatment periods; RMSPE, the root mean square prediction error for the pre-treatment period (2005-2015);
ratio, the ratio of the RMSPE for the pre-treatment relative to the RMSPE for the post-treatment (2016-2019); rank, the relative position of the ratio
among the J+1 units and p-value, the probability that a random draw from the donor pool takes a lower than the value for the corresponding treated
region. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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2.6.2 Ancillary outcomes
As with the key outcomes, we take as the point of departure the single-stage DiD method using repeated
cross-sections (Equation 2.4) to analyze the ancillary outcomes, including as controls the same set of Min-
cerian demographic and occupational variables as before. The aggregated treatment effect (upper panel in
Table 2.10) is, again, not statistically significant for any of the ancillary outcome variables, whereas some
dynamic effects, reported in the lower panel, are found to be significant only when using the CRVE estim-
ator. However, the sizeable difference between the observed number of clusters and the effective number
(S∗) suggests that this inference is unreliable. Accordingly, testing the null of no effect using p-values from
wild bootstrap methods reveals that only the effect on the size of the informal sector is statistically signi-
ficant. However, this occurs under a violation of the conditional PTA. The same results are found in the
low-skilled working sample (Table 2.B12).
Table 2.10 – Single Stage DiD: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ informality rate and
inequality in formal and informal sector (full set of controls), 2011-2019
Informality rate Formal sector inequality Informal sector inequality
β̂ SE CRVE P. WB R P. WB W β̂ SE CRVE P. WB R P. WB W β̂ SE CRVE P. WB R P. WB W
Aggregated
2016-2019 0.003 (0.008) [0.740] [0.740] 0.000 (0.006) [0.985] [0.985] 0.014 (0.011) [0.495] [0.510]
S* 6.211 6.208 6.453
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 0.016 (0.007)** [0.140] [0.160] 0.012 (0.010) [0.320] [0.315] 0.013 (0.012) [0.235] [0.300]
2017 0.003 (0.009) [0.780] [0.765] 0.004 (0.012) [0.775] [0.750] 0.030 (0.016)* [0.420] [0.440]
2018 0.005 (0.010) [0.630] [0.650] 0.016 (0.009) [0.190] [0.165] 0.020 (0.018) [0.400] [0.415]
2019 0.018 (0.007)** [0.040] [0.020] 0.011 (0.008) [0.215] [0.130] 0.032 (0.016)* [0.385] [0.420]
N 415,425 148,419 267,006
S* 6.048 6.135 6.513
F stat. OLS 8.622*** 0.705 2.194
Notes: The sample is restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Individual level covariates are age and schooling in levels and
interacted and gender, area, industry and occupation dummies SE CRVE refers to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs; P. WB Rade and Webb, to the p-value of the Wild Cluster
Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights and Webb weights using 199 replications, respectively. S* refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald
(2013). F-stat refers to the stastistic from the F test of the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years previous to the treatment using the
cluster-robust VCE. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
When applying the two-step DiD method to control for the confounding effect of the unobserved
department-year specific shocks (Equation 2.5), two results stand out. Firstly, the finding from using the
single-stage DiD that the treatment increased informality levels by two percentage points in 2019 is con-
firmed (Table 2.11). The different variance-covariance matrix estimators suggest this is a robust finding.
In fact, it is statistically significant (at 5%) according to the p-values constructed from the wild bootstrap
methods (which tend to be more conservative compared to alternative methods for inference) and also ac-
cording to the p-values using the IK-DoF (at 10%, not shown in the table). The Granger predictability test
is statistically significant in the estimation using FE although those based on the FGLS-BC are not. This
provides some reassurance that the estimated effect under this latter estimation method corresponds to the
ATET. This same evidence is also found for low skilled workers (Table 2.B13), but the significance is now
marginal when evaluated against the Rademacher-based wild Bootstrap p-values. Second, the immigration
shock increased inequality by two percentage Gini points in the formal sector in 2018, and it is statistically
significant only in the whole sample and by taking a liberal significance level according to p-values from
Rademacher wild bootstrap (10% significance). The inference obtained using the wild bootstrap Webb-
based or IK-DoF (not shown) p-values suggest instead that this estimate is not statistically significant.
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Table 2.11 – 2 stages DiD: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector (full set of controls), 2011-2019
Informality rate Formal sector inequality Informal sector inequality
β̂ SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. WB N β̂ SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. WB N β̂ SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. WB N
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE OLS -0.002 (0.008) (0.008) [0.795] 216 -0.006 (0.007) (0.007) [0.425] 216 -0.003 (0.016) (0.017) [0.890] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.006 (0.006) 192 0.002 (0.007) 192 0.008 (0.013) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.008 (0.005) 168 0.010 (0.008) 168 0.013 (0.011) 168
S* 7.835 7.835 7.835
IK-DoF 6.846 6.846 6.846
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 FE OLS 0.003 (0.007) (0.007) [0.685] 216 0.017 (0.014) (0.014) [0.235] 216 0.006 (0.020) (0.021) [0.800] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.004 (0.008) 192 0.017 (0.016) 192 0.006 (0.022) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.004 (0.008) 168 0.017 (0.016) 168 0.008 (0.022) 168
2017 FE OLS -0.003 (0.008) (0.008) [0.780] 216 0.003 (0.014) (0.014) [0.855] 216 0.010 (0.014) (0.014) [0.530] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) -0.002 (0.008) 192 0.003 (0.015) 192 0.011 (0.015) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) -0.002 (0.008) 168 0.003 (0.015) 168 0.013 (0.015) 168
2018 FE OLS -0.003 (0.008) (0.008) [0.750] 216 0.023 (0.012)* (0.012)* [0.080] 216 0.023 (0.017) (0.017) [0.225] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) -0.002 (0.009) 192 0.023 (0.013) 192 0.023 (0.019) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) -0.002 (0.009) 168 0.023 (0.014) 168 0.026 (0.019) 168
2019 FE OLS 0.019 (0.009)* (0.010)* [0.035] 216 0.022 (0.014) (0.014) [0.135] 216 0.015 (0.014) (0.015) [0.370] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.020 (0.010)* 192 0.022 (0.015) 192 0.015 (0.016) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.020 (0.010)* 168 0.022 (0.015) 168 0.018 (0.017) 168
S* 7.835 7.835 7.835
IK-DoF 6.846 6.846 6.846
F stat. FE OLS 3.143** 0.883 0.608
F stat. GLS-BC AR(1) 1.043 0.683 0.237
F stat. GLS-BC AR(2) 0.437 0.269 0.081
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Using a 2-step estimation procedure presented in Hansen (2007), individual level covariates (age and schooling in levels and
interacted and gender, area, industry and occupation dummies) are partialled out first and then the treatment effects are estimated from a 2-way FEs (regions and years) model. SE CRVE refers to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of
SEs; SE CRVE2, to Bell and McCaffrey (2002) bias corrected CRVE2; P-val IK, to the p-value taking the effective DoF from Imbens and Kolesar (2012) (IK-DoF) taking CRVE2 SEs and P-val. WB, to the p-value of the Wild Cluster
Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights using 199 replications. S* refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald (2013). FE GLS-BC refers to the FE GLS Bias-corrected estimator of Hansen (2007)
using SE CRVE. F-stat refers to the statistic from the F test of the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years previous to the treatment using the cluster-robust VCE. * Significant at 10%
level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
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Analysing the estimated synthetic departments, the pre-treatment trajectories for these counterfactuals
and the observed treated departments exhibit a reasonable overlap, before 2016, for the outcome related to
the proportion of informal workers (Figure 2.6). However, the fit for the inequality outcomes is relatively
noisier in the pre-treatment period. Nevertheless, the pre-treatment differences are not statistically signific-
ant according to the DiD-like regressions (Table 2.A12), and the discrepancy of the averages of covariates
between the observed treated departments and the estimated synthetic control departments are within reas-
onable bounds (Table 2.A11). Turning to ATET estimation, the observed effects for informality and the
Gini in the formal sector are small. In contrast, the observed effects for inequality in the informal sector are
mostly negative except for Lima and Callao (first column in Table 2.12). Nonetheless, the visual assessment
of the statistical significance of these effects (Figure 2.A12) do not suggest statistical significance in any
treated area. This is also confirmed when taking a more robust inference approach based on the p-values
from the permutations (last column in Table 2.12), as the RMSPE ratios for the treated areas are located in
the bottom half of the distribution of ratios. This lack of significance is further confirmed when applying
the Ferman and Pinto (2021) demeaning procedure (Table 2.A14) to control for the more obvious lack of
perfect treatment in the case of these outcomes.
Figure 2.6 – SCM: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ informality rate and inequality in formal
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. The figures show the
causal effect taking each treated region separately. Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Arequipa Cusco La Libertad Lima y Callao Tumbes
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Table 2.12 – SCM: P-values for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ informality rate and
inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-201
ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value
1 Informality
Arequipa -0.0058 0.0115 1.5917 8/20 0.4000
Cusco 0.0067 0.0139 1.5524 9/20 0.4500
La Libertad -0.0140 0.0112 1.8059 8/20 0.4000
Lima y Callao -0.0188 0.0165 1.1865 12/20 0.6000
Tumbes 0.0252 0.0240 1.0667 14/20 0.7000
2 Inequality Formal
Arequipa -0.0091 0.0210 1.1505 9/20 0.4500
Cusco 0.0019 0.0205 1.1518 9/20 0.4500
La Libertad 0.0117 0.0122 1.9949 4/20 0.2000
Lima y Callao 0.0180 0.0280 0.6561 13/20 0.6500
Tumbes -0.0151 0.0502 0.6872 14/20 0.7000
3 Inequality Informal
Arequipa -0.0527 0.0221 2.7035 4/20 0.2000
Cusco -0.0308 0.0392 1.1816 12/20 0.6000
La Libertad 0.0245 0.0535 0.7150 15/20 0.7500
Lima y Callao 0.0600 0.0298 2.1036 3/20 0.1500
Tumbes 0.0007 0.0251 0.8872 12/20 0.6000
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only those
employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. ATE shows to the average TE
for the post-treatment periods; RMSPE, the root mean square prediction error for the pre-
treatment period (2005-2015); ratio, the ratio of the RMSPE for the pre-treatment relative to
the RMSPE for the post-treatment (2016-2019); rank, the relative position of the ratio among
the J+1 units and p-value, the probability that a random draw from the donor pool takes a
lower than the value for the corresponding treated region. Source: Author’s calculations
using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
2.7 Robustness checks
2.7.1 Panel data methods
We verify the results above using Panel data estimators from data aggregated at the department-year level for
the full set of years (following Equation 2.3). The control variables used are the same for SCM, excluding
the dummy if the department is on the borders with Ecuador and Colombia and excluding also the pre-
treatment outcomes. Estimation of the ATET using FE, FD and FE-GLS for the key variable confirm the
foregoing conclusions (Table 2.A15). Using the whole sample, the Exodus fails to register an effect on
wages in both the informal and formal sectors. In fact, for the formal sector, the statistical significance
of the cluster robust F-test for treatment dummies in the pre-treatment years suggest a violation of the
conditional PTA, so arguably the estimated impacts do not actually correspond to the ATET of interest. For
the low skilled population (see Table 2.B3), the Exodus had a negative effect on informal wages in 2019
but only according to the p-values from the wild bootstrap based on the Rademacher distribution for the FE
estimator. The p-values from the Webb distribution and those based on the IK-DoF (not shown) are larger
than 0.10. However, because we anticipate the population errors to be autocorrelated, results from the FD
estimator and the FGLS are more reliable. These confirm the lack of statistical significance.
Panel data estimation of the random growth model by FD and FE (Equation 2.10) and also of the
dynamic panel estimated by GMM (Equation 2.11 confirms the absence of statistical significance for the
causal effects in terms of formal and informal wages (Table 2.A16 and Table 2.A17).
Turning to the ancillary variables, panel data estimators (Table 2.A18) confirms the previous results
on informality and inequality in the formal sector. Point estimates for these two outcomes are significant
across different methods (including those which address the small S problem manifested in the S∗ and IK-
DoF). The estimates suggest that participation in the informal market increased by two percentage points
in 2019, and inequality increased by three to four percentage points in the formal sector in the last two
years. However, the statistical significance of the F-statistic across these different estimations suggests a
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violation of the basic identification condition of the PTA. The estimated results for the low skilled sample
(Table 2.B14) coincide with those obtained for the treatment effects on informality.
Results from the random growth model confirms the increasing effects on informality in the last year
and in the formal sector inequality in the last two years and also that the inflow increased inequality in
the informal sector between 3 and 4 percentage points in the last two years. (Table 2.A19). Results from
dynamic panel for these ancillary variables (Table 2.A20) suggest the lack of significance of the treatment,
yet the large J-test statistic suggests that the exogeneity of instrumentation is extremely weak. Therefore,
we settle for the results from the random growth models among these panel data estimators.
2.7.2 Alternative Synthetic Control Methods
Because theory rarely tells us what covariates to include in X0 and Xi, a researcher would have the oppor-
tunity to select specifications that adjust their hypothesis, generating substantial opportunities for subjective
researcher bias. In fact, simulations in Ferman et al. (2020) reveal that slight variations in model specific-
ation for SCM applications lead to significantly different treatment effects.46 This would do away with
the higher transparency that this method offers compared to alternative estimation methods (Abadie et al.
2015; Abadie 2020). Hence, the first robustness check for SCM is to consider alternative models which,
as Ferman et al. (2020) show, tend to avoid the problem of cherry-picking of the results. In contrast to
what Abadie (2020) recommends in the finite sample setting, they suggest focusing on specifications that
only use pre-treatment outcome lags which progressively increase with T0 in order to take care of unob-
served confounders (especially factor loadings). We fit three distinct models for both key and ancillary
outcomes: one where the covariate matrix includes only all the pre-treatment periods, another including
only pre-treatment outcomes in odd years (2005, 2007, ..., 2015) and another with only even years (2006,
2008, ...,2014). The RMSPEs for the divergence between the pre-treatment difference between treated units
and the control unit (see Table 2.A21 and Table 2.A22) are noticeably lower than those from the standard
and the demeaned SCM. The results are similar to those using standard and demeaned SCM estimator for
each of the five outcomes. This implies that the treatment had non-significant effects for all the outcomes
except for low skilled workers’ wages in Lima and Callao. This negative effect detected, however, remains
non-negligible, around 9%.
A second robustness check applies the residualization process of the outcomes outlined in Peri and
Yasenov (2017), in recognition that the average wages of different demographic groups had different na-
tional trends in the period of study, which in turn might introduce confounding factors into the analysis47.
This adjust for the potential confounding adjusting log wages of individual i in department s and year t for
observed demographic characteristics with heterogeneous slopes for every year. In terms of the population,
the model we fit is



































θ7,pt (Occupationp ×Yeart)+ ε (2.12)
where Yearτ = 1(year = τ) is an indicator function equal to 1 if the observation for year τ , Female is a
dummy equal to 1 if the individual is female and 0 otherwise, age is measures the age of the individual in
years, area is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual lives in the urban area, and Industrym and Occupationp
are a set of dummies for the industry and occupation where the individual lives, as described in section 2.3.
46More specifically, using 7 different common specifications, for a nominal test size of 5% the probability of detecting a false
positive in at least 1 specification can be as high as 14% when T0 = 12. To put matters worse, possibilities for specification searching
remain high even with an unrealistically large number of pre-treatment years: with T0 = 400 the probability that at least 1 specification
is significant at 5 % is 13%.
47Note how this differs from the residualization process outlined in Doudchenko and Imbens (2016) who, prior to choosing the
weights and the intercept, they suggest regressing the outcomes of the controls the controls on the pre-treatment variables, calculate
the residuals and use these residuals in the approaches above. Instead, here we residualize the series from individual covariates not the
aggregated ones.
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The residual ε̂ from this regression captures individual variation after wiping out those aggregate trends that
concerns us. We implement the SCM on those residuals averaged by department. Results in Table 2.A23
for the most part, coincide with those obtained earlier. As in Peri and Yasenov (2017), because we are now
trying to match “residualized" outcomes which are noisier measures than observed average wages, these
series exhibit year-to-year fluctuations which results in a more noisy pre-treatment match.
2.7.3 Variables definitions
We consider a number of variations in the construction of the dependent variables used in the estimations.
Related to wages, the first alternative uses monthly wages, and not standardized by the number of hours.
This is done to avoid possible measurement errors in the number of hours. The second uses a different
deflator, namely the Consumer Price Index (CPI) taking as the base year 2007 (obtained from Central
Reserve Bank of Peru). Related to informality, we restrict the occupational categories included in this
sector. On the one hand, we consider as formal only those white and blue collar workers, both in the public
and private sector, that are in pensionable jobs. On the other hand, we consider as informal those employers
or white and blue collar workers, both in the public and private sector, without a pensionable job. We
exclude from the analysis independent workers in recognition of potential differences in their wage data
generation process.
The results for the two-stage DiD using these alternative wages definitions remain unchanged after
accounting that inference should not rely on the CRVE estimator based on the value of S∗ (Table 2.A24).
Under the alternative definition of informality, results from Wild Bootstrap again show a lack of statistical
significance (Table 2.A25).48. Hence, our results are not sensitive when redifining the dependent variables.
2.8 Conclusions
The effects of the exogenous immigration shock represented by the Venezuelan Exodus, the most prominent
external displacement crisis in Latin America’s recent history, on the Peruvian labour market are studied.
However, key conditions in the host country of Peru differ from the typical setting analyzed in the liter-
ature, such as Mariel Boatlifters into Miami, repatriated immigrants from Africa to France and Portugal
or the sizeable influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey. Peru is a society not used to receiving immigrant
workers, and its native labour force is less educated and mainly employed in the informal sector of the
economy. The characteristics of this unique event, which began in 2016 and was triggered not by the buoy-
ant macroeconomic conditions in Peru but by a socio-economic collapse in Venezuela, allows us to exploit
quasi-experimental methods to establish causal effects. Unlike possible alternative methods available to
analyze immigration effects (mainly the National Approach), our methods do not rely on structural mod-
elling or assumptions about production functions or the elasticity of substitutions. Because the treatment
occurred at an aggregate level in few departments, we are able to use a combination of empirical methods
that address problems about consistency and inference of the estimators that have been recently emphasized
by studies in the literature exploiting immigration as a quasi-experiment. Therefore, the study contributes
to the literature on the effects that such a significant migratory movement has had on Latin American coun-
try’s labour market. This extends the typical focus on wages in recognition that the adjustments induced by
such shocks go beyond the formal labour markets, also impacting informal labour markets.
We first described the Venezuelan immigration and, second, analyzed the labour market effects of this
shock under different and alternative estimators in an attempt to determine a causal interpretation of the
results. Regarding the former, most of the Venezuelan population is younger than the native population,
mainly aged between 18 to 35 years old, and most of these are part of the economically active population.
48This robustness of the results shown in section 2.6 also holds for the estimations from the single-stage DiD method (not shown)
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They are primarily employed in the informal sector. Their education level is predominantly tertiary (college
or technical), a higher level than that of the natives, most of whom have secondary schooling. Despite
this, these immigrants suffer a considerable occupational downgrade in Peru, both in terms of the occupa-
tional category and job complexity compared to the activity they worked in Venezuela. Specifically, the
occupations they enter in the host country are more manual in nature than those involving cognitive and
communication abilities. This results in a lower occupational complexity score. This result also applies to
Venezuelans who have spent sufficient time in Peru to avail better job opportunities. An important explan-
ation for this lies in the several hurdles progressively implemented by the Peruvian government to restrict
the flow of immigrants along with the inefficiency of the country’s immigration authorities and its legal
standards, which prevented Venezuelans from joining the formal labour market. The earnings of migrants
as a consequence are lower than the natives across most of the distribution.
The treatment effects of the Exodus, based on the 2-step Difference in Difference procedure, using both
a repeated cross-section and panel data, reveal that the Exodus has impacted neither formal nor informal
wages in Peru. The methods applied account for the distortion (under-rejection) in the Wald tests induced
by the fact that the number of clusters is smaller than those observed (24) and that the treatment happens in
a few number of regions. The procedure also accounts for the unobserved department shocks specific to a
given period, which confounds the estimated treatment effect on the treated. Once these attributes are taken
into account, our DiD strategy results in statistically insignificant effects of the Exodus on our key outcome
variables in the Peruvian labour market. This robustness of this finding is also detected when using the
Synthetic Control Method estimator, which constructs the counterfactual for every department based on an
optimal convex combination of control units. However, an important exception of this result is the adverse
effects that the treatment exerted on the wages for informal workers in Lima y Callao, which suffered a
reduction of around 10%. This result remains valid under alternative methods. Results for the ancillary
variables, i.e. informality and informal and formal Gini inequality indices, are different depending on the
method. On the one hand, inequality in informal and formal labour markets have increased in the last year
of the treatment examined here (2019): the former in +2% and the latter by 2% to 4%. However, the SCM
procedure does not reveal statistically significant results in any of the treated departments.
The absence of effects in most cases suggests that either the increase in the relative supply of Venezuelans
was offset by an increase in relative demand in the affected labour markets or Venezuelans provided some
degree of labour complementary for native workers. In the case of Lima y Callao, an effect in line with the
predictions of a competitive labour market has been observed. This evidence departs from what previous
studies for Peru have found. Even though this result might provide support to the views that immigration
has a damaging effect on wages of a specific subsection of the native population, it is necessary to interpret
this relative to the labour supply increase that the Exodus induced in Lima and Callao. Such an assessment
suggests that wages had an inelastic response to the Exodus. Specifically, a 20% increase in labour supply
reduced the wage for informal unskilled workers by 10%. Thus, it is arguable that the impact of this Exodus
on the wages of the unskilled natives is, in fact, moderately low. A more elaborate rationalization of this
potentially differing nature of the effects obtained is confined to the agenda for future research.
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Appendix A: Descriptives and results for the whole sample
Descriptives
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Debt, inflation and oil prices
Note: GDP per capita is observed only until 2010; onwards it is imputed. Inflation in logarithm base 10 scale. Solid vertical line is the first year of Hugo Chavez in power and the vertical dashed line is the
beginning of the treatment. Source: GDP and inflation from IMF's World Economic Outlook (October 2020), oil price from inflationdata.com and External debt from World Bank, International Debt Statistics.
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Note: Ecuador and Colombia in dark and light grey, respectively. The 5 states in Venezuela where half of the 
Venezuelan immigrants in Peru began their emigration journey in brown. Lines correspond to the most commmon
routes followed by Venezuelan immigrants according to UNHCR (2018) Source: Author's calculations
using ENPOVE data.
Figure 2.A3 – Venezuelan immigrants flow in Peru, Jan. 2016 - Dec. 2019
















































































Note: Data includes all the immigrants, not only those with working permit and including underaged. Source: Data on Residents from Response for Venezuelans
(https://r4v.info/es/situations/platform) and on entrance, exit and residence permits from Superintendencia de Migraciones, Peru.
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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
 Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Date of arrival relative to when they entered Peru. The vertical line shows the beginning of
the treatment. Source: Author's calculations using ENPOVE data.
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Table 2.A1 – Legal Regulations set by the Peruvian Government to face with the Venezuelan Exodus
DS Date Effect Requisites Comments
Phase 1
DS N° 002-2017-IN:
Approval of guidelines for the Temporary Permit of
Permanence (PTP) for people of Venezuelan
nationality
3 January 2017 Provide the PTP for 1 year (extendable) to
Venezuelans who have entered Peru before 2 of
February 2017 (“before the publication of this legal
norm” is a modification, 48 hours later, of the
originally proposed date “before the exclusion of
Venezuela from the Mercosur Agreement [5 of
August 2017]”; deadline to submit the application: 3
July 2017
1) Have legally entered Peru before 2 of February
2017
2) Being in Peru in an irregular situation as a result of
the expiration of residence authorization, or being in
a regular situation
3) Have no criminal or judicial record at the national
and international level
4) Pay S/. 42
PTP is a document issued by the migration authority
which accredits to the Venezuelan citizen their
regular migratory situation in Peru and enables them
to carry out formal economic activities according to
the Peruvian legislation. This was validated gradually
within the following 2 months by Peru’s Migration
Authority
DS Nº 007-2017-IN:
Definition of New Migrant Categories
27 March 2017 Migration authority defines the Special Resident
Migration Status for those foreigners who, having
entered Peru, need to regularize their immigration
status. This allows the foreigner multiple entrances
into Peru and to work as employee or self-employed
in the public and or private sectors. Initially, the
validity of this document is 1 year but can be
extended
- The Special Resident Status
will be given to those Venezuelans who have been
granted the PTP as in DS N° 002-2017-IN after 1
year of residence in Peru
DS Nº 023-2017-IN
Extension of the approval of Guidelines for the
Temporary Permit of Permanence (PTP) for people of
Venezuelan nationality in DS N° 002-2017-IN
29 July 2017 Provide the PTP for 1 year (extendable) to
Venezuelans who have entered Peru before 31 of July
2017; deadline to submit the application: 1 December
2017
Same as in DS N° 002-2017-IN except:
1) Have legally entered Peru before 31 of July 2017
DS Nº 001-2018-IN
Extension of the approval of Guidelines for the
Temporary Permit of Permanence (PTP) for people of
Venezuelan nationality in DS N° 023-2017-IN
23 January 2018 Provide the PTP for 1 year (extendable) to
Venezuelans who have entered Peru before 31 of
December 2018; deadline to submit the application:
30 June 2019
Same as in DS Nº 023-2017-IN except:
1) Have legally entered Peru before 31 of December
2018
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Table 2.A1 – Legal Regulations set by the Peruvian Government to face with the Venezuelan Exodus
DS Date Effect Requisites Comments
RS No 043-2018-MIGRACIONES 30 January 2018 Defines the procedure for obtaining the Special
Resident Migration Status for Venezuelans after the
expiration of the PTP
They must meet the following conditions:
1) submitting the application 30 days before the
expiration of their PTP
2) have not been absent from Peruvian territory for
more than 183 consecutive or alternate days since
their last departure as a beneficiary of the PTP, within
a period of 365 days, without authorization from
Immigration;
3) have no criminal, judicial or police record
The motivation behind this was the fact that the PTP
delivered to Venezuelans began to expire. Hence, this
set concrete guidelines to obtain the Special Resident
migration Status for Venezuelans in Peru, defined in
DS Nº 007-2017-IN. The immigration card
constitutes the identification document for
Venezuelans that proves their regular residence and
provides them important legal benefits
RS 0000165-2018-MIGRACIONES
Free delivery of the "Extraordinary Work Permit” to
Venezuelans whose application for Temporary Permit
of Permanence (PTP) is being processed
12 May 2018 Migration Authority adopted the Extraordinary Work
Permit for all those who were processing the PTP.
This document enabled Venezuelans to perform
economic activities as employee or self-employed for
2 months, subject to automatic extension, until
obtaining the PTP.
Filling of an online application This was issued in recognition of the challenges faced
by Venezuelans whose PTPs were being processed,
mainly because of the number of months it took them
getting the required documentation from different
government institutions and changing their tourist
permit to the PTP, which is usually six months and
during this time they cannot carry out economic
activities.
RM Nº 176-2018-TR
Dispositions for hiring Venezuelans with Temporary
Permit of Permanence (PTP) or Extraordinary Work
Permit
6 July 2018 Defines that
• The quotas restrictions for foreigners within
firms are not changed
• The term of the contract for the Venezuelan
cannot go beyond the validity of their Ex-
traordinary Work Permit or PTP
• The loss of validity of the Extraordinary
Work Permit or PTP invalidates the contract
- Establishes dispositions for hiring Venezuelans with
PTP or Extraordinary Work Permit
Phase 2
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Table 2.A1 – Legal Regulations set by the Peruvian Government to face with the Venezuelan Exodus
DS Date Effect Requisites Comments
DS Nº 007-2018-IN
Modification of Guidelines for Granting of the
Temporary Permit of Permanence (PTP) for people of
Venezuelan nationality approved in DS No.
001-2018-IN
19 August 2018 Provide the PTP for 1 year (extendable) to only those
Venezuelans who entered Peru before 31 of October
2018; deadline to submit the application: 31
December 2018
Same as in DS Nº 001-2018-IN except:
1) Have legally entered Peru before 31 of October
2018
Reduction of the validity period to request PTP
RS N° 000270-2018-MIGRACIONES 24 August 2018 A valid passport is required for Venezuelans for
entrance into Peru from 25 of August 2018,
except in “humanitarian” cases that included:
applicants for the refugee status, children under 18
years, pregnant women in a state of vulnerability and
those over 65-year-old who had deteriorated health
due to the emigration trip. This put an effective end
to the PTP
The National Coordinator for Human Rights deemed
this as illegal because this violated the
the right to freedom of movement of Venezuelans.
The Superior Court of Justice of Lima voted in favour
of this habeas corpus claim on 5 of October 2018,
officially dropping this disposition. Yet, 2 months
later, on 4 of December, this decision was reversed by
Peru’s Judicial Power.
DS N° 008-2018-TR
Supreme Decree that modifies the Regulation of the
Law of Contracting Foreign Workers, approved by
Supreme Decree No. 014-1992-TR
13 September 2018 From 13 of October 2018
1) Registration of contracts in the Labour ministry
switch to virtual, which overrides the need of issuing
an official permit by the corresponding authority
2) There is no need to provide a legal document that
states that the employer fulfil with the quota of
foreign workers within their firm
3) The government has the authority audit the firm
within the next 5 years from the date the contract
with the foreigner was terminated in order to verify
the fulfilment of this new law
Its purpose was updating regulations on contracting
of foreign personnel to address the migration issue
and to simplify current regulations. This not only
applies to Venezuelans but for all non-Peruvians
Phase 3
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Table 2.A1 – Legal Regulations set by the Peruvian Government to face with the Venezuelan Exodus
DS Date Effect Requisites Comments
RS N° 000177-2019-MIGRACIONES
Venezuelans can enter the country only with Passport
and a particular types of Visa
12 June 2019 The right of Venezuelans to enter Peru without a
passport or without a tourist visa is suspended from
15 of June 2019
Venezuelans can enter if they hold passports (either
valid or expired) under the following conditions
For those with Temporal migratory or Resident
migratory status
1) Passport
2) Visa granted by a Peruvian Consular Office




3) Humanitarian Visa granted by a Peruvian Consular
Office
In any case, the migrant must also show a legalized
Venezuelan criminal record certificate
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Table 2.A2 – Venezuelans’ route characteristics and immigration status, 2018
Treated areas Total
Arequipa Cuzco La Libertad Lima y Callao Tumbes
Intermediate countries
Colombia only 5.57 3.84 3.30 6.82 0.71 6.72
Ecuador and Colombia 86.38 86.22 93.12 84.46 99.04 84.68
Ecuador only 1.86 1.91 1.62 1.89 0.26 1.88
None 2.84 1.14 1.48 5.85 0.00 5.70
Other 3.35 6.89 0.49 0.98 0.00 1.02
Immigration post
Lima airport 8.06 3.42 2.50 8.74 0.00 8.58
Tacna other 2.17 5.84 0.51 0.16 0.00 0.21
Tumbes 89.77 90.74 96.99 91.10 100.00 91.21
Mode of transportation
Air and bus 8.28 8.20 5.90 6.41 0.96 6.41
Air only 2.37 0.90 0.08 5.23 0.00 5.08
Bus and foot/sea 7.39 3.88 7.82 2.53 17.48 2.72
Bus only 81.08 86.07 85.53 85.43 79.79 85.37
Other 0.88 0.95 0.66 0.40 1.76 0.42
Document shown at the border
ID 18.02 34.06 28.21 18.52 49.26 18.80
Other 0.14 0.48 1.07 0.62 0.66 0.63
Passport 81.84 65.46 70.72 80.86 50.08 80.57
Migration status
Tourist Visa 2.96 4.82 2.74 4.04 4.98 4.01
Work/Student Visa 0.08 1.43 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.13
TPP requester 60.91 54.72 50.51 54.51 51.39 54.50
TPP holder 25.07 14.53 19.63 29.03 8.04 28.72
Refugee 5.55 31.16 18.99 4.85 22.60 5.24
Immigration card 4.12 1.20 3.41 5.92 0.64 5.83
Other 3.58 1.58 7.57 3.98 13.25 4.06
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Refugee status include those who have
requested it and those who hold it. Any individual can hold more than 1 migration status. Mode of transportation and
intermediate countries involved measure the relative frequency (%) for individuals within every treated location. Source:
Author’s calculations using ENPOVE data.
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Source: UNHCR (2019) Venezuela situation. Fact Sheet, April 2019 and UNHCR (2020) Venezuela situation. Fact Sheet, January 2020
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Note: (T) and (U) refer to treated and untreated regions. Vertical dashed lines denote the beginning of the treatment. Source: Author's calculations using INEI's official
website and INEI (2013).
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Table 2.A3 – Occupational distribution and skill level by treated areas, 2018
Arequipa Cuzco La Libertad Lima y Callao Tumbes
Peruv. Venezuelans Peruv. Venezuelans Peruv. Venezuelans Peruv. Venezuelans Peruv. Venezuelans
Earlier Recent Earlier Recent Earlier Recent Earlier Recent Earlier Recent
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Occupation category (%)
Managers and profess 10.36 20.37 3.30 19.83 2.71 7.27 13.61 6.29 16.24 3.11 7.95 14.48 1.76 17.63 1.82 12.43 18.09 3.99 17.03 2.94 7.48 0.00 0.00 11.18 0.63
Technical workers 17.50 26.70 15.36 21.87 5.26 34.90 10.76 14.14 17.13 5.70 19.78 29.73 5.56 24.01 4.63 14.93 22.98 7.89 21.36 5.38 16.69 23.83 12.47 18.37 2.87
Clerical svs sales workers 26.56 33.94 56.99 35.66 54.17 28.21 54.81 45.33 40.53 56.71 26.90 33.93 56.19 38.55 47.75 29.81 37.93 45.72 39.27 47.67 29.99 55.13 56.19 38.73 55.49
Craft and trades workers 7.81 4.82 3.11 8.67 13.43 5.80 9.15 15.95 6.82 10.96 9.27 10.55 11.50 6.98 12.44 9.41 8.05 13.28 6.71 14.33 7.37 0.00 0.00 8.46 11.87
Machine operators 14.07 7.41 8.42 7.93 2.74 7.34 2.06 3.58 12.79 2.13 13.67 7.57 9.44 8.78 5.72 11.63 7.69 7.48 9.39 6.68 13.13 6.81 6.96 12.36 4.66
Elementary occupations 23.71 6.75 12.81 6.03 21.69 16.47 9.61 14.71 6.49 21.40 22.43 3.74 15.55 4.04 27.65 21.79 5.26 21.65 6.23 23.00 25.35 14.23 24.39 10.89 24.48
Complexity
Communication skill 0.28 0.41 0.36 0.39 0.29 0.29 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.27 0.27 0.39 0.29 0.39 0.25 0.31 0.39 0.28 0.38 0.28 0.26 0.31 0.28 0.34 0.25
Cognoscitive skill 0.28 0.37 0.29 0.36 0.24 0.29 0.30 0.26 0.32 0.22 0.26 0.37 0.24 0.36 0.21 0.28 0.36 0.24 0.35 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.31 0.19
Manual skill 0.58 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.52 0.60 0.52 0.47 0.55 0.53 0.60 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.51 0.46 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.60 0.46 0.58 0.54 0.53
Complexity index 3.14 6.77 2.53 5.36 1.86 2.64 6.57 2.75 3.66 1.69 2.49 3.91 1.85 4.93 1.73 4.45 5.83 1.95 4.77 1.88 2.36 3.36 1.24 3.89 1.51
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Pre and post refer to the job the Venezuelan immigrant had in Venezuela (before migrating) and in Peru, respectively. Score measures follow Ottaviano et al. (2013). Source: Author’s
calculations using ENAHO 2018 data, ENPOVE data, O*NET 25.1 Database and crosswalks by Hardy et al. (2018).
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2005 2010 2015 2019
Informal sector inequality
Note: Sample includes employed native individuals between 18 and 65 years. Vertical dashed lines denote the beginning of the treatment. Source: Author's
calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Treated Untreated
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Table 2.A4 – Means of covariates by treatment area, 2011-2019
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Treated regions
Male (prop.) 0.57 (0.00) 0.57 (0.00) 0.57 (0.00) 0.57 (0.00) 0.57 (0.00)
Age (years) 38.13 (0.13) 38.03 (0.13) 38.18 (0.11) 38.41 (0.12) 38.64 (0.13)
Education (years) 11.08 (0.07) 11.27 (0.07) 11.26 (0.06) 11.26 (0.06) 11.20 (0.06)
Urban area (prop.) 0.93 (0.01) 0.92 (0.01) 0.93 (0.00) 0.93 (0.00) 0.93 (0.00)
Industry (prop.)
Agriculture 0.06 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 0.06 (0.00)
Mining 0.03 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00)
Manufacture 0.14 (0.00) 0.15 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.13 (0.00) 0.13 (0.00)
Construction 0.07 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00)
Retail 0.28 (0.01) 0.28 (0.01) 0.29 (0.00) 0.29 (0.01) 0.27 (0.01)
Transport 0.10 (0.00) 0.10 (0.00) 0.09 (0.00) 0.10 (0.00) 0.10 (0.00)
FIRE 0.09 (0.00) 0.09 (0.00) 0.09 (0.00) 0.09 (0.00) 0.09 (0.00)
Services 0.24 (0.01) 0.23 (0.01) 0.23 (0.01) 0.23 (0.00) 0.23 (0.01)
Occupation (prop.)
Managers 0.12 (0.00) 0.12 (0.00) 0.12 (0.00) 0.12 (0.00) 0.11 (0.00)
Tehnical 0.16 (0.00) 0.16 (0.00) 0.15 (0.00) 0.15 (0.00) 0.15 (0.00)
Clerical and sales 0.26 (0.01) 0.26 (0.01) 0.28 (0.00) 0.28 (0.00) 0.26 (0.00)
Craft and trades 0.14 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00)
Machine operators 0.09 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.09 (0.00)
Elementary 0.23 (0.01) 0.24 (0.01) 0.23 (0.01) 0.23 (0.00) 0.25 (0.01)
Untreated regions
Male (prop.) 0.62 (0.00) 0.62 (0.00) 0.62 (0.00) 0.62 (0.00) 0.63 (0.00)
Age (years) 38.37 (0.09) 38.27 (0.09) 38.51 (0.08) 38.66 (0.09) 38.65 (0.09)
Education (years) 9.35 (0.06) 9.55 (0.05) 9.51 (0.05) 9.46 (0.05) 9.53 (0.05)
Urban area (prop.) 0.66 (0.01) 0.66 (0.01) 0.67 (0.01) 0.67 (0.01) 0.68 (0.01)
Industry (prop.)
Agriculture 0.27 (0.00) 0.26 (0.01) 0.25 (0.00) 0.26 (0.00) 0.26 (0.00)
Mining 0.06 (0.00) 0.06 (0.00) 0.06 (0.00) 0.06 (0.00) 0.07 (0.00)
Manufacture 0.09 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.09 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00)
Construction 0.06 (0.00) 0.06 (0.00) 0.07 (0.00) 0.07 (0.00) 0.07 (0.00)
Retail 0.23 (0.00) 0.24 (0.00) 0.24 (0.00) 0.24 (0.00) 0.24 (0.00)
Transport 0.08 (0.00) 0.07 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00)
FIRE 0.04 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00) 0.04 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00)
Services 0.18 (0.00) 0.19 (0.00) 0.19 (0.00) 0.18 (0.00) 0.18 (0.00)
Occupation (prop.)
Managers 0.09 (0.00) 0.10 (0.00) 0.09 (0.00) 0.09 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00)
Tehnical 0.28 (0.00) 0.28 (0.00) 0.27 (0.00) 0.27 (0.00) 0.27 (0.00)
Clerical and sales 0.20 (0.00) 0.21 (0.00) 0.22 (0.00) 0.21 (0.00) 0.21 (0.00)
Craft and trades 0.10 (0.00) 0.10 (0.00) 0.10 (0.00) 0.09 (0.00) 0.09 (0.00)
Machine operators 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00)
Elementary 0.25 (0.00) 0.24 (0.00) 0.24 (0.00) 0.26 (0.00) 0.26 (0.00)
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed natives between 18 and 65 years. SEs in parenthesis. Source: Author’s
calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data..























Note: Data aggregated at department and year level. Sample includes employed native individuals between 18 and 65 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Vertical dashed
lines denote the beginning of the treatment. Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Arequipa Cusco La Libertad Lima y Callao




Table 2.A5 – 2 stages DiD: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal and informal wages (demographic controls only), 2011-2019
Formal wages Informal wages
β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. IK P-val. WB N β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. IK P-val. WB N
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE OLS 0.016 (0.017) (0.027) (0.029) [0.589] [0.645] 216 0.015 (0.018) (0.031) (0.032) [0.660] [0.680] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.013 (0.025) (0.030) 192 0.014 (0.026) (0.022) 192




2016 FE OLS 0.031 (0.035) (0.032) (0.033) [0.379] [0.395] 216 0.023 (0.039) (0.023) (0.024) [0.371] [0.380] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.030 (0.031) (0.035) 192 0.019 (0.027) (0.028) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.031 (0.033) (0.037) 168 0.020 (0.026) (0.028) 168
2017 FE OLS -0.004 (0.035) (0.031) (0.032) [0.909] [0.895] 216 0.027 (0.039) (0.024) (0.025) [0.309] [0.335] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) -0.005 (0.038) (0.035) 192 0.022 (0.036) (0.030) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) -0.004 (0.035) (0.037) 168 0.024 (0.032) (0.027) 168
2018 FE OLS 0.013 (0.035) (0.050) (0.051) [0.804] [0.815] 216 -0.011 (0.039) (0.029) (0.030) [0.722] [0.785] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.012 (0.040) (0.055) 192 -0.018 (0.042) (0.034) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.013 (0.038) (0.059) 168 -0.015 (0.035) (0.030) 168
2019 FE OLS 0.003 (0.035) (0.043) (0.044) [0.952] [0.955] 216 -0.028 (0.039) (0.029) (0.030) [0.371] [0.340] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.002 (0.041) (0.047) 192 -0.036 (0.045) (0.032) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.002 (0.039) (0.051) 168 -0.033 (0.037) (0.029) 168
S* 7.835 7.835
IK-DoF 6.846 6.846
F stat. FE OLS 1.707 1.080
F stat. GLS-BC AR(1) 0.211 0.394
F stat. GLS-BC AR(2) 0.008 0.272
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Using a 2-step estimation procedure presented in Hansen (2007), individual level covariates (age and schooling in levels and
interacted and gender and area dummies) are partialled out first and then the treatment effects are estimated from a 2-way FEs (regions and years) model. SE Homosk. refers to homoskedasticity-only SEs; SE CRVE, to Cluster Robust
Variance Estimator of SEs; SE CRVE2, to Bell and McCaffrey (2002) bias corrected CRVE2; P-val IK, to the p-value taking the effective DoF from Imbens and Kolesar (2012) (IK-DoF) taking CRVE2 SEs and P-val. WB, to the
p-value of the Wild Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights using 199 replications. S* refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald (2013). FE GLS-BC refers to the FE GLS Bias-corrected
estimator of Hansen (2007) using SE CRVE. F-stat refers to the statistic from the F test of the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years previous to the treatment using the cluster-robust
VCE. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
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Table 2.A6 – SCM: SC Weights for the ATE of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal and
informal wages, 2005-2019
Formal wages Informal wages
Areq. Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumb. Areq. Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumb.
Amazonas 0 0 0 .137 .218 0 0 0 0 0
Ancash 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ApurÃmac 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayacucho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cajamarca 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Huancavelica 0 0 0 0 0 0 .211 0 0 0
HuÃ¡nuco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ica .053 0 .254 0 0 .042 0 .389 .351 0
JunÃn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lambayeque 0 0 .252 0 0 0 0 .277 0 0
Loreto 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .282 0 .143
Madre de Dios 0 0 0 .405 .233 .33 0 0 .649 .434
Moquegua .485 .154 0 .406 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pasco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .101
Piura 0 .239 .054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Puno 0 .607 0 0 0 0 .21 0 0 0
San MartÃn 0 0 .198 0 0 0 0 .052 0 0
Tacna .462 0 0 .051 .428 0 .219 0 0 .322
Ucayali 0 0 .242 0 .122 .628 .36 0 0 0
Notes: In the upper panel the sample for the outcome is restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Real
hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.A7 – SCM: Covariate balance for the ATE of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal
and informal wages, 2005-2019
Arequipa Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumbes
Covariates
GDP pc (thousands) Obs. 15.924 11.714 9.441 16.380 9.498
Wei. Formal Wages 31.199 12.254 8.922 27.306 13.050
Wei. Informal Wages 10.753 8.587 10.393 16.273 15.440
Empl. LF low skill Obs. 0.536 0.678 0.667 0.551 0.678
Wei. Formal Wages 0.572 0.681 0.688 0.641 0.674
Wei. Informal Wages 0.704 0.709 0.666 0.644 0.658
Empl. LF serv. Obs. 0.644 0.549 0.588 0.734 0.683
Wei. Formal Wages 0.659 0.515 0.578 0.591 0.613
Wei. Informal Wages 0.622 0.552 0.595 0.616 0.639
Empl. LF manuf. Obs. 0.192 0.133 0.195 0.229 0.127
Wei. Formal Wages 0.152 0.154 0.158 0.126 0.127
Wei. Informal Wages 0.142 0.133 0.158 0.134 0.120
Schooling (years) Obs. 11.154 9.211 9.607 11.452 9.883
Wei. Formal Wages 10.888 9.522 9.752 10.072 9.851
Wei. Informal Wages 9.705 9.364 10.075 10.312 10.106
Proport. 18-25 yo. Obs. 0.168 0.154 0.183 0.189 0.177
Wei. Formal Wages 0.150 0.176 0.179 0.146 0.165
Wei. Informal Wages 0.170 0.170 0.183 0.167 0.166
Proport. 26-35 yo. Obs. 0.270 0.264 0.272 0.288 0.293
Wei. Formal Wages 0.272 0.260 0.271 0.277 0.279
Wei. Informal Wages 0.282 0.270 0.272 0.279 0.283
Urban population Obs. 0.881 0.535 0.776 0.979 0.922
Wei. Formal Wages 0.819 0.598 0.790 0.707 0.720
Wei. Informal Wages 0.767 0.620 0.799 0.784 0.751
Ecu.-Col. border(d) Obs. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Wei. Formal Wages 0.000 0.239 0.054 0.137 0.218
Wei. Informal Wages 0.000 0.000 0.282 0.000 0.143
Lagged Outcomes
2005 Obs. Formal Wages 1.387 1.229 1.467 1.711 1.634
Wei. Formal Wages 1.495 1.260 1.472 1.707 1.669
Obs. Informal Wages 0.612 0.131 0.539 1.007 0.772
Wei. Informal Wages 0.675 0.242 0.506 0.873 0.675
2010 Obs. Formal Wages 1.607 1.536 1.492 1.771 1.639
Wei. Formal Wages 1.698 1.608 1.514 1.822 1.698
Obs. Informal Wages 1.006 0.706 0.655 1.128 1.097
Wei. Informal Wages 1.001 0.682 0.693 1.153 1.032
2015 Obs. Formal Wages 1.859 1.657 1.643 1.947 1.872
Wei. Formal Wages 1.786 1.696 1.677 1.839 1.817
Obs. Informal Wages 1.282 0.967 0.943 1.356 1.077
Wei. Informal Wages 1.211 0.899 0.970 1.298 1.115
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed
between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. All variables (except the lagged outcomes) are aver-
aged for the 2005-2015 period. LF=Labour force; Ecu-Col border is a dummy that equals 1 if the region
neighbours Ecuador and Colombia. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Source: Author’s calculations using
ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.A8 – SCM: DiD Regressions for the ATE of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal and
informal wages, 2005-2019
GLS with AR(1) disturbances Baltagi and Wu (1999) estimator
(2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019 (2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019
Formal Wages
Arequipa -0.021 0.031 0.007 0.032 0.088 -0.041 0.039 0.017 0.040 0.093
(0.124) (0.125) (0.167) (0.194) (0.214) (0.109) (0.116) (0.143) (0.155) (0.162)
Cusco 0.104 0.116 0.061 0.238 0.183 0.084 0.126 0.074 0.252 0.196
(0.138) (0.138) (0.188) (0.222) (0.248) (0.131) (0.138) (0.171) (0.187) (0.195)
La Libertad 0.031 0.123 0.057 0.042 0.101 0.030 0.123 0.057 0.041 0.101
(0.102) (0.119) (0.135) (0.139) (0.141) (0.079) (0.092) (0.104) (0.108) (0.109)
Lima y Callao -0.036 0.077 0.089 0.032 0.053 -0.061 0.079 0.087 0.025 0.042
(0.086) (0.089) (0.113) (0.125) (0.133) (0.071) (0.081) (0.094) (0.098) (0.099)
Tumbes -0.028 -0.019 -0.069 -0.047 -0.027 -0.037 -0.020 -0.073 -0.054 -0.035
(0.094) (0.102) (0.123) (0.132) (0.136) (0.074) (0.087) (0.099) (0.102) (0.103)
Informal Wages
Arequipa -0.014 0.002 0.125 0.046 0.117 -0.027 0.011 0.140 0.065 0.138
(0.119) (0.119) (0.165) (0.199) (0.227) (0.119) (0.121) (0.156) (0.177) (0.190)
Cusco -0.020 0.023 -0.027 -0.092 0.026 -0.031 0.030 -0.015 -0.077 0.042
(0.163) (0.163) (0.226) (0.273) (0.310) (0.157) (0.160) (0.208) (0.236) (0.254)
La Libertad 0.040 -0.032 0.022 0.035 0.007 0.039 -0.031 0.024 0.038 0.011
(0.090) (0.090) (0.126) (0.152) (0.173) (0.090) (0.093) (0.119) (0.133) (0.141)
Lima y Callao -0.072 0.020 0.045 -0.049 -0.034 -0.064 0.016 0.039 -0.057 -0.042
(0.091) (0.091) (0.126) (0.152) (0.172) (0.086) (0.088) (0.114) (0.128) (0.138)
Tumbes 0.079 0.090 0.119 0.026 -0.006 0.074 0.093 0.125 0.034 0.003
(0.134) (0.135) (0.184) (0.218) (0.244) (0.117) (0.120) (0.154) (0.173) (0.184)
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before
data aggregation. Each row represents a regression of annual observations for the treated areas and its synthetic control between 2005 and
2019, N=30, which includes a dummy variable for the treated region, period dummies (2005-2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 with 2015
excluded) and their interactions; these interaction coefficients are the coefficients reported. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN * Significant
at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. The dark lines show the gap between the observed and the SC outcomes for the treated regions; the light ones, the gap for only
those J regions in the Donor Pool whose RMSPE pre-treatment is lower than 1.5 times that of the corresponding treated region. Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN.
In all of these, we first applied the demeaning routine suggested by Ferman & Pinto (2019). Source: Author's calculations using
ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Arequipa Cusco La Libertad Lima y Callao Tumbes
Table 2.A9 – SCM demeaned: DiD Regressions for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’
(log) formal and informal wages, 2005-2019
GLS with AR(1) disturbances Baltagi and Li (1991) estimator
(2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019 (2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019
Formal Wages
Arequipa -0.019 0.013 -0.051 -0.013 0.029 -0.030 0.016 -0.048 -0.012 0.028
(0.112) (0.112) (0.152) (0.179) (0.199) (0.102) (0.108) (0.133) (0.145) (0.152)
Cusco 0.140 0.115 0.088 0.289 0.227 0.092 0.137 0.118 0.320* 0.254
(0.126) (0.127) (0.173) (0.204) (0.228) (0.122) (0.130) (0.160) (0.173) (0.180)
La Libertad 0.008 0.093 0.044 0.024 0.061 0.006 0.093 0.043 0.022 0.060
(0.098) (0.114) (0.130) (0.135) (0.136) (0.076) (0.087) (0.100) (0.105) (0.106)
Lima y Callao 0.019 0.050 -0.019 -0.039 -0.073 0.034 0.044 -0.027 -0.048 -0.081
(0.086) (0.086) (0.116) (0.136) (0.150) (0.075) (0.081) (0.098) (0.106) (0.109)
Tumbes -0.016 -0.015 -0.090 -0.091 -0.082 -0.024 -0.014 -0.089 -0.092 -0.085
(0.088) (0.090) (0.116) (0.130) (0.139) (0.071) (0.078) (0.094) (0.100) (0.103)
Informal Wages
Arequipa -0.011 -0.003 0.043 0.026 -0.009 -0.019 0.003 0.052 0.037 0.003
(0.113) (0.113) (0.158) (0.190) (0.217) (0.117) (0.120) (0.155) (0.174) (0.187)
Cusco -0.035 0.009 -0.073 -0.111 -0.015 -0.045 0.016 -0.062 -0.097 -0.000
(0.173) (0.173) (0.240) (0.288) (0.327) (0.165) (0.168) (0.218) (0.247) (0.265)
La Libertad 0.033 -0.041 0.038 0.035 -0.001 0.027 -0.037 0.045 0.043 0.008
(0.093) (0.093) (0.129) (0.156) (0.177) (0.089) (0.092) (0.118) (0.132) (0.141)
Lima y Callao 0.028 0.034 -0.048 -0.088 -0.151 0.046 0.022 -0.067 -0.110 -0.176
(0.093) (0.093) (0.128) (0.155) (0.175) (0.089) (0.091) (0.117) (0.131) (0.140)
Tumbes 0.077 0.091 0.133 0.016 -0.002 0.075 0.093 0.136 0.020 0.003
(0.130) (0.130) (0.178) (0.212) (0.237) (0.113) (0.116) (0.149) (0.168) (0.179)
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. Each
row represents a regression of annual observations for the treated areas and its synthetic control between 2005 and 2019, N=30, which
includes a dummy variable for the treated region, period dummies (2005-2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 with 2015 excluded) and their
interactions; these interaction coefficients are the coefficients reported. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. In all of these, we first demeaned
the data following the routine by Ferman & Pinto (2019). * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1%
level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Arequipa Cusco La Libertad Lima y Callao Tumbes
Panel C: Heterogenous treatment effects by educ
Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years; the outcome variable is, additionally, restricted to those indicated in the heading
of every subgraph before data aggregation. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Results: Ancillary outcomes
Table 2.A10 – SCM: SC Weights for the ATE of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ informality rate and
inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-2019
Informality rate Inequality formal Inequality informal
Areq. Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumb. Areq. Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumb. Areq. Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumb.
Amazonas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .235
Ancash 0 .094 .585 0 0 0 .014 0 0 0 .488 .763 .287 0 0
ApurÃmac 0 .041 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .014 0 0 0 0 0
Ayacucho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cajamarca 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .101 0 0 0 .21 0 0 0
Huancavelica 0 0 0 0 0 0 .169 0 0 .069 0 0 0 0 0
HuÃ¡nuco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ica .319 .109 .104 .3 0 .007 .166 0 .106 .156 .042 0 0 .578 0
JunÃn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .01 0 0 0 0 0
Lambayeque .337 0 .236 0 .249 .683 0 .243 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loreto 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .048 .17 .357 0 0 0 0 0
Madre de Dios 0 .479 0 .075 .139 0 0 0 0 .168 0 0 0 0 0
Moquegua .096 0 0 .252 0 .188 .114 .344 .235 0 .47 0 .083 .019 0
Pasco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Piura 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Puno 0 .276 0 0 0 0 .537 0 0 0 0 0 .496 0 0
San MartÃn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .029 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tacna .247 0 0 0 .016 0 0 0 .489 0 0 .027 0 .403 .765
Ucayali 0 0 .076 .373 .596 .122 0 .235 0 .227 0 0 .133 0 0
Notes: In the upper panel the sample for the outcome is restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Inequality level measured by the Gini index of
individual hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.A11 – SCM: Covariate balance for the ATE of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ informality
rate and inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-2019
Arequipa Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumbes
Covariates
GDP pc (thousands) Obs. 15.924 11.714 9.441 16.380 9.498
Wei. Inequality Formal 14.536 11.777 20.659 22.111 10.169
Wei. Inequality Informal 29.657 12.877 11.496 16.576 14.006
Wei. Informality 15.916 12.618 12.260 20.389 8.680
Empl. LF low skill Obs. 0.536 0.678 0.667 0.551 0.678
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.675 0.683 0.666 0.606 0.704
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.615 0.695 0.686 0.583 0.641
Wei. Informality 0.620 0.678 0.676 0.634 0.711
Empl. LF serv. Obs. 0.644 0.549 0.588 0.734 0.683
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.615 0.484 0.588 0.660 0.588
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.580 0.524 0.523 0.645 0.641
Wei. Informality 0.634 0.564 0.576 0.610 0.623
Empl. LF manuf. Obs. 0.192 0.133 0.195 0.229 0.127
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.164 0.143 0.156 0.147 0.131
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.164 0.169 0.159 0.170 0.134
Wei. Informality 0.167 0.133 0.171 0.162 0.153
Schooling (years) Obs. 11.154 9.211 9.607 11.452 9.883
Wei. Inequality Formal 9.832 9.515 9.794 10.647 9.627
Wei. Inequality Informal 10.177 9.123 9.526 11.017 10.200
Wei. Informality 10.519 9.768 9.649 10.366 9.608
Proport. 18-25 yo. Obs. 0.168 0.154 0.183 0.189 0.177
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.176 0.171 0.160 0.163 0.173
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.153 0.171 0.175 0.177 0.166
Wei. Informality 0.176 0.169 0.179 0.165 0.177
Proport. 26-35 yo. Obs. 0.270 0.264 0.272 0.288 0.293
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.261 0.259 0.270 0.276 0.282
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.265 0.264 0.262 0.270 0.276
Wei. Informality 0.265 0.272 0.262 0.273 0.275
Urban population Obs. 0.881 0.535 0.776 0.979 0.922
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.806 0.546 0.732 0.812 0.707
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.691 0.546 0.582 0.879 0.754
Wei. Informality 0.849 0.651 0.694 0.809 0.784
Ecu.-Col. border(d) Obs. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.000 0.000 0.149 0.170 0.357
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.000 0.210 0.000 0.000 0.235
Wei. Informality 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lagged Outcomes
2005 Obs. Inequality Formal 0.442 0.454 0.393 0.507 0.362
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.444 0.446 0.406 0.479 0.342
Obs. Inequality Informal 0.497 0.500 0.507 0.433 0.454
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.492 0.475 0.479 0.414 0.465
Obs. Informality 0.608 0.823 0.779 0.696 0.826
Wei. Informality 0.617 0.803 0.779 0.665 0.826
2010 Obs. Inequality Formal 0.427 0.398 0.454 0.472 0.352
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.426 0.379 0.442 0.423 0.368
Obs. Inequality Informal 0.503 0.537 0.466 0.442 0.498
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.465 0.509 0.470 0.438 0.489
Obs. Informality 0.550 0.774 0.668 0.549 0.730
Wei. Informality 0.546 0.752 0.674 0.544 0.730
2015 Obs. Inequality Formal 0.412 0.351 0.417 0.436 0.345
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.411 0.367 0.407 0.421 0.395
Obs. Inequality Informal 0.448 0.438 0.464 0.394 0.408
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.457 0.454 0.462 0.382 0.429
Obs. Informality 0.522 0.695 0.631 0.495 0.679
Wei. Informality 0.535 0.695 0.634 0.505 0.679
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed
between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. All variables (except the lagged outcomes) are averaged
for the 2005-2015 period. LF=Labour force; Ecu-Col border is a dummy that equals 1 if the region neigh-
bours Ecuador and Colombia. Inequality level measured by the Gini index of individual hourly wages in
2007 PEN. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.A12 – SCM: DiD Regressions for the ATE of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ informality rate
and inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-2019
GLS with AR(1) disturbances Baltagi and Wu (1999) estimator
(2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019 (2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019
1 Informality
Arequipa 0.014 0.028 -0.018 0.002 0.017 0.015 0.028 -0.019 0.000 0.016
(0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.038) (0.043) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.031) (0.033)
Cusco -0.006 -0.022 0.004 -0.001 0.033 -0.005 -0.022 0.004 -0.001 0.034
(0.048) (0.048) (0.065) (0.076) (0.084) (0.042) (0.044) (0.055) (0.060) (0.063)
La Libertad -0.003 -0.017 -0.012 -0.027 0.012 -0.001 -0.019 -0.015 -0.030 0.009
(0.041) (0.041) (0.057) (0.068) (0.076) (0.040) (0.041) (0.052) (0.057) (0.061)
Lima y Callao -0.010 -0.004 -0.017 -0.019 -0.011 -0.004 -0.008 -0.023 -0.025 -0.018
(0.044) (0.044) (0.060) (0.072) (0.082) (0.045) (0.047) (0.059) (0.065) (0.069)
Tumbes 0.018 0.028 0.023 0.022 0.033 0.017 0.029 0.024 0.023 0.034
(0.036) (0.036) (0.050) (0.060) (0.068) (0.033) (0.034) (0.044) (0.050) (0.053)
2 Inequality formal
Arequipa -0.020 -0.013 -0.055 -0.013 0.003 -0.016 -0.014 -0.055 -0.013 0.004
(0.035) (0.036) (0.045) (0.050) (0.052) (0.027) (0.030) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039)
Cusco 0.017 0.052 0.012 0.037 -0.008 0.013 0.050 0.009 0.033 -0.012
(0.035) (0.040) (0.046) (0.048) (0.049) (0.027) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
La Libertad -0.009 0.009 -0.026 0.033 -0.003 -0.009 0.009 -0.027 0.032 -0.004
(0.055) (0.068) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.042) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Lima y Callao -0.010 -0.004 0.003 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.006
(0.038) (0.042) (0.050) (0.052) (0.053) (0.029) (0.034) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041)
Tumbes 0.019 0.020 -0.024 0.041 0.055 0.028 0.023 -0.018 0.048 0.063
(0.063) (0.070) (0.083) (0.088) (0.090) (0.051) (0.062) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069)
3 Inequality informal
Arequipa 0.012 -0.090 -0.039 -0.021 -0.020 0.010 -0.091* -0.040 -0.022 -0.021
(0.046) (0.065) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.036) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Cusco 0.010 -0.003 -0.052 0.038 -0.037 0.017 0.006 -0.045 0.045 -0.030
(0.051) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.040) (0.059) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054)
La Libertad 0.045 0.081 0.007 0.031 0.003 0.045 0.080 0.007 0.031 0.002
(0.045) (0.074) (0.058) (0.066) (0.063) (0.035) (0.057) (0.045) (0.050) (0.048)
Lima y Callao 0.010 0.021 0.068 0.063 0.061 0.008 0.021 0.067* 0.062* 0.059
(0.034) (0.037) (0.044) (0.047) (0.048) (0.026) (0.030) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037)
Tumbes 0.035 -0.010 0.015 0.034 0.050 0.035 -0.010 0.016 0.034 0.050
(0.055) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.043) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data
aggregation. Each row represents a regression of annual observations for the corresponding treated area and its synthetic control between 2005 and
2019, N=30, which includes a dummy variable for the treated region, period dummies (2005-2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 with 2015 excluded)
and their interactions; these interaction coefficients are the coefficients reported. Inequality level measured by the Gini index of individual hourly
wages in 2007 PEN. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using
ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Figure 2.A12 – SCM: Placebos in space of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ informality rate and
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. The dark lines show the gap between the observed and the SC outcomes for the treated regions; the light ones, the gap for only
those J regions in the Donor Pool whose RMSPE pre-treatment is lower than 2 times that of the corresponding treated region. Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Figure 2.A13 – SCM demeaned: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ informality rate and
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN.
In all of these, we first applied the demeaning routine suggested by Ferman & Pinto (2019). Source: Author's calculations using
ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Arequipa Cusco La Libertad Lima y Callao Tumbes
Table 2.A13 – SCM demeaned: DiD Regressions for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’
informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-2019
GLS with AR(1) disturbances Baltagi and Wu (1999) estimator
(2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019 (2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019
1 Informality
Arequipa 0.018 -0.001 -0.051 -0.031 0.011 0.018 -0.001 -0.051* -0.031 0.010
(0.025) (0.025) (0.035) (0.042) (0.047) (0.023) (0.024) (0.030) (0.034) (0.036)
Cusco -0.013 -0.028 0.019 0.008 0.033 -0.014 -0.027 0.020 0.010 0.035
(0.051) (0.051) (0.069) (0.081) (0.090) (0.045) (0.048) (0.059) (0.065) (0.068)
La Libertad -0.019 -0.013 -0.022 -0.021 -0.015 -0.014 -0.016 -0.027 -0.027 -0.021
(0.041) (0.041) (0.056) (0.067) (0.075) (0.038) (0.040) (0.050) (0.056) (0.059)
Lima y Callao -0.006 -0.015 -0.034 -0.037 -0.004 0.003 -0.019 -0.041 -0.045 -0.012
(0.043) (0.043) (0.059) (0.071) (0.080) (0.043) (0.045) (0.056) (0.062) (0.066)
Tumbes 0.018 0.011 0.005 0.006 0.035 0.018 0.011 0.005 0.005 0.035
(0.037) (0.037) (0.051) (0.061) (0.069) (0.034) (0.034) (0.045) (0.050) (0.054)
2 Inequality formal
Arequipa -0.051 -0.021 -0.046 -0.013 0.029 -0.050 -0.021 -0.047 -0.014 0.028
(0.039) (0.039) (0.051) (0.059) (0.064) (0.032) (0.034) (0.042) (0.045) (0.047)
Cusco 0.021 0.040 0.010 0.028 -0.018 0.019 0.039 0.010 0.027 -0.019
(0.034) (0.039) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.027) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
La Libertad -0.022 -0.018 -0.065 0.004 -0.009 -0.023 -0.018 -0.065 0.004 -0.010
(0.047) (0.055) (0.063) (0.065) (0.066) (0.037) (0.043) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051)
Lima y Callao -0.025 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.008 -0.027 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.007
(0.040) (0.041) (0.054) (0.063) (0.069) (0.035) (0.038) (0.046) (0.050) (0.052)
Tumbes -0.002 0.002 -0.024 0.021 0.041 0.008 0.008 -0.016 0.030 0.049
(0.067) (0.078) (0.089) (0.092) (0.093) (0.054) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
3 Inequality informal
Arequipa -0.011 -0.042 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009 -0.040 -0.006 -0.001 0.000
(0.045) (0.064) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.035) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Cusco 0.010 0.038 -0.010 0.054 -0.039 0.009 0.037 -0.010 0.053 -0.040
(0.052) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.040) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
La Libertad 0.007 0.056 0.001 0.008 -0.011 0.004 0.054 -0.001 0.005 -0.013
(0.055) (0.077) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.043) (0.054) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Lima y Callao 0.009 0.023 0.069 0.062 0.060 0.007 0.023 0.068* 0.061 0.059
(0.035) (0.039) (0.046) (0.048) (0.049) (0.027) (0.032) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038)
Tumbes 0.052 -0.031 0.001 -0.006 0.033 0.052 -0.031 0.001 -0.006 0.032
(0.044) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.034) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data
aggregation. Each row represents a regression of annual observations for the corresponding treated area and its synthetic control between 2005
and 2019, N=30, which includes a dummy variable for the treated region, period dummies (2005-2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 with 2015
excluded) and their interactions; these interaction coefficients are the coefficients reported. In all of these, we first demeaned the data following
the routine by Ferman & Pinto (2019). Inequality level measured by the Gini index of individual hourly wages in 2007 PEN. * Significant at 10%
level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.A14 – SCM demeaned: P-values for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ informality
rate and inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-2019
ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value
1 Informality
Arequipa -0.0372 0.0142 3.1236 2/20 0.1000
Cusco 0.0247 0.0176 1.9010 7/20 0.3500
La Libertad -0.0171 0.0158 1.1094 10/20 0.5000
Lima y Callao -0.0361 0.0215 1.8007 6/20 0.3000
Tumbes -0.0054 0.0216 0.6142 19/20 0.9500
2 Inequality Formal
Arequipa 0.0306 0.0358 1.1422 4/20 0.2000
Cusco -0.0018 0.0246 0.8998 8/20 0.4000
La Libertad -0.0018 0.0252 1.0277 5/20 0.2500
Lima y Callao 0.0325 0.0389 0.8366 10/20 0.5000
Tumbes 0.0108 0.0481 0.5555 16/20 0.8000
3 Inequality Informal
Arequipa -0.0037 0.0333 0.5146 18/20 0.9000
Cusco 0.0015 0.0456 0.8149 12/20 0.6000
La Libertad 0.0074 0.0323 0.8164 12/20 0.6000
Lima y Callao 0.0470 0.0275 1.8210 5/20 0.2500
Tumbes -0.0483 0.0296 1.8044 4/20 0.2000
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only
those employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. In all of these, we first
demeaned the data following the routine by Ferman & Pinto (2019). ATE shows to the
average TE for the post-treatment periods; RMSPE, the root mean square prediction error
for the pre-treatment period (2005-2015); ratio, the ratio of the RMSPE for the pre-treatment
relative to the RMSPE for the post-treatment (2016-2019); rank, the relative position of the
ratio among the J+1 units and p-value, the probability that a random draw from the donor
pool takes a lower than the value for the corresponding treated region. Source: Author’s
calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Robustness checks
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Table 2.A15 – Panel data: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal and informal wages (full set of controls), 2005-2019
Formal wages Informal wages
β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. I-K P-val. WB N β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. I-K P-val. WB N
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE OLS 0.048 (0.026)* (0.033) (0.035) [0.199] [0.200] 360 0.015 (0.020) (0.026) (0.028) [0.606] [0.655] 360
FD 0.026 (0.039) (0.025) (0.026) [0.347] [0.315] 336 0.012 (0.029) (0.023) (0.024) [0.632] [0.625] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.058 (0.030)* [0.035] 360 0.009 (0.016) [0.440] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.055 (0.030)* [0.035] 360 0.008 (0.017) [0.440] 360
S* FE 8.753 8.753
S* FD 8.032 8.032
IK-DoF FE 7.783 7.783
IK-DoF FD 6.955 6.952
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 FE OLS 0.030 (0.058) (0.030) (0.031) [0.368] [0.380] 360 0.004 (0.045) (0.032) (0.033) [0.906] [0.930] 360
FD 0.028 (0.039) (0.026) (0.026) [0.323] [0.310] 336 0.012 (0.029) (0.024) (0.025) [0.652] [0.660] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.027 (0.027) [0.360] 360 0.007 (0.027) [0.925] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.029 (0.027) [0.360] 360 0.007 (0.027) [0.925] 360
2017 FE OLS 0.001 (0.058) (0.040) (0.042) [0.986] [0.985] 360 0.004 (0.045) (0.025) (0.026) [0.889] [0.920] 360
FD 0.001 (0.056) (0.036) (0.038) [0.987] [0.980] 336 0.022 (0.042) (0.024) (0.023) [0.386] [0.410] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.001 (0.038) [0.975] 360 0.016 (0.023) [0.930] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.002 (0.037) [0.975] 360 0.016 (0.024) [0.930] 360
2018 FE OLS 0.002 (0.058) (0.055) (0.058) [0.980] [1.000] 360 -0.038 (0.045) (0.024) (0.024) [0.158] [0.190] 360
FD 0.018 (0.068) (0.056) (0.058) [0.771] [0.860] 336 -0.026 (0.051) (0.031) (0.032) [0.448] [0.525] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.011 (0.055) [0.980] 360 -0.032 (0.028) [0.420] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.011 (0.055) [0.980] 360 -0.032 (0.028) [0.420] 360
2019 FE OLS 0.003 (0.058) (0.044) (0.046) [0.945] [0.915] 360 -0.034 (0.045) (0.027) (0.028) [0.266] [0.230] 360
FD 0.017 (0.079) (0.047) (0.049) [0.733] [0.715] 336 -0.033 (0.059) (0.029) (0.029) [0.304] [0.230] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.010 (0.045) [0.930] 360 -0.037 (0.027) [0.550] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.011 (0.045) [0.930] 360 -0.037 (0.027) [0.550] 360
S* FE 7.956 7.956
S* FD 8.003 8.003
IK-DoF FE 6.968 6.968
IK-DoF FD 6.992 6.999
F stat. FE OLS 2.792** 3.433***
F stat. FD 2.043* 3.516***
F stat. GLS AR(1) 31.899*** 36.794***
F stat. GLS AR(2) 33.883*** 37.584***
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Controls included are gdp per capita, pea employed for low sckilled, pea employed in services, in manufacture, schooling,
proportion of population between 18 and 25 and between 26 and 35, percentage of urban population. Equations include 2-way FEs (regions and years). SE Homosk. refers to homoskedasticity-only SEs; SE CRVE, to Cluster Robust
Variance Estimator of SEs; SE CRVE2, to Bell and McCaffrey (2002) bias corrected CRVE2; P-val IK, to the p-value taking the effective DoF from Imbens and Kolesar (2012) (IK-DoF) taking CRVE2 SEs and P-val. WB, to the
p-value of the Wild Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights using 199 replications. S* refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald (2013). FE GLS-BC refers to the FE GLS Bias-corrected
estimator of Hansen (2007) using SE CRVE. F-stat refers to the F test cluster robust of the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years previous to the treatment. * Significant at 10% level;
** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.A16 – Panel data random growth: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal and informal wages (full set of controls), 2005-2019
Formal wages Informal wages
β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE SE CR2 P-val. I-K P-val. WB N β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE SE CR2 P-val. I-K P-val. WB N
All
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE 0.012 (0.040) (0.027) (0.028) [0.693] [0.670] 336 0.014 (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) [0.661] [0.670] 336
FD 0.036 (0.045) (0.026) (0.026) [0.207] [0.160] 312 0.008 (0.032) (0.039) (0.040) [0.853] [0.855] 312
Eff. G (CSS) 9.229 9.229
Eff. DoF (I-K) 7.047 7.047
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 FE 0.006 (0.040) (0.029) (0.029) [0.841] [0.820] 336 0.010 (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) [0.761] [0.745] 336
FD 0.003 (0.122) (0.029) (0.029) [0.922] [0.910] 312 0.011 (0.089) (0.029) (0.030) [0.725] [0.725] 312
2017 FE -0.043 (0.060) (0.040) (0.041) [0.332] [0.355] 336 0.016 (0.045) (0.039) (0.040) [0.695] [0.740] 336
FD -0.045 (0.251) (0.043) (0.045) [0.346] [0.335] 312 0.020 (0.183) (0.040) (0.041) [0.639] [0.700] 312
2018 FE -0.048 (0.076) (0.057) (0.059) [0.445] [0.445] 336 -0.033 (0.057) (0.052) (0.054) [0.565] [0.700] 336
FD -0.044 (0.391) (0.060) (0.062) [0.501] [0.450] 312 -0.028 (0.285) (0.054) (0.056) [0.632] [0.700] 312
2019 FE -0.070 (0.091) (0.055) (0.056) [0.253] [0.265] 336 -0.043 (0.068) (0.052) (0.054) [0.448] [0.525] 336
FD -0.064 (0.540) (0.058) (0.061) [0.325] [0.275] 312 -0.041 (0.393) (0.054) (0.056) [0.493] [0.555] 312
Eff. G (CSS) 7.835 7.835
Eff. DoF (I-K) 6.731 6.772
F stat. FE 1.694 2.570**
F stat. FD 1.460 2.585**
Low-Skilled
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE -0.053 (0.069) (0.045) (0.046) [0.285] [0.220] 336 -0.011 (0.046) (0.048) (0.051) [0.835] [0.830] 336
FD -0.046 (0.079) (0.061) (0.061) [0.473] [0.425] 312 0.015 (0.051) (0.054) (0.056) [0.794] [0.810] 312
Eff. G (CSS) 9.229 9.229
Eff. DoF (I-K) 7.047 7.047
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 FE -0.055 (0.071) (0.046) (0.047) [0.276] [0.210] 336 -0.019 (0.046) (0.048) (0.050) [0.719] [0.715] 336
FD -0.061 (0.219) (0.049) (0.050) [0.258] [0.200] 312 -0.019 (0.141) (0.047) (0.048) [0.700] [0.715] 312
2017 FE -0.076 (0.104) (0.064) (0.065) [0.284] [0.225] 336 -0.061 (0.069) (0.068) (0.070) [0.416] [0.520] 336
FD -0.080 (0.452) (0.068) (0.071) [0.299] [0.235] 312 -0.057 (0.291) (0.069) (0.071) [0.446] [0.510] 312
2018 FE -0.050 (0.133) (0.076) (0.078) [0.544] [0.565] 336 -0.087 (0.087) (0.088) (0.092) [0.377] [0.570] 336
FD -0.048 (0.703) (0.080) (0.084) [0.585] [0.525] 312 -0.085 (0.453) (0.089) (0.091) [0.381] [0.530] 312
2019 FE -0.085 (0.159) (0.086) (0.087) [0.364] [0.295] 336 -0.116 (0.105) (0.072) (0.075) [0.168] [0.120] 336
FD -0.079 (0.971) (0.089) (0.094) [0.430] [0.335] 312 -0.119 (0.626) (0.074) (0.076) [0.165] [0.110] 312
Eff. G (CSS) 7.835 7.835
Eff. DoF (I-K) 6.721 6.760
F stat. FE 2.149* 1.038
F stat. FD 1.755 1.113
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Controls included are gdp per capita, pea employed for low sckilled, pea employed in services, in manufacture,
schooling, proportion of population between 18 and 25 and between 26 and 35, percentage of urban population. Equations include 2-way FEs (regions and years). SE Homosk. refers to homoskedasticity-only SEs; SE
CRVE, to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs; SE CRVE2, to Bell and McCaffrey (2002) bias corrected CRVE2; P-val IK, to the p-value taking the effective DoF from Imbens and Kolesar (2012) (IK-DoF) taking
CRVE2 SEs and P-val. WB, to the p-value of the Wild Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights using 199 replications. S* refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald (2013).
FE GLS-BC refers to the FE GLS Bias-corrected estimator of Hansen (2007) using SE CRVE. F-stat refers to the F test cluster robust of the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for
the years previous to the treatment. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.A17 – Dynamic Panel data: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal and informal wages (full set of controls), 2005-2019
Formal wages Informal wages
2 step GMM Iterated GMM 2 step GMM Iterated GMM
β̂ SE CRVE β̂ SE CRVE β̂ SE CRVE β̂ SE CRVE
All
Aggregated
Treatment 2016-2019 -0.005 (0.053) 0.017 (0.118) 0.039 (0.041) 0.038 (0.044)
Lagged outcome 0.304* (0.166) 0.389 (0.233) 0.602*** (0.093) 0.328 (0.337)
AR2 2.418** [0.016] 1.147 [0.252] 0.053 [0.957] -0.212 [0.832]
J-test 5.197 [0.268] 5.959 [0.202] 2.370 [0.668] 0.419 [0.981]
Number of instr. 25 25 25 25
Number of obs. 336 336 336 336
Yearly (Base 2015)
Treatment 2016 0.509 (0.408) 0.491 (0.955) 1.838 (2.483) -0.490 (1.534)
2017 0.878 (0.731) 0.812 (1.727) 3.607 (4.920) -1.038 (3.120)
2018 1.300 (1.046) 1.252 (2.469) 1.947 (2.639) -1.597 (4.273)
2019 1.750 (1.378) 1.243 (2.601) 0.335 (0.404) 0.801 (1.983)
Lagged outcome 0.189 (0.426) 0.764 (1.482) 0.317 (0.326) 0.887 (1.962)
AR2 1.819* [0.069] 0.328 [0.743] -0.730 [0.465] -0.384 [0.701]
J-test 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000]
Number of instr. 28 28 28 28
Number of obs. 336 336 336 336
Low-Skilled
Aggregated
Treatment 2016-2019 -0.083 (0.095) -0.069 (0.196) 0.024 (0.076) 0.051 (0.157)
Lagged outcome 0.288* (0.152) 0.338 (0.443) 0.457*** (0.162) -0.033 (0.271)
AR2 0.814 [0.416] -0.015 [0.988] 1.659* [0.097] 1.192 [0.233]
J-test 3.081 [0.544] 0.381 [0.984] 1.913 [0.752] 3.531 [0.473]
Number of instr. 25 25 25 25
Number of obs. 336 336 336 336
Yearly (Base 2015)
Treatment 2016 0.102 (0.442) 0.098 (0.152) 0.824 (0.722) 0.397 (1.068)
2017 0.501 (0.946) 0.122 (0.217) 0.375 (0.478) 0.664 (1.971)
2018 0.320 (0.830) 0.298 (0.180) 0.595 (0.739) 0.715 (2.048)
2019 0.137 (0.771) 0.253 (0.222) 0.750 (0.942) 0.711 (2.068)
Lagged outcome 0.399* (0.204) 0.816 (0.491) 0.767 (0.498) -0.023 (0.925)
AR2 -0.664 [0.507] 1.960* [0.050] 1.301 [0.193] 0.194 [0.846]
J-test 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000]
Number of instr. 28 28 28 28
Number of obs. 336 336 336 336
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years and for low skilled, for those with at most secondary school. Real
hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Controls included are gdp per capita, pea employed for low sckilled, pea employed in services, in manufacture,
schooling, proportion of population between 18 and 25 and between 26 and 35, percentage of urban population. Equations include 2-way FEs
(regions and years). SE CRVE refers to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; ***
Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.A18 – Panel data: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector (full set of controls), 2005-2019
Informality rate Formal sector inequality Informal sector inequality
β SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. WB N β SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. WB N β SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. WB N
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE OLS -0.004 (0.011) (0.011) [0.730] 360 0.013 (0.013) (0.013) [0.315] 360 -0.008 (0.010) (0.011) [0.465] 360
FD 0.008 (0.009) (0.009) [0.360] 336 0.031 (0.012)** (0.012)** [0.010] 336 0.018 (0.016) (0.017) [0.300] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.004 (0.008) [0.430] 360 0.015 (0.012) [0.245] 360 -0.005 (0.009) [0.315] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.003 (0.008) [0.430] 360 0.015 (0.012) [0.245] 360 -0.005 (0.009) [0.315] 360
S* FE 8.753 8.753 8.753
S* FD 8.032 8.032 8.032
IK-DoF FE 7.783 7.783 7.783
IK-DoF FD 6.954 6.946 6.946
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 FE OLS 0.007 (0.009) (0.009) [0.460] 360 0.029 (0.016)* (0.016)* [0.060] 360 0.018 (0.019) (0.020) [0.365] 360
FD 0.008 (0.008) (0.009) [0.335] 336 0.032 (0.012)** (0.012)** [0.005] 336 0.018 (0.016) (0.017) [0.305] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.008 (0.008) [0.430] 360 0.029 (0.015)* [0.080] 360 0.018 (0.018) [0.415] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.008 (0.008) [0.430] 360 0.029 (0.015)* [0.080] 360 0.018 (0.018) [0.415] 360
2017 FE OLS 0.001 (0.010) (0.010) [0.955] 360 0.003 (0.017) (0.017) [0.885] 360 0.011 (0.012) (0.012) [0.365] 360
FD -0.001 (0.009) (0.009) [0.910] 336 0.008 (0.013) (0.013) [0.635] 336 0.009 (0.013) (0.013) [0.505] 336
FE GLS AR(1) -0.000 (0.009) [0.895] 360 0.004 (0.015) [0.875] 360 0.010 (0.012) [0.475] 360
FE GLS AR(2) -0.000 (0.009) [0.895] 360 0.004 (0.015) [0.875] 360 0.010 (0.012) [0.475] 360
2018 FE OLS -0.003 (0.009) (0.009) [0.715] 360 0.034 (0.013)** (0.013)** [0.010] 360 0.034 (0.015)** (0.015)** [0.015] 360
FD -0.004 (0.008) (0.008) [0.640] 336 0.038 (0.013)*** (0.013)*** [0.015] 336 0.034 (0.015)** (0.015)** [0.020] 336
FE GLS AR(1) -0.003 (0.008) [0.760] 360 0.034 (0.013)** [0.050] 360 0.034 (0.015)** [0.060] 360
FE GLS AR(2) -0.003 (0.008) [0.760] 360 0.034 (0.013)** [0.050] 360 0.033 (0.015)** [0.060] 360
2019 FE OLS 0.024 (0.011)** (0.011)** [0.065] 360 0.034 (0.014)** (0.014)** [0.020] 360 0.020 (0.013) (0.013) [0.190] 360
FD 0.023 (0.011)* (0.012)* [0.100] 336 0.040 (0.018)** (0.018)** [0.040] 336 0.024 (0.015) (0.015) [0.135] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.024 (0.010)** [0.050] 360 0.035 (0.014)** [0.125] 360 0.020 (0.013) [0.200] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.024 (0.010)** [0.050] 360 0.035 (0.014)** [0.125] 360 0.020 (0.013) [0.200] 360
S* FE 7.956 7.956 7.956
S* FD 8.003 8.003 8.003
IK-DoF FE 6.968 6.968 6.968
IK-DoF FD 6.990 7.014 7.016
F stat. FE OLS 3.409*** 1.970* 2.816**
F stat. FD 4.305*** 2.069* 2.422**
F stat. GLS AR(1) 50.246*** 24.100*** 31.981***
F stat. GLS AR(2) 49.659*** 24.246*** 31.938***
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Controls included are gdp per capita, pea employed for low sckilled, pea employed in services, in manufacture, schooling, proportion of
population between 18 and 25 and between 26 and 35, percentage of urban population. Equations include 2-way FEs (regions and years). SE Homosk. refers to homoskedasticity-only SEs; SE CRVE, to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs;
SE CRVE2, to Bell and McCaffrey (2002) bias corrected CRVE2; P-val IK, to the p-value taking the effective DoF from Imbens and Kolesar (2012) (IK-DoF) taking CRVE2 SEs and P-val. WB, to the p-value of the Wild Cluster Boostrap taking the
Rademacher weights using 199 replications. S* refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald (2013). FE GLS-BC refers to the FE GLS Bias-corrected estimator of Hansen (2007) using SE CRVE. F-stat refers to
the F test cluster robust of the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years previous to the treatment. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s
calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.A19 – Panel data random growth: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector (full set of controls), 2005-2019
Informality rate Formal sector inequality Informal sector inequality
β SE CRVE SE CR2 P-val. WB N β SE CRVE SE CR2 P-val. WB N β SE CRVE SE CR2 P-val. WB N
All
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE 0.009 (0.010) (0.010) [0.330] 336 0.031 (0.013)** (0.013)** [0.020] 336 0.019 (0.018) (0.019) [0.320] 336
FD 0.013 (0.014) (0.014) [0.330] 312 0.045 (0.019)** (0.020)** [0.035] 312 0.026 (0.021) (0.022) [0.240] 312
Eff. G (CSS) 9.229 9.229 9.229
Eff. DoF (I-K) 7.047 7.047 7.047
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 FE 0.011 (0.009) (0.009) [0.230] 336 0.033 (0.013)** (0.013)** [0.010] 336 0.020 (0.017) (0.017) [0.255] 336
FD 0.011 (0.009) (0.009) [0.195] 312 0.033 (0.013)** (0.012)** [0.005] 312 0.019 (0.016) (0.016) [0.250] 312
2017 FE 0.005 (0.010) (0.010) [0.675] 336 0.010 (0.015) (0.015) [0.515] 336 0.013 (0.014) (0.014) [0.365] 336
FD 0.005 (0.010) (0.010) [0.620] 312 0.009 (0.014) (0.014) [0.515] 312 0.010 (0.014) (0.014) [0.465] 312
2018 FE 0.004 (0.009) (0.009) [0.665] 336 0.042 (0.016)** (0.016)** [0.015] 336 0.041 (0.016)** (0.015)** [0.015] 336
FD 0.004 (0.009) (0.009) [0.600] 312 0.041 (0.016)** (0.016)** [0.010] 312 0.038 (0.016)** (0.015)** [0.020] 312
2019 FE 0.034 (0.012)*** (0.012)*** [0.015] 336 0.045 (0.019)** (0.018)** [0.040] 336 0.033 (0.016)** (0.015)** [0.050] 336
FD 0.034 (0.012)*** (0.012)** [0.010] 312 0.045 (0.021)** (0.021)** [0.020] 312 0.030 (0.017)* (0.017)* [0.065] 312
Eff. G (CSS) 7.835 7.835 7.835
Eff. DoF (I-K) 6.718 6.767 6.793
F stat. FE 2.727** 1.950* 1.825
F stat. FD 2.811** 2.126* 1.971*
Low-Skilled
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE 0.013 (0.011) (0.011) [0.295] 336 0.035 (0.030) (0.031) [0.265] 336 0.002 (0.047) (0.050) [0.995] 336
FD 0.018 (0.017) (0.018) [0.335] 312 0.023 (0.039) (0.040) [0.615] 312 0.006 (0.066) (0.070) [0.930] 312
Eff. G (CSS) 9.229 9.229 9.229
Eff. DoF (I-K) 7.047 7.047 7.047
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 FE 0.015 (0.010) (0.011) [0.200] 336 0.036 (0.030) (0.030) [0.250] 336 0.000 (0.048) (0.050) [0.995] 336
FD 0.014 (0.009) (0.010) [0.175] 312 0.036 (0.030) (0.030) [0.250] 312 -0.002 (0.050) (0.052) [0.975] 312
2017 FE 0.006 (0.013) (0.013) [0.780] 336 0.045 (0.032) (0.032) [0.175] 336 -0.029 (0.045) (0.047) [0.750] 336
FD 0.006 (0.014) (0.014) [0.775] 312 0.046 (0.034) (0.034) [0.175] 312 -0.032 (0.048) (0.050) [0.760] 312
2018 FE 0.009 (0.011) (0.011) [0.480] 336 0.035 (0.035) (0.035) [0.350] 336 0.022 (0.050) (0.052) [0.650] 336
FD 0.009 (0.011) (0.012) [0.395] 312 0.038 (0.036) (0.036) [0.260] 312 0.018 (0.053) (0.054) [0.710] 312
2019 FE 0.033 (0.017)* (0.017)* [0.090] 336 0.030 (0.038) (0.039) [0.455] 336 -0.012 (0.052) (0.054) [0.910] 336
FD 0.034 (0.019)* (0.020)* [0.080] 312 0.033 (0.040) (0.042) [0.360] 312 -0.013 (0.055) (0.058) [0.910] 312
Eff. G (CSS) 7.835 7.835 7.835
Eff. DoF (I-K) 6.736 6.745 6.769
F stat. FE 1.872 3.206** 1.901
F stat. FD 1.947* 3.507*** 2.123*
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Controls included are gdp per capita, pea employed for low sckilled, pea employed in services, in manufacture,
schooling, proportion of population between 18 and 25 and between 26 and 35, percentage of urban population. Equations include 2-way FEs (regions and years). SE Homosk. refers to homoskedasticity-only SEs; SE CRVE,
to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs; SE CRVE2, to Bell and McCaffrey (2002) bias corrected CRVE2; P-val IK, to the p-value taking the effective DoF from Imbens and Kolesar (2012) (IK-DoF) taking CRVE2 SEs
and P-val. WB, to the p-value of the Wild Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights using 199 replications. S* refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald (2013). FE GLS-BC
refers to the FE GLS Bias-corrected estimator of Hansen (2007) using SE CRVE. F-stat refers to the F test cluster robust of the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years previous
to the treatment. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.A20 – Dynamic Panel data: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector (full set of controls), 2005-2019
Informality Formal wages Informal wages
2-step GMM Iterated GMM 2-step GMM Iterated GMM 2-step GMM Iterated GMM
β̂ SE CRVE β̂ SE CRVE β̂ SE CRVE β̂ SE CRVE β̂ SE CRVE β̂ SE CRVE
All
Aggregated
Treatment 2016-2019 0.010 (10.436) 0.017 (0.037) 0.022 (0.044) 0.055 (0.112) 0.025 (0.020) 0.021 (0.162)
Lagged outcome 0.415 (1153.147) -0.152 (0.672) 0.339 (0.582) 0.488 (4.240) 0.237** (0.110) 0.030 (0.938)
AR2 0.002 [0.999] 0.278 [0.781] -0.619 [0.536] 0.031 [0.975] 0.021 [0.984] 0.500 [0.617]
J-test 6.734 [0.241] 3.453 [0.485] 3.366 [0.499] 3.312 [0.507] 0.605 [0.963] 3.896 [0.420]
Number of instr. 25 25 25 25 25 25
Number of obs. 336 336 336 336 336 336
Yearly (Base 2015)
Treatment 2016 -0.282 (0.205) -0.383 (0.401) -0.416 (0.270) -0.416 (2.681) 0.005 (0.023) -0.266 (0.303)
2017 -0.549 (0.384) -0.760 (0.772) -0.445* (0.245) -0.445 (4.304) 0.049 (0.048) -0.533 (0.566)
2018 -0.777 (0.544) -0.742 (0.764) -1.046 (0.649) -1.046 (6.634) 0.074 (0.048) -0.698 (0.630)
2019 -0.758 (0.550) -0.716 (0.783) -1.607 (1.018) -1.607 (9.291) 0.175 (0.153) -0.724 (0.615)
Lagged outcome 2.191* (1.262) 1.852 (2.326) -1.477 (1.478) -1.477 (5.870) -1.567 (1.654) 0.159 (2.305)
AR2 1.685* [0.092] 0.356 [0.722] -0.679 [0.497] -0.211 [0.833] -0.504 [0.615] -0.457 [0.647]
J-test 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000]
Number of instr. 28 28 28 28 28 28
Number of obs. 336 336 336 336 336 336
Low-Skilled
Aggregated
Treatment 2016-2019 0.012 (0.012) 0.020 (0.026) 0.012 (0.036) 0.008 (0.050) -0.005 (0.054) -0.019 (0.058)
Lagged outcome 0.419 (0.316) -0.423 (0.890) -0.002 (0.102) 0.003 (0.088) 0.043 (0.180) 0.159 (0.174)
AR2 1.699* [0.089] -0.406 [0.684] -0.314 [0.753] -0.247 [0.805] 0.647 [0.517] 0.582 [0.561]
J-test 3.217 [0.522] 1.067 [0.899] 0.220 [0.994] 0.313 [0.989] 1.143 [0.887] 1.878 [0.758]
Number of instr. 25 25 25 25 25 25
Number of obs. 336 336 336 336 336 336
Yearly (Base 2015)
Treatment 2016 -0.320 (0.274) 0.027 (0.129) -0.022 (0.126) -0.002 (0.097) -0.284 (0.320) -0.171 (0.253)
2017 -0.659 (0.534) -0.059 (0.250) -0.045 (0.223) 0.005 (0.093) -0.535 (0.569) -0.418 (0.372)
2018 -0.905 (0.752) 0.031 (0.351) -0.110 (0.309) -0.055 (0.109) -0.672 (0.786) -0.432 (0.631)
2019 -1.271 (0.875) 0.113 (0.475) -0.138 (0.410) -0.060 (0.113) -0.933 (1.059) -0.583 (0.816)
Lagged outcome 3.201* (1.858) -0.265 (1.839) 0.007 (0.113) -0.078 (0.583) 0.484 (0.560) 0.310 (0.373)
AR2 2.227** [0.026] -0.822 [0.411] 0.033 [0.974] -0.465 [0.642] 2.348** [0.019] -0.196 [0.844]
J-test 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000] 0.000 [1.000]
Number of instr. 28 28 28 28 28 28
Number of obs. 336 336 336 336 336 336
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years and for low skilled, for those with at most secondary school. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Controls included
are gdp per capita, pea employed for low sckilled, pea employed in services, in manufacture, schooling, proportion of population between 18 and 25 and between 26 and 35, percentage of
urban population. Equations include 2-way FEs (regions and years). SE CRVE refers to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; ***
Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.A21 – SCM matching only on lagged outcomes: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’
(log) formal and informal wages, 2005-2019
All Low-skilled
ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value
1 Formal Wage
Arequipa
All years 0.065 0.003 1.332 10/20 0.500 0.101 0.007 1.257 12/20 0.600
Even years only 0.062 0.005 1.011 11/20 0.550 0.148 0.015 1.218 10/20 0.500
Odd years only 0.069 0.003 1.324 9/20 0.450 0.046 0.012 0.969 15/20 0.750
Cusco
All years 0.093 0.006 1.508 8/20 0.400 0.069 0.016 1.131 12/20 0.600
Even years only 0.082 0.007 1.302 6/20 0.300 0.075 0.017 1.152 11/20 0.550
Odd years only 0.123 0.006 1.698 5/20 0.250 0.052 0.012 1.693 8/20 0.400
La Libertad
All years 0.092 0.001 2.743 3/20 0.150 0.113 0.001 4.493 3/20 0.150
Even years only 0.088 0.003 1.770 4/20 0.200 0.108 0.004 1.816 6/20 0.300
Odd years only 0.124 0.002 2.608 2/20 0.100 0.125 0.002 2.741 3/20 0.150
Lima Y Callao
All years 0.028 0.000 5.274 1/20 0.050 0.054 0.001 2.369 8/20 0.400
Even years only 0.059 0.003 1.267 7/20 0.350 0.123 0.004 2.053 7/20 0.350
Odd years only 0.054 0.000 3.223 1/20 0.050 0.070 0.002 1.939 6/20 0.300
Tumbes
All years -0.019 0.001 1.666 7/20 0.350 -0.061 0.004 1.492 12/20 0.600
Even years only -0.024 0.003 0.545 19/20 0.950 -0.029 0.007 0.697 17/20 0.850
Odd years only -0.047 0.002 1.142 10/20 0.500 0.025 0.011 0.711 19/20 0.950
2 Informal Wage
Arequipa
All years 0.054 0.001 2.514 8/20 0.400 0.061 0.002 2.191 8/20 0.400
Even years only 0.057 0.001 1.880 10/20 0.500 0.084 0.003 1.784 9/20 0.450
Odd years only 0.006 0.001 0.370 19/20 0.950 0.006 0.002 1.623 7/20 0.350
Cusco
All years -0.036 0.003 1.132 13/20 0.650 -0.036 0.012 0.761 19/20 0.950
Even years only -0.026 0.004 0.993 16/20 0.800 -0.006 0.014 0.515 20/20 1.000
Odd years only -0.040 0.003 1.204 13/20 0.650 -0.036 0.012 0.776 17/20 0.850
La Libertad
All years 0.021 0.001 1.300 13/20 0.650 0.007 0.001 1.491 12/20 0.600
Even years only -0.017 0.001 1.005 16/20 0.800 0.008 0.001 1.635 10/20 0.500
Odd years only 0.015 0.001 1.181 15/20 0.750 0.013 0.003 1.041 13/20 0.650
Lima Y Callao
All years -0.064 0.001 2.381 8/20 0.400 -0.097 0.000 9.575 1/20 0.050
Even years only 0.006 0.002 1.460 12/20 0.600 -0.043 0.001 2.769 3/20 0.150
Odd years only -0.075 0.002 2.106 6/20 0.300 -0.090 0.000 5.347 1/20 0.050
Tumbes
All years -0.056 0.002 1.637 9/20 0.450 -0.035 0.001 2.775 5/20 0.250
Even years only -0.078 0.004 1.550 10/20 0.500 -0.106 0.001 3.542 1/20 0.050
Odd years only -0.036 0.003 1.208 14/20 0.700 -0.013 0.002 1.775 6/20 0.300
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation.
Estimations under the low skilled heading, in the case of the formal outcome, also restrict to those with at most primary or secondary school level and, in
the case of the informal outcome, additionally restrict the sample to those between 18 and 35 years before data aggregation. ATE shows to the average
TE for the post-treatment periods; RMSPE, the root mean square prediction error for the pre-treatment period (2005-2015); ratio, the ratio of the RMSPE
for the pre-treatment relative to the RMSPE for the post-treatment (2016-2019); rank, the relative position of the ratio among the J+1 units and p-value,
the probability that a random draw from the donor pool takes a lower than the value for the corresponding treated region. Source: Author’s calculations
using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
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Table 2.A22 – SCM matching only on lagged outcomes: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’
informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-2019
All Low-skilled
ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value
3 Informality
Arequipa
All years 0.021 0.000 6.290 4/20 0.200 -0.007 0.000 2.297 8/20 0.400
Even years only -0.005 0.000 2.355 10/20 0.500 -0.014 0.000 1.358 12/20 0.600
Odd years only 0.029 0.000 5.061 3/20 0.150 0.013 0.000 1.842 8/20 0.400
Cusco
All years 0.009 0.000 1.462 15/20 0.750 0.032 0.000 4.113 3/20 0.150
Even years only 0.005 0.000 1.011 17/20 0.850 0.049 0.000 4.981 1/20 0.050
Odd years only 0.015 0.000 1.559 13/20 0.650 0.034 0.000 3.702 3/20 0.150
La Libertad
All years -0.013 0.000 2.479 11/20 0.550 -0.009 0.000 1.408 14/20 0.700
Even years only -0.020 0.000 2.936 7/20 0.350 -0.016 0.000 1.828 8/20 0.400
Odd years only -0.013 0.000 2.117 11/20 0.550 -0.016 0.000 2.237 4/20 0.200
Lima Y Callao
All years -0.008 0.000 1.183 16/20 0.800 0.008 0.000 1.353 16/20 0.800
Even years only -0.014 0.000 1.333 15/20 0.750 0.016 0.000 1.702 10/20 0.500
Odd years only -0.008 0.000 1.113 15/20 0.750 0.001 0.000 0.629 18/20 0.900
Tumbes
All years -0.012 0.000 2.574 11/20 0.550 0.003 0.000 1.389 15/20 0.750
Even years only -0.010 0.000 1.775 13/20 0.650 -0.011 0.000 1.106 16/20 0.800
Odd years only -0.007 0.000 1.465 13/20 0.650 -0.001 0.000 0.865 17/20 0.850
4 Inequality Formal
Arequipa
All years 0.006 0.000 1.627 10/20 0.500 0.024 0.000 1.824 8/20 0.400
Even years only 0.017 0.001 1.161 10/20 0.500 0.023 0.001 0.827 13/20 0.650
Odd years only 0.004 0.000 1.123 15/20 0.750 0.023 0.000 1.622 4/20 0.200
Cusco
All years 0.016 0.000 1.578 12/20 0.600 0.023 0.002 0.688 19/20 0.950
Even years only -0.011 0.001 0.626 18/20 0.900 -0.015 0.003 0.285 19/20 0.950
Odd years only 0.033 0.001 1.389 10/20 0.500 0.055 0.002 1.176 9/20 0.450
La Libertad
All years 0.014 0.000 4.192 2/20 0.100 -0.006 0.000 2.625 5/20 0.250
Even years only -0.002 0.000 1.795 4/20 0.200 -0.000 0.001 0.621 16/20 0.800
Odd years only 0.006 0.000 1.943 6/20 0.300 0.008 0.001 1.206 9/20 0.450
Lima Y Callao
All years 0.019 0.000 2.467 6/20 0.300 0.020 0.000 4.089 2/20 0.100
Even years only 0.033 0.001 1.248 9/20 0.450 0.019 0.000 2.008 6/20 0.300
Odd years only 0.005 0.000 0.997 16/20 0.800 0.041 0.001 1.731 4/20 0.200
Tumbes
All years 0.014 0.001 0.871 17/20 0.850 0.053 0.000 2.945 3/20 0.150
Even years only 0.016 0.002 0.864 12/20 0.600 0.065 0.001 2.085 5/20 0.250
Odd years only 0.007 0.003 0.339 18/20 0.900 0.073 0.001 2.884 2/20 0.100
5 Inequality Informal
Arequipa
All years -0.047 0.001 2.397 8/20 0.400 -0.030 0.004 0.668 19/20 0.950
Even years only -0.045 0.001 1.675 8/20 0.400 -0.021 0.003 0.932 14/20 0.700
Odd years only -0.056 0.001 2.820 5/20 0.250 -0.034 0.004 0.879 16/20 0.800
Cusco
All years 0.004 0.001 1.010 18/20 0.900 -0.004 0.002 1.336 15/20 0.750
Even years only 0.004 0.002 0.884 16/20 0.800 -0.016 0.003 0.971 13/20 0.650
Odd years only 0.007 0.001 1.105 12/20 0.600 0.004 0.003 1.260 11/20 0.550
La Libertad
All years 0.026 0.001 1.384 13/20 0.650 -0.006 0.002 0.920 18/20 0.900
Even years only 0.008 0.001 1.293 12/20 0.600 0.006 0.003 0.621 17/20 0.850
Odd years only 0.022 0.001 1.513 11/20 0.550 0.015 0.003 0.752 15/20 0.750
Lima Y Callao
All years 0.016 0.000 3.146 5/20 0.250 -0.006 0.000 1.414 11/20 0.550
Even years only 0.014 0.000 1.334 11/20 0.550 -0.049 0.001 2.450 5/20 0.250
Odd years only 0.027 0.000 2.166 9/20 0.450 0.017 0.000 1.159 14/20 0.700
Tumbes
All years -0.006 0.000 1.560 13/20 0.650 0.009 0.000 1.534 11/20 0.550
Even years only -0.014 0.001 1.363 10/20 0.500 0.001 0.001 1.241 9/20 0.450
Odd years only -0.007 0.000 1.546 10/20 0.500 0.015 0.001 1.444 10/20 0.500
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation.
Estimations under the low skilled heading, in the case of the formal outcome, also restrict to those with at most primary or secondary school level and, in
the case of the informal outcome, additionally restrict the sample to those between 18 and 35 years before data aggregation. ATE shows to the average
TE for the post-treatment periods; RMSPE, the root mean square prediction error for the pre-treatment period (2005-2015); ratio, the ratio of the RMSPE
for the pre-treatment relative to the RMSPE for the post-treatment (2016-2019); rank, the relative position of the ratio among the J+1 units and p-value,
the probability that a random draw from the donor pool takes a lower than the value for the corresponding treated region. Source: Author’s calculations
using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
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Table 2.A23 – SCM regression adjustment: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal and
informal wages, 2005-2019
All Low-skilled
ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value
1 Formal Wage
Arequipa 0.079 0.009 0.854 8/20 0.400 0.112 0.009 1.188 7/20 0.350
Cusco 0.110 0.014 1.023 7/20 0.350 0.119 0.015 1.362 4/20 0.200
La Libertad 0.072 0.003 1.492 3/20 0.150 0.061 0.005 0.893 9/20 0.450
Lima y Callao 0.142 0.012 1.320 4/20 0.200 0.143 0.012 1.316 4/20 0.200
Tumbes 0.058 0.005 0.905 8/20 0.400 0.066 0.009 0.832 10/20 0.500
2 Informal Wage
Arequipa 0.110 0.004 1.722 3/20 0.150 0.062 0.008 1.158 4/20 0.200
Cusco 0.059 0.005 1.027 9/20 0.450 0.006 0.014 0.490 17/20 0.850
La Libertad 0.039 0.001 1.674 4/20 0.200 0.035 0.004 1.156 5/20 0.250
Lima y Callao 0.017 0.002 0.842 13/20 0.650 -0.008 0.002 1.580 3/20 0.150
Tumbes -0.038 0.005 0.814 12/20 0.600 -0.059 0.004 1.730 1/20 0.050
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation.
Estimations under the low skilled heading, in the case of the formal outcome, also restrict to those with at most primary or secondary school level and,
in the case of the informal outcome, additionally restrict the sample to those between 18 and 35 years before data aggregation. M1 to M3 refer to the
SC estimator based on residuals aggregated on department-year level that result from regressing the outcome on interactions of year with gender, age,
schooling and its interaction, area (M1), including aditionally industry group (M2) and also occupation group (M3). ATE shows to the average TE for
the post-treatment periods; RMSPE, the root mean square prediction error for the pre-treatment period (2005-2015); ratio, the ratio of the RMSPE for
the pre-treatment relative to the RMSPE for the post-treatment (2016-2019); rank, the relative position of the ratio among the J+1 units and p-value, the
probability that a random draw from the donor pool takes a lower than the value for the corresponding treated region. Source: Author’s calculations using
ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.A24 – 2 stages DiD: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ (log) formal and informal
wages under alternative wage definitions (full set of controls), 2011-2019
Monthly wages CPI deflactation
β̂ SE CRVE SE CR2 P-val. I-K P-val. WB N β̂ SE CRVE SE CR2 P-val. I-K P-val. WB N
Formal
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE OLS 0.020 (0.019) (0.020) [0.349] [0.340] 216 0.013 (0.024) (0.024) [0.608] [0.675] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.019 (0.022) 192 0.008 (0.023) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.021 (0.024) 168 0.010 (0.029) 168
Eff. G (CSS) 7.835 7.835
Eff. DoF (I-K) 6.846 6.846
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 FE OLS 0.030 (0.023) (0.024) [0.256] [0.265] 216 0.027 (0.023) (0.024) [0.298] [0.295] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.030 (0.026) 192 0.026 (0.026) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.030 (0.026) 168 0.027 (0.027) 168
2017 FE OLS 0.001 (0.022) (0.023) [0.981] [0.970] 216 -0.006 (0.025) (0.025) [0.827] [0.835] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.000 (0.024) 192 -0.007 (0.027) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.001 (0.024) 168 -0.006 (0.028) 168
2018 FE OLS 0.037 (0.036) (0.037) [0.353] [0.275] 216 0.011 (0.040) (0.041) [0.793] [0.770] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.037 (0.040) 192 0.010 (0.044) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.037 (0.040) 168 0.011 (0.046) 168
2019 FE OLS 0.002 (0.029) (0.029) [0.943] [0.940] 216 0.004 (0.031) (0.032) [0.914] [0.915] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.002 (0.032) 192 0.003 (0.034) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.002 (0.032) 168 0.004 (0.036) 168
Eff. G (CSS) 7.835 7.835
Eff. DoF (I-K) 6.846 6.846
F stat. FE OLS 0.396 1.707
F stat. GLS-BC AR(1) 0.419 0.210
F stat. GLS-BC AR(2) 0.619 0.008
Informal
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE OLS 0.043 (0.025) (0.025)* [0.130] [0.085] 216 0.016 (0.030) (0.031) [0.623] [0.635] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.029 (0.038) 192 0.019 (0.023) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.023 (0.038) 168 0.009 (0.019) 168
Eff. G (CSS) 7.835 7.835
Eff. DoF (I-K) 6.846 6.846
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 FE OLS 0.032 (0.035) (0.037) [0.412] [0.410] 216 0.029 (0.024) (0.025) [0.293] [0.320] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.030 (0.042) 192 0.026 (0.029) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.029 (0.043) 168 0.026 (0.029) 168
2017 FE OLS 0.041 (0.036) (0.037) [0.309] [0.355] 216 0.024 (0.025) (0.025) [0.366] [0.390] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.037 (0.047) 192 0.019 (0.031) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.036 (0.045) 168 0.020 (0.028) 168
2018 FE OLS 0.038 (0.041) (0.043) [0.403] [0.470] 216 -0.011 (0.032) (0.033) [0.745] [0.795] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.033 (0.055) 192 -0.017 (0.038) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.032 (0.052) 168 -0.016 (0.034) 168
2019 FE OLS 0.014 (0.036) (0.037) [0.722] [0.740] 216 -0.030 (0.028) (0.028) [0.322] [0.290] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.008 (0.048) 192 -0.037 (0.032) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.007 (0.046) 168 -0.035 (0.029) 168
Eff. G (CSS) 7.835 7.835
Eff. DoF (I-K) 6.846 6.846
F stat. FE OLS 0.383 1.078
F stat. GLS-BC AR(1) 0.292 0.394
F stat. GLS-BC AR(2) 0.129 0.259
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Using a 2-step estimation procedure presented in Hansen (2007), individual
level covariates (age and schooling in levels and interacted and gender, area, industry and occupation dummies) are partialled out first and then the treatment effects are estimated from
a 2-way FEs (regions and years) model. SE CRVE, to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs; SE CR2, to Bell and McCaffrey (2002) bias corrected CRVE CR2 and P-val. WB,
to the p-value of the Wild Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights using 199 replications. Eff. G (CSS) refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and
Steigerwald (2013). FE GLS-BC refers to the FE GLS Bias-corrected estimator of Hansen (2007) using SE CRVE. F-stat refers to the statistic from the F test of the set of interactions
of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years previous to the treatment using the cluster-robust VCE. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level;
*** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
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Table 2.A25 – 2 stages DiD: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on natives’ outcomes under alternative definition of informality (full set of controls), 2011-2019
Informal wage Informality Informal sector inequality
β̂ SE CRVE SE CR2 P-val. WB N β̂ SE CRVE SE CR2 P-val. WB N β̂ SE CRVE SE CR2 P-val. WB N
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE OLS 0.008 (0.020) (0.020) [0.715] 216 -0.004 (0.012) (0.012) [0.690] 216 -0.013 (0.024) (0.025) [0.570] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.028 (0.025) 192 0.001 (0.010) 192 -0.001 (0.022) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.012 (0.022) 168 0.009 (0.012) 168 0.009 (0.018) 168
Eff. G (CSS) 7.835 7.835 7.835
Eff. DoF (I-K) 6.846 6.846 6.846
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 FE OLS 0.042 (0.035) (0.036) [0.215] 216 0.003 (0.009) (0.009) [0.710] 216 0.007 (0.034) (0.034) [0.880] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.043 (0.039) 192 0.004 (0.010) 192 0.007 (0.037) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.043 (0.040) 168 0.004 (0.010) 168 0.008 (0.038) 168
2017 FE OLS 0.013 (0.028) (0.028) [0.660] 216 -0.003 (0.013) (0.013) [0.885] 216 0.020 (0.025) (0.025) [0.410] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.014 (0.031) 192 -0.002 (0.014) 192 0.020 (0.027) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.013 (0.031) 168 -0.002 (0.014) 168 0.022 (0.028) 168
2018 FE OLS 0.007 (0.029) (0.029) [0.820] 216 -0.011 (0.013) (0.013) [0.405] 216 0.008 (0.032) (0.032) [0.880] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.009 (0.033) 192 -0.010 (0.015) 192 0.008 (0.035) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.007 (0.034) 168 -0.010 (0.015) 168 0.010 (0.035) 168
2019 FE OLS 0.049 (0.032) (0.032) [0.130] 216 0.011 (0.011) (0.011) [0.315] 216 -0.004 (0.038) (0.039) [0.910] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.050 (0.037) 192 0.012 (0.012) 192 -0.004 (0.042) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.049 (0.037) 168 0.012 (0.012) 168 -0.002 (0.044) 168
Eff. G (CSS) 7.835 7.835 7.835
Eff. DoF (I-K) 6.846 6.846 6.846
F stat. FE OLS 2.534* 5.403*** 0.653
F stat. GLS-BC AR(1) 2.774* 3.664** 0.675
F stat. GLS-BC AR(2) 2.114 0.478 0.323
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most primary or secondary school level. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Using a 2-step estimation procedure presented in Hansen (2007), individual
level covariates (age and schooling in levels and interacted and gender, area, industry and occupation dummies) are partialled out first and then the treatment effects are estimated from a 2-way FEs (regions and years) model. SE CRVE,
to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs; SE CR2, to Bell and McCaffrey (2002) bias corrected CRVE CR2 and P-val. WB, to the p-value of the Wild Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights using 199 replications. Eff.
G (CSS) refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald (2013). FE GLS-BC refers to the FE GLS Bias-corrected estimator of Hansen (2007) using SE CRVE. F-stat refers to the statistic from the F
test of the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years previous to the treatment using the cluster-robust VCE. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1%
level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
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Appendix B: Results on Low skilled population
Key outcomes
Table 2.B1 – Single stage DiD: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’ (log) formal and
informal wages (full set of controls), 2011-2019
Formal wages Informal wages
β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE P-val. Rade P-val. Webb β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE P-val. Rade P-val. Webb
Aggregated
2016-2019 0.031 (0.013)** (0.022) [0.225] [0.215] -0.019 (0.015) (0.021) [0.415] [0.405]
S* 6.088 6.089
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 0.016 (0.026) (0.018) [0.415] [0.435] 0.006 (0.029) (0.033) [0.860] [0.830]
2017 0.034 (0.027) (0.031) [0.365] [0.360] -0.025 (0.030) (0.031) [0.415] [0.370]
2018 0.022 (0.026) (0.023) [0.340] [0.345] -0.092 (0.031)*** (0.037)** [0.170] [0.145]
2019 0.020 (0.026) (0.030) [0.570] [0.525] -0.100 (0.030)*** (0.038)** [0.170] [0.190]
N 61,297 72,779
S* 6.197 6.068
F stat. OLS 1.562 2.891**
Notes: The sample for the formal outcome is restricted to those with at most primary or secondary school level and the sample for the informal outcome is additionally
restricted to those between 18 and 35 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Individual level covariates included are age and schooling years in levels and interacted
and gender, area, industry and occupation dummies. SE CRVE refers to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs; P-val. WB Rade and Webb, to the p-value of the
Wild Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights and Webb weights, respectively, using 199 replications. S* refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter,
Schnepel and Steigerwald (2013). F-stat refers to the statistic of the F test for the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years
previous to the treatment using the cluster-robust VCE. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations
using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
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Table 2.B2 – 2 stages DiD: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’ (log) formal and informal wages (full set of controls), 2011-2019
Formal wages Informal wages
β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. IK P-val. WB N β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. IK P-val. WB N
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE OLS 0.043 (0.025)* (0.026) (0.027) [0.156] [0.100] 216 -0.041 (0.024)* (0.033) (0.034) [0.276] [0.250] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.015 (0.036) (0.029) 192 -0.040 (0.035) (0.034) 192




2016 FE OLS -0.006 (0.054) (0.027) (0.028) [0.830] [0.835] 216 -0.000 (0.050) (0.042) (0.044) [0.995] [0.995] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) -0.007 (0.052) (0.040) 192 -0.001 (0.047) (0.033) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) -0.007 (0.052) (0.031) 168 -0.000 (0.046) (0.046) 168
2017 FE OLS -0.021 (0.054) (0.042) (0.043) [0.631] [0.595] 216 -0.052 (0.050) (0.052) (0.054) [0.366] [0.455] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) -0.022 (0.059) (0.031) 192 -0.053 (0.054) (0.046) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) -0.023 (0.056) (0.047) 168 -0.052 (0.051) (0.057) 168
2018 FE OLS 0.042 (0.054) (0.049) (0.051) [0.437] [0.395] 216 -0.049 (0.050) (0.055) (0.058) [0.422] [0.565] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.041 (0.061) (0.047) 192 -0.050 (0.057) (0.057) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.041 (0.057) (0.056) 168 -0.049 (0.051) (0.061) 168
2019 FE OLS 0.033 (0.054) (0.057) (0.058) [0.587] [0.600] 216 -0.055 (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) [0.305] [0.285] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.032 (0.061) (0.056) 192 -0.055 (0.057) (0.061) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.032 (0.058) (0.064) 168 -0.054 (0.051) (0.053) 168
S* 7.835 7.835
IK-DoF 6.846 6.846
F stat. FE OLS 2.680* 0.968
F stat. GLS-BC AR(1) 0.512 0.475
F stat. GLS-BC AR(2) 0.779 0.270
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most primary or secondary school level; additionally, regressions for the informal sector take only those between 18 and 35 years. Real hourly wages
in 2007 PEN. Using a 2-step estimation procedure presented in Hansen (2007), individual level covariates (age and schooling in levels and interacted and gender, area, industry and occupation dummies) are partialled out first and then
the treatment effects are estimated from a 2-way FEs (regions and years) model. SE Homosk. refers to homoskedasticity-only SEs; SE CRVE, to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs; SE CRVE2, to Bell and McCaffrey (2002)
bias corrected CRVE2; P-val IK, to the p-value taking the effective DoF from Imbens and Kolesar (2012) (IK-DoF) taking CRVE2 SEs and P-val. WB, to the p-value of the Wild Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights
using 199 replications. S* refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald (2013). FE GLS-BC refers to the FE GLS Bias-corrected estimator of Hansen (2007) using SE CRVE. F-stat refers to the
statistic from the F test of the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years previous to the treatment using the cluster-robust VCE. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; ***
Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
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Figure 2.B1 – 2 stages DiD: ATET Heterogeneity of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’ (log)






(0.201), 216 (0.074), 216 (0.070), 200 (0.506), 192 (0.860), 168







(0.186), 216 (0.235), 216 (0.205), 200 (0.654), 192 (0.608), 168








(0.114), 216 (0.134), 216 (0.105), 200 (0.169), 192 (0.112), 168







(0.525), 216 (0.687), 216 (0.690), 200 (0.654), 192 (0.346), 168






















Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most primary or secondary school level; additionally, regressions for the informal sector take only those between
18 and 35 years. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Using a 2-step estimation procedure presented in Hansen (2007), individual level covariates (age and schooling in levels and interacted and gender, 
area, industry and occupation dummies) are partialled out first and then the treatment effects are estimated from a 2-way FEs (regions and years) model. FE OLS CRVE refers to Cluster Robust
Variance Estimator of SEs; Wild Boots., to the p-value of the Wild Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights using 199 replications and FE GLS-BC, to the FE GLS Bias-corrected estimator of
Hansen (2007) using SE CRVE. Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
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Table 2.B3 – Panel data: Average Treatment Effect of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’ (log) formal and informal wages (full set of controls), 2005-201911-2019
Formal wages Informal wages
β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. I-K P-val. WB N β̂ SE Homosk. SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. I-K P-val. WB N
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE OLS 0.056 (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) [0.163] [0.145] 360 -0.009 (0.025) (0.030) (0.032) [0.781] [0.810] 360
FD -0.029 (0.068) (0.040) (0.041) [0.508] [0.460] 336 -0.011 (0.044) (0.039) (0.041) [0.800] [0.810] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.058 (0.035) [0.095] 360 -0.015 (0.020) [0.725] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.054 (0.035) [0.095] 360 -0.014 (0.020) [0.725] 360
S* FE 8.753 8.753
S* FD 8.032 8.032
IK-DoF FE 7.783 7.783
IK-DoF FD 6.951 6.948
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 FE OLS -0.016 (0.084) (0.040) (0.041) [0.709] [0.700] 360 -0.015 (0.057) (0.044) (0.045) [0.743] [0.745] 360
FD -0.027 (0.068) (0.042) (0.042) [0.542] [0.470] 336 -0.011 (0.045) (0.039) (0.040) [0.791] [0.790] 336
FE GLS AR(1) -0.021 (0.039) [0.750] 360 -0.014 (0.041) [0.800] 360
FE GLS AR(2) -0.019 (0.038) [0.750] 360 -0.015 (0.042) [0.800] 360
2017 FE OLS -0.025 (0.085) (0.053) (0.054) [0.660] [0.640] 360 -0.060 (0.057) (0.049) (0.050) [0.266] [0.360] 360
FD -0.019 (0.097) (0.056) (0.057) [0.754] [0.750] 336 -0.044 (0.063) (0.048) (0.048) [0.386] [0.425] 336
FE GLS AR(1) -0.022 (0.052) [0.640] 360 -0.052 (0.047) [0.370] 360
FE GLS AR(2) -0.019 (0.051) [0.640] 360 -0.052 (0.047) [0.370] 360
2018 FE OLS 0.027 (0.085) (0.071) (0.073) [0.718] [0.720] 360 -0.063 (0.057) (0.051) (0.053) [0.269] [0.330] 360
FD 0.036 (0.119) (0.070) (0.072) [0.635] [0.690] 336 -0.062 (0.078) (0.061) (0.062) [0.352] [0.455] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.030 (0.069) [0.705] 360 -0.064 (0.054) [0.405] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.032 (0.069) [0.705] 360 -0.063 (0.054) [0.405] 360
2019 FE OLS 0.027 (0.085) (0.067) (0.069) [0.712] [0.735] 360 -0.069 (0.057) (0.037)* (0.037)* [0.107] [0.095] 360
FD 0.029 (0.137) (0.069) (0.071) [0.697] [0.705] 336 -0.082 (0.090) (0.044)* (0.045)* [0.107] [0.120] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.026 (0.064) [0.630] 360 -0.076 (0.039)* [0.390] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.028 (0.065) [0.630] 360 -0.076 (0.039)* [0.390] 360
S* FE 7.956 7.956
S* FD 8.003 8.003
IK-DoF FE 6.968 6.968
IK-DoF FD 7.005 7.009
F stat. FE OLS 3.175** 0.928
F stat. FD 1.600 0.863
F stat. GLS AR(1) 40.871*** 9.760
F stat. GLS AR(2) 42.134*** 9.769
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most secondary school. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Controls included are gdp per capita, pea employed for low sckilled, pea employed in
services, in manufacture, schooling, proportion of population between 18 and 25 and between 26 and 35, percentage of urban population. Equations include 2-way FEs (regions and years). SE Homosk. refers to homoskedasticity-only
SEs; SE CRVE, to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs; SE CRVE2, to Bell and McCaffrey (2002) bias corrected CRVE2; P-val IK, to the p-value taking the effective DoF from Imbens and Kolesar (2012) (IK-DoF) taking
CRVE2 SEs and P-val. WB, to the p-value of the Wild Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights using 199 replications. S* refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald (2013). FE GLS-BC
refers to the FE GLS Bias-corrected estimator of Hansen (2007) using SE CRVE. F-stat refers to the F test cluster robust of the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years previous to the
treatment. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.B4 – SCM: SC weights for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’ (log)
formal and informal wages, 2005-2019
Formal wages Informal wages
Areq. Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumb. Areq. Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumb.
Amazonas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ancash 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ApurÃmac 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayacucho 0 0 .055 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cajamarca 0 0 .102 0 0 0 0 .111 0 0
Huancavelica 0 0 0 0 0 0 .308 0 0 0
HuÃ¡nuco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ica .147 0 .12 0 .24 .077 0 .355 .35 0
JunÃn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lambayeque 0 0 .28 0 0 0 0 .341 0 0
Loreto 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .245
Madre de Dios 0 0 0 .382 .414 .043 0 0 .65 .477
Moquegua .52 .041 0 0 0 .568 .132 0 0 0
Pasco 0 .116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Piura 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Puno 0 .484 0 0 0 0 .149 0 0 0
San MartÃn 0 0 .06 0 .209 0 0 0 0 .068
Tacna .333 .193 .131 .524 0 .312 0 0 0 .21
Ucayali 0 .167 .252 .095 .138 0 .411 .193 0 0
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years and with at most
secondary school level and, in the case of the informal outcome, the sample is additionally restricted to those between
18 and 35 years before data aggregation. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO
2005-2019 data.
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most secondary school level; additionally, estimations for the
informal sector take only those between 18 and 35 years before data aggregation. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. 
Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Arequipa Cusco La Libertad Lima y Callao Tumbes
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Table 2.B5 – SCM: Covariate balance for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’
(log) formal and informal wages, 2005-2019
Arequipa Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumbes
Covariates
GDP pc (thousands) Obs. 15.924 11.714 9.441 16.380 9.498
Wei. Formal Wages 32.129 10.727 9.137 15.830 12.693
Wei. Informal Wages 33.654 11.722 10.012 16.275 13.723
Empl. LF low skill Obs. 0.536 0.678 0.667 0.551 0.678
Wei. Formal Wages 0.569 0.675 0.691 0.638 0.679
Wei. Informal Wages 0.572 0.725 0.669 0.644 0.681
Empl. LF serv. Obs. 0.644 0.549 0.588 0.734 0.683
Wei. Formal Wages 0.644 0.549 0.588 0.676 0.583
Wei. Informal Wages 0.643 0.511 0.586 0.616 0.629
Empl. LF manuf. Obs. 0.192 0.133 0.195 0.229 0.127
Wei. Formal Wages 0.156 0.148 0.157 0.131 0.133
Wei. Informal Wages 0.152 0.126 0.172 0.134 0.116
Schooling (years) Obs. 11.154 9.211 9.607 11.452 9.883
Wei. Formal Wages 10.910 9.776 9.617 10.369 9.875
Wei. Informal Wages 10.850 9.061 9.918 10.311 9.883
Proport. 18-25 yo. Obs. 0.168 0.154 0.183 0.189 0.177
Wei. Formal Wages 0.150 0.175 0.177 0.166 0.167
Wei. Informal Wages 0.146 0.162 0.181 0.167 0.166
Proport. 26-35 yo. Obs. 0.270 0.264 0.272 0.288 0.293
Wei. Formal Wages 0.270 0.267 0.270 0.281 0.281
Wei. Informal Wages 0.271 0.268 0.266 0.279 0.287
Urban population Obs. 0.881 0.535 0.776 0.979 0.922
Wei. Formal Wages 0.819 0.637 0.746 0.801 0.754
Wei. Informal Wages 0.807 0.565 0.784 0.784 0.735
Ecu.-Col. border(d) Obs. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Wei. Formal Wages 0.000 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.000
Wei. Informal Wages 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.245
Lagged Outcomes
2005 Obs. Formal Wages 1.131 0.812 1.218 1.341 1.271
Wei. Formal Wages 1.259 0.966 1.218 1.459 1.337
Obs. Informal Wages 0.460 -0.064 0.367 0.874 0.606
Wei. Informal Wages 0.545 0.125 0.453 0.792 0.599
2010 Obs. Formal Wages 1.355 1.166 1.218 1.466 1.397
Wei. Formal Wages 1.400 1.187 1.215 1.459 1.381
Obs. Informal Wages 0.821 0.508 0.529 1.057 0.943
Wei. Informal Wages 0.920 0.531 0.599 1.057 0.940
2015 Obs. Formal Wages 1.667 1.328 1.339 1.633 1.623
Wei. Formal Wages 1.480 1.361 1.380 1.521 1.540
Obs. Informal Wages 1.217 1.030 0.873 1.288 1.026
Wei. Informal Wages 1.139 0.824 0.928 1.254 1.093
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 and
at most secondary school level and, in the case of the informal outcome, additionally restrict the sample
to those between 18 and 35 years before data aggregation. All variables (except the lagged outcomes) are
averaged for the 2005-2015 period. LF=Labour force; Ecu-Col border is a dummy that equals 1 if the
region neighbours Ecuador and Colombia. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Source: Author’s calculations
using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.B6 – SCM: DiD Regressions for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’
(log) formal and informal wages, 2005-2019
GLS with AR(1) disturbances Baltagi and Wu (1999) estimator
(2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019 (2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019
Formal Wages
Arequipa -0.050 -0.048 0.054 0.054 0.147 -0.089 -0.029 0.082 0.085 0.175
(0.118) (0.118) (0.161) (0.190) (0.212) (0.106) (0.111) (0.139) (0.153) (0.161)
Cusco 0.083 -0.015 -0.037 0.334 0.274 0.072 -0.009 -0.028 0.343* 0.283
(0.155) (0.155) (0.213) (0.254) (0.285) (0.138) (0.142) (0.181) (0.203) (0.217)
La Libertad 0.036 0.079 0.087 0.068 0.119 0.042 0.079 0.088 0.070 0.122
(0.108) (0.115) (0.141) (0.152) (0.158) (0.084) (0.095) (0.111) (0.117) (0.119)
Lima y Callao -0.012 0.082 0.095 0.121 0.131 -0.039 0.090 0.104 0.126 0.132
(0.102) (0.103) (0.136) (0.155) (0.168) (0.084) (0.089) (0.110) (0.119) (0.124)
Tumbes -0.003 -0.033 -0.103 -0.134 -0.055 -0.029 -0.034 -0.109 -0.146 -0.071
(0.121) (0.128) (0.158) (0.172) (0.179) (0.096) (0.108) (0.126) (0.132) (0.135)
Informal Wages
Arequipa 0.022 0.020 -0.185 0.164 0.067 0.001 0.034 -0.164 0.190 0.094
(0.162) (0.162) (0.223) (0.266) (0.300) (0.148) (0.151) (0.194) (0.219) (0.234)
Cusco -0.175 -0.143 -0.222 -0.205 -0.066 -0.187 -0.135 -0.210 -0.190 -0.050
(0.192) (0.192) (0.266) (0.320) (0.363) (0.179) (0.182) (0.237) (0.269) (0.290)
La Libertad 0.091 -0.071 0.051 0.043 0.010 0.075 -0.061 0.066 0.059 0.027
(0.121) (0.121) (0.167) (0.201) (0.228) (0.117) (0.121) (0.153) (0.170) (0.180)
Lima y Callao 0.051 0.060 0.012 -0.119 -0.064 0.040 0.068 0.026 -0.102 -0.044
(0.105) (0.105) (0.145) (0.173) (0.196) (0.094) (0.096) (0.124) (0.141) (0.151)
Tumbes 0.162 0.143 0.077 -0.023 -0.052 0.146 0.154 0.095 -0.000 -0.027
(0.122) (0.122) (0.169) (0.203) (0.229) (0.114) (0.116) (0.150) (0.169) (0.181)
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most secondary school
level and, in the case of the informal outcome, additionally restrict the sample to those between 18 and 35 years before data aggregation.
Each row represents a regression of annual observations for the treated areas and its synthetic control between 2005 and 2019, N=30,
which includes a dummy variable for the treated region, period dummies (2005-2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 with 2015 excluded) and
their interactions; these interaction coefficients are the coefficients reported. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN * Significant at 10% level;
** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Table 2.B7 – SCM: P-values for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’ (log) formal
and informal wages, 2005-2019
ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value
Formal wages
Arequipa 0.2066 0.1272 1.6851 6/20 0.3000
Cusco 0.0887 0.1140 1.6136 3/20 0.1500
La Libertad 0.0602 0.0442 1.4387 8/20 0.4000
Lima y Callao 0.1761 0.0692 2.5464 2/20 0.1000
Tumbes -0.0499 0.0800 0.8531 17/20 0.8500
Informal wages
Arequipa 0.0764 0.0704 2.0763 4/20 0.2000
Cusco 0.0331 0.1243 0.5453 20/20 1.0000
La Libertad -0.0549 0.0514 1.3948 7/20 0.3500
Lima y Callao 0.0018 0.0505 1.3872 6/20 0.3000
Tumbes -0.0397 0.0479 1.8919 5/20 0.2500
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18
and 65 years with at most secondary school level and, in the case of the informal outcome,
additionally restrict the sample to those between 18 and 35 years before data aggregation.
ATE shows to the average TE for the post-treatment periods; RMSPE, the root mean square
prediction error for the pre-treatment period (2005-2015); ratio, the ratio of the RMSPE
for the pre-treatment relative to the RMSPE for the post-treatment (2016-2019); rank, the
relative position of the ratio among the J+1 units and p-value, the probability that a random
draw from the donor pool takes a lower than the value for the corresponding treated region.
Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.B8 – SCM demeaned: Covariate balance for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled
natives’ (log) formal and informal wages, 2005-2019
Arequipa Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumbes
Covariates
GDP pc (thousands) Obs. 15.924 11.714 9.441 16.380 9.498
Wei. Formal Wages 19.221 13.785 9.671 15.474 10.113
Wei. Informal Wages 19.386 11.317 10.267 15.787 13.548
Empl. LF low skill Obs. 0.536 0.678 0.667 0.551 0.678
Wei. Formal Wages 0.574 0.691 0.671 0.577 0.686
Wei. Informal Wages 0.581 0.685 0.675 0.581 0.676
Empl. LF serv. Obs. 0.644 0.549 0.588 0.734 0.683
Wei. Formal Wages 0.596 0.507 0.574 0.594 0.596
Wei. Informal Wages 0.632 0.485 0.584 0.626 0.642
Empl. LF manuf. Obs. 0.192 0.133 0.195 0.229 0.127
Wei. Formal Wages 0.184 0.137 0.169 0.188 0.140
Wei. Informal Wages 0.170 0.122 0.168 0.177 0.121
Schooling (years) Obs. 11.154 9.211 9.607 11.452 9.883
Wei. Formal Wages 11.087 9.394 9.768 11.117 9.844
Wei. Informal Wages 10.975 9.318 9.790 11.058 9.947
Proport. 18-25 yo. Obs. 0.168 0.154 0.183 0.189 0.177
Wei. Formal Wages 0.177 0.160 0.181 0.184 0.178
Wei. Informal Wages 0.173 0.172 0.181 0.180 0.169
Proport. 26-35 yo. Obs. 0.270 0.264 0.272 0.288 0.293
Wei. Formal Wages 0.266 0.272 0.262 0.265 0.283
Wei. Informal Wages 0.269 0.260 0.270 0.268 0.285
Urban population Obs. 0.881 0.535 0.776 0.979 0.922
Wei. Formal Wages 0.881 0.600 0.745 0.895 0.754
Wei. Informal Wages 0.862 0.544 0.780 0.887 0.747
Ecu.-Col. border(d) Obs. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Wei. Formal Wages 0.000 0.088 0.163 0.000 0.507
Wei. Informal Wages 0.000 0.000 0.353 0.000 0.356
Lagged Outcomes
2005 Obs. Formal Wages -0.265 -0.345 -0.045 -0.130 -0.143
Wei. Formal Wages -0.116 -0.273 -0.044 -0.115 -0.081
Obs. Informal Wages -0.427 -0.572 -0.252 -0.169 -0.280
Wei. Informal Wages -0.273 -0.397 -0.221 -0.240 -0.289
2010 Obs. Formal Wages -0.041 0.010 -0.045 -0.005 -0.017
Wei. Formal Wages -0.008 0.046 -0.030 -0.011 0.009
Obs. Informal Wages -0.066 -0.000 -0.090 0.014 0.057
Wei. Informal Wages 0.003 0.018 -0.057 -0.016 0.047
2015 Obs. Formal Wages 0.271 0.171 0.076 0.161 0.209
Wei. Formal Wages 0.191 0.165 0.128 0.201 0.112
Obs. Informal Wages 0.331 0.522 0.254 0.245 0.141
Wei. Informal Wages 0.290 0.347 0.290 0.300 0.223
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years
with at most secondary school level and, in the case of the informal outcome, additionally restrict the sample
to those between 18 and 35 years before data aggregation. All variables (except the lagged outcomes) are
averaged for the 2005-2015 period. LF=Labour force; Ecu-Col border is a dummy that equals 1 if the region
neighbours Ecuador and Colombia. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. In all of these, we first demeaned the
data following the routine by Ferman & Pinto (2019). Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-
2019 data.
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN.
In all of these, we first applied the demeaning routine suggested by Ferman & Pinto (2019). Source: Author's calculations using
ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Arequipa Cusco La Libertad Lima y Callao Tumbes
Table 2.B9 – SCM demeaned: DiD Regressions for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled
natives’ (log) formal and informal wages, 2005-2019
GLS with AR(1) disturbances Baltagi and Wu (1999) estimator
(2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019 (2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019
Formal Wages
Arequipa -0.053 -0.067 -0.059 -0.071 -0.014 -0.066 -0.061 -0.051 -0.063 -0.008
(0.122) (0.122) (0.167) (0.198) (0.223) (0.112) (0.116) (0.146) (0.161) (0.170)
Cusco 0.079 -0.048 -0.031 0.328 0.263 0.043 -0.035 -0.016 0.341 0.272
(0.172) (0.172) (0.233) (0.273) (0.302) (0.163) (0.177) (0.214) (0.229) (0.236)
La Libertad 0.049 0.069 0.068 0.071 0.106 0.051 0.069 0.069 0.072 0.107
(0.101) (0.110) (0.132) (0.141) (0.145) (0.079) (0.089) (0.104) (0.109) (0.110)
Lima y Callao 0.008 -0.002 -0.042 -0.060 -0.113 0.018 -0.007 -0.049 -0.068 -0.121
(0.111) (0.111) (0.151) (0.177) (0.196) (0.096) (0.102) (0.126) (0.137) (0.143)
Tumbes -0.057 -0.100 -0.198 -0.208 -0.171 -0.075 -0.099 -0.201 -0.215 -0.181
(0.125) (0.130) (0.164) (0.181) (0.190) (0.100) (0.112) (0.132) (0.139) (0.141)
Informal Wages
Arequipa 0.021 0.072 -0.055 0.113 -0.035 0.003 0.083 -0.039 0.132 -0.016
(0.152) (0.152) (0.210) (0.251) (0.282) (0.141) (0.144) (0.185) (0.208) (0.222)
Cusco -0.129 -0.069 -0.194 -0.196 -0.031 -0.146 -0.058 -0.177 -0.176 -0.010
(0.190) (0.190) (0.264) (0.316) (0.358) (0.181) (0.185) (0.239) (0.269) (0.288)
La Libertad 0.105 -0.011 0.093 0.066 0.037 0.088 -0.000 0.110 0.086 0.059
(0.126) (0.126) (0.175) (0.210) (0.237) (0.120) (0.124) (0.157) (0.176) (0.186)
Lima y Callao 0.063 0.076 0.006 -0.101 -0.193 0.065 0.076 0.005 -0.102 -0.193
(0.112) (0.112) (0.154) (0.185) (0.209) (0.102) (0.104) (0.134) (0.151) (0.161)
Tumbes 0.157 0.146 0.087 -0.027 -0.067 0.144 0.155 0.102 -0.009 -0.047
(0.122) (0.123) (0.170) (0.204) (0.230) (0.115) (0.118) (0.152) (0.171) (0.183)
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most secondary school
level and, in the case of the informal outcome, additionally restrict the sample to those between 18 and 35 years before data aggregation.
Each row represents a regression of annual observations for the treated areas and its synthetic control between 2005 and 2019, N=30,
which includes a dummy variable for the treated region, period dummies (2005-2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 with 2015 excluded) and
their interactions; these interaction coefficients are the coefficients reported. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. In all of these, we first
demeaned the data following the routine by Ferman & Pinto (2019). * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant
at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.B10 – SCM demeaned: P-values for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’
(log) formal and informal wages, 2005-2019
ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value
Formal wages
Arequipa 0.0117 0.1133 0.1970 20/20 1.0000
Cusco 0.1099 0.1507 1.2960 6/20 0.3000
La Libertad 0.0318 0.0498 0.7168 15/20 0.7500
Lima y Callao -0.0875 0.0565 1.6900 4/20 0.2000
Tumbes -0.1022 0.0861 1.3160 7/20 0.3500
Informal wages
Arequipa 0.0470 0.0843 1.0269 12/20 0.6000
Cusco 0.0376 0.1454 0.5652 19/20 0.9500
La Libertad 0.0022 0.0520 0.7189 16/20 0.8000
Lima y Callao -0.1048 0.0358 4.0720 1/20 0.0500
Tumbes -0.0536 0.0492 2.0996 2/20 0.1000
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18
and 65 years with secondary school and, in the case of the informal outcome, additionally
restrict the sample to those between 18 and 35 years before data aggregation. ATE shows to
the average TE for the post-treatment periods; RMSPE, the root mean square prediction error
for the pre-treatment period (2005-2015); ratio, the ratio of the RMSPE for the pre-treatment
relative to the RMSPE for the post-treatment (2016-2019); rank, the relative position of the
ratio among the J+1 units and p-value, the probability that a random draw from the donor
pool takes a lower than the value for the corresponding treated region. In all of these, we
first demeaned the data following the routine by Ferman & Pinto (2019). Source: Author’s
calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most secondary school level; additionally, estimations for the
informal sector take only those between 18 and 35 years before data aggregation. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. 
Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Table 2.B11 – SCM: P-values for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’ (log)
formal and informal wages across subsamples, 2005-2019
Formal wage Informal wage
ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value
Sex
Arequipa
Female 0.0742 0.1766 0.4989 18/24 0.7500 0.0621 0.1502 0.8745 9/24 0.3750
Male 0.2070 0.1604 1.3098 6/24 0.2500 0.0992 0.1024 1.1132 9/24 0.3750
Cusco
Female 0.2889 0.2353 1.3142 2/24 0.0833 -0.0370 0.1621 0.7693 13/24 0.5417
Male 0.0467 0.1492 1.3170 4/24 0.1667 0.0344 0.1318 0.3846 18/24 0.7500
La Libertad
Female 0.0719 0.1467 0.9904 7/24 0.2917 -0.0349 0.1216 0.3358 20/24 0.8333
Male 0.0877 0.0539 1.7068 1/24 0.0417 0.0308 0.0514 0.9499 11/24 0.4583
Lima y Callao
Female 0.2747 0.2978 0.9382 8/24 0.3333 0.1304 0.2407 0.8536 10/24 0.4167
Male 0.1965 0.1768 1.1176 5/24 0.2083 0.0308 0.0966 0.6740 15/24 0.6250
Tumbes
Female -0.0627 0.2782 0.4113 18/24 0.7500 -0.0157 0.1427 0.2844 20/24 0.8333
Male 0.0154 0.0966 0.3161 20/24 0.8333 -0.0444 0.0893 1.8186 2/24 0.0833
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most secondary school level and, in the
case of the informal outcome, additionally restrict the sample to those between 18 and 35 years before data aggregation. ATE shows to the average TE
for the post-treatment periods; RMSPE, the root mean square prediction error for the pre-treatment period (2005-2015); ratio, the ratio of the RMSPE
for the pre-treatment relative to the RMSPE for the post-treatment (2016-2019); rank, the relative position of the ratio among the J+1 units and p-value,
the probability that a random draw from the donor pool takes a lower than the value for the corresponding treated region. Source: Author’s calculations
using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Ancillary outcomes
Table 2.B12 – Single stage DiD: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’ informality rate
and inequality in formal and informal sector (full set of controls), 2011-2019
Informality rate Formal sector inequality Informal sector inequality
β̂ SE CRVE P. WB R P. WB W β̂ SE CRVE P. WB R P. WB W β̂ SE CRVE P. WB R P. WB W
Aggregated
2016-2019 0.005 (0.010) [0.590] [0.605] 0.023 (0.011)** [0.105] [0.165] 0.013 (0.009) [0.295] [0.325]
S* 6.233 6.087 6.477
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 0.018 (0.007)** [0.120] [0.110] 0.028 (0.016)* [0.295] [0.275] 0.010 (0.015) [0.535] [0.510]
2017 0.004 (0.011) [0.700] [0.700] 0.016 (0.017) [0.375] [0.435] 0.005 (0.012) [0.700] [0.650]
2018 0.001 (0.010) [0.935] [0.950] 0.046 (0.024)* [0.365] [0.380] 0.009 (0.023) [0.850] [0.820]
2019 0.017 (0.010)* [0.105] [0.080] 0.002 (0.015) [0.935] [0.930] 0.049 (0.017)*** [0.155] [0.160]
N 280,589 61,297 219,292
S* 6.241 6.187 6.390
F stat. OLS 6.486*** 2.976** 1.878
Notes: The sample is restricted to only with at most primary or secondary school level. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Individual level covariates are age and schooling in levels and
interacted and gender, area, industry and occupation dummies SE CRVE refers to Cluster Robust Variance Estimator of SEs; P. WB Rade and Webb, to the p-value of the Wild Cluster
Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights and Webb weights using 199 replications, respectively. S* refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald
(2013). F-stat refers to the stastistic from the F test of the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years previous to the treatment using the
cluster-robust VCE. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
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Table 2.B13 – 2 stages DiD: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’ informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector (full set of controls), 2011-2019
Informality rate Formal sector inequality Informal sector inequality
β̂ SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. WB N β̂ SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. WB N β̂ SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. WB N
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE OLS 0.003 (0.011) (0.012) [0.855] 216 0.026 (0.012)** (0.012)** [0.065] 216 0.001 (0.019) (0.020) [0.955] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.011 (0.008) 192 0.027 (0.018) 192 0.010 (0.012) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.010 (0.008) 168 0.035 (0.019)* 168 0.011 (0.012) 168
S* 7.835 7.835 7.835
IK-DoF 6.846 6.846 6.846
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 FE OLS 0.009 (0.010) (0.010) [0.415] 216 0.040 (0.034) (0.034) [0.250] 216 0.005 (0.023) (0.024) [0.845] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.009 (0.011) 192 0.040 (0.037) 192 0.005 (0.025) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.009 (0.011) 168 0.040 (0.037) 168 0.006 (0.026) 168
2017 FE OLS 0.004 (0.010) (0.010) [0.785] 216 0.042 (0.031) (0.030) [0.170] 216 0.004 (0.015) (0.015) [0.780] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.005 (0.011) 192 0.042 (0.034) 192 0.004 (0.016) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.005 (0.011) 168 0.042 (0.034) 168 0.006 (0.018) 168
2018 FE OLS -0.001 (0.009) (0.009) [0.880] 216 0.027 (0.031) (0.031) [0.420] 216 0.020 (0.019) (0.019) [0.295] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) -0.000 (0.010) 192 0.027 (0.034) 192 0.020 (0.021) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) -0.000 (0.009) 168 0.027 (0.034) 168 0.022 (0.023) 168
2019 FE OLS 0.021 (0.013) (0.014) [0.095] 216 0.028 (0.031) (0.031) [0.380] 216 0.026 (0.017) (0.018) [0.185] 216
FE GLS-BC AR(1) 0.022 (0.015) 192 0.028 (0.034) 192 0.026 (0.019) 192
FE GLS-BC AR(2) 0.023 (0.014) 168 0.028 (0.034) 168 0.028 (0.022) 168
S* 7.835 7.835 7.835
IK-DoF 6.846 6.846 6.846
F stat. FE OLS 1.473 1.722 0.648
F stat. GLS-BC AR(1) 0.261 1.878 0.299
F stat. GLS-BC AR(2) 0.213 0.004 0.353
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most primary or secondary school level. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Using a 2-step estimation procedure presented in Hansen (2007), individual level covariates
(age and schooling in levels and interacted and gender, area, industry and occupation dummies) are partialled out first and then the treatment effects are estimated from a 2-way FEs (regions and years) model. SE CRVE refers to Cluster Robust
Variance Estimator of SEs; SE CRVE2, to Bell and McCaffrey (2002) bias corrected CRVE2; P-val IK, to the p-value taking the effective DoF from Imbens and Kolesar (2012) (IK DoF) taking CRVE2 SEs and P-val. WB, to the p-value of the Wild
Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights using 199 replications. S* refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald (2013). FE GLS-BC refers to the FE GLS Bias-corrected estimator of Hansen (2007) using
SE CRVE. F-stat refers to the statistic from the F test of the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years previous to the treatment using the cluster-robust VCE. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at
5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
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Table 2.B14 – Panel data: Average Treatment Effect of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’ informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector (full set of
controls), 2005-2019
Informality rate Formal sector inequality Informal sector inequality
β SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. WB N β SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. WB N β SE CRVE SE CRVE2 P-val. WB N
Aggregated
2016-2019 FE OLS 0.003 (0.013) (0.013) [0.805] 360 0.042 (0.013)*** (0.013)*** [0.000] 360 -0.015 (0.010) (0.010) [0.130] 360
FD 0.012 (0.010) (0.010) [0.290] 336 0.033 (0.026) (0.027) [0.240] 336 -0.000 (0.042) (0.045) [1.000] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.009 (0.009) [0.685] 360 0.042 (0.013)*** [0.000] 360 -0.015 (0.010) [0.175] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.009 (0.009) [0.685] 360 0.042 (0.013)*** [0.000] 360 -0.016 (0.010) [0.175] 360
S* FE 8.753 8.753 8.753
S* FD 8.032 8.032 8.032
IK-DoF FE 7.783 7.783 7.783
IK-DoF FD 6.954 6.946 6.945
Yearly (Base 2015)
2016 FE OLS 0.011 (0.011) (0.011) [0.320] 360 0.037 (0.027) (0.027) [0.170] 360 -0.001 (0.045) (0.046) [0.975] 360
FD 0.012 (0.010) (0.010) [0.285] 336 0.034 (0.026) (0.027) [0.220] 336 -0.000 (0.044) (0.045) [0.990] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.012 (0.010) [0.275] 360 0.037 (0.027) [0.235] 360 -0.001 (0.044) [0.980] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.012 (0.010) [0.275] 360 0.037 (0.027) [0.235] 360 -0.001 (0.044) [0.980] 360
2017 FE OLS 0.004 (0.013) (0.013) [0.815] 360 0.040 (0.024) (0.024) [0.085] 360 -0.029 (0.035) (0.037) [0.630] 360
FD 0.001 (0.013) (0.013) [0.985] 336 0.042 (0.024) (0.024)* [0.095] 336 -0.031 (0.035) (0.036) [0.550] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.003 (0.012) [0.835] 360 0.040 (0.023)* [0.155] 360 -0.029 (0.035) [0.535] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.003 (0.012) [0.835] 360 0.040 (0.023)* [0.155] 360 -0.030 (0.035) [0.535] 360
2018 FE OLS 0.003 (0.010) (0.010) [0.685] 360 0.032 (0.026) (0.026) [0.225] 360 0.017 (0.039) (0.040) [0.690] 360
FD 0.002 (0.010) (0.010) [0.870] 336 0.030 (0.025) (0.025) [0.240] 336 0.019 (0.038) (0.038) [0.640] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.004 (0.009) [0.740] 360 0.032 (0.026) [0.320] 360 0.017 (0.039) [0.695] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.004 (0.009) [0.740] 360 0.032 (0.026) [0.320] 360 0.017 (0.039) [0.695] 360
2019 FE OLS 0.025 (0.014)* (0.014)* [0.100] 360 0.026 (0.027) (0.028) [0.400] 360 -0.020 (0.033) (0.034) [0.710] 360
FD 0.023 (0.016) (0.016) [0.200] 336 0.023 (0.022) (0.022) [0.340] 336 -0.016 (0.032) (0.033) [0.790] 336
FE GLS AR(1) 0.026 (0.014)* [0.130] 360 0.026 (0.027) [0.395] 360 -0.021 (0.032) [0.660] 360
FE GLS AR(2) 0.026 (0.014)* [0.130] 360 0.025 (0.027) [0.395] 360 -0.021 (0.032) [0.660] 360
S* FE 7.956 7.956 7.956
S* FD 8.003 8.003 8.003
IK-DoF FE 6.968 6.968 6.968
IK-DoF FD 6.992 7.015 7.018
F stat. FE OLS 1.149 2.856** 5.650***
F stat. FD 2.423** 4.387*** 3.281***
F stat. GLS AR(1) 22.258** 34.637*** 67.781***
F stat. GLS AR(2) 22.189** 34.576*** 64.671***
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most secondary school. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Controls included are gdp per capita, pea employed for low sckilled, pea employed in services, in manufacture,
schooling, proportion of population between 18 and 25 and between 26 and 35, percentage of urban population. Equations include 2-way FEs (regions and years). SE Homosk. refers to homoskedasticity-only SEs; SE CRVE, to Cluster Robust
Variance Estimator of SEs; SE CRVE2, to Bell and McCaffrey (2002) bias corrected CRVE2; P-val IK, to the p-value taking the effective DoF from Imbens and Kolesar (2012) (IK-DoF) taking CRVE2 SEs and P-val. WB, to the p-value of the Wild
Cluster Boostrap taking the Rademacher weights using 199 replications. S* refers to the effective number of clusters from Carter, Schnepel and Steigerwald (2013). FE GLS-BC refers to the FE GLS Bias-corrected estimator of Hansen (2007) using
SE CRVE. F-stat refers to the F test cluster robust of the set of interactions of the dummy for treatment qualification and the dummy for the years previous to the treatment. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1%
level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.B15 – SCM: SC weights for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’
informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-2019
Informality rate Inequality formal Inequality informal
Areq. Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumb. Areq. Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumb. Areq. Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumb.
Amazonas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ancash 0 0 .422 0 0 .182 0 .176 0 0 0 .162 0 0 0
ApurÃmac 0 .249 0 0 0 0 .02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ayacucho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cajamarca 0 0 0 0 .056 0 .183 0 0 0 .536 0 0 0 0
Huancavelica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .225 0 0 0
HuÃ¡nuco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ica .259 0 .094 .261 0 .015 .316 0 .358 .075 0 0 .112 .489 .099
JunÃn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lambayeque .355 0 .037 0 .094 .227 .146 .087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loreto 0 0 0 0 .629 0 0 0 .333 .108 0 0 0 0 .336
Madre de Dios 0 .292 .147 .149 .15 0 0 .284 0 .163 0 .079 0 0 .309
Moquegua .053 .193 0 .176 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .083 .069 0 .047
Pasco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Piura 0 0 0 0 0 0 .334 0 0 0 0 0 .207 0 .209
Puno 0 .266 0 0 0 0 0 .149 0 0 0 0 .609 0 0
San MartÃn 0 0 .145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tacna .139 0 .155 0 0 .216 0 0 0 0 .464 0 .003 .511 0
Ucayali .194 0 0 .414 .071 .36 0 .304 .309 .654 0 .452 0 0 0
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years and with those with at most secondary school level before data
aggregation. Inequality level measured by the Gini index of individual hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Figure 2.B5 – SCM: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’ informality rate and
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most secondary school level before data aggregation. Real hourly wages
in 2007 PEN. Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Arequipa Cusco La Libertad Lima y Callao Tumbes
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Table 2.B16 – SCM: Covariate balance for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’
informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-2019
Arequipa Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumbes
Covariates
GDP pc (thousands) Obs. 15.924 11.714 9.441 16.380 9.498
Wei. Inequality Formal 10.693 10.035 10.865 10.371 9.498
Wei. Inequality Informal 11.303 12.152 9.807 16.119 13.253
Wei. Informality 12.700 16.280 13.608 17.772 8.909
Empl. LF low skill Obs. 0.536 0.678 0.667 0.551 0.678
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.680 0.678 0.699 0.676 0.708
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.687 0.719 0.680 0.585 0.689
Wei. Informality 0.651 0.678 0.668 0.650 0.726
Empl. LF serv. Obs. 0.644 0.549 0.588 0.734 0.683
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.628 0.554 0.587 0.605 0.618
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.550 0.547 0.514 0.659 0.604
Wei. Informality 0.626 0.534 0.581 0.613 0.597
Empl. LF manuf. Obs. 0.192 0.133 0.195 0.229 0.127
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.160 0.167 0.146 0.155 0.147
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.153 0.133 0.158 0.166 0.130
Wei. Informality 0.167 0.123 0.150 0.157 0.124
Schooling (years) Obs. 11.154 9.211 9.607 11.452 9.883
Wei. Inequality Formal 9.837 9.543 9.587 10.042 9.682
Wei. Inequality Informal 9.222 9.197 9.604 10.997 9.707
Wei. Informality 10.219 9.572 9.776 10.227 9.390
Proport. 18-25 yo. Obs. 0.168 0.154 0.183 0.189 0.177
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.177 0.181 0.173 0.180 0.174
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.163 0.164 0.180 0.176 0.173
Wei. Informality 0.179 0.154 0.171 0.167 0.176
Proport. 26-35 yo. Obs. 0.270 0.264 0.272 0.288 0.293
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.270 0.265 0.273 0.280 0.282
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.274 0.271 0.260 0.271 0.281
Wei. Informality 0.267 0.266 0.272 0.275 0.287
Urban population Obs. 0.881 0.535 0.776 0.979 0.922
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.775 0.725 0.692 0.788 0.769
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.573 0.621 0.612 0.878 0.736
Wei. Informality 0.835 0.583 0.698 0.801 0.686
Ecu.-Col. border(d) Obs. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.000 0.518 0.000 0.333 0.108
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.536 0.000 0.207 0.000 0.545
Wei. Informality 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.685
Lagged Outcomes
2005 Obs. Inequality Formal 0.396 0.495 0.324 0.361 0.292
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.400 0.443 0.348 0.356 0.293
Obs. Inequality Informal 0.378 0.409 0.467 0.422 0.424
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.423 0.409 0.428 0.390 0.397
Obs. Informality 0.733 0.900 0.847 0.804 0.925
Wei. Informality 0.755 0.894 0.854 0.792 0.925
2010 Obs. Inequality Formal 0.412 0.326 0.384 0.380 0.375
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.392 0.375 0.360 0.351 0.336
Obs. Inequality Informal 0.625 0.432 0.406 0.392 0.415
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.527 0.417 0.441 0.381 0.429
Obs. Informality 0.687 0.872 0.782 0.669 0.847
Wei. Informality 0.687 0.847 0.782 0.676 0.844
2015 Obs. Inequality Formal 0.343 0.314 0.423 0.335 0.325
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.325 0.321 0.416 0.332 0.349
Obs. Inequality Informal 0.554 0.352 0.418 0.358 0.382
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.499 0.376 0.453 0.365 0.417
Obs. Informality 0.651 0.812 0.759 0.640 0.815
Wei. Informality 0.679 0.795 0.750 0.652 0.818
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years and
at most secondary school level. All variables (except the lagged outcomes) are averaged for the 2005-2015
period. LF=Labour force; Ecu-Col border is a dummy that equals 1 if the region neighbours Ecuador and
Colombia. Inequality level measured by the Gini index of individual hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Source:
Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.B17 – SCM: DiD Regressions for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’
informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-2019
GLS with AR(1) disturbances Baltagi and Wu (1999) estimator
(2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019 (2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019
Formal Wages
Arequipa -0.050 -0.048 0.054 0.054 0.147 -0.089 -0.029 0.082 0.085 0.175
(0.118) (0.118) (0.161) (0.190) (0.212) (0.106) (0.111) (0.139) (0.153) (0.161)
Cusco 0.083 -0.015 -0.037 0.334 0.274 0.072 -0.009 -0.028 0.343* 0.283
(0.155) (0.155) (0.213) (0.254) (0.285) (0.138) (0.142) (0.181) (0.203) (0.217)
La Libertad 0.036 0.079 0.087 0.068 0.119 0.042 0.079 0.088 0.070 0.122
(0.108) (0.115) (0.141) (0.152) (0.158) (0.084) (0.095) (0.111) (0.117) (0.119)
Lima y Callao -0.012 0.082 0.095 0.121 0.131 -0.039 0.090 0.104 0.126 0.132
(0.102) (0.103) (0.136) (0.155) (0.168) (0.084) (0.089) (0.110) (0.119) (0.124)
Tumbes -0.003 -0.033 -0.103 -0.134 -0.055 -0.029 -0.034 -0.109 -0.146 -0.071
(0.121) (0.128) (0.158) (0.172) (0.179) (0.096) (0.108) (0.126) (0.132) (0.135)
Informal Wages
Arequipa 0.022 0.020 -0.185 0.164 0.067 0.001 0.034 -0.164 0.190 0.094
(0.162) (0.162) (0.223) (0.266) (0.300) (0.148) (0.151) (0.194) (0.219) (0.234)
Cusco -0.175 -0.143 -0.222 -0.205 -0.066 -0.187 -0.135 -0.210 -0.190 -0.050
(0.192) (0.192) (0.266) (0.320) (0.363) (0.179) (0.182) (0.237) (0.269) (0.290)
La Libertad 0.091 -0.071 0.051 0.043 0.010 0.075 -0.061 0.066 0.059 0.027
(0.121) (0.121) (0.167) (0.201) (0.228) (0.117) (0.121) (0.153) (0.170) (0.180)
Lima y Callao 0.051 0.060 0.012 -0.119 -0.064 0.040 0.068 0.026 -0.102 -0.044
(0.105) (0.105) (0.145) (0.173) (0.196) (0.094) (0.096) (0.124) (0.141) (0.151)
Tumbes 0.162 0.143 0.077 -0.023 -0.052 0.146 0.154 0.095 -0.000 -0.027
(0.122) (0.122) (0.169) (0.203) (0.229) (0.114) (0.116) (0.150) (0.169) (0.181)
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most secondary school
level and, in the case of the informal outcome, additionally restrict the sample to those between 18 and 35 years before data aggregation.
Each row represents a regression of annual observations for the treated areas and its synthetic control between 2005 and 2019, N=30,
which includes a dummy variable for the treated region, period dummies (2005-2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 with 2015 excluded) and
their interactions; these interaction coefficients are the coefficients reported. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN * Significant at 10% level;
** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
Table 2.B18 – SCM: P-values for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’ informality
rate and inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-2019
ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value
1 Informality
Arequipa -0.0056 0.0186 1.0303 14/20 0.7000
Cusco 0.0428 0.0129 3.6468 3/20 0.1500
La Libertad -0.0203 0.0099 2.4121 4/20 0.2000
Lima y Callao -0.0094 0.0087 1.7318 4/20 0.2000
Tumbes 0.0135 0.0143 1.2823 10/20 0.5000
2 Inequality Formal
Arequipa 0.0055 0.0217 0.8037 9/20 0.4500
Cusco 0.0150 0.0391 0.5631 16/20 0.8000
La Libertad 0.0220 0.0272 1.4389 2/20 0.1000
Lima y Callao 0.0188 0.0363 1.2098 6/20 0.3000
Tumbes 0.0199 0.0462 0.8875 10/20 0.5000
3 Inequality Informal
Arequipa -0.0263 0.0567 0.6368 15/20 0.7500
Cusco -0.0099 0.0512 0.9916 12/20 0.6000
La Libertad 0.0160 0.0694 0.5777 14/20 0.7000
Lima y Callao 0.0295 0.0259 1.2525 8/20 0.4000
Tumbes -0.0288 0.0268 1.3115 5/20 0.2500
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18
and 65 years with at most secondary school level before data aggregation. ATE shows to the
average TE for the post-treatment periods; RMSPE, the root mean square prediction error
for the pre-treatment period (2005-2015); ratio, the ratio of the RMSPE for the pre-treatment
relative to the RMSPE for the post-treatment (2016-2019); rank, the relative position of the
ratio among the J+1 units and p-value, the probability that a random draw from the donor
pool takes a lower than the value for the corresponding treated region. Source: Author’s
calculations using ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.B19 – SCM demeaned: SC weights for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled
natives’ informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-2019
Informality rate Inequality Occupational complexity
Areq. Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumb. Areq. Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumb. Areq. Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumb.
Amazonas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ancash 0 0 .073 0 0 .049 0 .292 0 0 0 .319 0 0 0
ApurÃmac 0 .153 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .164 0 0 0
Ayacucho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cajamarca 0 0 0 0 0 0 .045 0 0 0 .014 0 0 0 0
Huancavelica 0 0 0 0 0 0 .128 0 0 0 0 .167 0 0 0
HuÃ¡nuco 0 .345 .118 0 0 0 .243 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ica .292 .182 .321 .584 .091 .641 0 .139 .867 0 0 .039 .18 .664 .128
JunÃn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .321 0 0
Lambayeque .469 0 .18 0 .099 0 0 .029 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loreto 0 0 0 0 .117 0 0 0 0 .194 0 0 0 0 .035
Madre de Dios 0 .289 0 0 .221 0 0 .191 0 .021 0 .21 0 0 .001
Moquegua .14 .031 0 .213 0 .275 .012 0 .101 .066 0 .101 0 0 0
Pasco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Piura 0 0 .079 0 .114 0 .127 0 0 0 0 0 .098 0 .233
Puno 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .088 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
San MartÃn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tacna .1 0 0 0 .055 0 .443 0 0 .192 .986 0 0 .336 .256
Ucayali 0 0 .228 .203 .304 .036 0 .261 .032 .528 0 0 .402 0 .346
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most secondary school level before data aggregation. Inequality level
measured by the Gini index of individual hourly wages in 2007 PEN. For all these estimations, we first demeaned the data following the routine suggested by Ferman &
Pinto (2019).Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
Figure 2.B6 – SCM demeaned: ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’ informality rate
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years before data aggregation. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN.
In all of these, we first applied the demeaning routine suggested by Ferman & Pinto (2019). Source: Author's calculations using
ENAHO 2005-2019 data.
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Table 2.B20 – SCM demeaned: Covariate balance for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled
natives’ informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-2019
Arequipa Cusco La Lib. L y C. Tumbes
Covariates
GDP pc (thousands) Obs. 15.924 11.714 9.441 16.380 9.498
Wei. Inequality Formal 23.708 11.236 12.117 18.366 11.992
Wei. Inequality Informal 16.594 15.120 8.993 15.898 11.063
Wei. Informality 15.980 11.326 10.164 20.467 10.790
Empl. LF low skill Obs. 0.536 0.678 0.667 0.551 0.678
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.581 0.682 0.680 0.579 0.690
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.594 0.695 0.673 0.582 0.668
Wei. Informality 0.633 0.693 0.672 0.602 0.692
Empl. LF serv. Obs. 0.644 0.549 0.588 0.734 0.683
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.597 0.568 0.584 0.597 0.636
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.716 0.521 0.582 0.637 0.633
Wei. Informality 0.619 0.525 0.581 0.603 0.618
Empl. LF manuf. Obs. 0.192 0.133 0.195 0.229 0.127
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.177 0.128 0.156 0.184 0.146
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.145 0.124 0.159 0.174 0.156
Wei. Informality 0.169 0.121 0.165 0.175 0.144
Schooling (years) Obs. 11.154 9.211 9.607 11.452 9.883
Wei. Inequality Formal 10.909 9.354 9.771 11.040 9.849
Wei. Inequality Informal 10.838 9.254 9.873 11.038 9.962
Wei. Informality 10.343 9.230 9.811 10.740 9.756
Proport. 18-25 yo. Obs. 0.168 0.154 0.183 0.189 0.177
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.168 0.168 0.174 0.178 0.172
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.169 0.157 0.183 0.179 0.179
Wei. Informality 0.177 0.163 0.181 0.170 0.176
Proport. 26-35 yo. Obs. 0.270 0.264 0.272 0.288 0.293
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.266 0.271 0.271 0.266 0.282
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.277 0.265 0.269 0.269 0.274
Wei. Informality 0.262 0.271 0.267 0.269 0.277
Urban population Obs. 0.881 0.535 0.776 0.979 0.922
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.843 0.627 0.708 0.879 0.775
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.853 0.554 0.758 0.884 0.808
Wei. Informality 0.839 0.588 0.764 0.846 0.773
Ecu.-Col. border(d) Obs. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.194
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.014 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.268
Wei. Informality 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.231
Lagged Outcomes
2005 Obs. Inequality Formal 0.022 0.121 -0.037 -0.003 -0.039
Wei. Inequality Formal 0.081 0.062 0.001 0.104 -0.020
Obs. Inequality Informal -0.060 -0.008 -0.006 0.050 -0.002
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.019 -0.006 -0.006 0.031 0.009
Obs. Informality 0.025 0.067 0.060 0.111 0.066
Wei. Informality 0.051 0.061 0.058 0.094 0.068
2010 Obs. Inequality Formal 0.038 -0.047 0.023 0.015 0.045
Wei. Inequality Formal -0.025 -0.041 0.008 -0.030 -0.007
Obs. Inequality Informal 0.188 0.015 -0.067 0.019 -0.011
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.063 0.021 -0.015 0.003 0.016
Obs. Informality -0.020 0.039 -0.005 -0.024 -0.012
Wei. Informality -0.005 0.019 -0.007 -0.012 -0.010
2015 Obs. Inequality Formal -0.030 -0.059 0.062 -0.029 -0.005
Wei. Inequality Formal -0.051 -0.052 0.014 -0.059 -0.032
Obs. Inequality Informal 0.116 -0.064 -0.055 -0.015 -0.043
Wei. Inequality Informal 0.064 -0.025 -0.039 -0.020 -0.012
Obs. Informality -0.056 -0.022 -0.028 -0.053 -0.044
Wei. Informality -0.027 -0.035 -0.029 -0.030 -0.036
Notes: Estimations restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years
with at most primary or secondary school level before data aggregation. All variables (except the lagged
outcomes) are averaged for the 2005-2015 period. LF=Labour force; Ecu-Col border is a dummy that equals
1 if the region neighbours Ecuador and Colombia. In all of these, we first demeaned the data following the
routine by Ferman & Pinto (2019). Inequality level measured by the Gini index of individual hourly wages
in 2007 PEN. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
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Table 2.B21 – SCM demeaned: DiD Regressions for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled
natives’ informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-2019
GLS with AR(1) disturbances Baltagi and Li (1991) estimator
(2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019 (2005-14) 2016 2017 2018 2019
1 Informality
Arequipa 0.041 0.051* 0.006 0.018 0.027 0.038 0.052** 0.008 0.020 0.029
(0.028) (0.028) (0.038) (0.044) (0.049) (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.034) (0.037)
Cusco -0.020 -0.014 0.032 0.014 0.058 -0.018 -0.014 0.031 0.013 0.056
(0.033) (0.033) (0.045) (0.054) (0.060) (0.030) (0.032) (0.040) (0.044) (0.046)
La Libertad -0.026 -0.014 -0.031 -0.029 -0.009 -0.019 -0.018 -0.037 -0.036 -0.017
(0.030) (0.030) (0.042) (0.050) (0.057) (0.029) (0.030) (0.038) (0.043) (0.045)
Lima y Callao 0.013 0.010 -0.022 -0.022 0.007 0.017 0.008 -0.025 -0.025 0.003
(0.040) (0.041) (0.056) (0.066) (0.075) (0.040) (0.042) (0.052) (0.058) (0.061)
Tumbes 0.036 0.014 0.010 0.013 0.036 0.030 0.017 0.016 0.020 0.044
(0.028) (0.028) (0.039) (0.047) (0.053) (0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.039) (0.042)
2 Inequality formal
Arequipa -0.026 0.031 0.022 0.024 0.060 -0.026 0.030 0.021 0.023 0.059
(0.060) (0.064) (0.078) (0.084) (0.087) (0.047) (0.053) (0.062) (0.065) (0.066)
Cusco 0.029 -0.000 0.074 0.019 0.036 0.022 -0.001 0.072 0.016 0.033
(0.071) (0.078) (0.094) (0.100) (0.102) (0.056) (0.066) (0.074) (0.077) (0.078)
La Libertad -0.051 -0.034 0.047 -0.014 -0.013 -0.051** -0.034 0.047 -0.014 -0.013
(0.031) (0.048) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.024) (0.037) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Lima y Callao -0.024 0.055 0.039 0.116 0.028 -0.028 0.054 0.035 0.110 0.021
(0.063) (0.066) (0.083) (0.090) (0.095) (0.051) (0.059) (0.068) (0.071) (0.071)
Tumbes -0.038 0.057 0.003 -0.002 -0.039 -0.036 0.057 0.004 -0.001 -0.038
(0.061) (0.069) (0.081) (0.084) (0.086) (0.047) (0.056) (0.063) (0.065) (0.066)
3 Inequality informal
Arequipa -0.057 -0.097 -0.087 -0.093 -0.069 -0.057 -0.097 -0.087 -0.093 -0.069
(0.094) (0.129) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.073) (0.103) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099)
Cusco 0.042 0.036 -0.030 0.082 -0.035 0.044 0.038 -0.029 0.084 -0.034
(0.071) (0.092) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.056) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075)
La Libertad 0.015 0.065 -0.013 0.005 -0.012 0.018 0.069 -0.010 0.008 -0.008
(0.074) (0.114) (0.098) (0.103) (0.101) (0.059) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
Lima y Callao -0.006 0.019 0.020 0.006 0.022 -0.005 0.020 0.022 0.007 0.024
(0.036) (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.028) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Tumbes 0.037 -0.005 0.016 0.002 0.049 0.033 -0.008 0.014 -0.001 0.046
(0.039) (0.056) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.031) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only those employed between 18 and 65 years with at most
secondary school level before data aggregation. Each row represents a regression of annual observations for the corresponding treated area and
its synthetic control between 2005 and 2019, N=30, which includes a dummy variable for the treated region, period dummies (2005-2014, 2016,
2017, 2018, 2019 with 2015 excluded) and their interactions; these interaction coefficients are the coefficients reported. In all of these, we first
demeaned the data following the routine by Ferman & Pinto (2019). Inequality level measured by the Gini index of individual hourly wages
in 2007 PEN. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO
2011-2019 data.
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Table 2.B22 – SCM demeaned: P-values for the ATET of Venezuelan immigration on low skilled natives’
informality rate and inequality in formal and informal sector, 2005-2019
ATE RMSPE pre Ratio post-pre Rank p-value
1 Informality
Arequipa -0.0072 0.0180 1.0307 11/20 0.5500
Cusco 0.0371 0.0100 4.5484 1/20 0.0500
La Libertad -0.0170 0.0181 1.0771 10/20 0.5000
Lima y Callao -0.0271 0.0129 2.4071 3/20 0.1500
Tumbes 0.0066 0.0148 0.7789 14/20 0.7000
2 Inequality Formal
Arequipa 0.0537 0.0467 1.1933 5/20 0.2500
Cusco 0.0138 0.0527 0.5715 15/20 0.7500
La Libertad 0.0434 0.0316 1.6743 2/20 0.1000
Lima y Callao 0.0769 0.0719 1.1678 5/20 0.2500
Tumbes 0.0370 0.0522 0.9542 6/20 0.3000
3 Inequality Informal
Arequipa -0.0345 0.0649 0.5563 15/20 0.7500
Cusco -0.0251 0.0614 0.8938 7/20 0.3500
La Libertad -0.0019 0.0509 0.6327 12/20 0.6000
Lima y Callao 0.0231 0.0219 1.0940 7/20 0.3500
Tumbes -0.0179 0.0408 0.6726 11/20 0.5500
Notes: Estimations under the total heading restrict the sample for the outcome to only those
employed between 18 and 65 years with at most primary or secondary school level before
data aggregation. In all of these, we first demeaned the data following the routine by Ferman
& Pinto (2019). ATE shows to the average TE for the post-treatment periods; RMSPE, the
root mean square prediction error for the pre-treatment period (2005-2015); ratio, the ratio of
the RMSPE for the pre-treatment relative to the RMSPE for the post-treatment (2016-2019);
rank, the relative position of the ratio among the J+1 units and p-value, the probability that a
random draw from the donor pool takes a lower than the value for the corresponding treated
region. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO 2011-2019 data.
Chapter 3
A Dual Approach to the Effect of
Discrimination Against Venezuelans in
Peru
3.1 Introduction
The opportunity provided by a large and sudden influx of foreign workers into a country has been exploited
by labour economists in the past to study how exogenous labour supply shocks affects outcomes for natives.
Notable examples of this include Card (1990), Hunt (1992) or Carrington and de Lima (1996). In contrast,
immigrants’ outcomes have been less explored, with the role of discrimination particularly neglected. While
this is explained by the fact that changes in the native wage dominate the political discussion (Dustmann
et al. 2019), the inherent complexities in defining and measuring discrimination usually hampers its study
(Blank et al. 2004; Heckman 1998; Altonji and Blank 1999). However, compelling evidence suggests
that discrimination against migrants, whether perceived by them or factually exercised against them, has
a critical impact on different areas. It includes not only the immigrants’ well-being (Schmitt et al. 2014;
Nandi et al. 2016; Safi 2010) but also social cohesion (de Vroome et al. 2014; Auer and Ruedin 2019),
employment and labour productivity (Di Stasio et al., 2021; Oreopoulos, 2011; Baert, 2017; Ensher et al.,
2001) within the host society.
The emphasis placed by the studies around the effects of the Venezuelan Exodus to Peru in 2016 illus-
trates the above. This migratory episode, of a magnitude second only to the Syrian refugee crisis, turned
Peru overnight into the second-largest recipient of Venezuelans in the world (UNHCR 2020, 2019d). The
quasi-experimental evidence in Del Pozo Segura (2021), Boruchowicz et al. (2021) and Morales and Pierola
(2020) focus on the effect of this migrant shock across a comprehensive array of labour market outcomes for
native workers and also for low-skilled nationals. In turn, the study of how this migrant population, which
represents a non-negligible 2.5% of Peru’s population, has inserted into the host labour market remains
under-explored. This is an important concern, as the natives’ reaction to this migrants influx has been unfa-
vourable (PUCP 2020, 2019; UNHCR 2019b). For instance, Carroll et al. (2020) and Mougenot et al. (2021)
document the progressive deterioration of their mental health since their arrival to Peru, some of which is
attributed to self-perceived discrimination. This concern adds to the importance of directly analysing how
discrimination by Peruvians has affected Venezuelans’ wages and their perceptions of discrimination and
further disentangle the mechanisms behind those impacts.
In view of this, firstly, we analyze how Peruvians’ attitudes affect the wages of Venezuelan migrants
in terms of both self-perceived and objectively measured discrimination. In order to estimate the relevant
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perceived and actual treatment effects, we apply a novel decomposition technique suggested by Firpo et al.
(2018). Secondly, we study how their self-perceived discrimination varies with the treatment effect once
we control for characteristics that psychological theories, such as relative deprivation (Dion 1986; Dion and
Kawakami 1996), social identity (Tajfel and Turner 1986) and prototypic conceptions (Inman et al. 1998;
Inman and Baron 1996) regard as important predictors of migrants’ expectations of equal treatment and their
awareness of social inequalities (Banerjee 2008). We do this using two representative surveys conducted by
Peru’s National Statistical Office, including the 2018 Venezuelan Resident Population Survey (ENPOVE).
This latter provides detailed and unique information on the labour market activity of Venezuelans after they
arrived in 2016.
The results of this chapter can be split into three. Firstly, the proportion of Venezuelans that perceive
discrimination is as large as that prevalent in countries with negligible shares of migrant workers and is
more extensive than what migrants report in OECD countries. This supports theories that explain negative
attitudes towards migrants linked to their origin, regardless of their individual characteristics. Secondly,
we find evidence of a treatment differential among Venezuelans regarding perceived discrimination and
more significant treatments between Venezuelans and Peruvians. Concerning the latter, these treatments are
found to widen sharply across the unconditional wage distribution. Thirdly, the perception of discrimination
of Venezuelans is actually influenced by the objective discrimination experienced. In other words, they
are aware of the level of unequal treatment they encounter, which contrasts with some of the previous
literature. However, the magnitude is not large, as variables that reflect migrants’ expectations for equality
(e.g., education and experience) have a more sizeable effect.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. The first is by filling the literature gap
related to short-run labour market outcomes for immigrants who arrive in conditions similar to a natural
experiment. Indeed, as shown below, most of the studies analysing the migrants-natives pay gap as well
as the determinants of migrants’ self-perceived discrimination are framed within long and progressive mi-
gration processes and are undertaken for developed economies. Instead, compared to the Syrian migration
into Turkey (Tumen 2015) or the Cuban inflow into Miami (Card 1990), the Venezuelan Exodus is unique
in that these migrants inserted primarily into the informal economy, are more educated than the natives and
do not face a language barrier nor a significant distance relative to their host society in terms of religion and
culture. The second contribution is to further the studies that have analyzed migrant wage gaps or percep-
tions of discrimination across the unconditional distribution of wages (e.g. Biddle (2013); Banerjee (2008);
Chiswick et al. (2008); Auer et al. (2017)). This provides a more detailed portrait of how discrimination
affects Venezuelans. Compared with evidence arising from classic decomposition methods (DiNardo et al.
1996; Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973), the method we apply is robust to departures from linearity of the pop-
ulation conditional expectation (see Barsky et al. 2002) and relies on weaker identifying assumptions than
alternative methods (e.g. Machado and Mata 2005). This latter is essential for policy purposes, as the size
of the wage-structure relative to the composition component suggest different strategies for tackling down
the pay gap of migrants relative to natives.
The text is organized as follows. section 3.2 briefly describes the Venezuelans’ insertion into the Per-
uvian labour market regarding their perceived discrimination and how this relates to their observed labour
market characteristics and wages. section 3.3 discusses the challenges involved in identifying the migrant
labour market discrimination and reviews the findings of studies focused on the native-migrant wage gap
and the impact of perceived discrimination on their wages. section 3.4 describes the sources of data used
for the regression. section 3.5 discusses the econometric methods employed, both for estimation and de-
composition. section 3.6 presents estimations of the impact of discrimination on the migrant’s wages under
the two methodological approaches adopted. Finally, section 3.7 discusses the results in terms of policy
implications and points areas for future research.
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3.2 Venezuelan integration into the host labour market
As explained in the previous chapter, the Venezuelan Exodus represents a crisis of similar magnitude to
that represented by the Syrian crisis, and which was labelled by the United Nation’s High Commissioner
for the Refugees as the “largest external displacement crisis in Latin America’s recent history” (UNHCR
2019d). As of January 2020, approximately 4.5 million Venezuelans had left their country due to socio-
economic uncertainty and political turmoil (see Reinhart and Santos 2015; Restuccia 2019; IAHCR 2017;
HRW 2018). Over 80% of migrants remained in Latin America and the Caribbean (R4V 2020b). Among
these, Peru, one of the fastest-growing countries in the region (Ross and Peschiera 2015) and one of the
least used to receiving migrants (Torales et al. 2003), played a unique role by turning overnight into one of
the leading destinations for Venezuelans. By January 2020 (see Figure 3.A2), it was both the second-largest
recipient of Venezuelan migrants who comprise around 2.5% of the total native population and the largest
recipient of requests for asylum-seeking Venezuelans (receiving half of these applications, R4V 2020a).
Note that the former proportion is only second to Colombia (3.5%, see UNHCR 2019d) and is similar to
the Syrian in Turkey in 2015 (2.1%, see Tumen 2015).
Given Peru’s historically high informal employment rates (around 65% by the time the influx began,
INEI 2020), the government adopted a series of measures (see table A1 in chapter two for a detailed de-
scription) to absorb these new migrants (80% of which are of working age) into the formal sector. Neverthe-
less, the most important of these, known as the Temporary Permit of Permanence (PTP), was unsuccessful
because it implied long waiting times for Venezuelan applicants who needed to enter the labour market
(even informally) upon arrival in order to send remittances back home (see below).1 Concurrently, most
Peruvian employers hired Venezuelans as informal workers because of the poorer opportunities provided
by the comparatively tight Peruvian labour legislation to hire foreigners (Geronimi 2004).2 In addition, the
deficient law enforcement (Viollaz 2019) allowed them to ignore the working permits issued for Venezuelan
job applicants (e.g. the Extraordinary Working Permit or the official Refugee-seeker Card), even if this con-
travened Peru’s immigration rules (IDEHPUCP et al. 2020). These factors were coupled with an additional
restriction mandating that, from August 2018, only those with a valid passport could enter Peru. This rep-
resented an insurmountable hurdle for most of them since its processing fee within Venezuela, where the
basic monthly wage is lower than five USD, oscillated between 2,000 and 5,000 USD (see Blouin 2019).3
Thus, around 95% of Venezuelan workers ended up in the informal sector, characterized by an absence of
regulations and low firm productivity (La Porta and Shleifer 2014; ILO 2015; Pages 2010). Overall, their
situation mirrors what Syrian migrants faced when arriving in Turkey (Akgündüz et al. 2015; Ceritoglu
et al. 2015).
This sudden influx of a vast amount of Venezuelans in the labour market generated an adverse reaction
from Peruvians, despite that the close historical and cultural ties of the migrants with the host country
would have a priori suggested otherwise (Dancygier and Laitin 2014). Although the average native feels
indifferent towards these immigrants (column 1 in Table 3.1), most do not welcome the arrival of more
Venezuelans into the country. Slightly more than half of the natives defends the idea that the government
1This is due to long time it takes to obtain, firstly, the documentation from different government institutions (including the IN-
TERPOL international exchange token) and, secondly, the confirmation of the change from tourist-permit holder to PTP holder from
Peru’s Migration Authority, requiring an additional 6 months (Blouin 2019).
2These norms are stated in the Legislative Decree No. 689 of 1991, Law for the hiring of foreign workers, and the Supreme Decree
No. 014-92-TR of 1992. The Supreme Decree No. 179-2004-EF defines the special income tax regime, which applies for foreigner
both if self-employed (based on their net income) or employees (based on their total income). On the one hand, there are these cannot
represent more than 20% of the total number of workers and their wages cannot exceed 30% of the total payroll in the firm. On the
other hand, foreigners who do not have permanent residence in Peru are subject to a special income tax regime of 30%.
3Further restrictions, implemented after this study’s time span, made their legal entry into Peru even more difficult. From 15 of
June 2019, Venezuelans must also have a Visa or a Humanitarian Visa in addition to a valid passport, which could only be requested at
the very same Consulates (in Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador) dealing with an excessive amount of applications from Venezuelans
trying to enter to Peru (UNHCR 2019b). Additionally, application for refugee status (which would obviate the need for the Humanit-
arian Visa) could only be made once they reach the border via an interview, during which they could not enter Peru (IDEHPUCP et al.
2020).
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should impose a quota on Venezuelan workers, and one in four think instead that they should be banned
(columns 2-5).4 In line with what Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2019; Wallace and Figueroa 2012; Fasani
et al. 2019; ILO 2019 find in Europe and the USA, respectively, natives’ opinions are explained by a belief
that these immigrants both harm the economy and take jobs that “legitimately belong to Peruvians” (see
columns 6-8 in Table 3.1). In contrast to what prevails in the OECD and higher-income countries among
those higher-educated (Grigorieff et al. 2020), the table also reveals that the majority of highly-educated
Peruvians regard immigrants as a threat to their jobs. This occurs notwithstanding international evidence
suggesting that they are the least affected by immigration (Dustmann et al. 2008).5
Table 3.1 – Peruvians’ attitudes and beliefs towards Venezuelan immigrants
Unlikeable Ideal immigration policy Beliefs about Venezuelans
CoJ Quota Ban Harm econ. Take jobs Uneduc. Unexp. Delinq.
Sex
Male 2.10 47.71 50.80 47.43 74.65 76.20 60.68 47.12 55.97
(0.02) (2.39) (1.42) (1.91) (1.24) (1.21) (1.39) (1.42) (1.42)
Female 2.09 52.29 49.20 52.57 75.84 78.32 62.47 50.51 56.41
(0.02) (2.39) (1.42) (1.91) (1.19) (1.15) (1.35) (1.39) (1.38)
Age (Years)
18-25 2.02 25.46 23.23 16.89 75.27 76.91 57.45 44.91 57.82
(0.03) (2.09) (1.20) (1.44) (1.84) (1.80) (2.11) (2.12) (2.11)
26-35 2.09 23.39 26.05 24.38 75.88 78.30 65.43 49.52 56.27
(0.03) (2.03) (1.24) (1.65) (1.72) (1.65) (1.91) (2.01) (1.99)
36-45 2.08 22.94 21.54 21.00 73.54 76.82 57.85 49.64 56.57
(0.03) (2.01) (1.17) (1.56) (1.89) (1.80) (2.11) (2.14) (2.12)
46-65 2.17 28.21 29.18 37.74 75.94 77.07 64.04 50.50 54.76
(0.03) (2.16) (1.29) (1.86) (1.51) (1.49) (1.70) (1.77) (1.76)
Education Level
Primary 2.23 19.50 16.00 34.80 76.91 78.61 75.72 62.82 53.99
(0.05) (1.90) (1.04) (1.83) (1.74) (1.69) (1.77) (1.99) (2.06)
Secondary 2.14 47.71 42.20 46.84 75.92 77.26 61.59 47.99 57.48
(0.02) (2.39) (1.40) (1.91) (1.28) (1.25) (1.46) (1.50) (1.48)
Technical 2.03 16.28 20.90 11.75 76.85 81.86 50.84 43.91 59.43
(0.03) (1.77) (1.15) (1.23) (2.06) (1.88) (2.45) (2.43) (2.40)
College 1.97 16.51 20.90 6.61 69.21 70.48 51.91 35.62 52.42
(0.03) (1.78) (1.15) (0.95) (2.33) (2.30) (2.52) (2.42) (2.52)
Total 2.10 18.05 51.51 28.20 75.26 77.28 61.60 48.85 56.20
(0.02) (0.78) (1.02) (0.92) (0.86) (0.84) (0.97) (1.00) (0.99)
Notes: In the first column, rows shows the average of a measure of ’how unlikeable are the Venezuelan immigrants’ that goes from 1
(totally like them) to 4 (totally dislike them). In columns 2 to 5, rows show the relative frequency (%) among those who consider as ideal
the different immigration policies for Venezuelan immigrants. In columns 6 to 8, rows show the proportion (%) who share different beliefs
about Venezuelan immigrants in Peru within the corresponding group. CoJ = Conditional on jobs; Unex. = lack labour market experience;
Uneduc. = lack enough schooling; Delinq. = are engaged in criminal activities. SEs in parenthesis. Source: Author’s calculations using
IOP-PUCP data (2019).
A peculiar feature of the Exodus is that in contrast to the studies undertaken by Card (2001), Carring-
ton and de Lima (1996) or Akgündüz et al. (2015), Venezuelan immigrants are more educated than the
natives. Specifically, almost 60% of Venezuelan workers have higher education (left panel in Table 3.2),
whereas almost half of Peruvian workers (47%) have only secondary education. However, these believe
that Venezuelans are mostly uneducated (“Uneduc.” heading in Table 3.1). This misperception extends
to their past labour market experience (next to the last column of Table 3.1), despite that four out of five
Venezuelans have had previous job experience (Table 3.2), and to their criminality (last column in the table),
despite that there is not evidence of excessively high crime rates in the regions where Venezuelans have loc-
ated (Bahar et al. 2020a). A follow-up round of the IOP-PUCP survey (PUCP 2020) suggests that Peruvians
still hold these beliefs. Nonetheless, there is no evidence of a reversion to a “type” of Venezuelan immigrant
4Similar evidence is provided by a survey conducted by IEP (2019) during the same year: 73% opposes Venezuelan immigration,
and 66% agrees with the further immigration restrictions imposed in 2019 (see table table A1 in Chapter Two). The IOP-PUCP survey
conducted one year later reveals that the negative attitude of natives towards Venezuelans had intensified relative to the survey reported
here (see PUCP 2020).
5Along these lines, IEP (2019) reports that 33% of Peruvians directly blame Venezuelans for the loss of jobs of Peruvians, and
75% of those who oppose Venezuelan immigration lies on the belief that they will harm the economy.
135
that actually matches their negative beliefs (see bottom panel of Figure 3.A3 in Appendix). This natives’
mismatch between beliefs and facts about immigrants, however, is not exclusive to Peru as it coincides with
has been documented for developed economies with a higher proportion of immigrants such as the USA,
Great Britain and Continental Europe (Grigorieff et al. 2020; Blinder 2015; Citrin and Sides 2008). These
studies confirm that migrants from less developed countries are often perceived more negatively regardless
of their individual characteristics (Kustov 2019).
Given the foregoing, it is not surprising to find that Venezuelans have been more likely to experience
discrimination in the host country compared to natives (Figure 3.1). Around 20% of the sample report
that they perceived unequal treatment within the labour market, with only 3% of Peruvians reporting the
same (see section 3.4 for further details on this data).6 This ENPOVE estimate for Venezuelans, although
conservative when compared to what Freier and Pérez (2021) report7, is similar to what migrant workers
report in the Japanese labour market (20%-25%, see CHRET 2017 p.28), characterized by a small share
of migrants in the total working population (Morita 2017; ILO 2019). The proportion of Venezuelans
self-perceiving discrimination in Peru is larger than what is found in Switzerland (17%, Auer and Ruedin
2019), New Zealand (15%, Daldy et al. 2013), Britain and EU-14 countries (16%-17%, Fernández-Reino
2020), and most of the states in the USA (Hopkins et al. 2016). It is also more extensive than what is
reported by indigenous Peruvians8, a group that historically has been subject to stark social exclusion and
marginalization in terms of access to labour, education and health markets in Peru (Valdivia et al. 2007;
Gushiken and Campos 2015).
The likelihood of perceiving labour market discrimination is directly related to the education level of
the Venezuelan worker (right panel in Table 3.2). Those with a college education are statistically more
prone to perceive unequal treatment than those with only secondary or primary education. This is partly
explained by the fact that more educated workers are more aware of social inequities and of their advant-
age relative to less-skilled native workers; it also increases their expectations for career success (Banerjee
2008). In turn, Venezuelan males are less likely to feel discriminated against. In addition, they are typic-
ally younger than Peruvians, with 70% in the 18-35 age category while only 30% of native workers fall in
the same bracket. There is no statistical association between being older and perceiving discrimination for
Venezuelan workers. However, only the eldest Peruvians are less prone to perceive unequal treatment.9
Further, an inspection of the right panel in Table 3.2 suggests that two types of occupation (further
explained in section 3.4) comprise 70% of the Venezuelan workers: Elementary occupations (i.e., unskilled
and characterized by low wages) and Services and sales workers (mostly in retail establishments). These are
also the two occupational groups where workers are most likely to report discrimination. For Venezuelans,
the proportion of those who self-report experiencing workplace discrimination is statistically higher than
6The phrasing of the question in ENAHO and ENPOVE is not the same. In the former, only the head of household is asked if
they have perceived discrimination in several instances (out of which within the labour market is one of them) and the reason for
this (e.g., race, language, family background or origin). In ENPOVE everybody (over five years old) is asked if they have perceived
discrimination (out of which within the labour market is one of them) for being Venezuelan. However, we have reason to believe
that the mechanisms behind the nationality-based discrimination of Venezuelans are comparable to those behind race and the ethnic
background-based discrimination of Peruvians.
7Their estimated proportion, between 68% and 95%, is plausibly explained by the differences in size, scope and timing of their
research. Here we focus on quantitative data from ENPOVE, which leads to N=6,125. Freier and Pérez (2021) use instead qualitative
data, leading to N=115. Also, we on focus on workplace discrimination (see section 3.4), whereas they consider all types of discrim-
ination reported by Venezuelans, including that experienced in public places. Additionally, ENPOVE was recorded at the end of 2018,
whereas theirs extends between 2018 and 2020. A series of events during this period (outside our time frame) contributed to a sharp
increase in hostility from Peruvian natives.
8We determined the membership to this group based on the mother tongue spoken by the head of the household during their
childhood, namely Quechua, Aymara or another native language. According to Benavides and Valdivia (2004), this criterion is more
likely to reflect differences in beliefs and practices associated with specific ethnic groups. Even though the reported mother tongue may
change with migration from rural to urban areas, this will unlikely affect the prevalence of cultural patterns underlying the exclusion
of these specific groups.
9An important caveat is that ENAHO only records data (for natives) on self-perceived workplace discrimination for a subset of
heads of households from the total sample. Following Figure 3.1, the number of Peruvians who were discriminated against is very
small (N=27), contributing to the lack of statistical significance in terms of the estimated differences. Nevertheless, this restriction on
the data is only imposed for this table. The full sample of Peruvians is used in the main regression analysis undertaken subsequently.
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h1 h2 h1 h2 h1 h2 h1 h2 h1 h2 h1 h2
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Peruvians (indigenous and not indigenous)
Peruvians (only indigenous)
Venezuelans
Note: Sample restricted to only those employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years. h1 and h2 refers to the first and second half of the year. Informality
approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. For Peruvians, data points are calculated only for head of housedhols in the corresponding year while for
Venezuelans are calculated for every individual given their corresponding half of year of arrival to Peru. Horizontal dashed lines refers to the average for the whole period.
 Vertical lines correspond to the 90% confidence intervals adjusting for clustering. Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO and ENPOVE (2018) data.
those who don’t within the Services and sales occupations. Their allocation across these groups has changed
little since arriving in 2016 (see bottom panel of Figure 3.A2 in the Appendix). Interestingly, the (observed)
proportion of those in Managerial and Technical occupational fell from 11% in early 2017 to 4.5% two
years later. The total distribution for Peruvians, in contrast, is more evenly spread across the categories
shown, with one in four performing as technical workers. As described in Del Pozo Segura (2021), the
occupational complexity of Venezuelans is lower than Peruvians’ and is even lower for those who reported
being discriminated against. Moreover, a lengthier stay in Peru and prior working experience in Venezuela
are positively associated with their higher tendency to report experiencing workplace discrimination. The
higher expectation of a more equitable treatment from employers as migrants increase their time in the host
country is a plausible explanation for this (Banerjee 2008).
Certainly, the fact that a larger share of Venezuelans perceive discrimination in the host labour market
does not necessarily mean the existence of mechanisms penalising their outcomes based on their nationality.
However, it transpires that in their case, there is an actual relationship between perceiving unequal treatment
and earning a lower (log) hourly wage (Table 3.3). The direction of these gaps and their magnitudes,
between four and six percentage points favouring those immigrants who did not experience self-perceived
discrimination, as well as its statistical significance, remains consistent across the selected statistics reported
in the table. It is zero only at the uppermost part of the wage distribution. This same pattern is also found
when analysing the (log) hourly wages from their primary occupation (see left panel of Figure 3.A4 in
Appendix).
Venezuelans do engage more time in labour market activities than their Peruvian counterparts, espe-
cially those Venezuelans who self-perceived discrimination. The lower hourly wage that Venezuelans earn
explains this, particularly those perceiving unequal treatment. In turn, this results in this group working
more hours. However, working in the informal labour market gives them enough flexibility to undertake
practically any desired number of work hours per month. As the histogram of this variable shows (right
panel of Figure 3.A4 in Appendix), 73% work more than what is legally allowed per week (48 hours10) and,
remarkably, 15%, 13% and 8% of them work 60, 72 and even 84 hours per week, respectively. Despite this,
40% of Venezuelan workers earn a monthly wage lower than the minimum legal in Peru as of 2018 (around
10Note that almost all of those who work more than the maximum number of hours do so while working in their only job, since
only 5% of Venezuelans report having a second job.
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170 GBP in 2018 prices). As mentioned above, this occurs even though on average they have higher edu-
cation, experience and the absence of a language barrier, which usually provide migrants with the basis for
relative success in a labour market (Chiswick and Miller 1999).
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Table 3.2 – Characterization for Peruvians in treated areas and Venezuelans immigrants and perception of
discrimination
Peruvians Venezuelans
Peruv. Venez. Diff. Discriminat. Not discrim. Diff. Discriminat. Not discrim. Diff.
If male 0.62 0.57 0.05*** 0.59 0.59 -0.00 0.54 0.58 -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age group (years)
18-25 0.17 0.32 -0.15*** 0.11 0.11 -0.00 0.32 0.32 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
26-35 0.24 0.42 -0.19*** 0.19 0.20 -0.01 0.44 0.42 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
36-45 0.24 0.18 0.06*** 0.30 0.26 0.04 0.16 0.18 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
46-55 0.22 0.06 0.15*** 0.41 0.24 0.17* 0.07 0.06 0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
56-65 0.14 0.01 0.13*** 0.00 0.19 -0.19*** 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Education level
Primary 0.18 0.10 0.08*** 0.41 0.25 0.15 0.08 0.11 -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Secondary 0.49 0.31 0.18*** 0.30 0.48 -0.18* 0.29 0.32 -0.03*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Technical 0.17 0.19 -0.03*** 0.11 0.15 -0.04 0.20 0.19 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College 0.16 0.39 -0.23*** 0.19 0.12 0.06 0.43 0.38 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Occupation groups
Managerial 0.04 0.01 0.03*** 0.00 0.03 -0.03*** 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Technical 0.19 0.05 0.13*** 0.22 0.25 -0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.02**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Clerical Workers 0.04 0.05 -0.01*** 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Services And Sales 0.22 0.32 -0.11*** 0.30 0.22 0.08 0.35 0.32 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Craft And Trades 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.11 -0.08** 0.11 0.13 -0.02*
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Machine Operators 0.12 0.06 0.06*** 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.01*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Elementary Occup. 0.27 0.37 -0.10*** 0.30 0.28 0.02 0.37 0.37 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Occup. complexity (mean) 2.62 1.79 0.84*** 1.55 1.98 -0.43 1.65 1.82 -0.17*
(0.11) (0.05) (0.35) (0.15) (0.09) (0.05)
If employed in Venezuela 0.81 0.83 0.80 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Time in Peru (mean) 7.77 8.51 7.58 0.94***
(0.09) (0.20) (0.10)
N 4,989 6,125 11,114 27 1,254 1,281 1,256 4,869 6,125
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years. Additionally, sample for Peruvians restricted to those
regions exposed to Venezuelan migration and sample for Venezuelans restricted to those regions who arrived to Peru from January 2016 onwards. Informality
approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. Discriminated/Non discriminated refers to the perception of discrimination and Diff. refers
to the difference in the proportions across these two groups. Time in Peru measured in months. Managerial occupation includes professionals and technical
occupations includes Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers. SEs in parenthesis adjusting for clustering. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at
5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO (2018) and ENPOVE (2018) data.
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Table 3.3 – Labour outcomes statistics for Peruvians in treated areas and Venezuelan immigrant workers
by perception of discrimination
Peruvians Venezuelans
Discriminated Not discriminated Diff. Discriminated Not discriminated Diff.
(Log) Hourly Wages
Mean 1.11 (0.16) 1.27 (0.03) -0.16 1.03 (0.02) 1.09 (0.01) -0.06***
p10 0.07 (0.31) 0.22 (0.05) -0.16 0.51 (0.02) 0.57 (0.01) -0.06**
p25 0.72 (0.25) 0.83 (0.03) -0.10 0.77 (0.01) 0.81 (0.01) -0.04**
p50 1.16 (0.15) 1.31 (0.02) -0.15 1.01 (0.02) 1.04 (0.01) -0.04**
p75 1.66 (0.26) 1.77 (0.02) -0.11 1.27 (0.01) 1.31 (0.01) -0.04**
p90 2.22 (0.28) 2.21 (0.04) 0.01 1.63 (0.03) 1.63 (0.02) 0.00
(Log) Monthly Wages
Mean 6.42 (0.23) 6.46 (0.03) -0.04 6.58 (0.01) 6.59 (0.01) -0.00
p10 5.00 (0.33) 5.20 (0.08) -0.21 6.09 (0.01) 6.09 (0.01) 0.00
p25 5.86 (0.38) 5.96 (0.04) -0.10 6.37 (0.02) 6.42 (0.02) -0.05**
p50 6.60 (0.22) 6.59 (0.03) 0.01 6.60 (0.01) 6.60 (0.00) 0.00
p75 7.18 (0.22) 7.06 (0.03) 0.11 6.79 (0.01) 6.78 (0.00) 0.01
p90 7.68 (0.25) 7.48 (0.03) 0.20 7.07 (0.03) 7.01 (0.01) 0.05
Total Monthly Hours
Mean 238.51 (18.81) 206.54 (2.59) 31.97* 272.81 (2.31) 258.95 (1.46) 13.85***
p10 104.29 (26.07) 78.21 (4.35) 26.07 173.81 (6.52) 156.43 (4.35) 17.38***
p25 186.85 (28.24) 139.05 (6.52) 47.80 217.26 (4.35) 208.57 (0.00) 8.69***
p50 269.40 (23.90) 208.57 (0.00) 60.83** 260.71 (3.26) 260.71 (0.00) 0.00
p75 304.17 (21.73) 260.71 (2.17) 43.45** 312.86 (2.17) 312.86 (0.00) 0.00
p90 356.31 (26.07) 330.24 (7.60) 26.07 365.00 (1.09) 365.00 (0.00) 0.00
N 27 1,254 1,281 1,256 4,869 6,125
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years. Additionally, sample for Peruvians restricted to
those regions exposed to Venezuelan migration and sample for Venezuelans restricted to those regions who arrived to Peru from January 2016 onwards.
Discriminated/Non discriminated refers to the perception of discrimination. (Log) hourly and monthly wages include income from the main and secondary
occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. p = percentile. SEs in parenthesis adjust for clustering. *




The seminal economic characterization of labour market discrimination is attributable to Becker’s (1971)
taste-based theories. In this framework, the subjective and non-pecuniary costs induced for hiring members
of a minority group represents a penalty in the profit function of the employer.11 In the short run, this results
in a wage gap between discriminated and non-discriminated workers, which increases with the number of
prejudiced employers and the intensity of their discriminatory preferences. As firms enter the market, this
gap will dissipate as discriminating employers are forced to leave the industry given the additional economic
cost induced by their preferences. However, this theoretical prediction does not correspond with the fact
that wage gaps remain in the labour market. Further, psychological and sociological research demonstrating
the importance of personal and dynamic intergroup processes explaining this process (Fiske 1998; Pager
and Shepherd 2008), suggests that other factors are responsible for these gaps.
An alternative explanation for unequal treatment is motivated by statistical discrimination theory. This
approach attributes the wage gap to the profit-maximizing employer’s lack of information about the skills
and turnover of the applicants, leading to discrimination based on observable characteristics (being the
migrant condition a relevant one) given the direct and indirect costs of hiring a wrong candidate (Altonji
and Blank 1999). In this literature, two different strands focus on how prior beliefs influence the hiring
and paying decisions about the productivity of members of a group (Arrow 1973; Phelps 1972) and in
the role of employers’ information about individual productivity, where it is assumed that the variation in
human capital levels is greater within the minority (migrants) group (Aigner and Cain 1977). The former
characterization predicts that employers’ stereotypes are self-confirming and lead to a low-level equilibrium
for immigrants reflecting their lower expected returns to human capital. In contrast, the latter predicts that
members of the minority group end up being less productive since employers face difficulties determining
their productivity.
In both approaches, employer discrimination is viewed as a rational response due to preferences or per-
ceived differences (in terms of averages and dispersion) in human capital. Distinguishing between the two
is usually tricky. Consequently, the observed wage differentials (between natives and migrants) in the in-
formal Peruvian labour market, where the entrance is almost unrestricted (Viollaz 2019), might signal both
a taste for Peruvian employers’ discrimination and statistical discrimination. The natives’ unfavourable
opinion of the productivity of migrants backs this latter (Table 3.1). Although these two theories have been
the most popular, other plausible explanations are the non-random sorting and segregation of migrant work-
ers, which explains Venezuelans’ allocation into occupational categories with lower productivity (shown
in Table 3.2, see Elliott and Lindley 2008 and Peri and Sparber 2009 for evidence the UK and the USA)
and their downgrade (see Del Pozo Segura 2021). Also, it is likely that their education and working ex-
perience acquired back home are less valued than domestically acquired human capital (Friedberg 2000).
Furthermore, discrimination may be unintentional and outside of the discriminator’s awareness (Bertrand
et al. 2005; Dovidio and Gaertner 2010). See Lang and Lehmann (2012) for other alternative theories.12
Empirical studies within these two frameworks have focused on the impact of a migrant on unemploy-
ment, both using observational data and field experiments. Among the former, Auer et al. (2017) find that
an immigrant’s longer unemployment spell in Switzerland is mainly due to discrimination by employers.
11Becker (1971) also discussed the consequences of employees discrimination and consumer discrimination. The former refers to
the prejudice of workers in the majority group against those in the minority group (migrants) and hence avoid working with these; the
latter, to prejudiced consumers in the majority group who attain less utility by purchasing from a member of this minority group. The
consumer-based channel may impair the earnings ability of the self-employed members of the minority group. The former consumer-
based channel may impair the earnings ability of the self-employed members of the minority group. See Altonji and Blank (1999).
12Note that a source of wage differentials emphasized by Freeman (1980) and explored by Kampelmann and Rycx (2016) is that
institutional factors, mainly collective bargaining, can reduce wage discrimination against foreigners. However, in our case, most
Venezuelans do not have access to unions by being absorbed within the informal sector. Likewise, an explanation based on employers’
lexicographic search (see Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004), whereby the ethnic origin of the applicant as embedded in their last name
is the primary driver of their hiring decision (Daldy et al. 2013. This latter is not tenable in our case because the cultural origin of
Venezuelans is comparable to that of Peruvians.
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Across Western Europe, Kogan (2006) provides evidence that in the 90s, the probability of migrants ex-
periencing unemployment was lower in countries with a larger share of unskilled and low-skilled jobs and
more flexible labour markets. Additionally, Koopmans (2015) finds that sociocultural factors were the main
drivers behind the lower labour market participation and unemployment of predominantly Muslim immig-
rant groups in 2010. Evidence arising from field experiments using correspondence studies13 provide sup-
port for theories other than statistical discrimination. Relative to native applicants, discrimination against
those from an ethnic minority or a migrant background starts from the recruitment even after providing
detailed information on their experience in the host country and relevant work skills. Di Stasio and Heath
(2019) find that minorities with non-Western origin or background (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sub-Saharan
Africa and Latin America) are less likely to be shortlisted by UK employers, and Di Stasio et al. (2021) find
that Muslim applicants, especially males from Africa and the Middle East, face a severe recruitment disad-
vantage in European countries with different approaches towards cultural and religious rights to minorities
(Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the UK). For North America, Oreopoulos (2011) finds sig-
nificant discrimination towards applicants with non-English names in various occupations in Toronto, while
Widner and Chicoine (2011) report a similar effect in the United States around 2008 for those whose names
are associated with Arab or Middle Eastern origin. See Baert (2017) for a review of similar studies.
Another set of studies for developed economies focuses instead on the outcomes for employed, mainly
using non-experimental data. After conditioning on a set of individual and firm-level characteristics, these
reveal a widespread native-migrant wage gap primarily for migrants from non-English speaking countries.
Brunow and Jost (2019) find that the mean daily wage gap between German workers and migrants ranges
between 7.9% to 27%. In contrast, Chiswick et al. (2008) find that the observed positive hourly wage gap
between English speaking USA natives and migrants across the pay distribution, especially from the 2nd
decile, remains after discounting the effect of differences in endowments. Their results for Australia mimic
those from the USA and also confirm Kidd’s (1993) findings; namely, that the mean wage gap between
natives and non-English speaking migrants ranges from 2% to 19% in the own and paid employment sectors,
and this is explained in most cases by the wage-structure effect. Siebers and van Gastel (2015) find that
the under-utilization of migrants’ skills and the application of socio-ideological labour control widens the
migrant earnings gap in the Dutch public sector, while Dickens and McKnight (2008) find that in the UK,
the mean wage gap is around 30% for men and 15% for women at arrival, and it takes ten years for the
wages of an average migrant to converge to the level of natives (except for Asian men). In fact, across
countries in the European Community, Adsera and Chiswick (2007) find a partial natives-migrant mean
wage gap of around 40%.
The prevalence of mean hourly wage gaps between natives and migrants is also reported by ILO (2020)
across 49 countries around 2015 under a unified methodological approach. For Europe, the gap is as high
as 30% in Southern Europe, characterized by a large proportion of immigrants (around 40%) in unskilled
occupations, and less than 2% in the UK and Switzerland. For Latin America, in Argentina and Chile, which
experienced a large influx of migrants from within the region during the 1990s, the mean gaps are 18% and
2%, respectively, favouring natives. Nonetheless, consistent with what is reported for Peru (Table 3.3),
in both countries the migrant wage gaps in the informal sector favour migrants (7% and 17% higher than
natives in Argentina and Chile). The gap in the informal sector favours migrants even more in Mexico
(23%). A decomposition of the gaps across the hourly wage distribution suggests they are explained mainly
by differential returns to migrants in the labour market in most countries.
Nevertheless, the presence of both unconditional or conditional wage gaps and the magnitude of the
wage-structure effects should not be automatically equated with wage discrimination. This is because the
latter, as Heckman (1998) argued, is defined relative to a hypothetical ceteris paribus experiment where
13Which involves sending resumes or cover letters of inexistent applicants fixing a set of relevant occupational characteristic but
randomly varying their nationality (or background) traits.
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an employer pays a different wage to two otherwise identical individuals who only differ in their migrant
status. Nonetheless, because a worker’s unobservable characteristics (mainly cognitive and non-cognitive
ability), as well as relevant aspects of his observed attributes relevant for the employer, cannot be included in
a regression14, a crucial part of observed gaps can be actually attributed to differences between migrant and
native skills and not to labour market discrimination (see, e.g. Neal and Johnson 1996 or Altonji and Blank
1999, p. 3161). In fact, an approach that tries to circumvent this problem using audit studies can detect
discrimination when none exists. 15. Hence, the discriminatory effect (of race or gender) at a randomly
selected firm does not necessarily provide an accurate measure of the discrimination in the market as a
whole (Heckman 1998).
A complementary approach to measure discrimination, avoiding some of these problems, is to directly
study how a worker’s perceptions are associated with observed disparities in outcomes among migrants
and natives (Blank et al. 2004). Although subjective, perceived discrimination has a significant impact on a
migrant’s well-being, mental health and objective chances in life (Schmitt et al. 2014; Nandi et al. 2016; Safi
2010; Mougenot et al. 2021), their integration into the host society (de Vroome et al. 2014; Auer and Ruedin
2019) and their productivity (Ensher et al. 2001). Despite their potential correlation, we do not anticipate
that this measure aligns perfectly with the actual incidence of discrimination for at least two reasons. Firstly,
as explained by Kobrynowicz and Branscombe (1997) and Crosby (1984), self-protective and situational
factors as well as psychological characteristics (such as self-esteem, assertiveness and depression) influence
the interpretation of prejudicial events and explain deviations from perceived and actual discrimination. A
migrant’s socio-economic background, location, and even socio-political context can also influence this
perception (Fernández-Reino 2020; Hopkins et al. 2016). Secondly, the potential misreporting can go in
both directions (Biddle 2013). It is expected (as it occurs in Table 3.2) that the more qualified Venezuelans
declare experiencing discrimination given their downgrading and ensuing low wages (see Del Pozo Segura
2021). In contrast, those in the groups that are usually the more poorly paid in the labour market (i.e.,
females, less educated, younger) may not realize that they are being discriminated against. Nevertheless,
we argue that considering direct reports of discrimination by affected individuals is likely to be informative
and are also likely to represent lower-bound estimates of the actual occurrence of discrimination (Blank
et al. 2004).
The literature on measures of perception of workplace discrimination is scant (see Blank et al. 2004
and Wrench 2007). We follow the route of studies which analyse the migrant’s perception of workplace
discrimination. Daldy et al. (2013) report that in New Zealand, female immigrants from South East Asia
(and New Zealander women born in Pacific Islands) are 60% more prone to report workplace discrimination
than New Zealanders of European heritage. This likelihood increases with the years after arrival and the
education of female workers. On the other hand, Auer and Ruedin (2019) study how variables related to
different aspects of the migration process and integration impact the reporting of discrimination by immig-
rants in Switzerland. They find that migrants from South America and Asia have a 30% and 40% lower
(ceteris paribus) odds, respectively, to report discrimination than European immigrants. Additionally, they
find that attachment to the host country and positive past experiences during the migration process play a
substantial role in decreasing the likelihood of reporting discrimination.
14Data on the quality of the education and workers’ ability are usually absent, as well as socio-cultural variables that allow for
more successful integration into the labour market for the migrant (Koopmans 2015). The heterogeneity in the types of skills achieved
within the same level of education does not match those required in the particular job of the worker. This is particularly relevant for
Venezuelans because most of the activities they perform in the informal sector lead to their occupational downgrading, which implies
that their cognitive skills marginally contribute to their marginal productivity (see Del Pozo Segura 2021).
15On the one hand, correspondence studies do not necessarily apply in more realistic scenarios in which employers are confronted
with native and migrant candidates who simultaneously differ along many dimensions and where rejection might be for reasons other
than his skill (see Koopmans 2015). On the other hand, sending resumés and applications to the companies requires detailed pre-
knowledge of what characteristics are essential for that particular job, which is unfeasible for most applications (see Blank et al. 2004;
Heckman and Siegelman 1993). Moreover, discrimination is also in the recruitment and promotion processes as well as in day-to-day
interaction with the employees, aspects which are not necessarily observed in cross-sectional data as the one here (Daldy et al. 2013).
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Two other studies explicitly examine the relationship between a migrant’s self-perceived discrimination
and income disparities. This latter is estimated as the wage-structure component between migrants and nat-
ives from an Oaxaca-Blinder type decomposition.16On the one hand, Biddle (2013) finds that the estimated
employment discrimination in the Australian labour market is (partially) positively associated with being
overseas-born. The estimated employment and wage discrimination effects are higher for females and de-
cline with the years in the host country.17 The probability of reporting discrimination by the employer is
correlated with the estimated wage discrimination measures. Nonetheless, the small estimated coefficient
for wage discrimination suggests that other sources of discrimination are of greater importance.18 On the
other hand, Banerjee (2008) finds that the estimated wage discrimination, either unconditionally or after
controlling for observed attributes, does not significantly affect self-perceived discrimination for migrant
workers in Canada. This hints that these are either unaware of the degree of inequality or unable to accept
that income discrimination could affect them personally.
3.4 Data
We use information from two micro-datasets. The first source is the National Survey of the Resident
Venezuelan Population (ENPOVE), collected in the last quarter of 2018 by Peru’s National Statistical Office
(INEI). This provides information on Venezuelan demographic and labour market variables, including their
past working experience in Venezuela, and is statistically representative at the national level and for each of
the five cities where these located from 2016 (according to the Population Census of 2017). These cities are
Lima and Callao, Tumbes, Cusco, Arequipa and La Libertad (see Figure 3.A1).19 Importantly, ENPOVE
also provides information about the perception of discrimination in different spheres of a migrant’s life in
Peru, including the workplace, public areas or government institutions. It is worth noting that this type
of information is pretty uncommon in surveys of immigrants (Blank et al. 2004). The focus for the ana-
lysis here relates to perceived discrimination that occurred only in the workplace.20 The second dataset is
Peru’s National Household Survey (ENAHO), also collected by INEI following a similar sampling design
as ENPOVE. It constitutes the Peruvian government’s primary source of labour market indicators, given its
statistical representativeness at the national and regional levels. It includes accurate information on wages
and hours of work as well as detailed information on Peruvians’ demographic and employment character-
istics for those in formal and informal sectors. Its information is comparable across the years (from 2005
onwards), and we use the 2018 ENAHO dataset to match the year recorded in ENPOVE.
By combining these two data sources, we approach the issue of the migrant wage disadvantage in two
complementary ways. The first (in subsection 3.6.1), based only on data for Venezuelans from ENPOVE,
16In these two studies, estimation of the wage-structure effect implies inputting labour market returns from the sample of natives to
characteristics of the migrants, and subtracting from this the migrants’ observed wage, as in Banerjee (2008). Biddle (2013) takes an
alternative route, by estimating employment (wage) discrimination as the difference between the own workers’ predicted employment
(wage) conditional on a set of observed attributes and their observed value.
17The former outcome is measured by a dummy that is equal to 1 if the worker thinks he was unsuccessful because the employer
discriminated against them him (and 0 otherwise); for the latter, by a dummy that is 1 if the worker thinks that he has experienced
discrimination by his current employer
18The estimations of the conditional expectation of self-reported discrimination in job applications also suggest that this outcome
is positively correlated with being a female and being born overseas. At the same time, it is negatively associated with the time the
worker has been in Australia’s labour market.
19These comprise 85% of the Venezuelan population, located mainly in Lima and Callao, the capital of the country and the centre
of economic activity in Peru. This represents 38% of the employment and 48% of the total GDP as of 2018. Tumbes, bordering
Ecuador, is their entry point to Peru. La Libertad and Arequipa are the second and third recipients of the Venezuelan population,
respectively. The latter being the second largest contributor to Peru’s GDP (INEI 2019a). Cuzco is a tourist city and generates jobs in
mostly services-oriented activities.
20Question p702 in the ENPOVE survey asks the individual if he has felt discriminated in (1) the workplace, (2) the Educational
Institution, (3) the health facility, (4) Judicial Institutions, (5) street / public places, (6) In public transport, (7) Immigration offices, (8)
In the offices of the Chancellery, (9) In your community/neighbourhood and (10) Another place. We focus on (1), which is similar in
concept and time frame to what Daldy et al. (2013); Banerjee (2008); Auer and Ruedin (2019) exploit. In fact, the time frame inquired
by the question (“last two years”) captures the whole labour market experiences of the Venezuelans, as these mainly arrived in 2016.
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provides evidence on how the migrants’ self-perceived workplace discrimination affects their wages, con-
ditional on the inclusion of a wide range of characteristics. The second approach (in subsection 3.6.2)
appends both datasets to study how the individual’s nationality (i.e., Peruvian or Venezuelan) affects wages,
again controlling for an array of other covariates. This also allows us to obtain a direct measure of objective
discrimination (discussed in section 3.5.), which is a key determinant in the probability that a Venezuelan
worker perceives discrimination (in subsection 3.6.3). Importantly, the similar sampling design and vari-
ables harmonization (in terms of their definition, its categories, and their units of measurement) of ENPOVE
and ENAHO, as well as their same level of coverage for the topics in the survey, makes those datasets com-
parable and justifies its use in a pooled regression framework.
Throughout the paper, we restrict the sample to workers in the informal sector21 between 18 and 65
years old, living in the five regions where the Venezuelan migrants settled (for the ENPOVE data, we
additionally restricted to include only those who arrived in Peru in 2016). We further restrict the sample to
include only those who declare a positive hourly wage. Hourly wages are expressed in real terms (using
the GDP deflator from Peru’s Central Bank, taking 2007 as the reference year). It is constructed as the
ratio of self-reported individual’s wage, summing what they obtained for their primary, secondary and extra
activities (including monetary and in-kind payments) to the self-reported number of hours that they usually
work in all their occupations. However, it is worth noting that only 5% of Venezuelans hold two jobs in this
sample. We define informal workers as those employed without access to contributory health insurance 22.
This variable reflects the vulnerability experienced by informal workers as these are not protected by legal
and regulatory frameworks (ILO 2002; ILC 2002; Hussmanns 2001). This criterion is valid for Peru, as in
the Latin American region “informal workers lack almost every form of social protection [...] Restricted
access to health, unemployment and injuries insurance, make informal workers too exposed to the normal
risks of work” (Freije 2002, p. 2). 23
In both ENAHO and ENPOVE, the demographic control variables are sex, a dummy equal to 1 if the
individual is male and 0 otherwise, age, the worker’s age in years, and education level (the maximum edu-
cation level attained). The control variables that capture an individual’s industry and occupation follow
international classifications to facilitate comparability across other studies. The vector of six industry dum-
mies is a reduced version of the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities
(ISIC), Revision 4: 1) Agriculture, forestry and fishing (A and B and C); 2) Manufacturing and Public
Utilities (D and E); 3) Construction (F); 4) Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants (G and I);
5) Transport, Storage, and Communication (H and J); 6) Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate and Com-
munity, Social and Personal Services (K - U). The vector of seven occupation dummies groups the codes
in the data, defined initially based on INEI’s adaptation of the International Standard Classification of Oc-
cupations (ISCO-2008) from ILO: 1) Managers, Professionals and Armed forces (MGs 1, 2 and 10); 2)
Technicians and associates (MG 3) and Skilled agricultural and fishery workers (MG 6); 3) Clerks (MG 4);
4) Service and sales workers (MG 5); 5) Building workers, electricians, artisans and telecommunications
(MG 7); 6) Industrial machinery operators, assemblers and drivers (MG 8); 7) Elementary occupations (MG
9).
By merging occupation data in ENAHO and ENPOVE with the US-Department of Labour ONET 25.1
(2019) dataset, we calculate scores of the intensity of distinct types of abilities (“skills”) required by differ-
21INEI defines a worker as those engaged in any economic activity (including those dependent and independent workers who did
not work at the time of the interview but had a contract) who worked more than 15 hours per week (INEI 2019b, p. 553). We follow
this definition but drop unpaid family workers from our sample.
22An alternative variable, lack of access to a pension system of the worker, is included in the ENAHO dataset but is absent in
ENPOVE. Hence, our criterion, based on health access, also make the information in both datasets comparable. In the ENAHO
sample, both variables are strongly correlated (Pearson χ21 = 1,100, p-value=0.000).
23Hussmanns (2004) suggests taking jobs rather than employed persons as the observation unit, as some workers can have multiple
jobs. To conform with his suggestion, we take as observation unit the worker, and their informality status is based on their primary
occupation.
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ent occupations24. An important caveat is that these are based on the Standard Occupation Classification
(SOC). In contrast, occupation data from ENAHO and ENPOVE are an adaptation from ISCO-2008 no-
menclature, officially named National Code of Occupations 201525. Following Ottaviano et al. (2013) (see
appendix therein), we take only three types of skills from this database: Cognitive Intensity (comprised by
ten variables classified as “cognitive and analytical”), Communication Intensity (4 variables capturing writ-
ten and oral expression and understanding) and Manual Intensity (19 variables capturing dexterity, strength,
and coordination). Once merged with ENAHO and ENPOVE, we re-scale each value to equal the percent-
ile score in that year, which measures the relative importance of a given skill among workers. This ranges
between 0 and 1. A task with a score of 0.02 for some skill indicates that only 2 percent of workers in 2018
were supplying that skill less intensively). We take the average of the variables involved in each type of
skill to create three indices, as well as a Complexity index summarizing the intensity of a task in cognitive-
communication skills relative to manual skills: Complexity score = (Cognitive Intensity + Communication
Intensity)/Manual Intensity.
3.5 Econometric methods
3.5.1 RIF regression method
Because of its intimate link to the population regression function, applied labour research focusing on
(log) hourly wages has strongly relied on OLS estimation of linear conditional mean functions. Despite
its weaker consistency conditions than alternative methods (see Cameron and Trivedi 2005; White 2000),
the marginal impacts provided by this method might conceal important heterogeneity of the impacts across
the distribution of the outcome (Angrist and Pischke 2009). The literature extensively moved towards
the conditional quantile estimator (Koenker and Bassett 1978 and Koenker 2005) to obtain a more complete
picture of the joint distribution of the outcome and covariates than OLS. Nonetheless, an essential drawback
of this method is that its coefficients capture the covariates’ effects on the quantiles of the distribution
of the outcome defined by the covariates. Only exceptionally these will coincide with the effects at the
unconditional quantiles of the outcome, which we are actually after (Porter 2015).26 Methods to transition
from the conditional to the unconditional quantiles, such as those by Machado and Mata (2005) and Melly
(2005), require estimation of all conditional quantiles to pin down a specific unconditional quantile27 and
strongly rely on simulations and numerical integration (Angrist and Pischke 2009).
In this study, we apply the quantile estimator from Firpo et al. (2009). This computationally simpler
method circumvents these inherent problems of conditional quantile regression and, importantly, provides
the covariates’ effects on the unconditional distribution of the outcome. At its core, it builds upon the
influence function (IF) concept. Letting Fω be the unconditional (marginal) distribution of (log) hourly
wages (ω) and τ-th be the percentile of the distribution Fω , IF (ω;qτ ,Fω) represents the influence of an
24Admittedly, US occupation skills will differ from those in Peru and Venezuela; however, it is reasonably to assume that this
difference goes in the same direction for occupations in both countries. This is reasonable because there are no reasons to believe that
suddenness of the influx might have lead to changes in the composition in the host country in the short run. Moreover, because we are
not interested in the actual value of these indices but, instead, in their change, these difference in levels in both countries relative to
USA are not important.
25We use table 2 in annex of INEI (2016) which provides correspondences to relate the former in codes equivalent to the latter. Then
we use table 1 in that annex to translate these into ISCO-2008 codes. We match these with the O*NET dataset, using the cross-walks
in Hardy et al. (2018) which translate these into O*NET-SOC-10 to SOC-10 and from this to ISCO-2008 codes.
26This does not imply that conditional quantile regression is inappropriate in all applications. Porter (2015) discusses cases, other
than estimating treatment effects with controls, where this method provides the effects of interest. See Wenz (2019) for a discussion
on the widespread misinterpretation of the estimated coefficients from conditional quantile in part of the applied literature.
27From a theoretical point of view, by being an M-estimator, more stringent conditions for consistency and asymptotic normality
are required for conditional quantile estimation compared to OLS (see Newey and McFadden 1994 for further discussion). Also, since
the objective (also known as check) function is not differentiable, gradient optimization methods are not applicable. Instead, linear
programming is required to estimate the coefficients.
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individual observation on the τ-th quantile. The Recentered version of the Influence Function (RIF)28 is
expressed as
RIF (ω;qτ ,Fω) = qτ + IF (ω;qτ ,Fω) = qτ +
τ −1(ω < qτ)
fω (qτ)
(3.1)
where 1(.) is an indicator function and fω (qτ) is the probability density function of ω evaluated at qt . The
expectation of Equation 3.1 conditional on z, a (column) vector of K +1 exogenous explanatory variables,
can be approximated by a linear (in parameters) regression model
E [RIF (ω;qτ ,Fω) |z] = z
′
γτ (3.2)
Because the unconditional expectation of the RIF function in Equation 3.1 equals the statistic qτ (since∫
IF (ω;qτ ,Fω)dF (ω) = 0), the Law of Iterated Expectations assures that qτ = E [RIF (ω;qτ ,Fω)] =
E [E [RIF (ω;qτ ,Fω) |z]] = z
′
γτ (with the outer expectation with respect to the distribution z). Hence, es-
timation of Equation 3.2 by OLS provides the vector of coefficients γ̂τ capturing the effect of the covariates
on the τth percentile of the unconditional distribution of ω , given a marginal increase in the average of a
variable d in z.29
An advantage of OLS estimation of the linear model in Equation 3.2 is that, under plausible assumptions,
it can consistently estimate the unconditional quantile partial effect even if the population parameters are
random. This is akin to consistent estimation by OLS of the (unconditional) partial effects from E (ω|z)
even if the coefficients on z depend on an unobserved component30, and contrasts with the inability of
the conditional quantile estimator to provide consistent partial effects in this case (see Wooldridge 2010).
However, it is necessary to emphasize that the linearity of the RIF model in Equation 3.2 serves as a
convenient approximation to a highly non-linear functional, such as E [RIF (ω;qτ ,Fω) |z] = g(z,γτ) with
g(.) nonlinear in γτ , rather than an assumption about the conditional expectation function (this rationale
carries over to the decomposition methods below). This assumed linearity, commonplace in the literature
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005), implies a zero expected approximation error (Firpo et al. 2018). Consequently,
under the quadratic loss function induced by the OLS estimation of the RIF model, this reduced form can
be interpreted as the best linear prediction of an (unknown) nonlinear function (White 1980).
Operationalizing this estimator requires estimating the quantile of the distribution of Fω and the cor-
responding probability density function by non parametric Kernel density estimation methods, so that







. In contrast to the assumptions invoked for the Kernel distribution K31,
those about the bandwidth b are critical since the estimated RIF coefficients are a local approximation for
28This recentering is not fundamental if we are only interested in the marginal effects. However, adding back the IF to the statistic
allows for identification of the intercept and hence enables the computation of Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions at various quantiles
(Firpo et al. 2009, p. 954).





= 1fω (qτ )
∫ ∂Pr(ω>qτ |z)
∂d dF (x)






and then dividing these (unconditional) probability effects by fω (qτ ) in order to locally invert them back into the
(unconditional) quantile effects. Different methods can be used to estimate ∂Pr(ω>qτ |z)
∂d , and in our subsequent empirical analysis we
use the LPM. The estimated coefficients under this method coincide with that from OLS in Equation 3.2 due to the assumed linearity
of the RIF model.
30For a random draw, let the coefficient of a (continuous) variable d ∈ z to also depend on individual-specific unobserved het-
erogeneity v, as in E [RIF (ω;qτ ,Fω ) |zi,vi] = (δτ +ξ1vi)d + z
′
iγτ +ξ2vi ≡ δi,τ d + z
′
iγτ +ξ2vi. Because (see next subsection) we are
assuming mean independence of v and d, along with E (v) = 0, then by the LIE E (RIF (ω;qτ ,Fω ) |z) = E (E (RIF (ω;qτ ,Fω ) |z,v) |z).
Hence OLS provides a consistent estimator of δτ which also equals the (unconditional) quantile partial effect
∂E(RIF(ω;qτ ,Fω )|z,v)
∂d aver-
aged across the population distribution of v. This result can be generalized assuming dependency on v of all coefficients in z and can
also accommodate for d discrete.
31As shown in Pagan and Ullah (1999), the Epanechnikov density, characterized by its parabolic shape with bounded support,
minimises the Mean Integrated Square Error (MISE). However, evidence therein indicates that differences between the MISE attained
by alternative kernels and this optimal one are small.
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the effect of changes in the distribution of a covariate on the quantile of interest (Fortin et al. 2011).32 The
main results in this paper take as bandwidth the one following the plug-in method by Silverman (1986)
and the Epanechnikov Kernel density.33 Following Porter (2015), we run a sensitivity analysis by altering
the kernel and bandwidth when estimating the densities embedded in the unconditional quantile regression
estimator (shown in subsection 3.6.1). An advantage of our application is that, unlike in Firpo et al. (2018)
or DiNardo et al. (1996), our focus is on the informal labour market which is characterized by a wide-
spread lack of compliance regarding minimum wages (see section 3.2). This ensures that the problem of a
heap in the distribution of the outcome at the minimum wage, which can reduce the precision of the local
approximations, and a high dependence on the kernel smoothing factor, is not encountered here.
We estimate RIF equations in Equation 3.2 for each five percentiles beginning from the 10th (i.e. = 0.10,
0.15, ..., 0.90). The model is expressed as z′γτ ≡ δτ d +x
′
βτ , where x is a (column) vector of K variables
containing the intercept and exogenous demographic and labour market characteristics (using splines for
the effect of age) and d is a dummy variable. In subsection 3.6.1, d is 1 if the Venezuelan worker self-
declares perceiving workplace discrimination (and is 0 otherwise), whereas in subsection 3.6.2 d is 1 if the
worker is Peruvian and 0 if Venezuelan. Hence, δ̂τ is the estimated partial effect of individual perception
of discrimination or nationality-based discrimination at the percentile τ of the unconditional distribution of
(log) hourly wages. To reflect that computation for the RIF involves in turn estimation of a kernel density,
we estimate the variances of the estimator using a (clustered) bootstrap (Firpo et al. 2009; Rios-Avila 2020)
at the level where the sampling of the data takes place (Abadie et al. 2017).
3.5.2 Decomposition method
Compared to the observed gap at the τth percentile in (log) hourly wages between those workers belonging
to the two groups defined by d, δ̂τ from Equation 3.2 is an adjusted gap, as it nets out the effect that
(observed) demographic and labour market characteristics have on the outcome. Nonetheless, this is not
the only adjustment that is of interest. We also want to estimate what part of differences in ω cannot be
attributed to differences in observed characteristics among Venezuelans who perceived unequal treatment
and those who did not, and subsequently between Peruvians and Venezuelans. Much of the literature has
relied on index number decomposition methods to answer these questions. Essentially, these approaches
estimate a counterfactual quantity to separate the observed gap between two groups at any given point in
the distribution, ∆O, into a part attributed to differences in observed characteristics, the composition effect
(∆X ), and the wage-structure effect (∆S), attributed to differences in their labour market payment structures
(Fortin et al. 2011). This section focuses on estimating this latter component for the τth quantile of the
unconditional distribution of ω .
The (two-fold) Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (OB, see Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973) is the most com-
mon method for estimating ∆S at the mean of the unconditional distribution. A powerful reason for this
lies in its simplicity (requiring only sample means and OLS estimates from a linear regression model34)
and the doubly-robust property (see, e.g., Wooldridge 2010) of its estimator for the counterfactual (Kline
2011).35 Nonetheless, this robustness does not carry over for other distributional statistics. Furthermore,





= 1fω (qτ )
∫ ∂Pr(ω>qτ |z)
∂x dF (x), small
discrepancies in f̂ω (q̂τ ) can translate in large differences in the estimated effects. For instance, the difference between f̂ω (q̂τ ) = 0.050
and f̂ω (q̂τ ) = 0.025 will lead to twice the estimated effect.
33Silverman’s method is reasonable given the log-linear model adopted in our paper. Still, we take a robust variation of the original
formula that involves using a fraction of the interquantile range in case this is less than the standard deviation of the estimated
distribution. Several other bandwidth methods are outlined in Pagan and Ullah (1999).
34Non-parametric methods can also be used to estimate the conditional expectations in the OB decomposition. However, more
computationally involving procedures are needed in this case to split the observed gap into its two aggregate components (Fortin et al.
2011).
35Kline (2011) proves this by showing that the standard OB decomposition reweights the observations in d=0 to match the covariate
distribution of the group d = 1, with weights estimated as linear function of the covariates. Because of this, the method provides a
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the OB decomposition based on a linear regression model yields biased estimates of ∆S when the underly-
ing conditional expectation of ω is non-linear (Barsky et al. 2002). Methods extending this decomposition
to quantiles (see, e.g., Machado and Mata 2005; Melly 2005; Albrecht et al. 2003; Chernozhukov et al.
2013), and those which use non-parametric reweighting to allow for non-linearities (e.g. DiNardo et al.
1996, Barsky et al. 2002) are unable to provide a path-independent and “exact” detailed decomposition (see
Fortin et al. 2011). This detailed decomposition is relevant as it further explains the mechanisms driving
each of the two components of the observed gap.
In order to circumvent these limitations and to obtain a more refined estimation of the composition
and wage-structure component for the τth unconditional quantile ω , ∆τX and ∆
τ
S, we apply the recent Firpo
et al.’s (2018) reweighted decomposition. It extends the original OB method using RIF regressions. As
a starting point, the authors assume the existence of an (unknown) joint distribution function Fω,x,d that
describes relationships between ω , the observed (exogenous) characteristics x, and d, which identifies the
membership to any of two (exclusive) groups. For a given worker, ω0 and ω1 are the (log) hourly wages that
would be paid if an individual was exogenously assigned to group 0 or group 1. However, because of the
fundamental problem of causal inference (Holland 1986), we observe only one of these possible outcomes
according to a (Rubin) potential-outcome model
ω = ω1d +ω0 (1−d) (3.3)
where d = 1 if the individual reports perceiving discrimination and 0 otherwise.
From observed data on the triplet (ω,x,d) we can non-parametrically identify the distribution of ω for
those with d = 1, Fω|d=1, and those with d = 0, Fω|d=0, and hence we can define observed (log) hourly wages








, with q(.) a scalar function (the quantile operator)
that estimates the τth quantile of Fω|d . By the law of total probability, Fω|d=ℓ =
∫
Fω|x,d=ℓ (.|x = x0)dFx|d=ℓ
for ℓ= 0,1, this observed gap can be re-expressed in terms of the conditional distributions of ω with respect
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(3.4)
where Fω|x,d=ℓ (w|x = x0)≡ Pr (w ≥ ω|x = x0,d = ℓ) ;ℓ= 0,1 with w a dummy argument.
The decomposition of the observed difference into the two aggregated terms requires a counterfactual
distribution. For the case where d = 1 denotes the Venezuelan worker who self-perceived discrimina-
tion, we are interested in the counterfactual that simulates the wage distribution that results if workers
with observed and unobserved characteristics in the group d = 1 were paid as those in groups d = 0, i.e.∫
Fω|x,d=0 (.|x = x0)dFx|d=1.36 We can impose some structure in the wage determination process for the
two groups by assuming that it depends on the worker’s observable (xi with support X) and unobservable
characteristics (εi ∈ Rm), as in
ωℓi = mℓ (xi,εi) ;ℓ= 0,1 (3.5)
where mℓ (.) is a real-valued mapping mℓ : X×Rm → R+. Adding and subtracting this counterfactual in
Equation 3.4 leads to
minimum mean squared error approximation to the population weights, and under actual linearity of those weights, the double-robust
property under two independent sets of assumptions ensues.
36We are making the “simple counterfactual treatment assumption”, which means that we can pay workers from a given group
according to the structure of the other. This rules out other possible counterfactual wage structures (assumption 3 of Fortin et al.
2011), including those which involve general equilibrium effects or spill-over effects. Note how we use the term “structure” to denote





















Fω|x,d=0 (.|x = x0)dFx|d=0
)]
(3.6)
where the second term in brackets is that part of the observed gap explained by differences in distribu-
tions between the two groups at the τth percentile, (∆τX ). The assumption in Equation 3.5 suggests that,
conditional on x, the distribution of wages depends on both the conditional distribution of ε and the wage
structure mℓ (.) (Fortin et al. 2011). Hence, for the first term in Equation 3.6 to actually reflect what we are
after, the part of ∆τO that only represents differences in wage structure functions m1 (.) and m0 (.) at the τth
percentile, we need to fix the distribution of observables and unobservables as the one prevailing for group
1.37
Two identifying assumptions, commonplace in the treatment effect literature (see, e.g., Angrist and
Pischke 2009 or Wooldridge 2010), achieve this. The first is common support, which implies that any real-
ization of x in X is observed for both groups: p(x0)≡ Pr (d = 1|x = x0)< 1,∀x0 ∈ X, where p(x0) is the
propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). In our application, this overlap assumption is satisfied by
ensuring that the support of the observed covariates included in the equation for d = 1 is the same as for
d = 0.38 The second assumption is unconfoundness, which states that the distribution of unobserved ex-
planatory factors is the same across the two groups once we condition on a set of observable characteristics
x: ε⊥d|x, ∀x0 ∈X. Even though this assumption strengthens the mean independence assumption to encom-
pass full conditional independence of the errors, it is less restrictive than the assumptions in the classic OB
decomposition as it is agnostic about the dependence of the potential outcomes on x (Kline 2011). Firpo
et al. (2018) show that this strong ignorability ensures that no difference in ω will be systematically attrib-
uted to differences in distributions of errors. Consequently, ∆τS can be interpreted as a quantile-treatment
effect on the treated, with ∆τX being analogous to a selection bias component (Fortin et al. 2011).
39
Arguably, the array of control variables available for the analysis render the ‘ignorability’ assumption
plausible as these are highly correlated with unobservables. Indeed, none of the control variables can
be affected by the variable d, a situation that would potentially induce an endogeneity problem in our
estimators. Due to the very high proportion of the Venezuelans who are employed, 95% (see section 3.2),
we do not have reasons to believe that they self-select into the labour market based on unobservables that
impact both the probability to work and their wage (as in Heckman 1979). This mitigates the problem
of finding variables that provide the exclusion restrictions necessary to solve this incidental truncation
problem.
Conditional on the strong ignorability assumption, the counterfactual distribution
∫
Fω|x,d=0 (.|x = x0)dFx|d=1
can be identified non-parametrically from the data, avoiding the need for an a priori (linear) functional as-
sumption for the wage structure. Firpo et al. (2018) use a reweighting function, ωc (d,x), that transforms the
features of the marginal distribution of characteristics of group d = 0 to make it similar to those in group
37The observed distribution of ω for group ℓ in terms of the corresponding structural form equals Fω|x;d=ℓ (.|x = x0) =
Pr (w ≥ mℓ (x,ε) |x = x0,d = ℓ), with w a dummy argument. Then, the simple counterfactual treatment assumption will conflate
differences in the wage structure, which is what we want ∆τS to uniquely reflect, and differences in the conditional distributions
of ε , Pr
(




Fω|x,d=1 (.|x = x0,d = 1)dFx|d=0 (x)−
∫
Fω|x,d=0 (.|x = x0,d = 0)dFx|d=0 (x) =∫
[Pr (w ≥ m1 (x,ε) |x = x0,d = 1)−Pr (w ≥ m0 (x,ε) |x = x0,d = 0)]dFx|d=0 (x). So in general q
(∫





Fω|x,d=0 (.|x = x0)dFx|d=0
)
̸= ∆vS.
38The wage of immigrants depends on the length of their stay since they arrived in Peru and their work experience in Venezuela.
These two variables are not defined for natives. Hence, to fulfil this condition, we restrict the set of conditioning variables in x for the
decomposition of Venezuelans vs Peruvians.
39This is because through Equation 3.3
∫
Fω|x,d=0 (.|x = x0)dFx|d=1 =
∫
Fω0 |x,d=0 (.|x = x0)dFx|d=1 and by ignorability∫
Fω0 |x,d=0 (.|x = x0)dFx|d=1 =
∫



















which is the treatment effect on the treated for the τth quantile (Fortin et al.
2011).
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d = 1. This is given by
∫
Fω|x,d=0 (.|x = x0)dFx|d=1 ≈
∫
Fω|x,d=0ω (d,x)dFx|d=0. The high-dimensional
problem of estimating the conditional probability of x is circumvented by the Bayes rules. This makes the





dF (d = 0)
dF (d = 1)
× dF (d = 1|x)







where ρ is the proportion of the population with d = 1. Compared to pure reweighting approaches such
as those adopted by DiNardo et al. (1996) and Barsky et al. (2002), this method also leads to efficiency
gains (Fortin et al. 2011). However, as is well known (see, e.g. Lee 2016), reweighting methods have two
potential shortcomings. The first is that poor compliance of the common support assumption renders p̂(x)
very close to 0 or 1, making ω̂c (d,x) numerically unstable. In our application, we do not find this problem.
A second concern is that, by critically relying on p(x), a misspecified treatment model would not correct
for the bias induced by selection into the treatment even if this latter is actually based on observables.
Therefore, we estimate models containing a rich set of interactions of covariates which result in their
balance across d = 1 and d = 0 groups according to standardized measures defined in Austin (2009) and to
the Imai and Ratkovic’s (2014) overidentification-restrictions test.40 The first set of models is based on a
standard interaction of covariates, including polynomials of continuous variables in a logit model estimated
by ML. The second set is based on the best-fitting (using the Akaike criterion information) treatment logit
model among a set of candidate models constructed by sequentially interacting the controls up to 4th-
degree polynomials (via Stata’s bfit command, see Cattaneo et al. 2013). The last model is chosen by
the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) logit method, which performs supervised
model selection, setting to zero some regression coefficients (after including polynomials, splines, and
interactions of the covariates in the selection model) depending on their contribution to a penalty term the
objective function (see Hastie et al. 2009 and Hastie et al. 2015 for details).41 The tuning parameter that
controls the shrinkage’s magnitude is based on the Cross-Validation method (Tibshirani 1996). Based on
the evidence from Busso et al. (2014), we normalize the resulting ω̂c (d,x) from all these models to improve
their finite sample behaviour.
The assumed linearity of the conditional RIF in Equation 3.242 implies a linear wage structure in Equa-
tion 3.5 which provides a straightforward interpretation of the components of the decomposition. Letting the
superindices indicate the sample ℓ= 0,1 (in terms of d) where the corresponding element was estimated, the
classic OB expresses the τth percentile for the counterfactual distribution q
(∫
Fω|x,d=0 (.|x = x0)dFx|d=1
)
(in Equation 3.6) as xd=1
′
β̂d=0τ . Then, it leads to the following decomposition of the hourly wage gap for

















where xd=ℓ is a (column) vector of K means and β̂d=ℓτ is a (column) vector of K least squares estimates
taking as dependent variable a consistent estimator of Equation 3.1, R̂IF (). The estimated reweighting
40This test exploits the dual property of p(x) as a conditional probability of treatment assignment and as a covariate balancing score.
Hence, after stacking the propensity score’s moment conditions and the corresponding covariate balancing moment conditions (which
provide the over-identification), the value of the objective function evaluated at the efficient GMM estimates provides the basis for a
Hansen J’s statistic.
41Our primary interest in this “first stage” of the decomposition is estimating a model that allows for covariates balance, not
selecting the covariates for the linear RIF model for ω . This latter, instead, is informed by economic theory. Hence, there is no risk of
“regularisation bias”, arising from specifying an outcome model excluding variables with non-zero coefficients from the LASSO, or
incorrect inference of the estimated coefficients at this first stage. Methods that offer “principled” variable selection (e.g. double-lasso,
Belloni et al. 2014) are not necessary for our purposes.
42Avoiding this linearity assumption would require non-parametric identification of mℓ (xi,εi) , ℓ = 0,1, which in turn demand
stronger assumptions than ignorability, such as complete unconditional independence of z and ε and strict monotonicity. This is
implausible in most applications (Fortin et al. 2011).
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factors ω̂c (d,x) allow us to express that counterfactual, instead, as xd=c
′
β̂d=cτ . These are calculated from
the sub-sample for d = 0 reweighted to have the same distribution of characteristics as the sub-sample for











ω̂c,i (d,x)xiR̂IF (.)i (3.9)





















Nevertheless, because the linear RIF model is only an approximation to a highly non-linear statistic and
the reweighting process might not exactly identify the counterfactual distribution in Equation 3.6, we can
obtain a neater estimate of the wage-structure effect by making explicit the role of these errors. This results































On the one hand, the first term within ∆̂τS is the focus of the decomposition. This corresponds to the pure
wage-structure effect (∆̂τS,p) and reflects that part of the wage-structure effect ∆̂
τ
S left after netting out, via the
re-weighting, the imbalances between the two observed groups. The second term in ∆̂τS is the re-weighting
error (∆̂τS,e) which encapsulates these imbalances in the distribution of characteristics among the groups
with d = 1 and d = 0. Note how ∆̂τS from the classic OB (first term in the right hand side Equation 3.8)
embeds this reweighting error in the simple difference between β̂d=1τ and β̂
d=0
τ .
44 The negligible size of
∆τS,e and its lack of statistical significance in our application (see section 3.6) confirm that the propensity
score models selected are adequate for identifying the counterfactual. On the other hand, the leading term in
∆̂τX is the pure composition effect (∆̂
τ
X ,p). Its associated misspecification error (∆̂
τ
X ,e) indirectly tests whether
our linear model for the outcome is valid (Fortin et al. 2011; Rios-Avila 2020; Firpo et al. 2018).45
Additionally, the detailed components of the pure effects, ∆̂τS,p and ∆̂
τ
X ,p, can be computed in the same
way as for the OB decomposition. Letting the intercept be the first term, indexed by 1, in the subvector

















τ,k − β̂ d=cτ,k
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As in the case of the mean, the components in ∆̂τS will be subject to the problem of the omitted group
46. The






















xd=c′ β̂d=cτ . As shown in Firpo et al. (2018), these estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal under additional assumptions
following the strong ignorability.
44As discussed in Firpo et al. (2018), in the classic OB mean-decomposition OLS estimates may depend on the distribution of
covariates when the conditional expectation of ω is non-linear as OLS minimizes a specification error that itself depends on the
distribution of X (White 1980). In addition, changing the distribution of x changes the Fω , leading to a change in RIF (ω;qτ ,Fω ) and,
via Equation 3.2, it in turns affects the estimated RIF coefficient. This problem is addressed by using instead β̂cτ from the reweighted
sample.








= βτ . In the
classic OB decomposition, this happens only under the actual linearity of the RIF statistic and the zero conditional mean on linear
wage structures (Firpo et al. 2018).
46Because the contribution of each covariate to ∆qS is sensitive to the choice of the base group in the regression model, the elements
of the detailed decomposition can be viewed as arbitrary, and there is no general solution to this omitted group problem. In cases
where the omitted group has a particular economic meaning, the elements of the detailed decomposition are more interpretable (see
Fortin et al. 2011; Firpo et al. 2018).
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3.5.3 Probability model method
We now describe the empirical strategy to answer the second research question, i.e. how an objective
measure of wage inequity affects the Venezuelan workers’ perception of discrimination. Letting ∆S be the
wage-structure effect, a measure of objective discrimination in (log) hourly wages, and r a (column) vector
of R control variables (which includes a constant), we use an index model for a binary response. This is
expressed as:







and can be motivated from a latent model as d∗ = ρ∆S + r
′
θ+ ε where d = 1 if d∗ > 0 and 0 otherwise.
Assuming that ε is independent of the r and ∆S and follows a standard normal distribution, it can be shown
that G is the cumulative normal distribution for a probit model, estimated by maximum likelihood method
(Wooldridge 2010). Based on section 3.3, and in special Banerjee (2008), r includes the duration of mi-
grant’s stay in Peru, education, occupation complexity score and gender.47
Every estimated equation includes the vector r and the wage-structure ∆s estimated at the mean and the
17 percentiles (mentioned above) of the unconditional distribution of ω . The wage-structure at the mean
∆S is the difference between the predicted Venezuelan wages if they were paid as natives in the Peruvian
labour market and their observed (log) hourly wage (Banerjee 2008; Biddle 2013). The prediction for
Venezuelans in this case equals the inner product of the coefficients from a classic Mincer OLS regression
on the Peruvian sample (see Table 3.A5 in Appendix) and the observed attributes of Venezuelan workers.
The wage-structure at a given percentile τ , ∆τS, is the difference between predicted wages for Venezuelans
and the RIF for the τth percentile (Equation 3.1) of their observed (log) hourly wage. In this case, the
prediction equals for Venezuelans the inner product of the coefficients from a Mincer RIF-regression for
the τth percentile (using Equation 3.2) on the Peruvian sample and the observed attributes of Venezuelan
workers. The right-hand side variables in these Mincer regressions include gender, age group (in splines),
education groups, industry group, occupation and dummies for the regions where the Venezuelans settled.
Occupation is modelled using occupational categories dummies and, alternatively, using the occupational
complexity score. Note how these estimated ∆S are not based on the re-weighting procedure described
above. However, the magnitude of these treatment estimates following the classic OB decomposition does
not appear to be statistically different from those using the more sophisticated re-weighted procedures (see
subsection 3.6.2). This indicates that it is unlikely that replacing the former with the latter in our estimation
will significantly change our results.
A potential problem with the probit model is that the departures from some of its assumptions (mainly
but not exclusively the normal distribution of ε) lead to inconsistent estimators, converging instead to a
pseudo-true value whose interpretation is not straightforward (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). This consid-
eration, in fact, appears to be absent from previous studies which also address the determinants of per-
ception of discrimination (e.g. Biddle 2013; Banerjee 2008; Auer and Ruedin 2019; Daldy et al. 2013).
Consequently, we test underlying population assumptions (correct functional form, homoscedasticity and
normality) behind this estimators’ consistency and asymptotic normality using the framework in Chesher
















47An alternative model by Auer and Ruedin (2019) includes variables related to drivers, attachment and acceptance of the immigrant
to the host country. We do not follow this conceptualization since significant predictors in their study, for Switzerland, do not apply in
the current case. For instance, as discussed in section 3.2, Venezuelans do not face a language barrier, while the Peruvian legislation
does not allow foreigners, including Venezuelans, as congressmen. Also, their measure of “relationship with the immigration author-
ity” is not defined in our case as the sudden emergence of the Exodus made it unfeasible for the Peruvian government to provide an
articulated system of legal and bureaucratic counselling to these migrants.
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where i is a n×1 vector of ones (n being the number of Venezuelan workers) and R is an n× (1+R+P)
matrix whose columns are comprised by score contributions of each of the covariates in the model (com-
puted by multiplying ∆S and r, without the intercept, by the generalised residual), the generalised (or
pseudo) residual itself and a set of P additional terms (also interacted with the generalized residual) which
depend on the specific test. A test for the correct functional form in Equation 3.12, akin got the RESET test
(Ramsey 1969), includes in P the quadratic, cubic and quartic of the standardised probit index (and so P = 3
for this test). For a general test of heteroskedasticity, the P terms are the original explanatory variables in
the model (P = R). For testing normality, we focus on skewness and excess of kurtosis in the generalised
residuals (P = 2). Each test is chi-square distributed with P degrees of freedom under the corresponding
null hypothesis (no incorrect functional form, no heteroskedasticity and no normality, respectively).
3.5.4 Summary
The preceding methods described in this section are used in the following three separate exercises. First,
we complement the mean analysis by using unconditional quantile regressions to estimate the impact of the
perception of workplace discrimination on the hourly wages of Venezuelans in Peru based on an intercept
shift. This is then developed using an extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition outlined by Firpo
et al. (2018), incorporating re-weighting using separate sub-samples for those Venezuelans who perceive
discrimination and those who do not. This enables the estimation of the treatment effects across the un-
conditional log wage distribution. Second, we replicate this analysis using separate samples for Peruvians
and Venezuelans in the informal sector to estimate the magnitude of the pay gap between ‘natives’ and ‘mi-
grants’ at the mean and across the unconditional pay distribution. Finally, we integrate both these strands
by examining, using a probit model, the factors that determine whether or not Venezuelans perceive they
are subject to discrimination. This model includes, inter alia, a simple individual-level treatment effect of
the wage differential between what a Venezuelan earns in the Peruvian informal labour market and what
would be earned if the individual was rewarded according to a Peruvian pay schedule.
3.6 Empirical results
3.6.1 Perception of unequal treatment and the wage gap
The following subsection reports the results restricting the sample to only Venezuelans and taking as the
treatment and individual’s self-perception of workplace discrimination. This variable d is equal to 1 for
those Venezuelans who self-perceived workplace discrimination and 0 for those who did not. Firstly, we
show the observed and partial gaps (or ceteris paribus) gaps across the Venezuelan unconditional distribution
of the (log) hourly wages, defined as Fω . Attention then turns to the results for the (re-weighted) OB
decomposition in terms of their aggregate components and detailed effects.
3.6.1.1 Estimation
The extension of the analysis in Table 3.3 confirms that the perception of discrimination is associated with
an actual (statistically significant) negative effect on (log) hourly wages for most of the percentiles of the
distribution Fω (Figure 3.2). Specifically, the observed gaps are around 5% across different percentiles from
the first to the eighth decile. Adjusting these raw gaps using RIF regression (Equation 3.2) to control for
demographic variables (gender, age, education) and industry and occupation (either as occupation dummies
or as a complexity score) suggest a slightly higher penalty at every percentile of Fω . The point estimates
for these adjusted penalties are between 6% and 9% across the first half of the unconditional distribution of
ω . These reduce to 5% at the 80th percentile, losing statistical significance onwards. In general, however,
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these effects are fairly homogeneous across Fω (except beyond the 8th decile) and are primarily in comfort
with the mean penalty of approximately 7% (as displayed by the horizontal lines in these figures).
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Observed gap
Partial gap (Occup. dummies)
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Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years old who arrived after January 2016 onwards. (Log) hourly wages
include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The graph shows the observed and partial
effect of perceived discrimination on the unconditional distribution of the dependent variable from different models (shown in table 4) at 17 percentiles (beginning at the
10th in steps of 5, circles) and at the mean (solid horizontal line). Vertical lines correspond to the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals adjusting for clustering.
Source: Author's calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
Further details of the ceteris paribus effects of the observed characteristic at different percentiles of Fω
are provided in Table 3.4. The reported goodness of fit measures are around 9% for the effects at the mean
(OLS) and median (50th percentile) and fall to about 5% at the bottom and top deciles. The magnitude
of the estimated effects for demographic variables does not depend on the variable we use for occupation.
In contrast to what is found for the sample of Peruvians (see Table 3.A5), the partial gender gap across
the distribution of ω is no longer statistically significant, except at the very top (i.e., 9th decile) where
being a female is associated with a partial penalty between 5% and 6%. An additional year for those
Venezuelans aged 36-45 is associated with increasing their hourly wage by 1%. In turn, an additional year
for Venezuelans in the eldest bracket (56 to 65) enhances their wages for those in the upper half of Fω . The
estimated effects for education yield the anticipated effects, although the penalty associated with having
secondary education relative to college education widens from -3% at the 10th percentile of Fω to -7% at
the 75th. In comparison, the penalty for primary education exhibits the opposite pattern, reducing from
-14% at the 10th percentile to -7% at the 75th percentile.
The effect of labour market characteristics based on the same table suggests that being employed in the
Wholesale and Retail industry, the leading industrial sector for Venezuelans (see section 3.2), has a negative
partial effect on Fω compared to Venezuelans in the manufacturing industry. It reaches -5% at the mean
and is between -11% and -8% for the lower percentiles. Even larger penalties are found for Venezuelans
employed in the Transport, Storage and Communication sector, with the differential effect as large as almost
-20% at the bottom of Fω . Plausibly, this is because Venezuelans in this industry mainly provide transport
services for passengers and goods (e.g., as couriers) using digital platforms. In Peru, this type of work is
characterized by poor working conditions, a lack of regulation and even the lack of verification regarding
basic legal requirements such as driving license, and police permits, resulting in wages below the specified
legal minimum (see OIT 2021). The largest occupational penalties relative to those in technical jobs are for
those employed as Service and Sales workers and in Elementary occupations. These are, precisely, the two
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occupational categories with the largest share of Venezuelan workers (see table Table 3.2). The relative pay
penalties are 13% and 10% at the median but widen to 43% and 37% at the upper parts of Fω , respectively.
Their work experience acquired back in Venezuela does impact their wages. The reduced room for wage
bargaining by being employed in the informal economy partly explains this. Nonetheless, time spent in Peru
has a significant cumulative effect. Eight months after their arrival, the average worker secures a (partial)
premium of 8% compared to those who arrived more recently.
3.6.1.2 Decomposition
In order to complement these findings on self-perceived discrimination adjusted gaps, we now estimate
∆S, which represents that part of the observed gap corresponding to the differential labour-market payment
received by those who perceive discrimination relative to those who did not. Due to our maintained assump-
tion of selection on observables, ∆S can be interpreted here as a quantile-estimate of the treatment effect
on the non-treated. In other words, it represents how much lower the wages are for those who experienced
discrimination relative to a counterfactual situation had these workers never experienced such treatment.
A first approach for estimating this distributional treatment effect is given by the classic (unweighted)
OB RIF-decomposition following Equation 3.8. This reveals that most of the observed differences in ω
between those two groups can be almost exclusively attributed to the wage structure effect (left panel of
Figure 3.3). I.e., differences in unobserved payments in the labour market for those who perceive unequal
treatment and those who did not mainly explain the gap. The components of the detailed decomposition
(right panel of Figure 3.3) reveal that, at first glance, age (ticked lines) has an inverted U pattern across the
wages distributions. However, an examination of its explained and unexplained components (in Table 3.A3)
reveal they are estimated rather noisily, with none of the subcomponents found to be statistically significant
across the percentiles of Fω .
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Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years who arrived to Peru from January 2016. (Log) hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. 
Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The graph shows the decomposition components, without reweighting, at selected statistics, with ∆X and ∆S being the total Composition and total Wage
structure effects. The outcome model includes occupational dummies, see the text for details on the treatment model and the decomposition. (g) means that the component of the detailed decomposition refers to the effect after grouping
the corresponding dummies (see table 2 for the categories of the control variables). Vertical lines correspond to the bootstrapped SEs adjusting for clustering.
Source: Author's calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
In order to assess the validity of the local RIF approximation, which is mostly a practical issue (Fortin
et al. 2011), we compare these results with the re-weighted decomposition. One of the main elements be-
hind the Firpo et al. (2018) approach are the estimated weights which allow us to transform the features of
the marginal distribution of the outcome variable (i.e., the log hourly wages) into features of the counterfac-
tual distribution (as in Equation 3.7). The estimated counterfactual densities (Figure 3.4) convey how the
approach takes the probability density for the outcome variable for those who perceived discrimination and
renders it more similar to the probability density for those that did not. The six different treatment mod-
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els that we estimate here are broadly similar to each other. Furthermore, there is no evidence of features
that can potentially induce problems in the interpretation of empirical results, such as ’cliffs’ or ’peaks’
associated with, say, minimum wages at the bottom end of the distribution, or evidence of censoring of the
distribution at higher percentiles.
Figure 3.4 – (Log) hourly wage distribution for Venezuelan immigrant workers by perception of
discrimination and for reweighted sample
µ: Disc=1.04, Non disc=1.10
p10: Disc=0.52, Non disc=0.58
p25: Disc=0.77, Non disc=0.81
p50: Disc=1.01, Non disc=1.05
p75: Disc=1.28, Non disc=1.32
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Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years old who arrived after January 2016 onwards. (Log) hourly wages 
include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The graph shows kernel estimates of 
the unconditional distribution of the dependent variable by perception of discrimination and of the reweighted samples from different treatment models (see text for 
the covariates included in the treatment models). The procedure reweights those who did perceived discrimination as if they did not.
Source: Author's calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
The reweighted decomposition results (see the upper panel of Figure 3.5), following Equation 3.10,
point in the same direction. The differences in log hourly wages between those who perceived workplace
discrimination and those who did not are practically equal to the overall wage structure effect. In fact,
this unexplained effect, which is statistically different from zero, equals the pure unexplained effect ∆S,p
(bottom part). This confirms that our previous estimates of ∆S reflect the unequal treatment. The non-
statistically significance of the reweighting errors ∆S,e at every percentile of the unconditional distribution
of ω provides further validation. In addition, the non-significance of the specification error, ∆X ,e, suggests
that the linear RIF-regression model provides a good fit even in the presence of high non-linearities of the
population statistic or a random coefficients model (middle panel). Following Equation 3.11 and reported
in Table 3.5, the detailed decomposition suggests that across the percentiles of Fω the time (in months)
since their arrival in Peru and education levels are the two leading (statistically significant) drivers of the
composition effect. Their estimated signs mean that their superior knowledge of the labour market and
their higher skills of those who reported experiencing discrimination provide them with a wage advantage
compared to those who did not perceive workplace discrimination. However, this is counteracted by the
wage-structure effect that acts against them. These results are invariant to whether or not an individual’s
occupation is parametrized using occupational dummies or occupational complexity score (Figure 3.A5 and
Table 3.A4 in Appendix).
3.6.1.3 Robustness checks
Results from the reweighted OB decomposition make two implicit assumptions, as discussed in section 3.5.
The first one relates to the choice of the treatment model that provides the propensity scores and hence the
weights ωc (d,x) used in Equation 3.7. The modelling above uses a rich set of interactions and polynomials
of demographic and labour market variables, chosen a priori and successfully balanced the covariates across
the two groups d = 1 and d = 0. The second assumption corresponds to the bandwidth and the assumed
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kernel functions used to estimate fω (.) in Equation 3.1. We have taken a standard approach in terms of the
bandwidth by following Silverman’s bandwidth rule. However, the validity of the local approximation that
the RIF relies on is ultimately an empirical question. Consequently, to confirm that these assumptions do
not drive our results, we re-estimate the decompositions above under alternative assumptions. Throughout,
we take occupation dummies instead of occupation complexity scores for the log hourly wage model.
A key finding is that changing the treatment model does not change our results (see Figure 3.A6).
Put differently, taking a sequential or more computer-driven approach for the treatment assignment model
specification (see section 3.5) has no material effect on the key conclusions reported above. This is not
surprising since, as depicted in Figure 3.4, the reweighting of the distribution under different approaches
provides a similar counterfactual density of ω . For the robustness of the bandwidth and kernel density, we
take three different alternatives instead. The first is Silverman’s rule taking the canonical bandwidth48 from
the Epanechnikov kernel function. The second is the Sheather-Jones plug-in estimator of the bandwidth
again with the Epanechnikov function. The last one is the bandwidth from the normal approximation with
the Gaussian (normal) kernel. The results from these variations are indistinguishable from our main findings
(see Figure 3.A7).
An alternative type of robustness check implies taking a different definition of the outcomes and em-
ployment. On the one hand, we now take the (log.) hourly wages arising only from the main occupation.
This results in slightly larger (negative) gaps across Fω . However, these are not statistically different from
the results explained above (Figure 3.A8). On the other hand, we restrict the definition of worker to only
those employees in blue-collar and white-collar occupations, excluding independent and employers. This
reduces the number of observations from 6,1.25 to 4,659. Although the basic treatment assignment model
has a more critical effect on our estimates (Figure 3.A9), it conveys the same essential message: the wage-
structure effect is the most important factor behind the observed gaps. It also yields a loss of statistical
significance of the observed gaps in the first two deciles of the wage distribution. A statistical explanation
for this corresponds to the reduction of the sample size implied by this robustness check. However, a more
economic-focused interpretation is that the wages of blue-collar and white-collar Venezuelan workers at
the very bottom of the distribution are low enough to be reduced by experiencing discrimination (assum-
ing that there is a reasonably close correspondence between the perception and the actual occurrence of
discrimination).





)2) 15 where R(K) is a measure of the curvature of the chosen Kernel and σ2K is its variance (Pagan
and Ullah 1999).
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Table 3.4 – Adjusted perceived unequal treatment using Mincerian equations for (log) hourly wages for
Venezuelan immigrants
Occupation dummies Occupational complexity score
Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
If perceived discrimination (d) -0.066*** -0.086*** -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.049*** -0.003 -0.069*** -0.091*** -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.052*** -0.007
(0.014) (0.027) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.033) (0.014) (0.027) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.031)
If is male (d) -0.021 0.038* 0.005 0.005 -0.008 -0.064* -0.015 0.025 0.006 0.011 0.004 -0.053
(0.015) (0.022) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.033) (0.015) (0.021) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.032)
Age splines (years)
18-25 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.001 -0.013 0.002 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.002 -0.013
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
26-35 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
36-45 -0.010*** -0.020*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.005 0.003 -0.010*** -0.021*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.005 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
46-55 0.004 0.011 0.004 0.000 0.003 -0.007 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.001 0.004 -0.006
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012)
56-65 0.038** 0.007 0.013 0.026** 0.038** 0.083** 0.038** 0.007 0.013 0.027** 0.038** 0.082**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.039) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.012) (0.019) (0.036)
Education level (base: College)
Primary -0.100*** -0.140*** -0.092*** -0.096*** -0.067*** -0.065 -0.112*** -0.161*** -0.102*** -0.107*** -0.078*** -0.083*
(0.020) (0.053) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.049) (0.023) (0.052) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.049)
Secondary -0.053*** -0.012 -0.042*** -0.063*** -0.060*** -0.089*** -0.063*** -0.032 -0.052*** -0.073*** -0.068*** -0.104***
(0.016) (0.027) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.032) (0.017) (0.028) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.032)
Technical -0.017 -0.003 0.001 -0.014 -0.034* -0.052 -0.022 -0.013 -0.003 -0.018 -0.038** -0.060*
(0.017) (0.029) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.037) (0.017) (0.029) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.036)
Industry (base: Manufacture)
Agriculture 0.259 0.074 0.086 0.071 0.139 0.464 0.279 0.112 0.076 0.058 0.159 0.526
(0.188) (0.126) (0.113) (0.106) (0.157) (0.428) (0.183) (0.122) (0.111) (0.107) (0.171) (0.403)
Construction 0.273*** 0.149*** 0.147*** 0.241*** 0.358*** 0.582*** 0.276*** 0.167*** 0.143*** 0.233*** 0.359*** 0.584***
(0.032) (0.046) (0.026) (0.033) (0.044) (0.086) (0.029) (0.039) (0.023) (0.028) (0.041) (0.088)
Wholesale and retail -0.052* -0.101*** -0.080*** -0.036 -0.041 -0.001 -0.079*** -0.060* -0.107*** -0.086*** -0.087*** -0.034
(0.027) (0.037) (0.024) (0.026) (0.037) (0.061) (0.020) (0.036) (0.022) (0.024) (0.030) (0.044)
Transp., storage, and comm. -0.110*** -0.213*** -0.142*** -0.072** -0.079* 0.034 -0.114*** -0.204*** -0.156*** -0.089*** -0.082** 0.053
(0.035) (0.066) (0.035) (0.034) (0.046) (0.081) (0.033) (0.062) (0.036) (0.034) (0.040) (0.065)
FIRE and Services 0.072** 0.022 0.000 0.046 0.036 0.197*** 0.081*** 0.085** -0.003 0.033 0.032 0.212***
(0.032) (0.039) (0.026) (0.028) (0.036) (0.073) (0.023) (0.038) (0.023) (0.027) (0.031) (0.059)
Occupation (base: Technical)
Managers and professionals 0.072 0.065 0.051 0.087* 0.069 -0.037
(0.067) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.077) (0.156)
Clerical workers -0.123*** -0.019 0.016 -0.012 -0.156*** -0.429***
(0.037) (0.046) (0.032) (0.031) (0.052) (0.121)
Service and sales workers -0.179*** -0.074* -0.084*** -0.140*** -0.223*** -0.359***
(0.038) (0.041) (0.029) (0.028) (0.041) (0.114)
Craft and trades workers -0.129*** -0.145*** -0.019 -0.045 -0.135*** -0.316***
(0.039) (0.042) (0.031) (0.031) (0.043) (0.118)
Machine operators -0.156*** -0.185*** -0.074** -0.098** -0.151*** -0.283**
(0.045) (0.060) (0.036) (0.041) (0.051) (0.120)
Elementary occupations -0.145*** -0.113*** -0.058** -0.104*** -0.159*** -0.320***
(0.041) (0.037) (0.027) (0.025) (0.044) (0.120)
Occup. complexity score 0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.002 0.007*** 0.008
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
If employed in Venezuela (d) 0.003 -0.033 -0.014 0.001 0.009 0.008 0.005 -0.031 -0.012 0.004 0.011 0.009
(0.017) (0.028) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.039) (0.016) (0.029) (0.017) (0.016) (0.022) (0.038)
Length of stay in Peru 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 1.153*** 0.546*** 0.745*** 0.992*** 1.369*** 2.112*** 1.001*** 0.460** 0.708*** 0.909*** 1.189*** 1.776***
(0.112) (0.176) (0.120) (0.120) (0.139) (0.239) (0.116) (0.179) (0.118) (0.109) (0.122) (0.203)
N 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125
R2 0.098 0.050 0.076 0.092 0.076 0.045 0.091 0.048 0.072 0.084 0.069 0.039
Model χ2 test 1025.455 141.974 490.049 687.844 469.782 190.413 774.906 179.833 371.371 547.790 375.508 195.170
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Demog. vars χ2 test 54.248 36.714 50.113 65.594 23.445 23.017 60.772 49.261 73.271 77.276 30.288 25.885
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.006] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
Industry vars χ2 test 175.587 55.499 119.066 144.204 100.077 68.562 219.068 70.279 143.656 181.618 134.308 79.198
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Occupation vars χ2 test 42.672 24.280 46.171 70.483 65.420 16.761 1.789 2.390 1.995 1.409 11.600 1.721
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.010] [0.181] [0.122] [0.158] [0.235] [0.001] [0.190]
Notes: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years old who arrived after January 2016 onwards. (Log) hourly wages include income
from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The table shows the partial effects on the unconditional distribution of
the dependent variable at selected statistics from 2 different models. College includes also Postgraduate level. Agriculture industry includes also forestry, fishing and Mining and quarrying.
Wholesale and Retail industry includes also Hotels and Restaurants and FIRE and Services Industry includes communication, social and personal services. Technical workers occupations
includes Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers. Occupational complexity score following Ottaviano et al. (2013). Department dummies not shown. Bootstraped SEs (in parenthesis)
and p-values of the χ2 tests (in brackets) adjusting for clustering. (d)=dummy variable. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s
calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
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Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years who arrived to Peru from January 2016. (Log) hourly wages include
> tion and total Wage
structure effects. The outcome model includes occupational dummies, see the text for details on the treatment model and the decomposition. (g) means that the component of the detailed decomposition refers to the effect after grouping
the corresponding dummies (see table 2 for the categories of the control variables). Vertical lines correspond to the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals adjusting for clustering.
Source: Author's calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
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Table 3.5 – Detailed Reweighted OB decomposition of (log) hourly wages for Venezuelan immigrants by
self-perceived discrimination
Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Overall
Discriminated 1.032*** (0.017) 0.515*** (0.022) 0.772*** (0.020) 1.007*** (0.024) 1.271*** (0.016) 1.632*** (0.031)
Non discriminated 1.089*** (0.011) 0.572*** (0.018) 0.815*** (0.012) 1.044*** (0.010) 1.311*** (0.013) 1.629*** (0.021)
Disc. rwgt. as non 1.023*** (0.016) 0.508*** (0.031) 0.758*** (0.022) 1.002*** (0.025) 1.266*** (0.016) 1.614*** (0.030)
Obs. difference -0.057*** (0.014) -0.057** (0.023) -0.043** (0.018) -0.037 (0.025) -0.040** (0.019) 0.003 (0.030)
Total explained 0.009 (0.010) 0.007 (0.019) 0.014 (0.013) 0.006 (0.015) 0.005 (0.011) 0.018 (0.020)
Total unexplained -0.066*** (0.014) -0.064** (0.030) -0.058*** (0.020) -0.043* (0.025) -0.045** (0.019) -0.015 (0.030)
Explained Component
Specification error -0.001 (0.006) -0.004 (0.012) 0.006 (0.009) 0.000 (0.010) -0.003 (0.009) 0.007 (0.013)
Pure explained 0.010 (0.010) 0.011 (0.013) 0.008 (0.009) 0.005 (0.009) 0.008 (0.011) 0.010 (0.017)
Sex 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.000 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.003)
Age (g) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) -0.002 (0.003)
Education (g) 0.007** (0.003) 0.005 (0.005) 0.005* (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 0.006* (0.003) 0.007* (0.004)
Industry (g) -0.011* (0.006) -0.008 (0.005) -0.007* (0.004) -0.010** (0.005) -0.012 (0.008) -0.015 (0.015)
Occupation (g) -0.003 (0.003) -0.004 (0.004) -0.003 (0.002) -0.003 (0.003) -0.006 (0.004) -0.002 (0.006)
Employed in Venez. -0.000 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002)
Length in Peru 0.010** (0.004) 0.004 (0.005) 0.006* (0.003) 0.009*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.004) 0.014*** (0.005)
Region 0.006 (0.004) 0.015* (0.009) 0.008 (0.005) 0.005 (0.004) 0.004 (0.005) 0.005 (0.005)
Unexplained Component
Reweighting error 0.000 (0.003) -0.000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.003) -0.000 (0.003) -0.000 (0.004) 0.003 (0.006)
Pure unexplained -0.066*** (0.015) -0.064** (0.029) -0.058*** (0.020) -0.042* (0.025) -0.045** (0.019) -0.018 (0.030)
Sex -0.003 (0.021) -0.033 (0.030) 0.007 (0.022) 0.002 (0.020) -0.008 (0.023) 0.022 (0.043)
Age (g) -0.257 (0.232) -0.546 (0.414) -0.002 (0.263) 0.050 (0.267) -0.174 (0.286) -0.964* (0.543)
Education (g) -0.011 (0.022) -0.007 (0.033) -0.008 (0.024) -0.001 (0.026) -0.015 (0.024) -0.019 (0.049)
Industry (g) 0.003 (0.044) -0.097 (0.069) -0.014 (0.048) -0.024 (0.062) 0.033 (0.069) 0.127 (0.112)
Occupation (g) 0.046 (0.080) -0.019 (0.092) -0.066 (0.062) -0.052 (0.073) 0.044 (0.105) 0.350** (0.162)
Employed in Venez. 0.003 (0.028) -0.034 (0.047) -0.011 (0.040) -0.033 (0.034) 0.042 (0.036) 0.022 (0.069)
Length in Peru 0.002 (0.024) -0.045 (0.043) -0.021 (0.028) 0.008 (0.021) 0.016 (0.028) 0.007 (0.053)
Region 0.007 (0.015) 0.026 (0.029) 0.007 (0.022) 0.000 (0.013) -0.011 (0.019) 0.003 (0.033)
Constant 0.146 (0.255) 0.691 (0.456) 0.049 (0.285) 0.007 (0.302) 0.029 (0.331) 0.433 (0.563)
Notes: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years old who arrived after January 2016 onwards. (Log)
hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The table show
the components of the detailed decomposition, reweighting those who perceived discrimination as if they did not, at selected statistics of the unconditional distribution
of the dependent variable using coefficients from RIF regression. The outcome model includes occupational dummies, see the text for details on the treatment model.
(g) means that the component of the detailed decomposition refers to the effect after grouping the corresponding dummies (see table 2 for the categories of the control
variables). Bootstraped SEs (in parenthesis) adjust for clustering. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s
calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
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3.6.2 Actual unequal treatment and the wage gap
The evidence in the previous subsection suggests the unconditional gaps between those who perceived
workplace discrimination and those who did not are almost exclusively explained by the wage structure
component. However, this does not inform the more critical question about whether or not the labour
market differentially pays the observed characteristics of Venezuelans compared to Peruvian workers. This
actual differential may be larger than that based on the perception of discrimination in the previous sub-
section. To assess this, we now merge the Peruvian and Venezuelan data and construct a treatment variable
to re-do the decomposition analysis. The treatment assignment is now based on the worker’s nationality,
with d = 1 being Peruvians and d = 0 otherwise. As argued in section 3.3, this is a more direct approach to
actual discrimination.
The estimated wage-structure effect for Venezuelans (based on the procedure described in section 3.4)
suggest that if their characteristics were rewarded commensurate with those of a comparable Peruvian
worker (upper panel Figure 3.6 with occupation modelled as a set of dummies), the resulting simulated
distribution would exhibit higher means and percentiles, and also a smaller standard deviation (0.49 for the
observed and 0.27 for the simulated). For example, the observed average of ω for Venezuelans would be
0.29 log points higher than that observed (it rises from 1.08 to 1.37). In addition, the first decile would be
0.50 log points larger (rising from 0.55 to 1.10), and the difference would progressively reduce, contracting
up to 0.44 log points at the last decile (rising from 1.63 to 1.67). The effect of differential rewards between
Peruvians and Venezuelans operates stronger on males than females (lower panel of Figure 3.6). For these,
the simulated mean is 0.4 log points larger than the observed while that at the first and last decile is 89 and
11 percentage points, respectively. Similar conclusions hold when we model occupation using the com-
plexity score (Figure 3.A10). The sign and magnitude of the estimated coefficients based on the Peruvian
sample on which these results are based (Table 3.A5 in Appendix) provide a sense of validity to these direct
discrimination measures.
The differences between the simulated and observed distributions suggests a sizeable unequal treat-
ment for Venezuelan workers relative to their Peruvian counterparts. In order to analyze how much of the
observed gap is explained by the differential labour market payment based on the nationality of the work-
ers, we use the classic (unweighted) OB RIF-decomposition following Equation 3.849. Examining these
gaps and their decomposition across quantiles suggests two essential facts (Figure 3.7). First, the observed
(total) differences in ω between immigrants and natives monotonically increase as we move towards the up-
per parts of the unconditional log hourly wage distribution. At the 10th percentile, the gap is negative, with
Peruvians’ hourly wages 20% lower than Venezuelans. At the 20th percentile, the difference stops being
statistically different from zero. From that percentile onwards, the gap turns positive with Peruvians earning
a wage 80% higher at the 90th percentile. Secondly, similar to what we find when analysing self-perceived
workplace discrimination, most of these differences are attributed to a wage-structure effect. Thus, the ∆X
component is not statistically significant for most of the distribution (except at the top quartile). These same
results hold even if we decompose the observed gap using the reweighted method (Figure 3.A11).
In contrast to the detailed decomposition for self-perceived discrimination, the contribution of some
key factors behind the wage-structure effect is statistically different from zero (Table 3.6)50. Specifically,
Peruvians obtain higher returns for being male than Venezuelans across the distribution, and this magnitude
is not negligible. Indeed, this difference ranges between 10% (which occurs at the median) to 20% (at the
very bottom of the unconditional distribution). Interestingly, Peruvians, whose educational endowments are
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now identifies a quantile-treatment effect on the non-treated, i.e. how much higher would be the wages of Venezuelans if their attributes
were rewarded as Peruvians.
50Note how, unlike Equation 3.11, in this case the detailed decompositions are given by ∆̂τS =
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Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years and those who arrived 
to Peru from January 2016 onwards. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. Simulated 
distribution based on coefficients from Mincer equations of (log) hourly wages including income from the main and secondary 
occupations on Peruvian workers (shown in table A6) which include occupational dummies. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. 
Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO (2018) and ENPOVE data (2018).
lower, also receive lower education returns than Venezuelans. This is evidence that, effectively, employers
are aware of the lower skills of their natives, and hence are paid accordingly. In addition, differences in
occupations play a relevant role in ∆X and, not surprisingly, favour Peruvians across the unconditional
distribution of the (log) hourly wages.
We analyze the robustness of these results by running the same checks as in the previous subsection.
Again, changing the bandwidth and kernel density provides the same results as our main findings (see
Figure 3.A12). This robustness is also found when we take as the outcome the (log.) hourly wages arising
only from the main occupation (Figure 3.A13). The last check, restricting the type of workers who are
included in the sample for estimation, results in a more significant wage gap favouring Peruvians throughout
the unconditional distribution of ω (Figure 3.A14). The disadvantage of Peruvians at the very bottom of the
distribution disappears under this redefinition. Instead, the former have a wage advantage in 10 log points
compared to Venezuelans. However, the main message in the OB decomposition remains: the wage gap’s
main driver is the differential treatment that Venezuelans face in the labour market.
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years. Additionally, sample for Peruvians restricted to those regions exposed to Venezuelan migration and sample for Venezuelans restricted
to those regions who arrived to Peru from January 2016 onwards. (Log) hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation.
The graph shows the decomposition components, without reweighting, at selected statistics, with ∆X and ∆S being the total Composition and total Wage structure effects. The outcome model includes occupational dummies,
see the text for details on the decomposition. Vertical lines correspond to the bootstrapped SEs adjusting for clustering. Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO and ENPOVE (2018) data.
Table 3.6 – Detailed unweighted OB decomposition of (log) hourly wages by Peruvians and Venezuelan
workers
Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Overall
Peruvian 1.322*** (0.013) 0.373*** (0.026) 0.920*** (0.019) 1.334*** (0.012) 1.776*** (0.015) 2.231*** (0.017)
Venezuelans 1.077*** (0.011) 0.555*** (0.019) 0.804*** (0.011) 1.061*** (0.009) 1.297*** (0.009) 1.629*** (0.019)
Obs. difference 0.245*** (0.017) -0.182*** (0.031) 0.117*** (0.022) 0.274*** (0.015) 0.479*** (0.017) 0.602*** (0.024)
Total explained 0.086** (0.041) -0.006 (0.025) 0.026 (0.027) 0.034 (0.024) 0.090*** (0.034) 0.192** (0.078)
Total unexplained 0.159*** (0.046) -0.175*** (0.040) 0.090*** (0.034) 0.240*** (0.027) 0.389*** (0.038) 0.410*** (0.083)
Explained Component
Sex -0.001 (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002)
Age (g) 0.013 (0.012) -0.032** (0.014) -0.007 (0.009) 0.003 (0.010) 0.028** (0.014) 0.062*** (0.022)
Education (g) -0.018*** (0.004) -0.012** (0.006) -0.017*** (0.003) -0.022*** (0.004) -0.017*** (0.004) -0.020*** (0.007)
Industry (g) 0.055 (0.041) 0.020 (0.022) 0.028 (0.023) 0.020 (0.022) 0.035 (0.031) 0.089 (0.073)
Occupation (g) 0.031*** (0.006) 0.011** (0.005) 0.015*** (0.005) 0.027*** (0.005) 0.039*** (0.007) 0.057*** (0.016)
Region (g) 0.007 (0.004) 0.005 (0.006) 0.008 (0.005) 0.005 (0.005) 0.005 (0.004) 0.007 (0.005)
Unexplained Component
Sex 0.144*** (0.020) 0.201*** (0.040) 0.127*** (0.024) 0.101*** (0.020) 0.114*** (0.021) 0.142*** (0.033)
Age (g) 0.320 (0.219) -0.420 (0.458) 0.417 (0.294) 0.396 (0.259) 0.429* (0.260) 0.422 (0.359)
Education (g) -0.187*** (0.034) -0.230*** (0.060) -0.132*** (0.036) -0.073** (0.033) -0.196*** (0.049) -0.266*** (0.064)
Industry (g) 0.038 (0.058) -0.045 (0.079) 0.019 (0.054) 0.015 (0.050) 0.145** (0.067) 0.027 (0.115)
Occupation (g) 0.063 (0.044) 0.291*** (0.063) 0.170*** (0.042) 0.059 (0.038) -0.042 (0.051) -0.092 (0.098)
Region (g) -0.036** (0.015) -0.088*** (0.031) -0.034* (0.017) -0.003 (0.014) -0.014 (0.020) -0.077*** (0.029)
Constant -0.182 (0.240) 0.115 (0.473) -0.476 (0.310) -0.254 (0.275) -0.048 (0.280) 0.253 (0.397)
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years. Additionally, sample for Peruvians restricted to those regions exposed
to Venezuelan migration and sample for Venezuelans restricted to those regions who arrived to Peru from January 2016 onwards. (Log) hourly wages include income
from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The table show the components of the detailed
decomposition, reweighting those who perceived discrimination as if they did not, at selected statistics of the unconditional distribution of the dependent variable using
coefficients from RIF regression. The outcome model includes occupational dummies, see the text for details on the treatment model. (g) means that the component of
the detailed decomposition refers to the effect after grouping the corresponding dummies (see table 2 for the categories of the outcome variables). Bootstraped SEs (in
parenthesis) adjust for clustering. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO and
ENPOVE (2018) data.
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3.6.3 Impact of wage-structure on perception of unequal treatment
The above partial (or ceteris paribus) gaps and the wage-structure components allow us to disentangle the
factors driving the observed gaps that are attributable to discrimination experienced by Venezuelans. Atten-
tion now turns to an explanation of the factors that drive the Venezuelans’ perception of workplace discrim-
ination. We are interested in the impact of the nationality-based wage-structure effect, ∆S (expressed again
in logs), once we control for factors that can be regarded as relevant predictors of migrants’ expectations of
equal treatment and their awareness of inequalities (see section 3.5 for the construction of ∆S).
As discussed in section 3.5, a potential issue, usually overlooked by studies who analyze the determ-
inants of this perception is that the violation of assumptions behind conditional maximum likelihood es-
timation results in estimators that converge instead to a pseudo-true value. The p-values from the tests for
heteroskedasticity, normality and functional form (bottom of the Table 3.7) confirm that all key assumptions
are comfortably satisfied in our probit regressions. The coefficient of interest, the unequal treatment meas-
ure, has a positive partial effect across the different estimated models and always retains the same level of
statistical significance throughout (Table 3.7). This holds regardless of how we estimate the wage-structure
effect, suggesting that perceptions of discrimination correlate with wage disparity and confirm that employ-
ees correctly are underpaid. From the model with all covariates included, doubling the wage-structure effect
increases the probability of perceiving discrimination by (ln2× 0.040 =) 2.8 percentage points relative to
a mean of 20% (see Table 3.2). Even though its numerical magnitude is small, it is still larger than what
is found by Biddle (2013) and Banerjee (2008); in this latter case, the same change to ∆s results in a 0.01
percentage points increase in the probability.51
In contrast, some other covariates in the table exert larger effects. Being a female, for example, increases
the probability of perceiving discrimination by four percentage points. Those with higher education are also
more prone to perceive workplace discrimination. A Venezuelan with some college or a technical degree
has an increased perception of discrimination of almost five percentages points relative to someone with just
primary education. This indicates that the inequality exerted against the average Venezuelan worker makes
the migrant more aware of attitudes of discrimination against him. Thus, if they find that their qualifications
are undervalued, they may believe that discrimination is at play (Banerjee 2008). One extra month in Peru
also has a very moderate effect on the perception of discrimination. However, it becomes non-negligible
when we consider that the average Venezuelan, who has been eight months in Peru, has a probability of
perceiving unequal treatment five percentage points larger than when he arrived. Interestingly, while age
is not an statistically significant determinant of self-perceiving discrimination, previous work experience
in Venezuela is a statistically significant determinant. This asymmetry can be ascribed to the fact that
Venezuelan workers fix their expectations based on their work experience acquired in Venezuela.
We now analyze the impact of nationality-based wage-structure effect ∆S at different percentiles of the
unconditional (log) hourly wages distribution. The plot of the point estimates ∆S for different quantiles
suggest that, on average, the Venezuelan workers react differently to disparities at different points of the
unconditional (log) hourly wage distribution. The estimated effects are more pronounced at the middle of
the distribution than at the bottom (Figure 3.2). This provides indication that it is the inequality exerted
against the median Venezuelan worker that the migrant is more aware of. In turn, inequality exerted against
those more disadvantaged is less relevant for the worker’s perception. Possibly, these workers justify this
specific wage structure in terms of lower qualifications, experience or other unobservable attributes for
those in the bottom part of the distribution. However, discrimination from the 70th percentile onwards
stops being perceived. This latter is consistent with the results above, as workplace discrimination in terms
of self-perception lacks statistical significance at this upper part of the distribution
51Admittedly, including this estimated variable ∆S in the model can affect the estimated variance-covariance of the estimators (see
Wooldridge 2010). Nonetheless, the confirmation provided by the different tests that the assumptions of the probit model are fulfilled
suggests that the estimated variances also accurately estimate the population variance even under this generated regression case.
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Table 3.7 – Impact of mean wage structure effect on perception of discrimination of Venezuelan
immigrant workers (marginal effects)
Peruvian model using occup. dummies Peruvian model using occup. complexity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆S (wage structure) 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.040*** 0.042***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
If the individual is male (d) -0.040*** -0.042*** -0.037*** -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.041***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Age splines (years)
18-25 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
26-35 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
36-45 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
46-55 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
56-65 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Education level (base: primary)
Secondary educ. 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Technical educ. 0.044** 0.045** 0.044** 0.044**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
College and PG educ. 0.045** 0.048** 0.044** 0.046**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Occup. complexity score -0.005 -0.005*
(0.003) (0.003)
Time in Peru 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
If employed in Venezuela (d) 0.034** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.033** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.040***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
N 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125
R2 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.013
Model χ2 test 44.448 49.126 60.882 66.970 45.156 49.985 61.227 67.716
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Normality test 0.756 0.407 1.356 2.643 0.580 0.378 1.240 2.363
[0.685] [0.816] [0.508] [0.267] [0.748] [0.828] [0.538] [0.307]
Heterosk. test 6.609 9.612 12.464 17.822 6.808 9.515 12.316 17.425
[0.158] [0.383] [0.409] [0.164] [0.146] [0.391] [0.421] [0.181]
RESET test 0.777 0.495 1.363 4.139 0.631 0.408 1.313 4.139
[0.855] [0.920] [0.714] [0.247] [0.889] [0.939] [0.726] [0.247]
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years. Additionally, sample for Peruvians restricted 
to those regions exposed to Venezuelan migration and sample for Venezuelans restricted to those regions who arrived to Peru from January 2016 
onwards. (Log) hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance 
in their occupation. ∆S refers to the estimate of the mean wage structure effect for the Venezuelan workers, estimated as the difference between the 
simulated log hourly wage (using coefficients from the Mincer regression on log hourly wages on the Peruvian sample, shown in table A6) and 
the observed (log) hourly wage of Venezuelans. SEs (in parenthesis) and p-values of the tests (in brackets) adjusting for clustering. (d)=dummy 
variable. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO (2018) 
and ENPOVE (2018) data.
The partial estimated effects of the other variables are similar to those reported in the previous table
based on the mean treatment effect (Figure 3.8). Females are less aware of inequalities at this part of
the distribution. The diagnostics for these regressions confirm that assumptions for maximum likelihood
estimation are satisfied here. However, a feature of the estimations in this subsection is the prevalence of a
low pseudo-R2 which, in fact, is a shared characteristic with previous studies (Biddle 2013; Banerjee 2008;
Daldy et al. 2013). Even though this is not as important as the statistical and economic significance of the
explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2010), this just confirms the difficulty in disentangling the reasons for
discrimination. As suggested by Fernández-Reino (2020), multiple factors might be at play at the same time
and hence involves the study of social attitudes and stereotypes about certain groups. These are relevant
issues but beyond the scope of the current economic analysis undertaken here.
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years. Additionally, sample for Peruvians restricted to those regions exposed to Venezuelan migration and sample 
for Venezuelans restricted to those regions who arrived to Peru from January 2016 onwards. (Log) hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by 
the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The graph shows the partial effect of the wage structure effect, ∆S, calculated at 17 percentiles (beginning at the 10th n  steps of 5), calculated as the 
difference between the simulated log hourly wage (using coefficients from the Mincer regression on log hourly wages on the Peruvian sample, shown in table A6) and the RIF of the corresponding 
statistic of the observed (log) hourly wage of Venezuelans/ Vertical lines correspond to the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals adjusting for clustering.
Source: Author's calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
3.7 Conclusions
The Venezuelan Exodus into Peru is unique since, until then, foreigners were practically absent from their
labour market. These migrants also are more educated than Peruvians and most of them have prior job
experience in Venezuela. Our data provides the opportunity to investigate how discrimination experienced
by Venezuelans affects their wages under two complementary approaches. We show that the percentage of
Venezuelans who self-perceive workplace discrimination (20%) is comparable to that of Japan, one of the
countries with the lowest proportion of migrant workers globally. In contrast, this estimate is considerably
larger than what is reported in the OECD and the USA or even among indigenous Peruvians, one of the
groups more (if not the most) discriminated in Peru. This is somewhat unexpected because Venezuelans are
a population that, unlike a large proportion of migrants into the countries listed above, have close cultural
ties with Peruvians, do not face a language constraint and possess no big cultural distance to ignite such a
reaction from Peruvians. This evidence indirectly confirms Kustov’s (2019) view that negative attitudes of
the natives are closely linked to the origin of migrants, with those from less developed countries perceived
more negatively regardless of their personal characteristics. At the same time, it refutes views that negative
attitudes are generally against less skilled migrants (Hainmueller et al. 2015).
Subjective (self-perceived) discrimination is associated with an observed (log) hourly wage penalty of
around 5%. The disentanglement of the composition effect behind the gaps suggest that being more edu-
cated and having stayed longer in Peru plays a favourable role in the wages of those who actually perceived
discrimination. However this advantage is completely counteracted by the wage-structure effect that plays
against them. The Venezuelans who self-perceived discrimination, especially those with lower wages, face
larger wage penalties for being employed in Wholesale and Transport Industries and in Services and sales
jobs, the most common industries and occupation for these migrants characterized by unskilled tasks. In
terms of objective (nationality-based) discrimination, Venezuelans earn lower wages across the lower fifth
of the percentiles, but from that point onwards the wage disadvantage that Venezuelans experience relative
to Peruvians increases as we move to the upper parts of the unconditional wage distribution. The advant-
age of Peruvians can be explained by the concentration of Venezuelan workers in low skill occupational
categories (and conversely, by an under-representation in top occupational categories), which is associated
to their the lower complexity of the tasks in their occupations and their occupational downgrading (see Del
Pozo Segura 2021).
Finally, the perception of discrimination of Venezuelans is actually influenced by the objective dis-
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crimination they experience. They are more sensitive to the level of wage discrimination (relative to the
Peruvians) at the middle of the income distribution. In turn, they tend not to be influenced by the in-
equality at the bottom end of the wages distribution. This contrasts with the lack of responsiveness to the
wage structure effect that Banerjee (2008) finds for migrant workers in Canada, and confirms that negative
attitudes towards certain minorities result in more discrimination against these, as suggested by Fernández-
Reino (2020). The magnitude of these effects is small but still are larger than what previous studies, like
Biddle (2013), found. Specifically, doubling the size of inequality increases the probability of perceiving
discrimination by 2.8 percentage points relative to a mean of 20%. Factors related to their expectations for
equitable treatment have a larger role in this perception. The level of education is known to increase expect-
ations for career success and awareness of social inequalities. Similarly, lengthier stay in Peru increases the
probability of perceiving self-discrimination.
From a policy perspective, this study goes beyond simple summary measures of migrant wages gaps and
is able to disentangle its causes. Since the wage-structure effect is the main driver of observed wage gaps
under the two approaches, reducing this disadvantage of Venezuelan migrants in Peru is intimately related
to a change in the negative attitudes of the employers against them. Admittedly, this cannot be changed in
the short run, as it involves dealing with stereotypes and perceptions ingrained in the migrant population.
Nonetheless, a more effective way to reduce the impact of this component goes through mechanisms that
provide incentives for their integration away from occupations where they are currently concentrated. This
implies a downgrade of their abilities and greater concentration into other activities where their skills can
be considered a more valuable asset. As ENPOVE data reveals, about 40% of Venezuelans in Peru have
Social Sciences, Commercial and Law degrees, and 20% have Engineering backgrounds. It is highly likely
that their professional skills will be more valued in occupations and industries that match their training. A
sensible first step in that direction lies moving away from the permits system, due to its failure in Peru (and
also in Colombia, as assessed by Bahar et al. 2020b), and considering citizenship rights for the Venezuelans
instead. This can eliminate barriers for an important proportion of qualified immigrants, who previously
lacked documentation, to apply for formal jobs. Colombia, a country comparable in terms of the size
informal sector and absorption of Venezuelan migrants, has been the first country to follow this route since
the beginning of 2021, providing Venezuelans with citizenship rights over health and education.
The Venezuelans’ observed labour market skills, approximated here by education, are higher than those
of Peruvian natives. However, a further possibility not captured in our data is that these higher skills are
not necessarily useful for the elementary occupations and service and sales occupations within the informal
sector that Venezuelans generally perform. By the very nature of the tasks involved in these activities in
Peru (relatively unqualified and requiring face-to-face attention to customers), the set of skills acquired
in formal (university) education do not necessarily match the more manual and less cognitive-related tasks
required. However, given that this is Peru’s first experience with a large influx of migrants, there is scope for
designing and introducing policies that can promote training and equal opportunity for the upward mobility
of migrant workers. These can set a precedent for possible future inflows of migrant workers, given its
recent history of rapid economic growth. However, we are aware that the sizeable informal size of Peru’s
economy is an essential structural characteristic that contributes to the permanence of these sizeable wage
gaps. This complicates putting in place well-designed minimum wages with broad legal coverage for those
sectors and occupations in which migrants are chiefly employed, as suggested by ILO (2020). In any event,
a broader strategy that also includes adopting fair and effective labour migration policies is required. This
needs to be designed in conjunction with policies that address decent working conditions and ensure greater
coherence across employment, education and training.
Additional work needs to disentangle the role of other psychological factors behind workplace discrim-
ination, which, to date have remained unmeasured. In fact, we are cannot unpick the effect that experiences
and sensitivity to certain events have on the perceptions of discrimination of Venezuelan workers. As with
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other studies, we leave the influence of context and the interaction between context and individual character-
istics to future research, given these are more complex relationships and require inter-disciplinary thinking
beyond simply economics. Even though analysing migrants’ perception represents an advantage relative
to other studies in this field, the role of types of skills and human capital development of migrants are as
relevant as their perceptions. Hence, an approximation of these unobserved (or hard to observe) attributes
which are relevant in the labour market is needed in further studies. From a methodological point of view,
further work needs to be done assessing the effect in the statistical significance induced by including a gen-
erated regressor (the wage-structure) in the model, as this might affect the estimated variance-covariance
matrix. Also, the role of how alternative counterfactuals impact on the results from the re-weighted decom-
positions needs to be further examined, as this study focused its robustness checks in terms of definition of

















Note: Ecuador and Colombia in dark and light grey, respectively. The 5 states in Venezuela where half of the 
Venezuelan immigrants in Peru began their emigration journey in brown. Lines correspond to the most commmon
routes followed by Venezuelan immigrants according to UNHCR (2018) Source: Author's calculations
using ENPOVE data.
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 Note: Sample restricted to only those employed between 18 and 65 years. Date of arrival relative to when they entered Peru. The vertical line shows the beginning
of the treatment. Source: Author's calculations using ENPOVE data.
Figure 3.A3 – Outcome and control variables characterization for Venezuelans immigrant workers by
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Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years who arrived to Peru from January 2016 onwards. q1-q4
(h1,h2) refers to the quarter (half) of the year when they entered Peru. (Log.) hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality
approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The horizontal red line shows the average in the sample. Managerial occupation includes technical
workers and Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers. Vertical lines correspond to the 95% confidence intervals adjust for clustering.
Source: Author's calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
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Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed between 18 and 65 years who arrived to Peru from January 2016. Total labour hourly wages and monthly hours
worked include the main and secondary occupations. Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Source: Author's calculations using ENPOVE data (2018).
Estimations and Decompositions
Table 3.A5 – Mincer equations of (log.) hourly wages for informal Peruvian workers in treated areas
Occupational dummies Occupational complexity
Total Male Female Total Male Female
If the individual is male (d) 0.221*** (0.026) 0.243*** (0.025)
Age splines (years)
18-25 0.016* (0.009) 0.021* (0.012) 0.011 (0.014) 0.018** (0.009) 0.020* (0.012) 0.014 (0.014)
26-35 0.007 (0.004) 0.003 (0.005) 0.014* (0.008) 0.008* (0.004) 0.005 (0.005) 0.013 (0.008)
36-45 0.006 (0.005) 0.009 (0.006) 0.003 (0.008) 0.006 (0.005) 0.008 (0.006) 0.004 (0.008)
46-55 -0.010* (0.006) -0.015** (0.007) -0.002 (0.009) -0.010* (0.006) -0.015** (0.007) -0.003 (0.009)
56-65 -0.008 (0.008) -0.004 (0.010) -0.009 (0.013) -0.008 (0.008) -0.005 (0.010) -0.008 (0.013)
Education level (base: College)
Primary -0.445*** (0.050) -0.410*** (0.066) -0.504*** (0.075) -0.474*** (0.048) -0.424*** (0.063) -0.564*** (0.072)
Secondary -0.272*** (0.040) -0.279*** (0.053) -0.267*** (0.062) -0.299*** (0.038) -0.288*** (0.050) -0.326*** (0.060)
Technical -0.137*** (0.042) -0.124** (0.059) -0.165*** (0.062) -0.153*** (0.041) -0.127** (0.056) -0.201*** (0.062)
Industry (base: Manufacture)
Agriculture -0.039 (0.055) -0.157** (0.061) 0.086 (0.108) -0.024 (0.049) -0.176*** (0.055) 0.299*** (0.090)
Construction 0.335*** (0.049) 0.244*** (0.051) 0.361* (0.188) 0.317*** (0.048) 0.220*** (0.049) 0.409* (0.216)
Wholesale and retail 0.105** (0.048) 0.030 (0.056) 0.116 (0.093) 0.040 (0.042) -0.038 (0.049) 0.214*** (0.077)
Transp., storage, and comm. -0.003 (0.054) -0.079 (0.064) 0.043 (0.106) -0.005 (0.043) -0.100** (0.045) 0.165* (0.094)
FIRE and Services 0.201*** (0.048) 0.116* (0.064) 0.217** (0.092) 0.192*** (0.045) 0.074 (0.059) 0.392*** (0.078)
Occupation (base: Technical)
Managers and professionals 0.285*** (0.063) 0.226*** (0.083) 0.362*** (0.096)
Clerical workers -0.095* (0.056) -0.196** (0.080) -0.049 (0.075)
Service and sales workers -0.143*** (0.051) -0.090 (0.070) -0.186** (0.074)
Craft and trades workers -0.058 (0.053) -0.005 (0.059) -0.348*** (0.123)
Machine operators -0.041 (0.058) -0.028 (0.068) -0.180 (0.177)
Elementary occupations -0.098** (0.043) -0.094* (0.053) -0.124* (0.066)
Score Complexity 0.009*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.011*** (0.002)
Constant 0.998*** (0.213) 1.154*** (0.280) 1.129*** (0.346) 0.889*** (0.210) 1.138*** (0.277) 0.827** (0.333)
N 4989 3103 1886 4989 3103 1886
R2 0.121 0.105 0.124 0.118 0.102 0.118
Model F test 28.035 [0.000] 16.773 [0.000] 10.754 [0.000] 31.269 [0.000] 18.644 [0.000] 12.595 [0.000]
Demographic vars F test 21.809 [0.000] 9.009 [0.000] 6.861 [0.000] 28.340 [0.000] 10.231 [0.000] 8.966 [0.000]
Industry vars F test 17.882 [0.000] 14.011 [0.000] 2.626 [0.023] 19.060 [0.000] 15.941 [0.000] 6.948 [0.000]
Occupation vars F test 9.757 [0.000] 5.847 [0.000] 6.487 [0.000] 34.281 [0.000] 13.611 [0.000] 21.478 [0.000]
Notes: Sample restricted to only those Peruvians employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years in the regions exposed to Venezuelan immigration and without health
insurance in their occupation. (Log) hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their
occupation. Wholesale and Retail industry includes Hotels and Restaurants and FIRE and Services Industry includes communication, social and personal services. Technical workers
occupations includes Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers. Occupational complexity score follows Ottaviano et al. (2013). Department dummies not shown. SEs (in
parenthesis) and p-values of the F tests (in brackets) adjustomg for clustering. (d)=dummy variable. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level.
Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO (2018) data.
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Figure 3.A10 – Observed and counterfactual distributions of (log.) hourly wages for Venezuelan


























































Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years and those who arrived 
to Peru from January 2016 onwards. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. Simulated 
distribution based on coefficients from Mincer equations of (log) hourly wages including income from the main and secondary 
occupations on Peruvian workers (shown in table A6) which include occupational complexity score following Ottaviano et al. 
(2013). Real hourly wages in 2007 PEN. Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO (2018) and ENPOVE data (2018).
Figure 3.A11 – Aggregate Reweighted OB decomposition of (log) hourly wages for Venezuelan
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Note: Sample restricted to only those employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years. Additionally, sample for Peruvians restricted to those regions exposed to Venezuelan migration and sample for Venezuelans restricted to those
who arrived to Peru from January 2016 onwards (Log) hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The graph dissagregates each
component of the reweighted OB decomposition at selected statistics, with ∆X,p and ∆S,p referring to the pure component of the Composition and total Wage structure effects and ∆X,e and ∆S,e to the specification and reweighting errors.
The outcome model includes occupational dummies, see the text for details on the treatment model and the decomposition. Vertical lines correspond to the bootstrapped SEs (in parenthesis) adjusting for clustering.
Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO and ENPOVE (2018) data.
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Table 3.A1 – Adjusted perceived unequal treatment using Mincerian equations for (log) hourly wage for
Venezuelan Immigrants by perception of unequal treatment (occupational dummies)
Did not perceive discrimination Did perceive discrimination
Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
If is male (d) -0.020 0.038 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.070* -0.027 -0.016 0.022 0.004 -0.043 -0.051
(0.016) (0.026) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.040) (0.032) (0.043) (0.034) (0.029) (0.033) (0.062)
Age splines (years)
18-25 0.004 0.013 0.007 0.003 0.004 -0.008 -0.003 -0.012 0.009 0.009 -0.004 -0.031
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.020)
26-35 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.015
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
36-45 -0.008* -0.020*** -0.009** -0.005 -0.002 0.006 -0.015** -0.023* -0.019*** -0.019** -0.019** -0.009
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012)
46-55 0.002 0.006 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.014 0.011 0.027 0.025** 0.010 0.016 0.019
(0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.022) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024)
56-65 0.042** 0.016 0.023* 0.026** 0.053*** 0.091** 0.025 -0.026 -0.022 0.006 0.007 0.050
(0.018) (0.023) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.046) (0.039) (0.068) (0.039) (0.029) (0.035) (0.079)
Education level (base: College)
Primary -0.083*** -0.117** -0.080*** -0.090*** -0.049* -0.047 -0.195*** -0.136 -0.125** -0.117* -0.159** -0.176
(0.025) (0.050) (0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.062) (0.061) (0.108) (0.055) (0.070) (0.064) (0.110)
Secondary -0.055*** -0.009 -0.044*** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.084** -0.047 -0.051 -0.061 -0.031 -0.052 -0.114
(0.020) (0.030) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.040) (0.039) (0.057) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.071)
Technical -0.023 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.046** -0.059 0.010 0.007 0.040 -0.006 -0.017 -0.026
(0.020) (0.031) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.045) (0.029) (0.052) (0.039) (0.040) (0.047) (0.073)
Industry (base: Manufacture)
Agriculture 0.088 0.021 0.013 -0.006 0.028 0.050 0.827** 0.321** 0.207 0.309** 0.515 1.786**
(0.152) (0.155) (0.122) (0.113) (0.142) (0.286) (0.361) (0.149) (0.132) (0.151) (0.345) (0.807)
Construction 0.248*** 0.179*** 0.145*** 0.237*** 0.344*** 0.501*** 0.420*** 0.078 0.119* 0.311*** 0.571*** 0.974***
(0.034) (0.048) (0.029) (0.034) (0.051) (0.087) (0.075) (0.109) (0.068) (0.075) (0.122) (0.277)
Wholesale and retail -0.048* -0.068* -0.081*** -0.030 -0.044 -0.020 -0.075 -0.166** -0.089* -0.066 -0.029 0.070
(0.027) (0.039) (0.026) (0.031) (0.041) (0.069) (0.056) (0.076) (0.048) (0.061) (0.080) (0.112)
Transp., storage, and comm. -0.113*** -0.194*** -0.136*** -0.062 -0.119** -0.018 -0.101 -0.287** -0.200** -0.185** 0.016 0.186
(0.043) (0.064) (0.043) (0.041) (0.054) (0.094) (0.081) (0.115) (0.084) (0.085) (0.101) (0.156)
FIRE and Services 0.072*** 0.046 0.006 0.034 0.028 0.178** 0.066 -0.021 -0.023 0.035 0.081 0.266*
(0.027) (0.041) (0.032) (0.029) (0.036) (0.076) (0.061) (0.081) (0.051) (0.069) (0.087) (0.140)
Occupation (base: Technical)
Managers and professionals 0.062 -0.002 0.034 0.116** 0.081 -0.075 0.110 0.007 0.098 0.114 0.047 0.107
(0.079) (0.069) (0.053) (0.055) (0.084) (0.211) (0.136) (0.077) (0.070) (0.120) (0.197) (0.378)
Clerical workers -0.120*** -0.003 0.031 0.003 -0.147*** -0.463*** -0.152 -0.064 -0.060 -0.041 -0.211* -0.297
(0.038) (0.054) (0.042) (0.039) (0.052) (0.133) (0.109) (0.108) (0.084) (0.111) (0.119) (0.216)
Service and sales workers -0.188*** -0.067* -0.073** -0.130*** -0.229*** -0.411*** -0.150 -0.103 -0.128* -0.161* -0.250*** -0.141
(0.040) (0.040) (0.035) (0.032) (0.046) (0.128) (0.092) (0.081) (0.068) (0.083) (0.093) (0.174)
Craft and trades workers -0.134*** -0.138*** -0.012 0.000 -0.143*** -0.381*** -0.121 -0.126 -0.093 -0.122 -0.144 -0.054
(0.039) (0.043) (0.036) (0.035) (0.047) (0.118) (0.093) (0.107) (0.083) (0.077) (0.107) (0.203)
Machine operators -0.161*** -0.146** -0.098** -0.093** -0.144** -0.321** -0.148 -0.315** -0.077 -0.048 -0.166 -0.158
(0.049) (0.067) (0.047) (0.042) (0.058) (0.134) (0.104) (0.139) (0.085) (0.096) (0.121) (0.236)
Elementary occupations -0.157*** -0.111*** -0.042 -0.090*** -0.169*** -0.386*** -0.111 -0.135* -0.113* -0.110 -0.153 -0.048
(0.042) (0.042) (0.028) (0.030) (0.047) (0.127) (0.092) (0.080) (0.068) (0.074) (0.101) (0.190)
If employed in Venezuela (d) 0.003 -0.033 -0.011 0.006 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.060 -0.044 -0.038 0.058 0.035
(0.018) (0.031) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.041) (0.032) (0.055) (0.044) (0.037) (0.041) (0.070)
Length of stay in Peru 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.004 0.006** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Constant 1.116*** 0.395* 0.725*** 0.998*** 1.328*** 2.070*** 1.194*** 1.107*** 0.723*** 0.909*** 1.420*** 2.162***
(0.128) (0.212) (0.157) (0.126) (0.145) (0.245) (0.230) (0.320) (0.244) (0.269) (0.259) (0.534)
N 4869 4869 4869 4869 4869 4869 1256 1256 1256 1256 1256 1256
R2 0.094 0.051 0.077 0.085 0.073 0.043 0.129 0.068 0.074 0.087 0.101 0.080
Model χ2 test 747.941 190.826 499.402 501.377 369.871 153.507 154.744 80.335 230.596 212.537 101.891 69.833
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Demog. vars χ2 test 35.474 23.618 39.889 30.411 22.347 20.763 16.601 5.204 23.060 13.932 17.531 10.518
[0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.014] [0.055] [0.816] [0.006] [0.125] [0.041] [0.310]
Industry vars χ2 test 132.272 53.120 106.465 105.063 63.517 48.970 70.664 21.693 23.204 53.695 29.732 18.318
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003]
Occupation vars χ2 test 37.830 15.529 27.881 63.036 54.983 16.387 8.467 8.613 29.023 11.676 14.517 7.875
[0.000] [0.017] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.012] [0.206] [0.197] [0.000] [0.070] [0.024] [0.247]
Notes: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years old who arrived after January 2016 onwards. (Log) hourly wages include
income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The table shows the partial effects on the unconditional
distribution of the dependent variable from the model including occupational dummies at selected statistics. College includes also Postgraduate level. Agriculture industry includes also
forestry, fishing and Mining and quarrying. Wholesale and Retail industry includes also Hotels and Restaurants and FIRE and Services Industry includes communication, social and
personal services. Technical occupations includes Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers. Department dummies not shown. Bootstraped SEs (in parenthesis) and p-values of
the χ2 tests (in brackets) adjusting for clustering. (d)=dummy variable. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations
using ENPOVE (2018) data.
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Table 3.A2 – Adjusted perceived unequal treatment using Mincerian equations for (log) hourly wage for
Venezuelan Immigrants by perception of unequal treatment (occupational complexity score)
Did not perceive discrimination Did perceive discrimination
Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
If is male (d) -0.014 0.025 -0.002 0.008 0.011 -0.060 -0.024 -0.029 0.023 0.012 -0.026 -0.040
(0.015) (0.025) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.044) (0.032) (0.044) (0.034) (0.029) (0.034) (0.061)
Age splines (years)
18-25 0.004 0.012 0.007 0.004 0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.012 0.009 0.009 -0.002 -0.029
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.020)
26-35 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.014
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011)
36-45 -0.008** -0.021*** -0.010** -0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.014* -0.023* -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.017** -0.006
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012)
46-55 0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.013 0.010 0.025 0.024** 0.009 0.015 0.018
(0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.021) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.027)
56-65 0.041** 0.016 0.023* 0.026** 0.052*** 0.090* 0.025 -0.025 -0.022 0.004 0.008 0.050
(0.019) (0.022) (0.013) (0.012) (0.020) (0.046) (0.047) (0.074) (0.047) (0.033) (0.034) (0.083)
Education level (base: College)
Primary -0.094*** -0.134*** -0.089*** -0.099*** -0.061** -0.068 -0.213*** -0.163 -0.144** -0.136** -0.172*** -0.182*
(0.026) (0.051) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030) (0.070) (0.060) (0.105) (0.060) (0.066) (0.052) (0.107)
Secondary -0.065*** -0.026 -0.053*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.104** -0.056 -0.071 -0.072* -0.038 -0.052 -0.112*
(0.018) (0.032) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.044) (0.035) (0.056) (0.040) (0.038) (0.042) (0.067)
Technical -0.027 -0.012 -0.008 -0.010 -0.050** -0.067 0.002 0.000 0.034 -0.011 -0.022 -0.034
(0.020) (0.035) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.046) (0.031) (0.050) (0.039) (0.038) (0.046) (0.067)
Industry (base: Manufacture)
Agriculture 0.111 0.063 0.005 -0.038 0.055 0.137 0.838** 0.301** 0.205 0.332** 0.525 1.789**
(0.164) (0.151) (0.131) (0.100) (0.158) (0.271) (0.339) (0.144) (0.128) (0.148) (0.327) (0.773)
Construction 0.250*** 0.193*** 0.147*** 0.221*** 0.344*** 0.505*** 0.427*** 0.100 0.114* 0.310*** 0.572*** 0.984***
(0.029) (0.047) (0.030) (0.030) (0.052) (0.092) (0.072) (0.083) (0.067) (0.073) (0.123) (0.252)
Wholesale and retail -0.079*** -0.033 -0.101*** -0.097*** -0.091*** -0.053 -0.081* -0.130** -0.106** -0.089* -0.079 0.048
(0.021) (0.041) (0.026) (0.025) (0.033) (0.050) (0.045) (0.052) (0.047) (0.052) (0.069) (0.086)
Transp., storage, and comm. -0.116*** -0.171** -0.160*** -0.099*** -0.112*** 0.018 -0.105 -0.352*** -0.183*** -0.142** 0.006 0.135
(0.038) (0.070) (0.040) (0.038) (0.042) (0.075) (0.065) (0.120) (0.071) (0.072) (0.087) (0.119)
FIRE and Services 0.078*** 0.098** 0.009 0.004 0.028 0.202*** 0.090* 0.036 -0.009 0.051 0.070 0.258**
(0.025) (0.042) (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.063) (0.052) (0.059) (0.048) (0.060) (0.078) (0.109)
Occup. complexity score 0.007* -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.007*** 0.010 -0.004 -0.012 -0.006 0.001 0.005 -0.003
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010)
If employed in Venezuela (d) 0.005 -0.032 -0.009 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.058 -0.040 -0.035 0.061 0.041
(0.018) (0.027) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.041) (0.029) (0.051) (0.043) (0.040) (0.042) (0.066)
Length of stay in Peru 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.004 0.006** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Constant 0.951*** 0.312 0.697*** 0.940*** 1.140*** 1.667*** 1.056*** 0.987*** 0.631*** 0.790*** 1.210*** 2.010***
(0.127) (0.231) (0.136) (0.123) (0.131) (0.209) (0.207) (0.285) (0.233) (0.233) (0.267) (0.483)
N 4869 4869 4869 4869 4869 4869 1256 1256 1256 1256 1256 1256
R2 0.087 0.048 0.074 0.075 0.065 0.036 0.123 0.066 0.071 0.079 0.092 0.076
Model χ2 test 559.155 180.639 423.036 368.532 236.929 153.261 139.023 41.442 95.199 147.013 102.519 64.143
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Demog. vars χ2 test 40.979 29.515 54.002 30.476 28.642 19.064 18.100 8.518 21.499 18.718 17.287 10.380
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.025] [0.034] [0.483] [0.011] [0.028] [0.044] [0.321]
Industry vars χ2 test 184.416 67.361 113.844 141.074 73.260 59.121 76.603 27.542 37.712 78.147 37.611 23.063
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Occupation vars χ2 test 2.753 1.343 1.628 1.814 7.960 2.320 0.269 0.786 0.544 0.037 0.511 0.115
[0.097] [0.246] [0.202] [0.178] [0.005] [0.128] [0.604] [0.375] [0.461] [0.847] [0.475] [0.735]
Notes: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years old who arrived after January 2016 onwards. (Log) hourly wages
include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The table shows the partial effects on the
unconditional distribution of the dependent variable from the model including occupational complexity score (following Ottaviano et al. 2013) at selected statistics. College includes
also Postgraduate level. Agriculture industry includes also forestry, fishing and Mining and quarrying. Wholesale and Retail industry includes also Hotels and Restaurants and FIRE and
Services Industry includes communication, social and personal services. Department dummies not shown. Bootstraped SEs (in parenthesis) and p-values of the χ2 tests (in brackets)
adjusting for clustering. (d)=dummy variable. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENPOVE (2018)
data.
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Table 3.A3 – Detailed Unweighted OB decomposition of (log) hourly wages for Venezuelan immigrants
by perceived unequal treatment (occupational dummies)
Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Overall
Discriminated 1.032*** (0.017) 0.515*** (0.022) 0.772*** (0.020) 1.007*** (0.024) 1.271*** (0.016) 1.632*** (0.031)
Non discriminated 1.089*** (0.011) 0.572*** (0.018) 0.815*** (0.012) 1.044*** (0.010) 1.311*** (0.013) 1.629*** (0.021)
Obs. difference -0.057*** (0.014) -0.057** (0.023) -0.043** (0.018) -0.037 (0.025) -0.040** (0.019) 0.003 (0.030)
Total explained 0.010 (0.010) 0.011 (0.013) 0.008 (0.008) 0.005 (0.009) 0.008 (0.011) 0.012 (0.017)
Total unexplained -0.067*** (0.015) -0.068*** (0.027) -0.051*** (0.019) -0.042* (0.023) -0.048*** (0.018) -0.010 (0.029)
Explained Component
Sex 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002)
Age (g) -0.000 (0.002) -0.000 (0.003) -0.000 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003)
Education (g) 0.007** (0.003) 0.005 (0.004) 0.006** (0.003) 0.004* (0.003) 0.006** (0.003) 0.008* (0.004)
Industry (g) -0.011** (0.005) -0.008* (0.004) -0.007** (0.003) -0.010** (0.004) -0.012* (0.006) -0.015 (0.013)
Occupation (g) -0.003 (0.003) -0.004 (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) -0.003 (0.003) -0.006* (0.003) -0.003 (0.005)
Employed in Venez. -0.000 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.003)
Length in Peru 0.010** (0.004) 0.004 (0.005) 0.006* (0.003) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.004) 0.015*** (0.005)
Region 0.007* (0.004) 0.016* (0.008) 0.008* (0.005) 0.006 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 0.006 (0.005)
Unexplained Component
Sex -0.004 (0.021) -0.031 (0.029) 0.014 (0.020) 0.002 (0.019) -0.025 (0.023) 0.010 (0.044)
Age (g) -0.164 (0.221) -0.563 (0.368) 0.056 (0.236) 0.126 (0.249) -0.194 (0.265) -0.549 (0.483)
Education (g) -0.003 (0.021) -0.014 (0.031) -0.001 (0.022) 0.007 (0.025) -0.003 (0.023) -0.018 (0.047)
Industry (g) 0.000 (0.046) -0.077 (0.065) -0.014 (0.048) -0.020 (0.063) 0.045 (0.063) 0.122 (0.106)
Occupation (g) 0.030 (0.084) -0.033 (0.084) -0.057 (0.062) -0.032 (0.071) -0.005 (0.093) 0.267 (0.164)
Employed in Venez. -0.004 (0.026) -0.022 (0.046) -0.026 (0.037) -0.036 (0.034) 0.046 (0.034) 0.027 (0.056)
Length in Peru -0.002 (0.025) -0.052 (0.038) -0.027 (0.025) 0.003 (0.023) 0.011 (0.027) 0.031 (0.049)
Region 0.002 (0.015) 0.016 (0.028) 0.005 (0.019) -0.006 (0.013) -0.014 (0.019) -0.002 (0.032)
Constant 0.078 (0.254) 0.708* (0.398) -0.001 (0.270) -0.087 (0.289) 0.092 (0.306) 0.102 (0.536)
Notes: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years old who arrived after January 2016 onwards. (Log)
hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The table show
the components of the detailed decomposition, without reweighting, at selected statistics of the unconditional distribution of the dependent variable using coefficients
from RIF regression. The outcome model includes occupational dummies, see the text for details on the treatment model. (g) means that the component of the detailed
decomposition refers to the effect after grouping the corresponding dummies (see table 2 for the categories of the control variables). Bootstraped SEs (in parenthesis)
adjusting for clustering. * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
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Figure 3.A5 – Aggregate Reweighted OB decomposition of (log) hourly wages for Venezuelan
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Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years who arrived to Peru from January 2016. (Log) hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality
approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The graph shows the components of the reweighted OB decomposition at selected statistics, with ∆X and ∆S being the total Composition and total Wage structure effect.
The outcome model includes occupational complexity score (following Ottaviano et al. 2013), see the text for details on the treatment model and the decomposition. (g) means that the component of the detailed decomposition refers
to the effect after grouping the corresponding dummies (see table 2 for the categories of the control variables). Vertical lines correspond to the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals adjusting for clustering.
Source: Author's calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
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Table 3.A4 – Detailed Reweighted OB decomposition of (log) hourly wages for Venezuelan immigrants
by perceived unequal treatment (occupational complexity score)
Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Overall
Discriminated 1.032*** (0.016) 0.515*** (0.023) 0.772*** (0.019) 1.007*** (0.027) 1.271*** (0.016) 1.632*** (0.031)
Non discriminated 1.089*** (0.011) 0.572*** (0.018) 0.815*** (0.012) 1.044*** (0.009) 1.311*** (0.012) 1.629*** (0.020)
Disc. rwgt. as non 1.023*** (0.016) 0.508*** (0.031) 0.758*** (0.019) 1.002*** (0.026) 1.266*** (0.016) 1.614*** (0.031)
Obs. difference -0.057*** (0.014) -0.057** (0.023) -0.043** (0.018) -0.037 (0.026) -0.040** (0.018) 0.003 (0.029)
Total explained 0.009 (0.011) 0.007 (0.019) 0.014 (0.011) 0.006 (0.016) 0.005 (0.012) 0.018 (0.018)
Total unexplained -0.066*** (0.014) -0.064** (0.030) -0.058*** (0.019) -0.043 (0.027) -0.045** (0.019) -0.015 (0.030)
Explained Component
Specification error -0.004 (0.007) -0.011 (0.014) 0.002 (0.008) -0.004 (0.011) -0.007 (0.009) 0.006 (0.014)
Pure explained 0.014 (0.010) 0.018 (0.014) 0.012 (0.008) 0.009 (0.009) 0.012 (0.010) 0.011 (0.016)
Sex 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.003)
Age (g) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) -0.002 (0.003)
Education (g) 0.008** (0.003) 0.006 (0.005) 0.006** (0.003) 0.005* (0.003) 0.006* (0.003) 0.007 (0.005)
Industry (g) -0.011* (0.006) -0.009 (0.005) -0.007* (0.004) -0.010* (0.005) -0.013* (0.007) -0.017 (0.013)
Occupation 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Employed in Venez. 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002)
Length in Peru 0.010*** (0.004) 0.004 (0.005) 0.006* (0.003) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.004) 0.014*** (0.005)
Region 0.006 (0.004) 0.015 (0.009) 0.008* (0.005) 0.005 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004) 0.006 (0.005)
Unexplained Component
Reweighting error 0.001 (0.004) 0.000 (0.007) 0.000 (0.003) -0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.004) 0.004 (0.006)
Pure unexplained -0.067*** (0.014) -0.065** (0.030) -0.058*** (0.019) -0.042 (0.026) -0.045** (0.019) -0.019 (0.030)
Sex -0.004 (0.020) -0.030 (0.030) 0.009 (0.024) 0.002 (0.019) -0.005 (0.022) 0.024 (0.040)
Age (g) -0.238 (0.226) -0.486 (0.387) 0.008 (0.266) 0.036 (0.260) -0.133 (0.274) -0.900* (0.545)
Education (g) -0.013 (0.022) -0.009 (0.034) -0.011 (0.025) -0.003 (0.024) -0.013 (0.024) -0.007 (0.049)
Industry (g) 0.014 (0.042) -0.119** (0.056) -0.015 (0.044) 0.021 (0.049) 0.035 (0.061) 0.097 (0.074)
Occupation -0.020 (0.016) -0.017 (0.025) -0.006 (0.014) -0.003 (0.011) -0.008 (0.019) -0.029 (0.027)
Employed in Venez. 0.005 (0.027) -0.035 (0.050) -0.009 (0.043) -0.032 (0.035) 0.043 (0.037) 0.024 (0.071)
Length in Peru -0.001 (0.024) -0.052 (0.044) -0.022 (0.027) 0.006 (0.021) 0.014 (0.028) 0.002 (0.054)
Region 0.007 (0.016) 0.028 (0.030) 0.008 (0.019) 0.001 (0.014) -0.010 (0.018) 0.003 (0.030)
Constant 0.182 (0.240) 0.656* (0.395) -0.019 (0.279) -0.071 (0.281) 0.031 (0.294) 0.768 (0.543)
Notes: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years old who arrived after January 2016 onwards. (Log)
hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The table
show the components of the detailed decomposition, reweighting those who perceived discrimination as if they did not, at selected statistics of the unconditional
distribution of the dependent variable using coefficients from RIF regression. The outcome model includes occupational complexity score (following Ottaviano
et al. 2013), see the text for details on the treatment model. (g) means that the component of the detailed decomposition refers to the effect after grouping the
corresponding dummies (see table 2 for the categories of the control variables). Bootstraped SEs (in parenthesis) adjust for clustering. * Significant at 10% level;
** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
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Figure 3.A6 – Aggregate Reweighted OB decomposition of (log) hourly wages for Venezuelan
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Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years who arrived to Peru from January 2016. (Log) hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. 
Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The graph shows the components of the reweighted OB decomposition at selected statistics, with ∆X and ∆S being the total Composition and total Wage
structure effects. The outcome model includes occupational dummies, see the text for details on the treatment models and the decomposition procedure.
Vertical lines correspond to the bootstrapped SEs adjusting for clustering. Source: Author's calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
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Figure 3.A7 – Aggregate Reweighted OB decomposition of (log) hourly wages for Venezuelan
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Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years who arrived to Peru from January 2016. (Log) hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. 
Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The graph shows the components of the reweighted OB decomposition at selected statistics, with ∆X and ∆S being the total Composition and total Wage
structure effects. The outcome model includes occupational dummies, see the text for details on the treatment model and the decomposition. Vertical lines correspond to the bootstrapped SEs adjusting for clustering.
Source: Author's calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
Figure 3.A8 – Aggregate Reweighted OB decomposition of (log) hourly wages (from the main occupation
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Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years who arrived to Peru from January 2016. (Log) hourly wages include income from the main occupation only. Informality approximated
by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The graph shows the components of the reweighted OB decomposition at selected statistics, with ∆X and ∆S being the total Composition and total Wage structure effects. The outcome model includes
occupational dummies, see the text for details on the treatment model and the decomposition. Vertical lines correspond to the bootstrapped SEs adjusting for clustering. Source: Author's calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
180
Figure 3.A9 – Aggregate Reweighted OB decomposition of (log) hourly wages for Venezuelan
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Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years who arrived to Peru from January 2016. (Log) hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated
by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The graph shows the components of the reweighted OB decomposition at selected statistics, with ∆X and ∆S being the total Composition and total Wage structure effects. The outcome model includes
occupational dummies, see the text for details on the treatment model and the decomposition. Vertical lines correspond to the bootstrapped SEs adjusting for clustering. Source: Author's calculations using ENPOVE (2018) data.
Table 3.A6 – Impact of wage structure effect on perception of discrimination of Venezuelan immigrant
workers at selected statistics (marginal effects)
Peruvian Mincer model using occup. dummies Peruvian Mincer model using occup. complexity
Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
∆S (wage structure) 0.040*** 0.016** 0.031*** 0.041*** 0.021** 0.000 0.042*** 0.016** 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.023*** 0.001
(0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005)
If the individual is male (d) -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.041*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.032***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Age splines (years)
18-25 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
26-35 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
36-45 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
46-55 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
56-65 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Education level (base: primary)
Secondary educ. 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.035* 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.035*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Technical educ. 0.045** 0.047** 0.048** 0.047** 0.048** 0.053*** 0.044** 0.048** 0.048** 0.047** 0.046** 0.052***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
College and PG educ. 0.048** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.060*** 0.046** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.060***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Occup. complexity score -0.005 -0.004* -0.005* -0.004* -0.004 -0.004 -0.005* -0.004* -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Time in Peru 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
If employed in Venezuela (d) 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
N 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125 6125
R2 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.011
Model χ2 test 66.970 65.028 66.471 68.324 64.544 64.589 67.716 64.897 66.393 68.578 65.222 64.515
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Normality test 2.643 2.928 3.000 3.085 3.684 3.952 2.363 3.052 2.910 2.958 3.366 3.961
[0.267] [0.231] [0.223] [0.214] [0.159] [0.139] [0.307] [0.217] [0.233] [0.228] [0.186] [0.138]
Heterosk. test 17.822 21.457 22.043 17.141 19.755 17.799 17.425 22.169 22.964 16.584 18.517 17.890
[0.164] [0.064] [0.055] [0.193] [0.101] [0.165] [0.181] [0.053] [0.042] [0.219] [0.139] [0.162]
RESET test 4.139 3.346 3.943 3.231 5.811 4.364 4.139 3.342 3.711 3.214 6.102 4.409
[0.247] [0.341] [0.268] [0.357] [0.121] [0.225] [0.247] [0.342] [0.294] [0.360] [0.107] [0.221]
Notes: Sample restricted to only those employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years. Additionally, sample for Peruvians restricted to those regions exposed to Venezuelan 
migration and sample for Venezuelans restricted to those regions who arrived to Peru from January 2016 onwards. (Log) hourly wages include income from the main and secondary 
occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. ∆S refers to the estimate of the mean wage structure effect for the Venezuelan workers, estimated as 
the difference between the simulated log hourly wage (using coefficients from the Mincer regression on log hourly wages on the Peruvian sample, shown in table A6) and the RIF of the 
corresponding statistic of the observed (log) hourly wage of Venezuelans. SEs (in parenthesis) and p-values of the tests (in brackets) adjusting for clustering. (d)=dummy variable. * Significant 
at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. Source: Author’s calculations using ENAHO (2018) and ENPOVE (2018) data.
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Figure 3.A12 – Aggregate Unweighted OB decomposition of (log) hourly wages by Peruvians and











































Note: Sample restricted to only those employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years. Additionally, sample for Peruvians restricted to those regions exposed to Venezuelan migration and sample for Venezuelans restricted to those
who arrived to Peru from January 2016 onwards (Log) hourly wages include income from the main and secondary occupations. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The graph shows the components
of the unweighted OB decomposition at selected statistics, with ∆X and ∆S being the total Composition and total Wage structure effects. The outcome model includes occupational dummies, see the text for details on the decomposition.
Vertical lines correspond to the bootstrapped SEs (in parenthesis) adjusting for clustering. Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO and ENPOVE (2018) data.
Total difference ∆X ∆S
Figure 3.A13 – Aggregate Unweighted OB decomposition of (log) hourly wages (from the main
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Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years who arrived to Peru from January 2016.
(Log) hourly wages include income from the main occupation only. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The graph
shows the components of the reweighted OB decomposition at selected statistics, with ∆X and ∆S being the total Composition and total Wage structure effects.
The outcome model includes occupational dummies, see the text for details on the decomposition. Vertical lines correspond to the bootstrapped SEs adjusting
for clustering. Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO and ENPOVE (2018) data.
Figure 3.A14 – Aggregate Reweighted OB decomposition of (log) hourly wages by Peruvians and
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Note: Sample restricted to only those Venezuelans employed in the informal sector between 18 and 65 years who arrived to Peru from January 2016.
(Log) hourly wages include income from the main occupation only. Informality approximated by the lack of health insurance in their occupation. The graph
shows the components of the reweighted OB decomposition at selected statistics, with ∆X and ∆S being the total Composition and total Wage structure effects.
The outcome model includes occupational dummies, see the text for details on the decomposition. Vertical lines correspond to the bootstrapped SEs adjusting
for clustering. Source: Author's calculations using ENAHO and ENPOVE (2018) data.
Concluding remarks
This thesis sheds light on three issues relevant to the Peruvian labour market over the last two decades.
The confluence of two unique phenomena characterizes this period and provide a backdrop against which
the analysis is set. First, the sustained growth in per capita income (GDP), which became known as the
’Peruvian Growth Miracle’. Peru’s economic growth rate between 2001 and 2019 reached a historical
peak and reflected a doubling in the average per capita GDP growth rates compared to Latin American
countries. This period witnessed a general increase in real wages. Nonetheless, throughout this period,
the informal sector remained the most dominant labour market segment, and is sizeable compared to the
other countries in the region. The second phenomenon during those years was the Venezuelan Exodus,
which surged as a consequence of the deterioration in the socio-economic conditions in Venezuela. The
sizeable influx of workers who arrived in Peru, traditionally one of the countries with the lowest proportion
of immigrants in its labour market, transformed the country into the second-largest recipient of Venezuelan
migrants and refugees. The distinctive nature of this Exodus compared to similar episodes in other countries
rests on a number of distinct factors. First, the significant proportion of Peru’s population these Venezuelan
migrants comprised, 2.5%, is comparable to what the Syrian immigrants represented in Turkey. Second,
the schooling levels of these migrants are higher than the average of the natives. Third, in contrast to other
similar episodes in the recent past, both natives and migrants share a common language and have close
cultural ties.
The first empirical chapter examines if the exceptional macroeconomic growth era in Peru was accom-
panied by a more equitable treatment for female workers across the unconditional pay distribution. We
find that males maintained a wage advantage across the whole pay distribution throughout the selected
years. These gender disparities were found to be even deeper in the informal sector. Notably, these gaps
are primarily attributed to the differential treatment females experienced in the Peruvian labour market and
not because they have less attractive observed characteristics than their male counterparts. This chapter’s
most policy-relevant finding is the existence and persistence of ‘sticky floors’ in the informal sector. That
is, women at the bottom of the wage distribution experience a double penalty. On the one hand, their low
wages and the lack of social protection that characterizes jobs in this sector (such as minimum wages, health
and safety regulations, and access to pension systems) render them particularly vulnerable to situations of
entering poverty. On the other hand, their already low wages are lower than those of males with similar
labour market attributes.
The other two chapters study two distinct aspects of the Exodus. The first aspect concerns the impact
of this large inflow (or labour supply shock) on a set of labour market outcomes for Peruvians. Using a
combination of different quasi-experimental methods, we find that this shock did indeed affect the different
outcomes analysed. More specifically, this exogenous increase in labour supply did not lead to statistically
significant changes overall in hourly wages for the natives in the formal and the informal sectors. The
Exodus also had non-statistically significant effects on the size of the informal sector and, for the most part,
on the wage inequality for both formal and informal sectors.
However, a non-negligible effect is found on the wages for those low skilled informal workers in a
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particular metropolitan area of Peru. This subgroup of workers residing in the capital city of Lima, and
who are most likely to compete with Venezuelan workers directly, experienced a reduction in their wages of
around 10%. The policy-relevant issue, in this case, relates to the adverse effect that workers in this sector of
the economy experienced. This result might give support to those that regard immigration as damaging for
natives’ wages. Nonetheless, as explained in the conclusions to chapter two, the relative size of the increase
in the labour supply labour is larger than the effect on wages in this city. Specifically, a 20% increase in
labour supply reduced the wage for informal unskilled workers by 10%, suggesting an inelastic response.
Thus, it is arguable that the impact of this Exodus on the wages of the unskilled natives is moderately low.
The final chapter is concerned with the effect of discrimination on the wages of Venezuelan immigrants
and the role that the wage inequity they experience exerts on their perception of workplace discrimination.
We find a migrant pay gap across the wage distribution. The wage gap increases in the upper part of the
wages distribution, and the gap is largely explained by a treatment effect against the Venezuelan workers.
The treatment effects at different percentiles are statistically significant determinants of a Venezuelan mi-
grant’s probability of perceiving workplace discrimination. Nonetheless, its effect is negligible compared
to other variables that reflect an expectation of equal treatment. These include education, previous work
experience, or time spent in Peru. In this case, the most critical policy issue pertains to the existence of
wage gaps that harm migrants in the informal sector, most of which cannot be explained by differences in
the levels of endowments between Peruvians and Venezuelans. This evidence, along with the natives’ gen-
eralized prejudice towards Venezuelan migrants, plausibly suggests the prevalence of this treatment effect
against migrants has its roots in discrimination. In fact, as most of these migrants are also employed in
the informal labour market, there are no effective mechanisms that ensure fair payment for the work they
undertake or that permit them to report abuse in the workplace. As studies reviewed suggest, this can have
a detrimental effect on their psychological wellness, mainly because they are aware of and directly exper-
ience these inequities. In addition, Venezuelans experience occupational downgrading and are confined to
lower occupational categories, which results in the underutilization of their human capital. The inevitable
implication of this is low monthly wages, as almost 60% of migrants earn wages below the minimum legal
monthly wage. Furthermore, the long hours of weekly work that these migrants engage in can negatively
affect their health and productivity.
On the basis of these conclusions, we now discuss some policy recommendations. The first chapter
provides evidence that macroeconomic growth cannot be expected to automatically reduce inequalities in
the labour market, such as those gender-related ones. In fact, this seems to be what the Peruvian govern-
ment anticipated, as during this period it primarily focused on nominally improving the legislation promot-
ing gender equality. Nonetheless, due to the lack of implementation of comprehensive policies to address
the problem of unequal treatment of female workers, Peru remains at the bottom of international rankings
measuring labour market quality (WEF 2020). In the face of this, some strategies can be pursued to ameli-
orate partially this problem. Due to the relatively high percentage of Peruvian women in the labour force,
a share larger than other Latin American countries (ILO 2018a), an essential part of these strategies should
focus on human capital accumulation and ensuring their access to high-quality jobs. Policies like these
imply promoting female incorporation into higher-paid occupations and careers, emphasising areas with
strong labour demand. An alternative strategy consists of strengthening the ability of the Labour Inspection
Authority to enforce Law No 30709 prohibiting gender wage discrimination. Further steps would involve,
for example, promoting access to credit for women who own small and medium enterprises (Morrison
2021). Some other experiences put in place by countries in the Latin America region, such as extending the
coverage of minimum wages to domestic workers, done in Brazil, and combining collective regulation with
social security, as Uruguay put in place, can also be helpful (ILO 2016).
On the basis of the third chapter, a way that Venezuelans’ low wages can be increased is by creating
incentives to migrate to occupations that match their professional skills. As emphasized above, this is a mi-
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grant population with higher education levels than the Peruvians, and yet are in jobs where they experience
a downgrade, requiring mostly manual skills instead of cognitive and analytical abilities. An alternative
way to increase their wages would be through re-orienting their abilities to match those required in their
current occupational sector. Nonetheless, this is more likely to occur if they integrate into the formal labour
market, as employers in this sector are more sensitive to the regulations that would foster equal treatment
of migrants compared to natives. Further, there is the need to tackle the unexplained part of the migrant pay
gaps, which finds more traction in the formal sector. This includes implementing the principle of "equal
remuneration for work of equal value" and, importantly, fostering their rights to a fair payment (ILO 2020).
This transition towards the formal labour market, however, cannot be seen as a magic bullet. This is because
the relatively small size of the formal sector in Peru implies that only a small proportion of workers will be
able to transit to this sector.
Nevertheless, the scope of what these types of policies can influence to achieve better results is con-
strained due to the historically large size of Peru’s informal sector. Hence, a first-order policy that this
thesis suggests is the integration of the informal and the formal sectors to achieve a reduction of the size
of the former sector. This is the fundamental problem that Peruvian policy-makers need to address as a
matter of urgency in the coming years. A crucial finding in this thesis is that workers in the informal la-
bour market are more vulnerable to lower wages and to experiencing discrimination based on gender and
nationality. In fact, the effects of a large informal sector resonate beyond the labour market itself, as it has
important repercussions for reducing inequality and poverty. The labour market ultimately decides who are
to be the winners and losers, with the latter group vulnerable to poverty. Specifically, a more significant
informal sector is positively associated with higher inequality and poverty (Messina and Silva 2018) and
lower productivity (IADB 2010). Simultaneously, economic growth is associated with a more rapid decline
in self-employment, which is the most prevalent occupational category in the informal sector in Peru (La
Porta and Shleifer 2014). Hence, as the large informal sector limits what can be done, we cannot compre-
hensively foster labour protection policies unless the formal sector assumes a role of primacy within the
country. For migrants and females, the discrimination they experience is likely to be significantly reduced
if they were in the more protected and regulated formal labour market. The effectiveness of the policies
related to higher transparency and more vigorous legal enforcement to tackle the problems mentioned above
would be more effective in the formal labour market. Certainly, Peru’s historically weak governance and in-
stitutions make more challenging the goal of reducing the wage gaps and providing protection compared to
more developed countries. Still, this is an essential step towards a situation that allows policies addressing
these concerns to have an actual effect.
Further work needs to be done to complement the findings in this thesis and to test their robustness. For
the first chapter, applying the more recent reweighted Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for the gender wage
gaps would provide a robustness check to verify that the sizeable unobserved component can be attributed
to a ’pure’ treatment effect. Also, netting out the effect of changes in the composition of observed attributes
of workers in the labour market during the period under analysis could provide a more refined measure of
changes in the magnitude of the gaps. Likewise, correcting for sample selection of women into work would
verify whether the proportion attributed to the unobserved components in the wage gaps as reported in the
chapter corresponds to what is reported here. The second chapter could also investigate what is driving
the results only in Lima and Callao and the nature of the labour markets in the other regions. This would
allow us the opportunity to unravel the mechanisms through which the other regions in Peru have been
unaffected by the Exodus and to verify if the increase in labour supply was offset by the increase in labour
demand in those regions. The role of complementarities in these labour markets also requires further invest-
igation. From a technical point of view, a more precise separation of the sample where Venezuelans have
settled without incurring a ’small area estimation problem’, can be adopted via recent Machine Learning
techniques.
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The work developed in the last chapter would benefit from exploring alternative counterfactual distri-
butions within the reweighted decomposition techniques. In addition, it would be helpful to assess how
the results change when applying sampling weights to the estimated regressions and under the inclusion
of other characteristics of the migrants, such as the educational experience of Venezuelans. Finally, as a
robustness check, it would be useful to model the probability of perceiving discrimination as a function of
treatment effects estimated using the reweighting decomposition procedure. This type of exercise would
provide some reassurance on the importance of the treatment effect in determining an individual’s percep-
tion of discrimination.
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